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Systems of Ethics.

IN THREE PARTS

PART I.—THEORETICAL ETHICS

PART II.—PRACTICAL ETHICS

PART III.—HISTORY OF ETHICS

BY

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and well-selected library, and whose esteemed
friendship has been a constant source of encourage-
ment and inspiration, this volume is gratefully
dedicated*

BY HIS FRIEND.



Preface

THE following treatise on Ethics is divided into three parts—Theoretical Ethics, Practical Ethics, and History of Ethics.

The first part gives a general outline of ethics, its sphere, and its relation to other sciences. It discusses the various systems of ethics—Theistic, Intuitionist, Utilitarian, Evolutionary, and Eclectic. It investigates the nature of the good, the relation of law and duty, and the effect of moral evil.

The second part treats of virtue, duty, reward, and penalty.

The third part traces the history of ethics from Greek ethics, through Roman, Mediæval, and Modern, down to the present.

It is only in the history of ethics, which sweeps over centuries of thought and reveals the moral life of nations, that we can have a clear view of what has been done in this great field of investigation.

Whenever practicable, the historical matter has been drawn from original sources. The writers reviewed, though not all of equal importance, were selected as showing the trend of ethical thought; but it

is to be remembered that to deal fairly with a system, or to let it speak for itself, is not an indorsement of that system.

The author has written, not as an advocate of a particular system, but as an investigator in the pursuit of truth. It is his hope that this treatise may interest many minds, and aid them in the study of the great subject of ethics, and thus contribute to the cause of sound morality.

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
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Part First

THEORETICAL ETHICS





Chapter I

GENERAL OUTLINE OF ETHICS

ETYMOLOGY.—The word *ethics* is from the Greek, *τὰ ἠθικά*, which is from *ἦθος*, character, related to *ἔθος*, habit or custom. The word *moral* is from the Latin *moralis*, from *mos*, custom, usage. Ethics is moral science.

2. *Acts, conduct, moral conduct, habit, character.*—*Acts* are movements of organic beings, whether aimless or with a purpose. *Conduct* is an act with a purpose; that is, an act directed to an end or a desired result. *Moral conduct* is conduct which involves right or wrong, because aiming at a good or bad end. Thus, swinging the arm, when walking, is an act, not conduct; viewing the stars is conduct, not moral conduct; speaking the truth, doing justice, lying, defrauding, or any kind or injurious act, is moral conduct. Here *moral conduct* signifies both right and wrong conduct; that is, the word *moral* is generalized so as to include *immoral*.

What we have done once, we are likely to do again; that is, acts tend to recur. Acts repeated form habits; and habits crystallize into character, which is the cause of subsequent acts. To aid in the formation of good character is, therefore, an important end in the study of ethics.

3. *Motives or springs of action.*—The motives of con-

duct are found chiefly in the affections, benevolent or malevolent; that is, in love or hatred, and in the desires or aversions. A *wish* is a specific desire, as when one says, "I wish you would call to-morrow." Motives appeal directly to the sensibility, and indirectly to the will. They are weighed by the intellect, and in view of them the will acts. Motives are reasons for volition, rather than causes of choice or decision.

4. *Ends and means.*—*Ends* are designed results of conduct; they are ultimate or subordinate, according as they are final or are means to ulterior ends; they are good or bad according as they are truly desirable or undesirable. Thus, perfection and happiness are good ultimate ends; imperfection and unhappiness are bad ultimate ends. Health, wealth, knowledge, power, position, popularity, notoriety, and the like, are subordinate ends. *Means* are agencies employed to realize ends; they are useful or deleterious, as they contribute to good or bad ends.

5. *Right and wrong.*—Right, from *rectus*, signifies straight, correct, according to rule, or means suitable to an end. Wrong signifies crooked, incorrect, not according to rule, or means unsuited to an end. We say right or wrong conduct, good or bad character.

6. *Motive, choice, aim, intention, conduct, end.*—Motive is an incentive to action; choice is the selection of an end; aim is the purpose to realize the choice; intention includes the aim with the foreseen consequences; conduct, called also effort or overt act, is the means employed to accomplish the end, which is the result, consequence, or outcome. These are elements of moral character.

7. *Characterization of the elements of character.*—The end is good or bad as it conduces to the welfare or injury of those affected; the motive is good or bad in agreement with the end; the choice is right or wrong as the motive is good or bad; the aim, the intention, and the conduct are right or wrong in agreement with the choice. The moral quality of the choice is determined by the motive; the choice itself is made by the person who, as the cause of the choice, is responsible for it, since he freely makes it, though not without motive, yet without compelling cause. Motives are reasons for choice, but are not causes coercing the will. The person makes the choice, directs the aim, forms the intention, performs the act, causes the consequences, and for all these he is responsible. The motive is the reason why the choice is made, and involves morality; the intention and the overt act relate to the end chosen, and involve responsibility. Hence, intentions are right when seeking to realize a good end or to avoid a bad end; they are wrong when seeking to realize a bad end or to avoid a good end. Motives are good when prompting to realize a good end or to avoid a bad end; they are bad when prompting to realize a bad end or to avoid a good end.

8. *Freedom and responsibility.*—Freedom resides in the person who employs his will power in making the choice of the end, but not in the choice as an act, which is caused by the will, nor in the intention which follows the choice, nor in the conduct which follows the intention. Responsibility resides in the person for his choice of end, for his yielding to motive, for his intention, and for his conduct.

9. *Ethical acts and states.*—Those acts are ethically right which are intended to realize a good end or to avoid a bad end, and those acts are ethically wrong which are intended to realize a bad end or to avoid a good end. Such acts are moral conduct. Ethical states are love and hatred, desire and aversion. Love of good or hatred of evil is right; love of evil or hatred of good is wrong. A desire for good or an aversion to evil is right; a desire for evil or an aversion to good is wrong. Moral character is the attitude of a person towards good and evil, right and wrong.

10. *Rule for determining good and evil, right and wrong.*—Seek light from every possible source, as revelation and experience, reason and conscience, civil law and social customs, philosophy and science, nature and the constitution of man. Choose a good end, aim and act accordingly. The fixed intention to do right stamps a good character.

11. *Definition of ethics.*—Ethics is the ^{doctrine} science of right and wrong in choice and conduct, and of good and bad in character.

12. *Divisions of the treatise.*—We make three divisions:

1. *Theoretical Ethics*, discussing,

1. The sphere of ethics.
2. The relation of ethics to other sciences.
3. The systems of ethics, embracing:
 - (1) Theistic ethics.
 - (2) Intuitionist ethics.
 - (3) Utilitarian ethics.
 - (4) Evolutionary ethics.
 - (5) Eclectic ethics.

4. The evolution of morals in man.
5. The good.
6. The moral law and the nature of duty.
7. Moral evil.

II. Practical Ethics, discussing:

1. The virtues—egoistic and altruistic.
2. Duties—personal, social, religious.
3. Rewards and penalties.

III. History of Ethics, embracing:

1. Greek ethics.
2. Roman ethics.
3. Christian ethics—patristic and scholastic.
4. Modern ethics—English, French, German, American, including various schools and writers to the present time.

Chapter II

THE SPHERE OF ETHICS

ETHICS: a normative science.—Ethics is called a *normative science* because it exhibits the *norms*, or *types*, of right conduct, and lays down the laws or rules of action in reference to an ultimate or ideal end, called the highest good, or the *summum bonum*.

In this respect, ethics differs from those other sciences which treat of facts, their relations and laws, without special reference to their application, which is left to the corresponding practical arts. The principles of ethics have direct relation to practice by keeping the ends of conduct—happiness and perfection—continually in view. In giving the ideal of moral life, ethics teaches us what *to be* and *to do*.

Though not strictly the art of living, yet ethics is the philosophy of the art of living. It is the theory of right and wrong willing and doing. It seeks also to cultivate right states of the sensibility and to establish right moral purposes. It aims at the perfection of character and the attainment of the highest happiness for self and others.

2. *Ethics: theoretical, practical, and historical.*—Ethics is theoretical when dealing with the principles relating to the moral constitution of man, his relation to the moral universe and to the laws of nature, as they regulate its evolution to a rational end. In treating

of the moral nature of man, ethics is scientific or psychological. In treating of the destiny of man in relation to the moral universe, it is philosophical.

Ethics is practical when giving the guiding principles and rules of a righteous life. It deals with the principles rather than with the details of practical conduct.

Historical ethics treats of the origin and development of the science in the various systems, through the past to the present day. The nature of ethics and the problems with which it deals can be learned from the history of its development.

3. *The realm of ethics.*—The realm of ethics is the moral character and conduct of man. The moral law rules in the sphere of liberty, but not in that of fate or chance. A person has the power to do wrong, but not the right. Fate, by excluding free will, would reduce ethics to a natural science. It allows no more liberty to man than to a galvanic battery. Liberty resides in the person who makes the choice, but not in the choice as an act, which is made and has no more liberty than a vessel made by the potter. The vessel is not free, but the potter is free to make or not to make it. He makes the vessel for an end which is the motive or reason why he makes it, but not a compelling cause. Chance, by excluding law, would reduce conduct to chaos, and render the science of ethics an impossibility.

4. *Moral conduct.*—Not every act is conduct, as breathing; and not all conduct is moral conduct, but only that which the person is free in making, and which is right or wrong, because springing from a right or

wrong choice, and directed by a right or wrong aim. The settled purpose always to do right, whether in choice, aim, or conduct, goes far in establishing moral character and in deciding subsequent conduct. In conduct, the best means to the end, if possible, should be chosen; but of means equally available and morally equivalent, the choice is morally indifferent, and may be left to other than ethical considerations. Acts at first thought to be morally indifferent may afterwards be found to involve an ethical principle.

The ultimate aim of each person should be so to will and to do, as to realize the highest possible good, both for himself and for others. He should also cultivate right affections and desires; for these are powerful aids to a righteous life, since they are motives or reasons for choice and conduct.

The special means employed will differ for different persons, with their circumstances and their natural and acquired endowments. For such cases, ethics has no particular precept to give, but only the general one: *Do those right acts you are the best fitted to do, as you have opportunity, and in the best possible manner.* Sound judgment is requisite in dealing with the facts of practical life. In aiming at what *ought to be*, we should take into consideration what *is*, and thus make the most of the circumstances.

5. *Right and wrong conduct, objectively and subjectively considered.*—Right conduct, objectively considered, is that conduct which tends to realize a good end, or to prevent a bad end. Wrong conduct, objectively considered, is that conduct which tends to realize a bad end, or to prevent a good end. Right conduct, sub-

jectively considered, is that conduct whose aim is to realize a good end, or to prevent a bad end. Wrong conduct, subjectively considered, is that conduct whose aim is to realize a bad end, or to prevent a good end. These relations are thus summarily exhibited:

Conduct	{	Subjectively right	{ Objectively right.
		Subjectively wrong	{ Objectively wrong.
			{ Objectively right.
			{ Objectively wrong.

Having blended the subjective and objective views, we can say absolutely that right conduct is such a conformity to the conditions of existence as tends to realize the highest good of all concerned, and that wrong conduct is non-conformity to these conditions. The fountain-head of right conduct is a good character—a deliberate intention, a fixed purpose, always to do right. This purpose will determine the choice, the aim, the conduct. Character, however, is not innate. It is formed by education and confirmed by conduct.

6. *Kind of conduct enjoined by ethics.*—Conduct subjectively right is that which ethics enjoins. It prohibits conduct subjectively wrong. At the same time, it requires of a moral being that he should seek light, so that, if possible, his conduct may be not only subjectively, but objectively, right. Right affections and desires naturally issue in right choices, aims, and conduct.

7. *Other normative sciences.*—These are: Logic, the science of thought; æsthetics, the science of beauty; and economics, the science of wealth, and all other sciences dealing with ideals. Those sciences which treat of the means for the realization of ends are practical. Some

sciences are mixed; that is, both normative and practical, as the science of medicine. The normative sciences have a practical bearing, as economics on the art of making a living, logic in thinking correctly and avoiding fallacy, and ethics in realizing the ultimate end, the *summum bonum*.

8. *Relation of science and art.* Science teaches us to know; art teaches us to do. Science unfolds principles; art applies them. Some arts, as sculpture and painting, apply the principles of many sciences. Navigation, a practical art, applies the principles of mechanics, physics, and astronomy. For its subject matter, oratory draws on the wide range of science, literature, and art, and in fact on every subject of human interest. Art frequently outruns its corresponding science, deriving its rules empirically or from the inspiration of genius, as in the early stages of an art.

9. *Postulates of ethics.*—The following postulates are assumed:

- (1) A law in nature regulating its evolution to the realization of a rational end.
- (2) The moral nature and responsibility of man.
- (3) A correlation between man and nature.
- (4) A rational end at which man should aim.

To these postulates, theistic ethics adds:

- (5) The existence of God.
- (6) A future life.

10. *Laws.* A law is a rule of action. As to origin, laws are:

- (1) *Human*, as civil or ecclesiastical laws, which are positive enactments, changeable and violable.

- (2) *Natural*. Those regulating the action of the forces of nature, as the laws of falling bodies, which are constant and inviolable.
- (3) *Moral*. Those which determine right and wrong in human character and conduct, which are unchangeable, though violable.

As to application, a law is categorical when it commands without condition, as the law of conduct: *Do right*. A law is hypothetical when expressing or implying a condition, as the law of art, addressed to those who would be artists: If you wish to be an artist, study nature as well as art.

II. *Truth, relative or absolute*. To a being differently constituted from man, the sensations of color, sound, touch, taste, smell, would probably be very different from those we experience, since these sensations vary with the organism; but truth, rationally apprehended, not dependent on the senses for its apprehension, but on reason, must be the same to all rational beings. No developed rational mind will deny that every event must have a cause; that body and motion imply space; that succession implies time; that mathematical theorems are true; that it is wrong wantonly to injure any being; that it is right to promote the perfection and happiness of ourselves and of others within our influence.

Intermediate between the facts of sensation and the truths apprehended by rational intuition are the facts of perception pertaining to external objects and the judgments as to the facts of nature; hence the three classes or kinds of knowledge:

- (1) The *senses* deal with facts or phenomena

varying with the subject, though the objective factor, or exciting cause, remains the same. Tomatoes are relished by some persons, but not by others. Some hanker after tobacco; others regard it with loathing.

- (2) The *judgment* deals with facts, varying with the object, though the subject remains essentially the same. The change in the form or position of an object is noticed by the observer, though he experiences no essential change in himself. We understand that the earth revolves around the sun; yet this knowledge is neither a fact of sensation nor a truth apprehended by reason as necessary; but it is a judgment derived from observed facts.
- (3) *Reason, or rational intuition*, deals with absolute truth, the subject being rational and the truth necessary. All rational minds assent to axioms and to truth logically demonstrated.

12. *Peculiarity of method*.—Though ethics may state the end at which it aims as a working hypothesis, yet this end need not be regarded as axiomatic, nor as strictly presupposed; but the statement of the end may be treated as a thesis to be established as the science is developed.

13. *The laws of ethics addressed to the will*.—The laws of other normative sciences are rules for the attainment of definite ends, which may or may not be sought without incurring guilt; but the laws of ethics are morally binding, though they may be violated.

The will is appealed to for its decision. Ethics deals especially with character as worthy or unworthy, with conduct as right or wrong, and with ends as good or bad.

14. *Peculiarity of the art of conduct.*—As the science of conduct differs from the other normative sciences, so the art of conduct differs from the other practical arts. A good singer is one who can sing well; but a good man is one who not only can do right, but one who wills to do right, and who actually does what he believes to be right whenever there is opportunity. But as the term “good,” as here used, applies to character, and the term “right” to conduct, it is not necessary that a person be always doing something in order to be good. A good man is good even when asleep, since he has such a character that he does right when awake. The right conduct is an expression of good character. The conduct ceases, but the character abides even while the man sleeps. Ethics deals not only with ideals, but with the facts of moral life and with the principles and rules of moral conduct.

15. *The essence of virtue is a good will.*—Virtue does not consist in a feeble wish to be good or to do right, but in a settled purpose to do right, even if it requires sacrifices on our part, or taxes our energies to the utmost. It requires, not simply *δύναμις*, the ability, which is a condition of virtue, though not its essence, but that, by a fixed purpose, the *δύναμις* be transformed into *ἐνέργεια*; that is, the potential energy into kinetic, whenever there is occasion. Virtue transforms the willing to do right into the doing, and that from the love of righteousness.

16. *The actual and the obligatory.*—Ethics does not overlook the *actual*. It considers what *is*; but it is chiefly concerned with the *ideal*, what *ought to be*. It does not, however, tell in every particular case what ought to be done; for that depends on many contingencies not foreseen; but it lays down principles which guide in ascertaining duty, and declares that duty ought always to be done. It insists on the pursuit of ideal ends by right means. It is right to be progressive in order to overthrow wornout institutions of the past, or to be conservative, in order to check a hasty, headlong movement, miscalled progress.

17. *Conscience.*—Conscience is that characteristic of man which distinguishes him as a moral being. It is a guide to conduct, though not infallible.

- (1) It seeks to discriminate between good and bad ends, right and wrong means.
- (2) It affirms the obligation to choose good ends and avoid bad, and to pursue good ends by right means.
- (3) It gives a sense of responsibility for choice and conduct by declaring that we are justly liable for the consequences.
- (4) It gives a sense of recompense.

The social conscience is the voice of the people. Conscience is sometimes said to be the voice of God. It involves reason and emotion; it appeals to the intellect to discriminate between good and evil, right and wrong; it stirs the sensibility to love and to desire the good, and to hate and to abhor evil; it stimulates the will to choose the good and to do right, to refuse evil, and to avoid wrong. In doing right, we have the ap-

proval of conscience, the approbation of God and of good men. In doing wrong we have the disapproval of conscience, the disapprobation of God and of good men.

18. *Influence of ethics on public morality.*—People who have never seen a book on ethics, and that scarcely know the meaning of the word, pass moral judgments on themselves and on others, and, in the main, correct judgments. How is this to be accounted for? The moral teachings of philosophers of all ages have been disseminated among the masses, and are the common sentiments of society. Unconsciously the people absorb the sentiments of their leaders. Again, every man is, by nature, a moralist, as he is a logician. The principles of ethics, like those of logic, appeal to the common sense of the people. Of what use, then, is the science of ethics? The history of ethics shows that the science is a growth, or development; that this development has been accelerated by the work of philosophers; and that their opinions have corrected and intensified the moral sentiments of the masses.

In the course of time, old theories are modified or discarded, and new ones proposed, and additional principles discovered. When these are accepted by popular leaders, they are promulgated among the masses, and become a part of the consensus of opinion. The great value of ethical science consists, therefore, in disseminating the principles and in elevating and enforcing the practice of morality, by awakening loyalty to truth and righteousness among the people.

Moral quality is discerned, at first, by reflection on our own motives and intentions. Our discoveries are

confirmed by observation on the conduct of others. The original source of ethical doctrine is, therefore, the moral consciousness of the human race, as developed in the individual and in society by the influence of philosophy, religion, and law. Individuals are born into a society having a moral code; but the code itself is subject to change through the advance of knowledge and the general progress of the race.

Chapter III

RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES

ETHICS: scientific, philosophical, and practical.—Ethics is scientific, or psychological, when treating of the moral facts of society and of the moral nature of man. It is philosophical when treating of the good in the universe and of the ultimate aim of human effort. It is practical when treating of duty and laying down rules for conduct.

It insists on the right intent, which is to be manifest in choice and aim, and embodied in conduct as opportunity is afforded. That the world is a rational system, exhibiting design, and tending to an ultimate good, and correlated to the mind of man, may be assumed as a working hypothesis, subject to verification or refutation as we proceed with the development of the subject.

2. *Relation of ethics to physical science.*—A knowledge of natural objects, their properties and relations, and the laws which govern their interactions, enables us to foresee certain consequences, and to adapt our conduct to the facts of nature, so as to realize certain results, or to adjust ourselves to the inevitable; yet man can not only adapt himself to his environment, but in many instances he can modify his environment.

Advancing knowledge tends to free us from superstition. We believe less in signs and charms and omens, and more in well-directed effort and in the stability of the laws of nature. We are becoming less afraid of ghosts, or witches, or the stars, but more afraid of foul air, bad water, unwholesome food, and of the consequences of immoral conduct. We can not change the laws of nature, yet to a certain extent we can modify the facts. Our volitions and conduct are subject to our control. Realizing our responsibility, conscience warns us against wrongdoing, and admonishes us that we should use our freedom of will to prevent evil and to accomplish worthy ends. Man is lord of creation, and has "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." To exercise worthily his lordship requires knowledge; hence it is man's duty to enlarge the sphere of his attainments.

3. *Relation to biology.*—Biology is the fundamental science of the organic kingdoms—vegetable and animal—giving rise to the special sciences, botany and zoology. Ethics sustains a much closer relation to biology than it does to physics or to chemistry. Writers of the evolutionary school assume its connection with biology as fundamental in character by placing the criterion of moral conduct in its tendency to promote or retard the development of life and the organic perfection of the individual, thus assuming that right or wrong in conduct applies also to physical well-being and, consequently, to all kinds of life, from the highest to the lowest forms. Of course, ethics requires that our con-

duct should bear favorably on the development of life in all its departments, so far as that promotes human perfection and happiness. The laws of life apply to moral beings, and should receive the attention of the students of ethics.

4. *Relation to sociology.*—Ethics and sociology are intimately related. Sociology, the science of society, is at present exciting keener interest than perhaps any other science. The social relations are to man the source of his greatest joys and deepest sorrows. The phenomena of the various classes of society—the criminal class, the pauper, the middle, the wealthy, the educated—afford ample material for profound study. Consciousness of kind, like-mindedness, the social imperative, draw people together, and mold the institutions of society. Why do people aggregate in certain localities? They go where they think they can best make a living. Like-mindedness begets sympathy; but people co-operate when they recognize mutual helpfulness, and believe it to be their interest to work together. The co-operation may spring from a consciousness of likeness or from that of unlikeness, the difference being supplemental, each supplying a lack in the other. Unlike-mindedness begets antipathy; but people antagonize when they recognize mutual harmfulness, and believe that their interests clash, as is the case with rivals, and this may be when there is consciousness of kind. Thus they co-operate or antagonize, as their interests dictate. The hope of social favor and the fear of social ostracism are powerful stimuli to moral conduct.

Ethics properly has jurisdiction over those phe-

nomena of society which involve moral distinctions, and its voice ought to be heeded as supreme. As society advances, ethical principles exert, as they should, a continually-increasing influence.

5. *Relation to psychology*.—Ethics looks to psychology for the collection and classification of the phenomena of the soul and for the determination of their conditions and laws. The processes of thinking, feeling, and willing, as revealed in consciousness, are facts with which psychology has to deal; but a portion of these facts relates to moral intentions, and thus falls within the province of ethics, which legislates for those volitions that issue in moral conduct.

6. *Relation to logic*.—Ethics deals with right and wrong in aim and conduct, and with good and evil as ends. Logic deals with the validity and fallacy of thinking, and with truth and falsity as objects of thought. Ethics is a guide to the will; logic is a guide to the intellect. Ethics aims to bring our wills into harmony with a rational self and with the ultimate ends—the perfection and happiness of rational beings; logic aims to secure the harmony of thought with itself, with the world of matter, and with the presuppositions of all experience. The realm of ethics is conscience and conduct; the realm of logic is intellect and thought.

7. *Relation to æsthetics*.—Ethics and æsthetics are intimately related. The Greek τὸ καλόν signifies either the beautiful or the good. The study of the beautiful, by withdrawing our minds from the gross or the immoral, prepares the way for the contemplation of the good and the pursuit of worthy ends by noble means. Æsthetics teaches us so to adjust our environment that

part may harmonize with part, making the whole appeal to a sense of beauty, and thus to gratify a cultivated taste.

Beauty is the befitting garb of goodness, its rightful adornment. The highest virtue ought to be radiant with the highest beauty. In seeking æsthetic culture, the mind fulfills an ethical requirement; for this ought to be done. As logic deals with the true, so æsthetics deals with the beautiful and ethics with the good.

8. *Relation to economics.*—Both ethics and economics are concerned with the good. Ethics concerns itself with the morally good, the ultimate end; economics with those goods which have a financial value. Both make use of means for the attainment of ends. Ethics employs choice and moral conduct; economics capital, labor, and management. Yet wealth, the end of economic effort, is not ultimate, but is only a means to a higher end; that is, to the end of ethics, the perfection and happiness of the human race. It is, therefore, evident that any economic effort in violation of moral law must finally meet with defeat and end in disaster. Economic writers are not willing that their science should longer be stigmatized as the *dismal science*, and are endeavoring to bring it, more and more, into harmony with ethics.

The aim of ethics is broader than that of economics. Mr. Giddings makes a statement to the point: "The economic motive is the desire for a particular satisfaction of a particular organ at a particular time. The ethical motive is the desire for the varied satisfaction of the entire organism through continuing time."

Economics shows how the mind seeks to adapt the

environment to itself, so as to secure the greatest satisfaction. The utilities which economics seeks satisfy a natural craving; and the value of these utilities rises or falls with the desire for them. Ethics supplies the needful moral restraints against the excessive desire for wealth. Sociology deals with association; economics with wealth; ethics with duty.

Both ethics and economics lead to co-operation as the condition of the greatest success, and thus stimulate altruistic tendencies and evolve and strengthen altruistic sentiments and instincts.

Duties, by long performance, become transformed into pleasures, and cease to be duties; but duty, in some form, will remain so long as a new opportunity of co-operation for good becomes apparent. Duties always have a social reference, even the so-called duties to self. As a person owes duties to society, it becomes his duty to render himself an efficient member of his social group. The great value of economics consists in the fact that, in increasing wealth, it enlarges our opportunities for rational enjoyment.

9. *Relation to politics.*—Man does not live alone. He is a member of society, and is, therefore, social; he is a citizen of the State, and is, therefore, political. The citizen owes duties to the State which he can not rightfully ignore. The State has an ideal end, as well as the individual; and it is the duty of the citizen to co-operate with other citizens in aiding the State to realize its ideal in accomplishing its mission in the world.

What can be thought of that citizen who sells his vote for money? Every voter has a voice and a duty and a responsibility. The citizen ought, therefore, to

inform himself on political questions, so that he can vote intelligently. A political campaign does much for the intellectual and moral education of the people.

According to Hobbes, self-love is the sole spring of action; but self-interests can be best secured by placing the standard of duty in the will of government, as expressed by law. In an absolute monarchy this view involves the doctrine of the divine right of kings; in a republic it signifies that the voice of the people is the voice of God.

10. Relation to pedagogics.—Education aims at the symmetrical development of all the powers of a human being—the physical, the intellectual, and the moral, and thus becomes a powerful aid to ethics in the realization of its ideal. It is, however, the province of ethics to guide in the work of education, so as best to promote the ultimate end of life—the perfection and happiness of human beings. Moral training is the most important part of education; for its fruit is a righteous life. The acquisition of knowledge is the means of intellectual training; and knowledge itself is a condition of happiness, since happiness is a consequent of right conduct, and right conduct requires knowledge.

11. Relation to metaphysics.—Metaphysics treats of the nature of being, the real in contrast with the phenomenal. It thus deals with the foundation of all science, including ethics. If in ethics we go beyond the facts and laws of morality, we enter the domain of metaphysics. But ethics can assume an ultimate end of conduct, and establish the laws of morality, without raising questions concerning the nature of reality; yet it often raises and discusses questions relating to God,

freedom, and immortality, whose final solution belongs to metaphysics.

12. *Relation of ethics to theology and of morality to religion.*—Theology is the philosophy of religion, as ethics is the science of morality. Religion is a life of applied theology as morality is that of applied ethics. It is true, however, that religion may exist with little knowledge of theology, as morality may exist with little knowledge of ethics. On the other hand, there may be knowledge of theology without the practice of religion, as there may be a knowledge of ethics without the practice of morality.

Certain writers make theology the basis of ethics, and religion that of morality, while others reverse the order. Again, other writers identify theology and ethics, religion and morality, while others make them independent of one another. The early history of these subjects seems to favor the view that ethics depends on theology and morality on religion, while later developments indicate their independence. Religion is belief in a Supernatural Being and allegiance to his authority, together with a *cult* or ceremonial of worship; morality is right conduct in view of a good end. Religion is devotion to God; morality is conformity to righteousness. Theology is the *rationale* of religion; ethics is the justification of morality.

Theology and ethics, religion and morality, though not identical, are not antagonistic, but co-operate in harmony.

Chapter IV

THEISTIC ETHICS

GOD the Source of authority.—Theistic ethics takes for its supreme rule the will of God. It holds that, without God, no sufficient basis can be found for right and wrong, but that in the belief in God and in reverence for his character and in allegiance to his authority we find the true basis for morals.

Theistic ethics, in general, may be accepted alike by the Jew, the Christian, and the Mohammedan, or by any other believer in God. To the Christian, the New Testament is authority; but he also receives light from the Old Testament.

2. *Christian ethics.*—The specialized form of theistic ethics, called Christian ethics, is the only form we shall consider. It has all the light of theistic ethics, in general, as the will of God revealed in the constitution of the world and in the moral nature of man, as accepted by all Theists. It has also the light of the Old Testament, as accepted by Jews and Christians, and, above all, the light afforded by the New Testament, as accepted only by Christians.

3. *Old Testament ethics.*—The ethics of the Old Testament has been often severely criticised for its apparent cruelty; but while its morality is not complete, yet it has a true ethical root—it was adapted to the

people and to the times. The invasion of Canaan by Israel under the lead of Joshua has its parallel in modern times in the occupation of the American continent by Europeans.

We find, however, in the Old Testament writings moral teaching that can scarcely be surpassed at the present day. Take, for example, the fifteenth Psalm: "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? Who shall dwell in thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly, and worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart. He that backbiteth not with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbor, nor taketh up a reproach against his neighbor. In whose eyes a vile person is contemned; but he honoreth them that fear the Lord. He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not. He that putteth not out his money to usury, nor taketh reward against the innocent. He that doeth these things shall never be moved." The Ten Commandments yet stand a firm foundation.

4. *New Testament ethics.* — Notwithstanding the gems of moral teaching scattered through the Old Testament, yet the New Testament is in advance of the Old. Take the following: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you."

In the New Testament we find the condensed statement of the Ten Commandments called the *Law of love*: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." We have also the *Golden*

Rule, which directs in the application of the Law of love: "Whatsoever ye think it right that others should do unto you, do ye likewise unto them." As in mathematics, so in morals, the rule is a guide in the application of the principle. The law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," may seem to teach that a man having ten thousand dollars should give five thousand to his neighbor who has nothing. Reverse the relation between the parties, and the man would not receive five thousand from his neighbor, but might desire work at fair wages. The Golden Rule is a guide in a multiplicity of instances.

We have, moreover, in Christianity a most powerful incentive to obedience in the doctrines of immortality, responsibility, future reward and punishment, but above all in the person and character of Jesus.

5. *The reason for the law of love.*—The law is one thing, but the reason for it is another. What is the reason for the law of love? Why should we love our neighbor as ourselves? Several theories have been proposed in answer to the question:

(1) *The eternal fitness of things.*—The distinction between right and wrong is, by some, held to be immutable and inherent in the nature of things. Reason, it is thought, intuitively apprehends that the law of love is the highest expression of duty, and that conscience enforces the obligation of obedience. This theory is really that of intuitive ethics, which will be considered more fully in the next chapter. If reason is really competent to apprehend the law of love, and the reason for the law, there would be no need of revelation on that point. Reason gives no absolute law, since the nature

of things is not immutable. God has given things their nature; but he might, so far as we can see, have given them another nature. There is no immutable nature of things apart from the will of God. There are, however, eternal principles.

In the nature of things which God has constituted, right and wrong are, no doubt, inherent; but this is so because things are so constituted. The nature of man, as a rational and moral being, is an appointment of God, and being rational and moral, the law of love is reasonable and right. If reason could not discover this law, it can see the righteousness of it when revealed.

(2) *The arbitrary will of God.*—The reason of the law of love is, by some, held to be the arbitrary will of God. Arbitrary will is not a good reason. Indeed, it may be doubted whether God, as infinitely rational and holy, has an arbitrary will. His will is the expression of his perfect character, and consequently is always reasonable and righteous. Hence, it will do to say, knowing his will concerning us, we know our duty.

(3) *The will of God as the expression of his perfect character.*—The will of God, as a perfect being, it is said, is the reason why the law of love is right, and why it is binding on our conscience; that is, the law is right because God wills it. Is it not better to say, God wills it because it is right? Having made man a sentient, moral being, the law of love is right. Knowing God's will, we know the law is right. The will of God, though not the reason for the righteousness of the law, may be a reason for our knowing it. God has a reason for willing as he does, and knowing his will, it is reasonable to obey.

(4) *The law of love requires the greatest worthiness*

and confers the highest happiness.—God's character, as a wise and holy being, and the nature of things which he has seen fit to ordain, require the law of love, because it confers the greatest good upon men, and we may believe renders satisfaction to God himself. Hence, we conclude, because of the resulting good, God has enacted the law of love as the expression of his supreme will.

Our insight into the nature of things, at best, is but partial; God's insight is perfect. God's will is, therefore, when known, a more perfect guide than our insight, and is consequently binding on us when it is revealed. In his wisdom God has constituted things as they are, and in this constitution is found the distinction between right and wrong. God's will has enacted the law which embodies the highest good of his creatures, and this law of love, as revealed to us, and as it is to be carried out by the Golden Rule, is the best guide to moral conduct, yielding, as it does, the most desirable consequences.

6. *Special duties.*—These will be considered more in detail hereafter. A brief consideration will suffice here. Christianity enjoins duties to self, to society, and to God.

(1) *Duties to self.*—These include care over life and health, self-support, the formation of proper habits, the culture of the mind and heart, the selection of a place of residence, the choice of vocation, the formation of associations—social, political, or religious, the choice of a companion, the cultivation of the graces of the Spirit, and, in short, the formation and preservation of a good moral and Christian character.

It behooves the individual, if he would do all these things well, to know himself, to learn his adaptations,

to study his environments, and to adjust properly means to ends. He finds helpful incentives in the precepts of the Scriptures. He is to be diligent in business, to study to show himself to be a workman, so to run that he may receive the crown of life.

(2) *Duties to society*.—No man liveth to himself alone. Indeed the good character formed and maintained in himself is to be exemplified in right conduct toward others. Duties to himself and family are to be supplemented by duties to society, to the Church, to the State, to the world. Let every man look not only on his own things, but also on the things of others. A wide field here opens, and an ample opportunity is afforded for the employment of his hands, his head, his heart, and his money. The kingdom of heaven is the realization of a righteous common fellowship.

Many fields of beneficent enterprise remain to be cultivated. The question which each thoughtful person will ask himself, What can I best do? is one of the most important in practical ethics. This question, which each one must answer for himself, ought to be settled, not from pride or vanity, or love of money, or from any other purely selfish consideration, but from a conscientious estimation of his own abilities, in view of his obligations to God and to his fellow beings.

(3) *Duties to God*.—To God, as his Creator, Benefactor, Law-giver, and Judge, man owes sacred duties. God has a rightful claim to man's obedience. The commands of God are not grievous, but are ordained for man's highest good.

Any transgression of a law of God is called sin. God forbids sin in all its forms. It is, therefore, man's duty

to repent of his sins, as God commands. Repentance means, at least, sorrow for sin, a turning away from it, and an honest effort to reform.

Faith in God is also required of man; and faith brings justification, a pure heart, and an obedient life, characterized by prayer, reverence, and love, and the fulfillment of every known obligation. Unbelief is a reflection on God's veracity.

To love our enemies is the perfection of love, which none but a Christian of the highest type can have. "Render to no man evil for evil, but ever follow after that which is good." "Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath." "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor."

Christian ethics, honestly applied, would solve many of the difficult problems of the times.

Chapter V

INTUITIONAL ETHICS

GENERAL VIEW.—The term *intuitional*, as applied to ethics, distinguishes a system in which the moral quality of conduct is assumed to be immediately known by reason, irrespective of consequences or of external authority. As examples, it is claimed that we have an intuition of the obligation to be truthful, honest, and just in purpose, and of the duty of the corresponding conduct in actual life.

Those holding this view maintain that the virtue of veracity, for example, is binding on a witness in court, though he foresees that his testimony would probably lead the jury to a wrong conclusion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. The duty of veracity being intuitively apprehended, it is maintained that the truth ought to be spoken without regard to consequences.

A person having written to Dr. Martineau, who accepted the intuitional theory, inquiring whether it would be right to deceive one dangerously sick as to the probability of recovery, received in substance the reply: "You ought to tell the truth; for though your deceit were available in the first instance, it would not, if known, be so the second time." Here Dr. Martineau went back on the theory that truth ought to be told regardless of the consequences; for the ulterior conse-

quences he gives as the very reason why the truth should be told.

A common liar is detestable. Truth ought always to be spoken to those entitled to it, which holds good in the ordinary intercourse of society. It is, however, sometimes best not to tell the truth. Should an officer, knowing all the plans of his general, if captured reveal those plans at the demand of an enemy?

It is not right to tell the truth to a tattler, or to a malicious person who will make a wrong use of the knowledge.

Discretion is a virtue as well as veracity, and a little common sense will tell when to speak and when to keep silence, or when to deceive.

A witness who has sworn to tell "the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth," may rightfully regard it his duty not to violate his oath, though he believes his testimony would unjustly condemn the prisoner. He can leave the consequences to God and to the court. Veracity is the rule. Good sense, guided by conscience, will take care of the exceptions.

2. *Consequences.*—It is evident that consequences are, in certain cases, the very things to be considered. Prudence, which is universally regarded as a virtue, looks to consequences in shunning danger or in seeking safety. Benevolence aims at consequences in relieving misery or in promoting happiness. Consequences are the things aimed at in legislation and in all the laudable enterprises of the world. Consequences can be taken as a guide when no ethical principle is violated; but possible consequences, or even probable, should not be suffered to override an accepted ethical principle.

Consequences of conduct stretch on and on in an interminable series of causes and effects. But whether the consequences be immediate or remote, a distinction is commonly made between those aimed at and those which, though foreseen, form no part of the motive for the act. Responsibility clearly pertains to the agent for all the consequences which enter into the motive followed. Consequences not foreseen, when proper effort is made to foresee, are, so far as the moral quality of the conduct is concerned, wholly irrelevant; but the foreseen consequences of conduct, whether desired or not, bear on the morality of the act. Thus, if two consequences of a certain act are foreseen to be inseparable from that act, one of which is desirable and the other undesirable, though the act is performed for the sake of the desirable consequence, that being the motive for the act, yet responsibility for the undesirable consequence can not be avoided. In such cases duty must be decided by the weight of the respective consequences; that is, the act ought or ought not to be done, according as the desirable or undesirable consequence has the greater weight. In such cases the intuitive method does not suffice, but we must be governed by considerations of utility.

Intuition may declare that benevolence is always right; but the question arises, Is a certain act, for example giving money to a vagrant, in view of all the consequences, broadly benevolent? Is it objectively right, though from a narrow view it may seem subjectively benevolent? The question, Why is a certain act right? is always legitimate. The answer, It is right because it is seen to be right, gives no reason. Better say it is seen to be right because it is right; but that does

not answer the question, Why is it right? Intuition must take the position that right is ultimate, and no reason can be given. It remains to be seen whether this *short method* of ethics will suffice. To say that the moral quality of an act is intuitively apprehended, is to shut off the question, Why is it right? Utilitarian ethics answers the question, Why is a certain act right or wrong? by saying that the act is subjectively right or wrong because it is believed to be conducive to a good or bad end, and that it is objectively right or wrong when it is so conducive.

In certain cases coming under settled principles of morality it is not necessary to consider the consequences, and intuitive ethics seems to suffice. To deal honestly is right; to defraud one's neighbor is wrong, and these are known to be so in actual cases at once, and the consequences need not be thought of. But the question remains, How did the maxim of honesty come to be accepted? Was it not found long ago that dishonesty worked ill to society, and that honesty worked well? The principle may seem intuitive to the individual, it may actually be intuitive to him, because by the long experience of the race it has become ingrained in human consciousness, so that to the individual it is intuitive, though to the race inductive.

But many questions are daily thrust upon us which can not be settled by a ready-made maxim, yet which can be rightly answered only by a careful consideration of the consequences. Of all the consequences, the moral effect of conduct upon the actor is one of the most important.

3. *Subdivisions of intuitional ethics.*—According to

Sidgwick, intuitional ethics may be divided into perceptive, dogmatic, and philosophical.

(1) *Perceptual intuitionism*.—An intuitionist may hold that the moral quality of any particular act is known immediately. The particular instance, and others like it, form the basis of an induction and correct definition. Thus Socrates formed, for example, the definition of justice, by considering different acts called just, and then forming a proposition embodying his concept of all the common qualities of the various instances. This is the scientific procedure in forming definitions; but before this there must have been a spontaneous, common-sense apprehension of the nature of justice, otherwise all these various instances would not have been called just. They would, indeed, have had no moral significance.

A perceptual intuitionist does not, however, make deductions of duty from general principles, but judges each particular case on its own merits. He regards a system of ethics as superfluous, or even misleading, preferring rather to be guided by his own conscience in passing judgments on each separate case. He prefers to discard system; but to discard system, and to judge each case on its own merits, is *his* system. To a certain extent, it may, no doubt, be employed with good results; yet it is incoherent, uncertain, and, to most minds, unsatisfactory. If this is all there is of ethics, a complete treatise on the subject could be written in two sentences: Do what you perceive to be right. Refrain from what you perceive to be wrong. Excellent precepts, as far as available.

(2) *Dogmatic intuitionism*.—Persons of a deductive

turn of mind are not satisfied with individual instances decided upon their own merits, but prefer to bring special cases under a general principle. They give, however, no other account of their general principle than that it is intuitively certain, when perhaps it is a generalization from particular cases, or is accepted on authority. A dogma serving the purposes of deduction often finds ready acceptance as a rational intuition.

In like manner, other principles are accepted, and by generalization what is common is found till we reach, perhaps, the principle of reciprocity, or the *Golden Rule*. Is this rule a mere dogmatic statement, or is it a rational intuition, or is it an induction from experience? To answer these questions properly requires thought.

Again, the particular intuition of which the principle is a generalization does not always present itself as certain beyond question. When scrutinized closely, doubts frequently arise. Its moral quality appears to vary from time to time, though the circumstances remain essentially the same. This vacillation of opinion is probably due to the fact that our judgment is more or less influenced, as we dwell, perhaps unconsciously, on this or that probable consequence. Doubt is also thrown on the validity of moral judgments by finding that the opinions of judges supposed to be competent do not harmonize. These doubts, if relating to particular acts, can be dispelled only by appealing to general principles, which, whether intuitive or dogmatic, seem to settle the question.

It does not, however, disprove the intuitive character of a proposition by finding that it is verified by experience; for, if true, this ought to be the case; but

the question is still open, whether the principle is an intuition or an induction.

It is the business of the philosophers of the intuitional school to collect, clearly state, classify, and harmonize ethical maxims, to exhibit their relative importance, and adjust them for the guidance of practical conduct. This they have done, to some extent, and we shall find, as we proceed, that we appeal to the principles of the intuitional school when it would be impracticable to settle questions of conduct by calculating the consequences, which is often a very difficult matter.

(3) *Philosophic intuitionism*.—Without denying that the precepts of common sense are right, that they may be so adjusted as to harmonize, that they are so complete as to cover the field of moral conduct, still we may search for a deeper reason why certain conduct is right or wrong.

As intuitionism does not employ ordinary induction, we may inquire, What is the philosophic warrant for passing from the particular instance with which this school, as any other, must begin to the principle applicable to all like cases. The principle seems to be this: *Whatever is true of a particular instance is true of all instances essentially the same*; for that which exists to make the first instance right exists in the second, and in the third, and so on for all the instances *essentially the same*. A failure in any instance would show that that instance is not essentially the same. Like conditions and causes are followed by like results. *This is a rational intuition*. Of course, in making deductions

from this principle for a new case, care must be taken to see that the case is essentially the same.

The above principle is employed in cases where it is little suspected. The mathematician proves that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides by drawing a particular right triangle, constructing squares on the three sides, and showing, by logical reasoning, that for the figure drawn, the square of the hypotenuse is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides. He at once generalizes his conclusion, and affirms that the same is true of any other right triangle, though it is so small as to be invisible to the naked eye, or so large that its sides reach the stars, or though the sides vary indefinitely in relative length, the one essential condition remaining, that the triangle is right-angled. This is not ordinary induction; for we do not prove the proposition for several cases, and then infer that it is true of all other cases. We prove for only one case, the triangle drawn, and then, by immediate generalization, affirm that the same is true of every right triangle, according to the principle, Whatever is true of a particular instance is likewise true of all instances essentially the same. It is seen that the demonstration for any other right triangle would be essentially the same.

For one to promote the perfection and happiness of himself, so far as this does not interfere with the rights of others, is intuitively apprehended to be right. To promote the perfection and happiness of others adds to his own, as well as to theirs, and is also intuitively

known to be right. By immediate generalization we reach the principle that the conduct which aims at the perfection and happiness of self and others is subjectively righteous conduct, and if it actually promotes the common welfare and is wisely directed, it is also objectively right.

This principle has received a wider acceptance than is commonly supposed. Kant says, "That conduct is right which would work for good if it became universal." The final justification is the consequences, taken not simply as immediate and in a narrow sense, but as ultimate and in the widest signification.

A Christian moralist may affirm that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him forever." This is true enough; but it is evident that we can add nothing to the intrinsic glory of God. We may declare his glory, and thus induce others to share his goodness; for no doubt God takes pleasure in the perfection and happiness of man. To glorify God is therefore a duty, since it promotes the welfare of man and is pleasing to God. The ultimate end of human conduct is the perfection and happiness of man as the crowning glory of God's wisdom and goodness.

An evolutionist, as Herbert Spencer, does not object to rational intuition when it is regarded as developed by the experience of the race, and transmitted by the laws of heredity, though not mysteriously implanted in the mind of the individual, yet intuitively, immediately, and rationally apprehended.

Chapter VI

UTILITARIAN ETHICS

CLASSIFICATION.—A summary classification is thus given:

Utilitarianism	{ Egoism	{ Hedonism. Eudemonism.
	{ Altruism	{ Hedonism. Eudemonism.

2. *General view.*—Utilitarianism considers the value of things. In view of their good or bad qualities, they are chosen or rejected. Moral acts form a series of choices with their consequent conduct; and moral life is a certain habit of choice and execution. Utilitarians call that moral which is favorable to the life and welfare of the individual and of the race.

What objects are unconditionally worthy of choice, and consequently ought to be chosen? The objects of choice fall into two classes—ends and means, according as they are final or instrumental. Ends have a primary, an intrinsic, an absolute value, and are chosen for their own sake, or, more strictly, for the sake of the person attaining them. Means have a secondary, an extrinsic, a relative value, and are chosen for the sake of the ends, or for the sake of the person employing them in attaining the ends. A proper end is a good; a right means is a utility. Perfection and happiness are

ends; health, wealth, knowledge, and the like are means. The end chosen may be the good of self or the good of others.

If the end is the good of self, we have egoism; if the end is the good of others, we have altruism. If the end is a sensation of pleasure, as in tasting food, it is hedonic; if it is a higher good, as the satisfaction from well-doing, it is eudemonic.

The true ultimate end is called *the good*, τὸ ἀγαθόν, *summum bonum*. What is it? Is the ultimate good perfection alone? That might be found in a watch, in a flower, in a bird. Is it happiness alone? That possibly may be enjoyed by an unworthy person.

Is not the ultimate good for man the union of perfection and happiness? Is it not that rectitude of character yielding the conscious satisfaction that we are in harmony with the power in the moral world that works for righteousness? In working for the good of others, what should be our aim? To help them in attaining happiness is right; to help them to be worthy of happiness is better. Consciousness of worthiness is the highest enjoyment, the greatest satisfaction. With worthiness of character God is well pleased.

3. *Subdivisions of utilitarianism*.—The subdivisions are:

(1) *Hedonic egoism*.—This system makes self-gratification, or pleasure, the sole object of choice. It is based on the supposed psychological fact that pleasure is the only thing actually chosen. But pleasures are higher or lower. Enjoyments range all the way from sensations to the consciousness of rectitude.

Mill says: "The only proof capable of being given

that an object is visible is that people actually see it; the only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it, and so on of the other sources of experiences. In like manner, I apprehend the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it."

People desire pleasure; therefore pleasure is desirable. This is the experimental basis of the theory of Hedonism. It suffices to prove that pleasure is desirable in the sense that it is desired, but not in the sense that it ought to be desired, or that it is the only thing desirable.

Ethics aims at the good, whatever the kind, from the lowest to the highest form. It warns against evil of whatever kind or degree. It deals with moral conduct—what ought or ought not to be done. We ought to aim especially at the highest good. Is mere pleasure—for example, the gratification of appetite—the highest good? That it is a good need not be denied. We are, no doubt, under moral obligation to eat; and the gratification of the appetite is an accompaniment to which no reasonable objection can be made, and may be innocently enjoyed. A good dinner is certainly not objectionable.

If pleasure is the only object of choice, the only thing that can be chosen, then it is folly to say that we ought to choose anything else. If we ought to choose anything else, then we can choose something else; for where there is no power there is no obligation; and where there is obligation there is power. The ability to do is coextensive with the obligation.

Pleasure is an object of desire, and may often be

*psychology
Hedonism*

innocently chosen; but the choice of pleasure, without regard to consequences, is immoral, and is condemned by hedonists themselves. They hold that we ought to consider the consequences, and make a reasonable choice. This was the teaching of Epicurus. Pleasure is the gratification of desire. It springs from normal activity, from the excitement of an organ or its reaction against a stimulus. It is not to be condemned when legitimate, but only when excessive, abnormal, or unlawful. The *bonum delectabile* is lawful, if not in conflict with the *bonum honestum*.

Acts are sometimes spontaneous from instinct, or from constitutional tendency; and if the act is accompanied with pleasure, then the remembrance of the pleasure re-enforces the impulse to repeat the act. If the pleasure is caused by an object, a desire for the pleasure begets a desire for the object, not perhaps as an end, but as a means to the end, which is a pleasurable state of the sensibility. The object which excites the pleasure, however, frequently becomes so vivid to the imagination as to seem to be the real object of desire, while the consequent pleasure is but obscurely recognized. In this case, the object is sought for, not consciously as a means, but apparently as an end. Feelings of pleasure are not, therefore, the only objects of desire. We choose the pleasant objects themselves, and often without thinking of the feelings they excite, or, if we think of the pleasure, we seek the external cause. We also choose our own development towards perfection. We choose to be something or to do something. In fact, we choose many things without regard to their subjective effects, though undoubtedly investi-

gation will reveal these effects. They come frequently as consequences, not always as ends deliberately chosen, and sometimes not even foreseen.

a. The will is the power of choice.—The person exerts his own inherent energy of will, or power of choice, in order to realize the end. The end, as motive, is not, however, the efficient, but the final cause or purpose of the choice. The motive is a reason why the person chooses, not the cause compelling him to choose. The simple psychological fact is expressed by the person when he says, "In view of the reasons, *I will do this.*" He does not say, "The motive compels me to do this." The person is active, not passive, in choosing. The act of choosing is also itself pleasurable. For the sake of the end, and for the pleasure of choosing, the person makes the choice. He makes it freely; for if he is compelled to make it, responsibility ceases. If the question be asked, What makes the choice? the answer is, Not the motive, but the person, by exerting his will-power in view of the motive. If the question is asked, What makes the person choose? the answer is, He is not made to choose. Being an original source of activity, a *reason*, not a *cause*, accounts for his making the choice. *He* is the efficient cause of the choice; the motive is only a reason. The freedom lies, not in the choice as a product, but in the person who makes it. When we say the will is free, we do not mean the will as an act, as a volition, or choice, but the will as a power, or more properly, we mean the person is free in using his will power. The will as volition or choice is a product, and hence not free, but caused—caused by the person; but the person is free; he is not caused to cause his volition.

The person, being free, is justly responsible for the consequences of his conduct.

b. Freedom does not render choice irrational.—The person does not need to choose irrationally because he is free. He has a selecting power between two possible motives, and is under moral obligation, but not compulsion, to choose wisely. A clear view of the end aids him in doing this. He is stimulated, not compelled; he is solicited, not caused. Motives are *causes* of states of the sensibility, but are *reasons* for the decisions of the will. The final decision or choice is the person's own free act, for which he alone is responsible. If he is constrained by efficient causes, his conduct has no more moral character than the falling of a stone. In such a case conscience would have no function.

c. The effect of character.—The character of a person is a constituent of himself, and over which he has great, if not controlling influence. If well informed, he can, by persistent, well-directed effort, change his character. A person of good character has a settled purpose, a fixed intent to choose a good end, and he chooses accordingly; but his good character is chiefly a product created by himself by previous right conduct. The dynamic in choice is the will-power of the person; the thing chosen is the end. The person chooses the good end for wise reasons. He is assured that he can make the right choice of a good end, however strong the opposing solicitations. Great allowance, however, should be made for persons subject to the adverse influences of heredity, environment, education, conduct, character; but this is a matter of degrees, reaching finally to an abnormal and irresponsible condition.

d. Is pleasure quantitative only?—If pleasure is quantitative only, and is the only good, then the greater the pleasure the greater the good. But pleasure is also qualitative, and is not to be graded by the scale of quantity alone, as greater or less in degree, but also by the scale of quality, as higher and lower in kind. If two pleasures are so related that but one can be enjoyed, then a choice should be made from an estimation of both quantity and quality, giving quality the preference.

Pleasures may be graded in an ascending scale, as pleasures of appetite, of the senses, of memory, imagination, thought, success, friendship, love, right intentions, and conduct. Pleasure of the higher and more permanent form is called happiness.

Pleasures directly pursued often elude our grasp; but in the pursuit of noble ends by worthy means we find pleasure as an accompaniment. It is not directly sought, but comes as the unsought reward of virtue. It may seem an anomaly to call pleasure an end, and yet not make it a direct object of pursuit; but this is not a question of its desirability, but of best method of attaining it; that is, it is a question of means, not of end.

e. Why do we seek the good of others?—If our own pleasure is the only object of choice, then it is impossible to consider the good of others as an end, but only as a means to our own enjoyment. Do we try to please others for their sake, or for our own? No doubt we are pleased to see them pleased. But whose pleasure is the motive? This question will be discussed under the head of *Altruism*, but it may be profitable to think of it here.

The above discussion reveals the fact that sensations of pleasure do not constitute the highest end of conduct. The ultimate end is not only pleasant to a sentient being, but worthy of the pursuit of a rational being.

(2) *Eudemonic egoism*.—The good recognized by egoistic utilitarians is not solely the sensation of pleasure, a mere feeling of the sensibility, however agreeable; but it is also a satisfaction arising from a well-executed work, from a generous deed, from the welfare of one's own family or friends, from a consciousness of rectitude, from the approval of conscience, from the approbation of good people, and, above all, from the testimony that we please God.

a. *Distinction between pleasure and happiness*.—Both pleasure and happiness are enjoyable. In this respect they are alike. Pleasure is the agreeable sensation accompanying the legitimate exercise of a particular organ; happiness is the satisfaction from the assurance of the welfare of the entire being.

If the general conditions are satisfactory and well assured, happiness is not suspended by temporary pains. Happiness is more permanent than pleasure; it is broader, higher, better; it is eudemonic rather than hedonic. It is removed far from the base or degrading, and is allied to the worthy and the elevating. Satisfaction arises from the development of a good moral character, from a consciousness of progress towards perfection.

b. *Consequences*.—In a good moral state, a person habitually gives expression of a worthy character in worthy achievements. For the attainment of good ends

he considers his own personality the subjective factor, and the environment the objective factor. He then strives so to adjust the subjective and objective factors as to secure the best possible development, and thus to be able most perfectly to fulfill his mission in life.

(3) *Hedonic Altruism*.—As it is right to seek innocent pleasure for ourselves, and to avoid pain, so it is also right to seek to promote the pleasure of others, and to relieve their distress, and in so doing we find enjoyment for ourselves. Our enjoyment in doing good to others may be of a higher order than that which they receive; that is, ours may be eudemonic, theirs hedonic, as when we give a hungry man a dinner.

a. *Is self-interest the only motive?*—Let us renew the question, Why do we seek to please others? Is it for their sake or for our own? This is a much-mooted question. The story of Lincoln and the pig is to the point. In riding along a road, Lincoln saw a pig in a ditch, struggling to get out. He rode on, but could not get rid of the thought of the distress of the pig. He became, at length, so troubled that he rode back and released the pig at the expense of soiling a new suit of clothes. He then rode on relieved. Being afterwards commended for his kind act, he replied: "It was not goodness at all. I did not release the pig for the pig's sake, but for my own. I was distressed at the pig's distress, and relieved its distress to get rid of my own."

If Lincoln had not had a benevolent heart, he would not have been troubled at the distress of the pig; neither would he have done the act of mercy. If we do good to others, not to give them pleasure, but for our own

satisfaction, we would cease to have satisfaction. We find our satisfaction in the satisfaction of others. The immediate aim is to give others satisfaction, but in doing so, satisfaction unsought comes to ourselves, and all the greater because unsought. Duty done to others brings the highest reward to ourselves.

(4) *Eudemonic Altruism*.—We may distinguish several kinds:

a. *Duties to others as individuals*.—As we seek pleasure for ourselves and for others, as we seek happiness for ourselves, so we ought to seek happiness for others. The perfection and happiness of others are ends objective to ourselves, and are to be sought for their sakes. As we receive satisfaction in contributing to the pleasure of others, so we receive purer enjoyment in promoting their higher welfare, their perfection and happiness. The end we seek should be, not simply pleasure for ourselves and others; it should be not simply interesting, but worthy of interest. We ought to do good to others, not for the sake of a reward to ourselves, but in doing them good we reap a reward; yet the less we think of the reward in advance, the richer will it be when it comes.

b. *Duties to society and to our country*.—It is our duty, since we receive much good from society, to render society returns, valuable, if not adequate. As the Government, so long as we are law-abiding, protects us in our right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, so we ought to be patriotic and stand by our country in time of war or peril; and we ought so to study the Constitution of our country and the current political questions that we may be able to vote intelligently. In ren-

dering loyal service to our country, we contribute to the welfare of our fellow-citizens, and aid in the advancement of civilization and the progress of the human race.

c. Duties to the race.—In a broad sense, the human race is one. Each nation receives somewhat from all other nations. Hence every nation should exhibit international comity, and every citizen should be a philanthropist. His sentiment should be, "I am a man, and nothing human is foreign to me."

d. The individual mission.—Every person has his own idiosyncrasies, his individuality, and a certain position in society. His characteristics and his position indicate his function in life. If he finds that he is not in harmony with his environment, he is at liberty to seek another situation. In determining his capabilities, finding his niche, and fulfilling his function, he best promotes his own perfection and happiness. In discharging his duties to society, he most satisfactorily promotes his own welfare. He best develops his own reason by seeking to comprehend the reason displayed in the universe. He realizes himself by realizing his relations to the world. In taking for his ethical end the highest good of the rational universe, he finds his own highest good as the unsought reward of his disinterested conduct.

e. Eudemonic utilitarianism not objectionable.—To utilitarianism, both egoistic and altruistic, thus considered as eudemonic, there can be no reasonable objection. The intuitionist is apt to say, "Do right for right's sake." This can not, of course, mean that right is a personality that can receive benefit. We are to *do* right that we may *be* right. We do right for our own sake,

for the sake of others, for God's sake; but right has no sake. Right means straight. It is the straight way of doing things. We do right, not for the sake of the way of doing, but for the sake of ourselves and others who receive the benefit of our right doing. When we say we do right for the sake of the good resulting, we mean we do right for the sake of some one who experiences the good or receives the benefit.

A reason can always be demanded why a certain act is right. The tautological answer, It is right because it is right, is mere trifling. If it is said, Virtue is beautiful, and gives satisfaction without regard to consequences, the reply is, The satisfaction which virtue gives is a consequence along with other consequences. The saying, Virtue is its own reward, means that the approval of conscience accompanying the consciousness of a virtuous act is a sufficient reward.

f. Objection to utilitarianism because difficult of application.—An objection is often raised against utilitarianism on the ground that it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to calculate the consequences, and that, therefore, this system will not always serve as a guide to conduct. This thoughtful objection is worthy of consideration, and, so far as it holds true, shows that utilitarianism is not all of ethics; but it does not show that utilitarianism does not hold good where the consequences can be foreseen. No system of ethics is without use. In many cases we do not need to calculate the consequences of our acts. The intuitional system has supplied, ready for use, many of the moral maxims which should regulate practical conduct. We do not need to know the endless consequences of veracity, hon-

esty, and chastity, or of their opposite, to know that these virtues ought to be practiced and the vices avoided. But in certain cases the consequences ought to be estimated; and utility is our only guide. Thus a wealthy man, without heirs, is approaching the end of life. He regards it his duty so to dispose of his wealth as best to subserve the interests of society. Several plans occur to him—a costly fountain, an opera-house, a public library. He decides to found a library. He may be mistaken in his estimate of the relative benefits of the different projects, but he is clearly right in considering the consequences.

Chapter VII

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS

ACTION, *conduct, moral conduct*.—Actions are all the movements—physical, intellectual, or moral—which organic beings are continually making. Conduct is action adjusted to ends. Moral conduct is conduct adjusted to moral ends. It involves right or wrong, because aiming at a good or bad end.

Aimless action is not conduct, as swinging the foot by one sitting. Conduct morally indifferent as to end and means is not moral conduct, as whether one attends the lecture or the concert, or whether he rides or walks. The conduct becomes moral, both as to end and means, if he has invited his wife to accompany him, and she prefers the concert, and is not able to walk.

Conduct, to be ethically right, must aim at a supposed good end, with a good motive, and employ right means. To be ethically wrong it must aim at a bad end, or at a good end, with a bad motive, or employ wrong means.

2. *The idea of moral conduct reached by exclusion*.—If from actions in general we exclude purposeless actions, the remainder is conduct; and if from conduct in general we exclude indifferent conduct, the remainder is moral conduct. The term *moral conduct* is generalized so as to embrace both good moral conduct and bad moral conduct. Acts rise by insensible degrees into

conduct, and conduct into moral conduct. Evolutionary ethics explains how this is brought about.

3. *Structure, function, conduct.*—In an organism, the function of an organ corresponds to its structure, and is modified as the structure is modified. There is, no doubt, a reaction of the function on the structure, so that a change in the required function, continued for generations, or for a single life, would modify the structure; that is, a modification of the work demanded of an organ, reacts on the organ, and becomes a factor in the evolution of its structure. The modification is transmitted. Conduct is correlated with structure and function, and adjusts itself to its environment. Higher beings also adjust the environment to themselves, or adjust both themselves and their environment, in view of attaining an ideal end. Choice reacts on evolution and association, and makes a variation permanent.

4. *Spencer's illustrations.*—Infusoria float at random, determined in their course by the varying stimuli of their media. Finding food, they flourish; failing, they starve; meeting a superior foe, they are devoured. Lacking the higher senses and the motor organs, their actions can scarcely be called conduct. Ascending to the rotifer, we find that by a whirling motion it takes in infusoria as food; by clinging with its prehensile tail to some object, it finds support; by drawing in its outer organs, and contracting itself, it escapes danger and prolongs life.

A low order of mollusca, as the ascidian, floating on the waters, at the mercy of every enemy it may chance to meet, whether drifted by currents or stranded on the shore, scarcely exhibits acts, much less conduct.

A higher order of mollusca, as the cephalopod, by swimming, by crawling, by pursuing its prey, by hiding itself in a cloud of ink, by using its arms for anchoring or for holding its prey, so adjusts itself to its environment that its acts rise above random movement to conduct adjusted to ends. It is certainly a hedonic egoistic utilitarian; but, as we have no reason to suppose that it raises the question, Ought I, or ought I not? we can not consider it a moral being.

5. *Natural selection*.—The struggle for existence between hostile species is a means of evolution. That species which secures the best adjustment to the environment survives, while others become extinct. Success varies as the efficiency. The fittest survive, the unfit perish. This is the principle called natural selection, or the survival of the fittest. The fittest are those best adapted to their environment; and these nature selects to live—they survive.

Advancing to the higher classes of vertebrates, we find animals that care for their young, and, in case of mammals, that nourish them from their own bodies. We also find those that defend one another in case of attacks from enemies. Such conduct, though it is called instinctive, has in it the unconscious germs of a truistic morality.

6. *Moral conduct*.—Intellect is evolved, *pari passu*, with the evolution of structure and function, till, at length, rational elements of mind appear. Finally, when it is seen that certain conduct is befitting, that it properly adjusts means to ends, that it tends to the highest good, then a sense of obligation arises, conscience is born, and instinct is no longer the exclusive guide.

Thenceforward the course of conduct found to be appropriate is enforced, and becomes the established custom.

The love of offspring—parental affection, paternal and maternal, especially maternal—prepares the way for altruistic sentiments. A family with its kindred families develops into a clan. Now, the egoistic feeling is no longer allowed to dominate, but it is subordinated to the welfare of the clan; altruism appears, and morality is in the ascendent.

7. *Ascending scale.*—An ascending scale is found from the lower animals to man. With organs greater in variety and more highly differentiated, and with corresponding enlargement of function, reaching more numerous objects, multiplying the number of possible adjustments, the sphere of action is enlarged, and the dominion over nature is more complete, till we reach man, the being not only the most highly organized, but also rational and moral. The races of mankind, from the lowest to the highest, have acquired a power over nature in proportion to their intellectual development.

How much more perfect is the adjustment of means to ends among the civilized races than among the savage! With advancement in knowledge goes a quickening of conscience and a corresponding advancement in the claims of moral obligation, including those pertaining to self, to family, to society, till finally the aim is the highest good to the greatest number.

8. *The work of ethics.*—We see, then, that ethics deals with the form of conduct manifest in the higher stages of evolution. As the numbers of the human race increase, man lives more and more in the presence of his

fellows, and it becomes more and more essential that his conduct should comply with ethical rules; that is, with those customs considered right.

9. *Test of morality.*—An act is good or bad according as it results in a good or bad end; but conduct may have various results—one, the end directly aimed at; another, not the ostensible end, yet clearly a consequence of the act. If the one end is good, and the other bad, what is to be done? Act in accordance with an enlightened conscience. What if the act itself is immoral? We are not to do evil that good may come. The end does not sanctify the means. An act may seem to be objectively right because it apparently tends to a good end; but if the act itself is immoral, it corrupts the doer, and this is a consequence so bad, that the apparent good end can not be taken as a justification. What is the source of moral obligation? We may look to the State, to the consensus of public opinion, to the Church, to conscience, or to reason as the last resort, which is the final court of appeal even in choosing any other; but reason refers to an end as the source of obligation—the worthiness of moral being.

Incitements to acts pertaining to the good of self are usually strong enough without moral re-enforcement. The ethical help here needed is not an inducement to look after self-interest, but that we should rightly discriminate between lower and higher good, and give preference to the higher. The same is true, in the main, in regard to our duties to our families, for here the incentives to right conduct are strong.

Our duties to society are altruistic, and chiefly eudemonic. Here we need the stimulus of moral precepts.

We are further stimulated to promote the progress of society, by seeing that it involves our own welfare.

Those acts are ethically the most perfect which most completely adjust and harmonize our duties to self, to family, to society, to humanity, and to God.

10. *Is life worth living?*—The pessimist answers no; the optimist, yes. The general opinion seems to be, after weighing the arguments on both sides, in favor of a modified optimism. Evolutionary ethics accents this view, and proceeds to inquire, What is the ultimate good? The answer of utilitarianism is happiness. Evolution accepts this answer, with some modifications. It places a high estimate on the development of the organism and the higher forms of life. It regards perfection as that state of being capable of effecting the complete adjustment of means to ends, and therefore not as the end, but as the means to the end.

As evolution accepts the utilitarian view of the end, let us consider:

11. *The tendency of utilitarianism.*—The tendency of utilitarianism is towards hedonism, that is, to reduce happiness to pleasure, whether egoistic or altruistic. To this we demur. With utilitarianism, in general, we have no quarrel. Even hedonism has its value if kept within its place; it is not, however, all of ethics, but only the lowest part. Eudemonic utilitarianism, whether egoistic or altruistic, emphasizes the ultimate end—the general good, and that, of course, includes the good of self along with the rest. In fact, to build up self is the best preparation for building up others. The thing to be guarded against is the building up of self to the injury of others.

Our own highest good is best attained when not made too direct an object of pursuit. Even in acquiring an education, it is better to keep usefulness in view than personal advancement. The good we receive is chiefly found in the satisfaction from disinterested conduct and noble achievement. Aristotle taught that happiness consists, not in the possession, but in the practice of virtue. Satisfaction is also experienced in the proper exercise of well-developed powers.

12. *Perfection the highest means or proximate end.*—If, as utilitarians maintain, perfection is not the ultimate end, it is at least the proximate end, the very highest order of means. The word *proximate* is used in the sense of *penultimate*, not next to the first, but next to the last. The best way of securing happiness as an end, is to make sure of a virtuous character as a means, and even then the less thought about the resulting happiness the better. We need not try to deceive ourselves. We may know and admit that happiness is the ultimate end, and yet for the time being keep our aim directed to perfection as the proximate end, just as the farmer withdraws his thoughts from the crop that he may concentrate them on the proper preparation of the soil. Knowing that multiplied instances of happiness will certainly flow from a good character, these need not be directly aimed at, nor even kept in mind, and the aim may be concentrated upon attaining moral excellence for ourselves and promoting it in others.

We have an analogous case in the mathematician who, knowing that a formula for a certain purpose will have ten thousand applications, concentrates his powers on finding the formula, and though the formula is for the

sake of the applications, he regards the applications as a matter of course, about which he is not at present concerned. In like manner a good character is the ethical formula for obtaining manifold blessings, and this character is the proximate end to be sought.

13. *Views of virtue as held by intuitionists and evolutionists.*—There is a marked difference between the intuitional and evolutionary schools in regard to the relation of virtue to happiness. The intuitionist holds to an immediate determination of conscience to approve the several virtues, and believes that they tend to happiness by a predetermined correspondence.

An evolutionist holds, with the utilitarian, that conduciveness to happiness is a test of virtuous conduct as well as a consequence.

An evolutionist does not hold that every act is justified by the pleasure immediately following, or condemned by the accompanying pain, but that special and proximate pleasures and pains ought, in many instances, to be disregarded in consideration of the higher pleasure that more remotely follows, or the greater pain that will finally be avoided. To do a mean act for an apparent immediate advantage is to lose self-respect, which as a consequence overbalances the good, and forbids the act.

14. *Evolution of the cardinal virtues.*—It will aid in the elucidation of evolutionary ethics to trace, in a summary manner, the development of the cardinal virtues, leaving their more systematic treatment to a subsequent chapter. Can we find at least the germs of these virtues in the lower animals?

(1) *Prudence.*—Among the lower animals the germ of prudence is seen in the instinct of fear, and in the cun-

ning displayed in escaping from enemies. In man the germ has developed into the virtue of prudence. The conscience of man affirms that, for his own sake, and for the sake of those depending on him, and for the general welfare, it becomes his duty to preserve his life, to care for his health and strength, and to diminish or avoid danger, so far as he can do this without sacrificing his own honor. Fear is transformed into caution, and cunning into wisdom.

(2) *Courage*.—Animals frequently display the quality called courage. By continual calls for its exercise, in attack or defense, it becomes habitual, and is transmitted from generation to generation.

Courage, as Aristotle has shown, is a mean between the extremes—cowardice, a deficiency of courage, on the one hand, and rashness, an excess of courage, on the other. Cowardice is fear transformed into an abject habit, dishonorable and contemptible. Rashness is foolhardiness, or courage without the guidance of wisdom.

(3) *Temperance*.—Temperance is moderation or self-control. Animals are guided by their appetites. In man the guidance of appetite should be supplemented by that of judgment. Temperance is more than abstinence from intoxicating drinks. It is moderation in all lawful indulgences. It curbs every tendency to excess. It enforces abstinence from all unlawful or hurtful pleasures.

The violation of the virtue of temperance is more frequent in the case of gluttony than in that of drunkenness. Of these vices gluttony is more common, less conspicuous, more respectable, and probably more harmful. The virtue of temperance is fully justified by its good consequences.

(4) *Veracity*.—Animals have the rudiments of language, and communicate with one another, sometimes truthfully and sometimes deceitfully. A hen finding food informs her brood by a peculiar call, which they readily understand. Seeing a hawk in the air, she gives the note of warning. The chicks take the alarm and hide in the bushes. Prompted by affection, the hen is truthful in communicating with her charge, but has no conception of veracity as a virtue.

Animals employ deceit. The opossum, through fear, simulates death, and thus sometimes finds safety. Some animals show deception in catching their prey. But their veracity springs, not from conscience nor their deceit from depravity, but from a slowly evolved instinct.

In man, veracity is a virtue. Its practice is a duty enforced by conscience, in consideration of its general utility. The exceptional cases, as in war, in which deceit is allowable, enforce with greater emphasis the duty of truthfulness in dealing with others in all the ordinary affairs of life. Insincerity is a dire disease.

(5) *Justice*.—Animals defend one another, and resist encroachments on their haunts, or the plunder of their store of food. A pig dragged from a herd of swine excites by its squeal hostile demonstrations against the captor from the rest of the herd, which muster to defend or avenge their unfortunate companion. But a hog acting out its nature seeks to appropriate all the swill, though its fellows starve. Bees defend their hive and kill off the lazy drones, on the principle that if a fellow will not work, neither shall he eat.

Man works, accumulates property, or invents a useful machine, and feels that he has a right to the fruit of his

own labor, or to the product of his own genius. He defends his property, and resents encroachments on his rights. But what he claims for himself he must concede to his neighbors, or they will not allow his claims. From the consequences to ourselves of the acts of others, we reason to the rightness or wrongness of those acts, and then, by reversing the order, find rules for our own conduct towards others.

The sentiment of mutually respecting one another's rights crystallizes into custom, and custom becomes embodied in law, which is enforced, not only by conscience, but by the sanction of penalties. The rights of one has for its correlative the duty of others to respect those rights. Justice is the core of honesty, and an honest man is God's nobleman.

(6) *Benevolence*.—The germ of benevolence is found among animals in the instinctive affection which mates have for each other and for their offspring. Services rendered to the weak vary inversely as their power to help themselves, as is seen in the care taken of the helpless young. But the benevolence of animals, if benevolence it can be called, has a restricted range. Sometimes a mother adopts, in place of her lost offspring, those of another; but this is done from the intense pressure of the maternal instinct, and not from good will. A hen sometimes kills one of her own brood, perhaps one from her own egg, because the chick differs in color from the rest of the brood. She has a suspicion that it is an intruder, and vowing that the little Ishmael shall not share bounty with her own Isaacs, she casts it off, or kills it without mercy. Animals, without remorse, prey with intense greed on those of other species. Selfishness is

the rule in the animal kingdom. Is cruelty the law of nature?

Among men we have had the abhorrent practice of cannibals devouring those of their own species; and among civilized races how often do self and avarice and cruelty and hate prevail! Even in acts called benevolent, how often are the doers led by the love of distinction, or of praise, or of power, or by other motives equally unworthy! Is genuine benevolence a fiction? If not, it seems to be the crowning glory of a few rare natures; yet these are a hope and a promise of what is in store for the human race when, by the evolution of its higher nature, it discovers and embraces the truth.

Natural selection applies most rigidly to rudimentary society; it is modified with ethical evolution. The world has been passing through preparatory stages, and the human race seems to be but emerging from the night of barbarism, and about to achieve its high destiny. The lion may yet lie down with the lamb, and the leopard with the kid. Then men will beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks. That day will dawn when benevolence reigns supreme.

Natural selection, or survival of the fittest *in respect of the whole of the conditions which exist*, relates especially to the survival of those who are ethically the best, as the ethical endowment is the crowning glory of man. Mr. Fisk has shown that the prolonged helplessness of infancy has developed benevolence and forethought in their parents, given better opportunities for the education of the children, and has thus promoted the progress of the human race.

Chapter VIII

EVOLUTION OF MORALS IN MAN

BEGINNING and growth of morals.—We have found that the traces of morality in animals, though the germs are found, are faint, if not resolvable into instinctive action. The dog has been thought to manifest conscience, by showing signs of guilt when he does forbidden things; but what appears to be a sense of guilt is, perhaps, the fear of his master's lash. The dog guards his master's property or protects his life, thus seeming to show a sense of justice or even of benevolence; but this grows out of a blind affection for his master.

If we wish to study the development of morals, we must turn away from mere animals, even from those of the highest type, as the dog, the horse, the elephant, and study man, who, though allied to animals in his physical nature, has a higher nature, and is a rational, moral, responsible being.

A child, physically, intellectually, and morally, is a potential, not an actual man. He starts in life with instincts, appetites, and passions, some awake and active, others yet dormant. His intellect is undeveloped; his knowledge is zero; his moral powers are inert. As he develops into manhood, he is at first guided, as is best, by his seniors. At length he begins to think for himself; he exhibits free will; he forms social ties; he attaches

himself to a political party, joins a Church, or becomes a free-thinker.

Low elements mingle with higher in all human acts, even in the best specimens of humanity. The individual rises, as the race, with many fluctuations, from the automatic to the free, from the animal to the moral, from the material to the spiritual. The instincts, appetites, emotions, affections, and desires, guided by intellect and conscience, are powerful impulses to moral development; but left without guidance they speedily lead on to ruin. In average cases there is more or less moral incompleteness. Mistakes are inevitable, and demands for charity are frequent and reasonable; yet mistakes can be corrected and progress promoted. An essential condition of progress, applying equally to the immature and to the advanced, is faithfulness to one's ideal. With progress the ideal is corrected and enlarged, the moral life is enriched, and manifests itself in everwidening activities.

2. *Factors of moral evolution.*—These factors are threefold:

(1) *The ethical ideal.*—The development of an ethical ideal involves a conception of what one ought to be or to do, also a sense of obligation in the person himself, and a fixed will or steadfast purpose to do right. Moral life is hastened or retarded as the ethical ideal is high or low. There seems to be a gradual elevation of standard, as is shown by a comparison of the present with the past. Certain kinds of conduct, such as gave good standing in the past, will scarcely satisfy the requirements of to-day.

Notwithstanding many exceptions, there seems to be a growing sense of personal obligation and respon-

sibility. With an advancing ideal and an increasing sense of obligation, the purpose to do right becomes, in a corresponding degree, more steadfast and potent. The advance is maintained by the consensus of opinion and the customs of society.

(2) *A moral code.*—A second factor in the advancement of morals is the development of a moral code, as expressed in social customs, and as embodied in the enactments of civil law. (Ethics unfolds but does not enforce obligation.) It declares that men ought to do right, and aids them in understanding what is right, but can not compel them to meet their obligations. Hence the necessity of a code of morals, the force of custom, the precepts of religion, and the sanctions of civil law.

The moral code, however, was not made by discovering abstract principles and forming them into a system. It began spontaneously, and was established as experience confirmed its utility. It was not created by reflection, but by reflection it was criticised and corrected. Thus, aggression and robbery, for example, being found by experience to be deleterious to the interests of society, were put under ban, and the aggressors punished.

Thinkers, and moralists, and reformers continually insist on higher moral principles and better practices. Other people imbibe their views and imitate their example, till at length their opinions become a part of the accepted code, and their conduct the practice of the better classes. The fashion becomes the custom, which, if need be, is made by legislative enactment a part of the civil law. This is seen in laws relating to property, to marriage, and to the right of suffrage. Thus a correct principle discovered by a thinker, put in practice by re-

formers, is adopted by society, and embodied in the civil code. The law as enacted by legislative authority is carried out and applied to the complex details of life. The working of the law is the final test of its wisdom, and often leads to its modification or repeal.

We do not hold with Hobbes that civil law is the standard of morals, and that the law is right because it is enacted and enforced by the authority of the Government. Still it holds good that the fact of a law is a presumption in its favor.

What should be the attitude of the citizen towards the laws of his country? Laws morally right should receive his hearty support; laws morally indifferent should be obeyed; laws morally wrong may be disobeyed and the penalty submitted to, or obeyed under protest till repealed; but the course taken must be left to the conscience of the citizen. Let him remember his own fallibility, and that it is more probable that an individual is mistaken, than a majority of a legislative body.

Heretofore, in the great spheres of economics and legislation, evolution has gone forward with but little reference to morals; but it is now beginning to be understood that neither economics nor politics can safely be left without the guidance of ethical principles. In business transactions moral principles are needed to check the greed of gain. The avarice of wealth may be brought to realize its meanness by bringing it face to face with the necessities of the poor. Laws ethically unsound are sure to be found to be unsatisfactory.

Life in all ranks needs to be permeated with good will. The Christian law of love, carried out in practice by the Golden Rule, is the best solution of the evils of

the times. Equal justice to all, or special favors to none, is a good rallying cry. The poor and the dependent should not be oppressed by the rich and the powerful, but encouraged to help themselves. Self-help will secure competence and independence.

The law of love, or right disposition of heart, has its limitations. Good will does not make a good financier nor a wise legislator. These require accurate knowledge and practical sagacity. There should be not only a benevolent heart, but a life directed by wisdom—a life with a fixed aim to realize in all respects, so far as possible, a rational ideal in full accord with the highest standard.

Each man has his own endowments. These are his credentials, bestowed by nature, fully authorizing him to go forward and fulfill his mission, and in doing this he realizes his highest happiness.

Though the code of morals, as found in society, enjoined by the Church, or enforced by civil law, is in general a guide, yet much must be left to the discretion of the individual. Many duties are unformulated, many questions each person must ask and answer for himself. What shall be my particular line of work? How shall I treat my friends? and how my enemies? What returns should gratitude make for a favor? In all this multiplicity of details, every individual can, by the exercise of his own common sense, best raise the questions and answer them for himself.

An enlightened mind learns to discriminate between the letter and the spirit. These narrow-minded Pharisees who thought that Jesus had committed a great sin in healing the withered hand on the Sabbath-day went

out, and on that very day held a council to find how they might destroy the Son of God. On the other hand, that all things may be done decently and in order, it is right to observe certain forms, and to conform to the proprieties of life. Good morals require that we do not offend the æsthetic tastes of cultivated people, nor needlessly violate the rules of etiquette.

(3) *The enlargement of the moral field.* This may be done:

a. *Subjectively*, in bringing, as time goes on, a greater number of personal actions within the sphere of morals. As the moral character of a person is developed, he sees that acts once regarded as indifferent have a moral bearing, and should be brought under the dominion of conscience. Knowing the influence of example, he disallows in his conduct any act which he believes might lead other people astray. His exemplary conduct is a pattern; his influence, though unconscious to himself, is powerful in its quiet effect. A conscientious man realizes that it is good neither "to drink wine, nor to do anything whereby his brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." He is careful how he spends his time, and will not allow himself to drive out for pleasure when he has agreed to deliver a lecture in the evening for which he is still unprepared. Yet he is no fanatic, and will drive out for health or for pleasure when no good reason appears to the contrary. It is a curious question why certain persons observe certain ethical rules, and disregard others. They will not cheat their neighbor, but do not hesitate to defraud the Government. Does this grow out of the fact that their ethical ideal is imperfectly developed? or is it because they persuade them-

selves that in defrauding the Government they wrong no one in particular, since their gain of a thousand would be but an infinitesimal loss for each when divided by the millions of the Nation? Perhaps they persuade themselves that by due caution they can conceal their conduct; but from two at least it can not be concealed—God and themselves.

b. Objectively, in extending moral activities to a wider range of objects. A conscientious person, with an ethical ideal, applies the principles of morals to wider and still wider range of objects.

Formerly it was thought that economics had nothing to do with morals; that business is business, and that, therefore, a man in business has a right to do, and that he always would do, that which he thought would bring him the greatest returns financially. It is true enough that business is business, and that a man in business has a right to do the best he can for himself, provided that in so doing he wrongs no one else; but he should be guided in business by moral principles. Ethics has a rightful supervision over economics, whenever moral principle is involved.

As economics within its range is an independent science, so also is politics as the science of Government. In their spheres these sciences are supreme. As to tariffs, revenues, taxes, methods of administration, the coinage of money, and the like, so long as these things are purely economical or political, ethics does not presume to dictate; but when they invade the domain of morals, ethics has a right to make its voice heard. If it is true that the Decalogue has no place in politics, then

politics has no right to touch a question involving morals. But Government does, to a certain extent, guard public morals, as is shown by its supervision of matter passing through the mails, and in its attitude towards lotteries and prize-fighting.

A man's private moral standard is often more strict than the social code, and still more than the political, yet he allows the conventionalities of society to guide his social conscience, and party creed his political. The true course is to carry the principles of private morals into social intercourse and public life.

We ought not to forget our moral obligations in dealing with dependents, with inferior races, with colonial dependencies, or with the lower orders of the animal kingdom. Cruelty to animals is a crime, and cruelty to servants a greater crime.

As the moral field increases in extent, it loses in content. Passing from self to family, to countrymen, to mankind, there is danger of considering the moral law less binding as its sphere becomes more general. The principles are less specific, but none the less sacred. It is as truly duty to be patriotic, philanthropic, benevolent, as it is to be faithful to one's family.

Have we any liberty to trample on the rights of a man because he is a foreigner? Have we any right to treat a domestic with cruelty? Have we any right to buy a horse at half its value, because the owner is compelled to raise a small sum of money? Whatsoever ye think it right that others should do unto you, do ye also in like circumstances unto them. This is the golden rule of practical morals.

The moral code is the supplementary legislation of public opinion, in view of the common welfare. It acts both as a restraint from evil, and as an incentive to beneficent deeds. It is becoming more and more perfect with the evolution of society. It behooves every good citizen not only to sustain, but to elevate the standard of morality.



Chapter IX

ECLECTIC ETHICS

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METHODS of *eclecticism*.—From the review of the four systems—the theistic, the intuitionist, the utilitarian, the evolutionary—we find good in all of them. The question is at once suggested, Can we not, by selecting the good from each of these systems, and combining the selections into an aggregate, form a more complete system?

The suggestion is worthy of consideration, and even of fair trial; but success in the trial will depend on the method adopted, not so much of selecting as of combining the selections. There are two methods of combining—the conglomerate, and the unifying. Some ethical writers are eclectic, but there is no compact, cohering eclectic system.

(1) *The conglomerate method*.—Selections from all the systems can be made and combined, perhaps not without order, but without a central, unifying, organizing principle. The result will be a conglomerate system, if system it can be called, having its type in a conglomerate rock.

A noted attempt of like nature has been made in philosophy by that brilliant genius, Victor Cousin. The want of a unifying principle prevents the eclectic phi-

losophy from becoming a true system. The method of eclecticism decided its destiny, and thus verified the statement of Cousin himself: "As is the method of a philosopher, so is his system, and the adoption of a method decides the destiny of his philosophy."

(2) *The unifying method.*—Some one central unifying principle can be chosen, around which are to be collected and organized all the selections made from the various systems. The central principle, however, must have sufficient vitality to assimilate the selections from the other systems, so that they can be organized into a compact, harmonious system. Without a principle of unity, embodying the ultimate end of ethics, the selections from the various systems can not be assimilated and organized into a coherent system, but with such a vital principle an eclectic system is possible.

What shall the principle be? What is the ultimate end of conduct? What ought to be the highest aim of a moral being? The different systems give somewhat different answers. Theistic ethics declares that "the chief end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy him forever." Intuitional ethics wavers between perfection and happiness. Utilitarian ethics answers the highest good of the greatest number. Evolutionary ethics, says the perfection of organic life. Eclectic ethics selects all the good of all the systems, and thus forms a complete system. It does this by finding the true fundamental principle, around which it collects and organizes all subordinate principles. What is the fundamental principle?

2. *The ultimate end.*—The highest good of all sentient beings is the ultimate end of conduct. Accepting the highest good of sentient being, including self and all

others, especially those in any way affected by us, as the ultimate end, it becomes our duty to aim so to direct our conduct as to realize, as far as possible, this ultimate end, or highest good.

Conduct habitually directed aright crystallizes into virtuous character, whose central and controlling element is the will to do right. The motto then becomes; I will do right according to the best of my knowledge and ability. Conduct, habit, character, constitute a trinity. Conduct guided by an ideal, and controlled by will, forms habit, and habit crystallizes into character, and character determines subsequent conduct.

Duty is directly related to conduct, and indirectly to character and happiness. Conduct that establishes character needs the guidance of the intellect and the control of the will. Conduct that issues from character is spontaneous and as habitual seems to produce itself, yet it should not be left without the guidance of reason. The immediate aim should be right conduct. Good character and right subsequent conduct and happiness will follow as natural consequences.

Character taken as the sole ultimate end gives a one-sided system, the result of which is apt to be an unwholesome withdrawal from the activities of life. Self-satisfaction as to character leads naturally to an indisposition to effort. Divorced from action, by regarding its end as already attained, character is of little worth. If it is said that good character will certainly issue in right conduct, it may be replied that it will thus issue, if it is believed that the end, continued satisfaction, is to be secured only by continued right conduct. But if it regard the end, perfection of character, as already attained,

it will ask, What need of further effort? A self-satisfied Pharisee is neither a progressive nor a useful man.

Character is, no doubt, a proximate end, yet a means to ulterior ends. The question can properly be asked, Why should I seek to establish a good character? If it is said, A good character is a beautiful thing in itself, the reply is, That is true; yet the reason given for a good character is æsthetical, not ethical; but a beautiful thing is valuable on account of the innocent pleasure it gives. If it is said a good character is a good thing in itself, it may be asked, Good for what? The reply must be the good conduct that follows, and the ethical satisfaction which it brings. Then the character is for the sake of the conduct which follows, and the satisfaction which constitute the end; but let it not be forgotten that the satisfaction can not be enjoyed without the character, which is its indispensable condition. The fact is, we should seek to establish a good character, because from a good character, as a never-failing fountain, issue the living streams of refreshing waters, making the desert blossom as the rose. But good character is established by right conduct, and only by right conduct can it be maintained. The thing of immediate concern is right conduct, and it is that upon which the eye is to be constantly kept. The ultimate good, the highest satisfaction, of all concerned, is the final justification of right conduct and good character. Worthiness of character is to be directly sought, happiness only indirectly, or not at all, as it follows necessarily from worthiness of character; but the immediate effort should be concentrated on conduct.

If attention be directed to pleasure as the end, the

tendency is to hedonic egoism, regardless of the means; and the consequence is likely to be moral disaster. Shall attention be directed to happiness as the end? Not too directly; for then it loses its charm, or escapes altogether. Happiness is more delightful, if not anticipated or not directly pursued. To do right is the matter of immediate concern; the consequences naturally follow; but whether happiness should be directly or indirectly pursued, is a question of method, not of end.

3. *Duty the immediate end.*—If duty is made the immediate object of attention, the question arises, What is duty? The answer is suggested by the word. Duty is what is due; it is, of course, right conduct—to will and to do what is right. But what is right conduct? It is right means to a good end. Right conduct is, therefore, that to which we should direct immediate attention, knowing that good results will follow as natural consequences. We are to deal directly and chiefly with conduct. Ethics may be defined as the science of conduct. It treats of the right and wrong in conduct. But how do we know what is right or wrong in conduct? Here emerge the different systems of ethics. Let us see what each has to say.

(1) *Theistic ethics* affirms that we should do right, or exhibit the various virtues in our conduct, because this is the will of God. Knowing or believing that certain conduct is the will of God, we believe that it is right, and that we ought to govern ourselves accordingly. To determine the will of God we may look to nature, to reason, or to revelation. But God's will is not arbitrary, and we may be permitted to inquire into the reason why God wills certain conduct. We can say, I trust without

presumption, that if we can find the ultimate end of right conduct, the end that is not the means to an ulterior end, then we can say, We believe God wills that conduct, for the reason that it tends to realize the ultimate end. In the last analysis, the highest good of sentient being must stand as the final reason or justification of conduct. In his goodness God has, no doubt, given to most minds such a degree of common sense that, guided by revelation, they immediately know the right and wrong in conduct without the task of calculating the consequences.

(2) *Intuitional ethics* declares that we have an intuitive knowledge of right and wrong. It is true that in many instances we say that certain conduct, such as speaking the truth, honest dealing, doing kind deeds, and the like, is intuitively known to be right, and that it ought to be performed without regard to consequences. This is true, and it answers as the ordinary guide. We need not stop to calculate the consequences of honesty or of dishonesty, to know that we ought not to cheat our neighbor. In case of the ordinary virtues, we can rely on the maxims of common sense. This is done by both the utilitarian and the evolutionist, who, however, give another account of their origin.

(3) *Utilitarian ethics* maintains that experience proves that all virtuous actions result in the general welfare, which is the final test. It also maintains that if it were found, by experience, to be true that honesty brought bad results, then honesty would no longer be a virtue, thus making the consequences of conduct the test of its moral character. The consequences would verify the moral character, even if the character were known intuitively. Is conduct known to be right, be-

cause known to be useful, or is it known to be useful, because known to be right?

(4) *Evolutionary ethics* can not deny the claim of the intuitionist, that to the individual the principal virtues are known intuitively; but he holds that the intuitions themselves are the products, not of an original intuitive faculty, but of the experience of the race; that all past generations have found, by experience, that honesty is the best policy, and that the tendency to believe this is inherited, and is now so strong, that it seems intuitive. Thus the evolutionist concedes to the intuitionist that the virtues seem to be intuitively known, but agrees with the utilitarian that their general utility is their justification, and this utility has been discovered by the experience of the race.

Intuitionists reply with force that honesty is not policy at all. By this they do not mean that it will not result in good; but that a man who deals fairly for the reason that in the long run he can make the most by such conduct, is not an honest man at all; but that an honest man deals fairly because it is right, without regard to consequences. Now, the old question emerges, Do the consequences make it right? What is right? and why?

(5) *Eclectic ethics*, not the conglomerate, but the unifying form, can take the highest good of sentient being as the ultimate end, since it is not for the sake of anything else, and is therefore ultimate as well as good. The highest good of sentient being is *self-realization of all the possibilities of good with the attendant satisfaction*.

Taking the ultimate end, the highest good of sentient being as the unifying principle, eclectic ethics can levy

contributions on all other systems, and arrange the selections about this principle, and thus organize a compact coherent system. In this sense, eclecticism is both allowable and profitable, for it enlarges the field of view and is more complete than any other system. In fact, all the systems have good points and contain more or less of truth, which may be gleaned from them.

Theistic ethics, based as it is on authority, was effective in the early stages of civilization, and even now is the most available for people in a low degree of development, or even for people of average cultivation.

Intuitional ethics is available for people of some culture and good common sense, but who have neither the time nor the inclination to study the philosophy of ethics.

Utilitarian ethics satisfies those who wish to submit every principle to the test of experience or to the verification of experiment, as in science.

Evolutionary ethics gives the philosophy of the origin and development of morals.

Eclectic ethics satisfies those who desire completeness, and seek light from every possible source.

4. *Means and ends.*—Means and ends form a sliding scale. For the time being the attention can be withdrawn from the ultimate end, the highest good of sentient being, and directed to character, the proximate end, or to conduct, the means to character, or to some form of good, as health, wealth, position, and the like. In securing means, the end is often nearly, if not quite, left out of sight, and the means taken for the end. Thus, a farmer desires a new plow. He searches about the hardware store for one to his liking. At the time the plow seems to be the end of his effort; but the plow is

the means for turning over the soil, which is the end for which the plow was bought. Plowing the soil is the means to the crop, as its end; the wheat is the means to the flour to be made of it, or to the money it will bring; the flour is for the bread; the bread is to be eaten; the food gives strength for work, the means to a multiplicity of subordinate ends; and not only for work, but for all moral conduct, the means to character, the proximate end, issuing in the highest good to self and others, as the ultimate end. In like manner the money for which the wheat is sold is the means to ends, which in turn become means to other ends, and so on till the ultimate end is attained.

The good at last attained must not be mere pleasure, which, though having a certain value, is a lower form of good, but is unsatisfactory to a rational being. It must come through a noble character, which is a constant source of the highest good, the purest happiness to self and to others. Practically it is better to aim at perfection than at happiness, not a self-satisfied perfection, which considers the end as already attained, and that there is nothing more to do, but at that perfection of the moral nature whose very essence is the energy of will directed by wisdom and benevolence, and whose end is the highest good of the greatest number.

5. *Order of means and ends.*—Aim immediately at conduct as a means to character, and at character as a means to assured conduct, which is a means to wealth, knowledge, power, position, and the like, and to a more highly developed character, and finally to the purest continued happiness, a consciousness of rectitude, the ultimate good.

Perfection, if it be a possibility without sensibility, is of no more value than that of a well-constructed and beautifully-finished machine, which is not an end, but at best only a means to an end. We are again brought to the conclusion, that pure enjoyment, the rational satisfaction springing from uprightness of character, is the ultimate end; but this calls for continual work, as it is always true that much remains to be done, so that the chief attention is ever to be given to right conduct, which will continue to insure its good consequences. Much land will always remain to be possessed.

The term *good* strictly applies to ends, but it is often applied to means when regarded, for the time being, as ends. Thus we speak of good conduct or of a good character. It is, however, more appropriately applied to an object than to an act. Thus it is proper to say a good plow, a good man. The term *right* is properly applied to actions. Thus we say, Fair dealing is right, not good. Right conduct is conducive to good character, which is "the promise and the potency" of the highest blessedness.

The value of happiness is not diminished, but enhanced, by its variability, which adds to the fullness and richness of its wealth.

Chapter X

THE GOOD

THE desirable.—The ultimate end is the good. What is the good? If we answer, The good is the desirable, then we may ask, Is the desirable what people actually desire, or is it what they ought to desire? The answer is, The desirable, in general, is what people actually do desire; but the ethically desirable is what they ought to desire—the morally good.

The sensibility is the susceptibility of feeling. It is the condition of pleasure and pain, of happiness and misery. If there were no susceptibility to feeling, there would, of course, be no feeling, and the words *pleasure* and *pain* would have no meaning. The sensibility is not only susceptibility to pleasure and pain, but to happiness and misery.

2. *The ethically desirable.*—What ought we to desire? Manifestly we ought to desire what is good and can be enjoyed without interfering with any established rights. A right implies the correlative duty to respect that right, and thus restricts our enjoyments within a certain range. The enjoyment or satisfaction which springs from right conduct is the ethically good. Objects which agreeably affect the sensibility are good in a subordinate sense, but more properly they are useful, since they are means rather than ends.

3. *Pain not the only evil; pleasure not the only good.*—

It is not to be understood that there is no evil but pain and no good but pleasure in the form of physical sensations. Higher than the pleasures of sensation are the enjoyments that come from the accomplishment of a laudable undertaking, from a discovery or an invention, from overcoming difficulties, from doing good to others, from victory over faults, from genuineness of character, from the realization of our highest possibilities, from the reflex of right action in any form. More to be dreaded than pain are the evils of misconduct, unworthiness, defeat, disgrace, degradation, remorse. Evil is, therefore, more than pain, and good more than pleasure, if the words pleasure and pain are restricted, as they are apt to be, to their lower signification of sensations.

4. *Extension of the signification of the words pleasure and pain.*—The term *pleasure* is not always restricted to the low sense of sensation. In fact, it is frequently extended to mean satisfaction or enjoyment in the higher forms. Thus "At thy right hand are pleasures for evermore." In like manner, the term *pain* need not be restricted to the ache accompanying the abnormal excitement of a nerve, but it may be extended to the woes of the spirit, as grief or remorse. A mother says to her child, "Your conduct pains me." "A wounded spirit who can bear?"

With this extended meaning of pleasure and pain, the good is any form of lawful pleasure, and evil is any form of pain. Still, it is believed that when we mean the higher forms of the good, the word satisfaction or

happiness is preferable to pleasure. Likewise, when we mean moral evil, a more appropriate word than pain can be selected, such as unworthiness, or sense of guilt, or sin.

5. *Satisfaction the good*.—Satisfaction in the realization of our highest possibilities is the good, the ultimate end. Conduct, character, virtue, perfection, though proximate ends, are means to the ultimate end—the satisfaction involved in the moral activity of a rational being. Material things, as lands, houses, equipage, money, credits, and the like, are only means, utilities; they afford pleasure, enjoyment, and contribute to happiness. The word *satisfaction* may be regarded as the genus containing the species—pleasure, enjoyment, happiness. It has also the negative—*dissatisfaction*.

As there is a gradation of pleasures, using the word in its wider sense, so there is a gradation of means, the highest of which is perfection of character. Some things are better than others, not only as ends, but as means, since they produce pleasures, not simply greater in degree, but higher in rank.

6. *Quantity of pleasures*.—Pleasures may be graded as to quantity, that is, degree of intensity and duration, or time of continuance, as greater or less. Strictly speaking, the distinction of quantity as greater or less can be applied only to pleasure the same in kind, as two agreeable odors or two sensations of taste, but only in a loose way to a smell and a taste. These, having no common unit of measure, are incommensurable; but we may say, one is more agreeable than the other.

7. *Quality of pleasures*.—Quality may be estimated

from the objects affecting the sensibility, or from the rank of the sense through which the sensibility is affected, or from the nature of the affection.

The pleasure in contemplating the starry heavens is certainly higher than that from the gratification of appetite.

The senses, smell, taste, touch, hearing, sight, form an ascending scale. The æsthetic pleasures from beauty, grandeur, sublimity, are not all of equal worth. The same is true of the pleasures from the fine arts, landscape and architecture, sculpture and painting, music and poetry, conversation and oratory. The difference of the pleasures from the art, as from music and painting, is certainly a difference of quality. The same is true, likewise, of the intellectual enjoyments of perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, and of the ethical enjoyments of right conduct. In grading pleasures according to quality, do we not introduce a new principle? No; the principle is still the good, as satisfaction. We discriminate. Some kinds of satisfaction are higher, richer, purer, than others; still satisfaction is the good. What is good or bad in ourselves is good or bad in others. What is right or wrong in ourselves is right or wrong in others. Human nature is essentially the same in all.

The distinctions between the different satisfactions are derived from consciousness and reflection; that is, from the immediate experience of these satisfactions and their discrimination. Each pleasure and pain has its own specific peculiarities of quality. The classification of the feelings is a logical convenience in taking a survey of their extent and natural groupings. The quali-

ties of the pleasures are known immediately by experience, and can be known in no other way. Why has one object a greater value than another? Is it not because we prefer the effect which one gives us to that of the other? It is not simply a greater sense of value, but a sense of greater value.

8. *Cause of difference of quality.*—Objects, as causes, affect the organs of sense, and produce sensations as effects. Each sensation is the joint product of the two factors, the action of the object and the reaction of the organ. The condition of sensation is the synthesis of the object and the organ. The peculiarity of the sensation is due rather to the object than to the organ, since varying the object, the organ remaining the same, the sensation varies, as is shown by experiment, in tasting, in succession, salt, sugar, cinnamon, pepper. Without doubt, the quality of the sensation is, in part, due to the constitution or the condition of the organ, as the same kind of food is relished by one animal and not by another, or by the same person at one time and not at another time. But since the sensation varies with the cause, the subject remaining essentially the same, we learn, by experience, to identify the cause from the peculiarity of the sensation.

There is no abstract pleasure, only as a concept of the logical class, called pleasure; yet the concept is not pleasure, but only the notion or idea of pleasure. Actual pleasures are all concrete. Pleasures are subjective; they are our own experiences of which we are conscious; but they have, as we have seen, objective conditions; and the difference of the objects accounts for the difference of the pleasures. The difference of pleasures is

not only *quantitative*—a difference in degree of intensity and in duration—but *qualitative*—a difference in kind or rank—as we have already seen.

9. *Rank of pleasures.*—The rank of pleasures is estimated by their *quantity*—that is, their degree of intensity and duration—and by their *quality*—that is, their worth, richness, or purity. Preference is due to quality rather than to quantity.

Pleasures of the same kind may be compared as to quantity, and the preference given to the greater, which thus outranks the less; but this holds good only up to that degree of intensity or duration producing the best effect. Thus a hungry man, having begun to eat his dinner, may properly eat more, and continue to eat till he reaches that point where more would be injurious, when he ought to cease. Of course, this point is somewhat indefinite, and can not be precisely, but only approximately, determined by the satisfaction of his appetite, supplemented by his judgment. Nature allows a little margin. It is not like crossing a line, but rather like crossing a belt of some width. It will do to cease anywhere within the belt.

10. *Do pleasures differ in quality?*—This has been called in question, but without good reason. If pleasures do not differ in quality, but only in quantity, how could we distinguish between two different smells of the same intensity, or two tastes, or a smell and a taste? It is true that a sensation has, in itself, no moral quality; but there may be a moral preference for one rather than for another.

Quality is even a more fundamental distinction than quantity. It is by quality that we identify and classify.

When pleasures are alike in quality, we compare as to quantity; but when they are unlike in quality, they can be compared only as to quality, since having no common unit of measure, they are incommensurable as to quantity.

One pleasure is chosen in preference to another; but even choice is not a sure test of rank; for one person chooses the pleasure of appetite rather than the approval of conscience, while another person chooses the approval of conscience. The consensus of opinion of those best competent to judge is to be regarded. The rank of pleasures differing in quality is settled primarily by their worth, and secondarily by their intensity. Thus the pleasures of the senses rank in general according to the ascending scale of smell, taste, touch, hearing, sight; but a man's hunger may be so great that, for the present, he may properly prefer a good dinner to the sight of the finest scenery.

There is an ascending scale in the æsthetic pleasures, also in the intellectual. The same is true of the practical activities of life, as in improving property, acquiring a fortune, gaining friends, attaining position, influence, fame, and in social intercourse, in political action, in moral conduct, in a religious life.

II. Rule in case of competing pleasures.—Pleasures often conflict and compete for choice. Thus sensual pleasures may compete with intellectual, or the intellectual with the moral. In all such cases the general rule is, Decide according to rank, taking into consideration the conditions and circumstances of the conflict. But how shall the rank be determined? The science of ethics can answer this question only in a general

way, leaving much to the judgment and conscience of the individual; and this is, no doubt, the best for the individual, as the decision of the question is a means of education. Some cases are difficult to decide, as, for example, Should a young man attend college, or stay at home and assist his overworked father? Is his father able to hire help, or is he not able?

12. *Question as to end.*—The reduction of happiness, in the final analysis, to pleasure, by certain utilitarians, and pleasure to sensation, together with the desire of intuitionists to base ethics on reason instead of on the sensibility, has led certain writers of the intuitional school to place the ultimate end in duty or conduct or perfection of character.

They ask, Can feeling, which is more or less transitory, be the ultimate end? Perfection is not an eternal fixity of being, but an unceasing pursuit of the good. The variable character of feeling breaks up monotony, and adds to its variety and richness. It can, on the other hand, be asked, Can that be ultimate which is a means to something else? Can, therefore, perfection, which is a means to happiness, be ultimate? We may aim at many things which, for the time being, are taken for ends, but which are found to be means to ulterior ends. Thus we should, no doubt, aim at duty or right conduct as an immediate end; but right conduct is for the sake of its consequences, one of which is progress towards perfection of character; but perfection of character, combining energy, wisdom, and goodness, though a proximate end, though it may be aimed at, for the time being, without regard to ulterior consequences, is the never-failing fountain from which flow the conse-

quences of other like conduct with all its accompaniments of pure enjoyments.

13. *The unity of the subject of moral action.*—The intellect, the sensibility, and the will, though discriminated for psychological purposes, though different capabilities, are faculties of the same ego, and never act separately. Cognition, feeling, and volition are manifestly phenomena of the same individual self, yet at one time, cognition may be more prominent, at another feeling, at another volition.

Choice or decision has reference to an object or to an act. It is duty to make a right choice of object, or decide to do a right act; yet neither choice nor the object, neither decision nor the act, is the end. But it may be asked, Is not the fixed will always to aim to make a right choice, or to decide to perform a right act, the consummation of ethical effort? It is, no doubt, the proximate end to have a right will; but if this right will was not satisfactory, if it resulted in no good consequences, no one would aim at it. It is satisfactory. The satisfaction, however, is not a sensation, but is a consciousness of rectitude. The realization of integrity of character, with its accompanying satisfaction, is the highest good, the ultimate end.

How abundant is the good springing from truth alone, from the beauty of ideas, their relations to one another, the cogency of an argument, the validity of a demonstration, the revelations of science, the laws of nature, the beauties of art, the gems of literature. The field is practically inexhaustible, and the satisfaction without alloy.

From moral conduct is derived the approval of con-

science, the approbation of the good, kindness returned for kindness received, the witness of the prosperity of friends, all of which is enjoyed in the only seat of enjoyment—the sensibility. Such enjoyment is final satisfaction.

The blessings of religion are matters of experience, and are consciously enjoyed in the sensibility. The essence of religion is love to God and love to man. Love, though inseparable from a knowledge of its object, is a feeling, a state of the sensibility. True love is the highest happiness. Blessedness is only another name for the highest happiness of which man is capable—the love of God. Love does not feed on self. It is not self-consuming, but it goes out to an object, and involves healthful action and reaction.

14. *The Epicurean view of the good.*—The Epicureans found the good in pleasure; and though they did not exclude the higher pleasures, as they distinguished two kinds of pleasure—the permanent and the transitory—the leaders giving preference to the permanent, yet the tendency of the rank and file of the Epicureans was to let their pleasures degenerate into mere bodily sensations.

Pleasure, even in its lower sense, is a good, but not the sole good, nor the chief good. Epicureanism has not been justified by the facts of its history. Its watchword finally became, "Let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die."

15. *The Stoic view.*—The Stoics rose above pleasure in all its forms, and found the ultimate end in virtuous conduct, personal dignity, or excellence of character. Though they admitted that pleasure is to be preferred

to pain, yet they did not make it an object of pursuit. Stoicism has produced some noble characters, as Zeno the founder of the system, Epictetus, and the Emperor Marcus. The tendency of the system, however, is to an unsympathetic attitude of its votaries towards their fellow-men, save those of their own persuasion. Aiming at the impossible, Stoicism has produced many pretenders, as those unmasked in the writings of Lucian.

16. Theistic view.—Theistic ethics maintains that much labor is saved, and certainty gained, by taking the will of God as the rule of duty and the glory of God and the enjoyment of his love as the end. For the majority of mankind, religion is, no doubt, more serviceable than rational ethics. The will of God is a guide to duty, and through duty to perfection of character, from which is derived the highest happiness. But what is the will of God? "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself." Love is the highest happiness. The love of God is indeed blessedness. Objective good finds its highest expression in God, the Source of the highest happiness. Here happiness or blessedness is the outcome, the end. Theistic ethics is, in reality, a confirmation of eudemonism. In fact, its central principle is eudemonic, "Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God." Seeing God is the means, blessedness is the end.

17. Intuitionist view.—Intuitionists hold that rational ethics must be based on a rational principle intuitively apprehended. This claim is not unreasonable. It may justly be assumed, as a rational intuition, that the ultimate end is the highest good of sentient being, including not only self, but all others. It is the accepted

end of utilitarianism, and is not unacceptable to evolutionists. No form of good need be rejected, neither pleasure, nor enjoyment, nor happiness, nor satisfaction, nor perfection, neither egoistic good, nor altruistic. It is not necessary that a person should neglect himself. In fact, if he does not take care of himself, he will be in no condition to help others. To care for self for the sake of others—as, for example, the head of a family should do—is a duty and is sound morality. Prudence is not morals, but it is right to be prudent and wrong to be imprudent.

Granting that the ultimate end is the highest good of sentient being, and that this principle is intuitively apprehended, still the question arises, What is the highest good of sentient being? Can intuitionism give an answer? We judge not; for some intuitionists declare that the highest good is a good will, others say perfection, others happiness or blessedness.

If we should admit that the highest good is happiness, still the question occurs, What form of happiness is the highest good? Is it the greatest in intensity or the longest in duration? Or shall we consider the quality, its intrinsic worth, its purity, or freedom from gross elements? Shall we choose momentary gratifications, because intense, and thus lose self-respect? These are questions that can be answered only by the consequences, as determined by experience.

The nature of good we learn from experience, and, having learned this, we judge that the conduct of others is right or wrong, according to the consequences; and by the same standard we judge our own conduct; but it is only in society that conduct can affect other people,

and hence it is only in society that our moral nature can be fully developed.

The ethical element is not found in the *result*, as good or evil, but in the *will*—that is, the volition—as right or wrong, because aiming to realize good or evil.

To will or to do a certain thing is right or wrong subjectively, according as the consequences are thought to be good or bad. Ethics requires right intention and right conduct.

Chapter XI

THE GOOD.—CONTINUED

UTILITARIAN view of the good.—The nature of man must decide the nature of the ultimate good. If man is capable of enjoying good only in the form of sensation, then hedonism is the true system. But if pleasures are distinguished by quality as well as by quantity, or, better, if we discriminate between pleasure and happiness, and if man is capable of enjoying, not only isolated momentary pleasures, but also that higher and more enduring enjoyment called happiness, if he finds satisfaction in the happiness of others, then *eudemonism* is the true system. Philosophers of different schools have said: Act according to nature; but the true nature of man is not that which is common to him and the brute, but that which is characteristically human—his reason and moral nature; and it is only in acting according to the dictates of these that he acts according to his true nature.

The word *utilitarianism* is misleading, if referring to the end, but appropriate if referring to the means. Utility is a means, not an end; but the ultimate good is the end, not the means. *Eudemonism* is appropriate as the name of the system whose ultimate end is the highest good of sentient being.

In giving preference to happiness over pleasure, it is not necessary to reject pleasures altogether, but to subordinate them to happiness. Pleasure is a part of our experience. It gives zest to life, and may often be innocently enjoyed, and is, in fact, indispensable. It is condemned, without reason, by an anchorite or a cynic.

2. *Faults of utilitarianism.*—Three faults have been charged against utilitarianism, and not without reason:

(1) *The tendency of the system to degenerate into hedonism.*—When this tendency is followed, and the extreme is reached, the passions are unchained, and men yield to an inordinate indulgence of appetite, and worship the goddess of voluptuousness.

(2) *The system tends to a calculating morality.*—If the control is given to reason, then the tendency of utilitarianism is to become a calculating morality, which extinguishes spontaneity and warm impulses and noble sentiments.

The above charges are both true—the first, when the pursuit is after uncomputed pleasure; the second, when the pleasure is first computed, then pursued.

(3) *Consequences can not always be computed.*—This fault is fatal to utilitarianism as an exclusive system; but as other systems supply its lack—for example, the theistic and the intuitionist, while utilitarianism supplies the lack of these other systems when it is needful and possible to compute the consequences—the contest between the systems may here be regarded as a drawn game—all are useful, and, in certain respects, all are defective.

The charge that, in considering quality, we are in-

troducing a new principle, that of excellence or degree of goodness, has, in part, already been answered in Chapter X, 7. The principle is still *the good*. There can be no reasonable objection to the act of distinguishing between kinds of good.

Janet, a distinguished French writer on morals, says: "For myself, I see no difficulty in accepting the theory of pleasures thus transformed; for the principal ground of my objection to the utilitarian philosophy is that it considers only the quantity of pleasures, and not their quality." But some utilitarians do distinguish pleasures by their quality as well as by their quantity, and of these John Stuart Mill is an illustrious example.

Even the Epicureans regard mental pleasures as superior to physical. In estimating pleasures, we are not only to calculate, with Bentham, their quantity—that is, their duration and intensity—together with their probability or certainty, but also, with Mill, to estimate their intrinsic worth. But if this consideration of quality transforms utilitarianism into eudemonism, let it be transformed, as it ought to be.

3. *Evolutionary view*.—Evolutionary ethics insists on the development of organic life, as the proximate end, but accepts happiness as the outcome or ultimate end.

4. *Eclectic view*.—If eclecticism is to be successful as a system of ethics—and any system, to be complete, must be, to a certain extent, eclectic—it must select some central, vital principle as the highest good of sentient being, and around this central principle organize its system. The eclectic feature tends to completeness. This amounts to the same thing as to say that eudemonism, holding fast to the highest good of sentient

being, as the ultimate end, should become eclectic, and thus maintain its claim as the true system.

5. *Postulate of freedom.*—In the play of motives—affections, desires, aversions—man is, no doubt, passively affected by the interaction of these forces; but when we rise into the higher regions of moral activity, the freedom of the will must be postulated. If there is no freedom, then duty, obligation, responsibility, are words without signification. What determines the volition? The ego determines the volition, not necessarily without motives, but in view of motives, which are reasons, not causes, of volition. There can be no fatalistic ethics. Mechanism is not morals; it obliterates the distinction between right and wrong; it annihilates right as merit and wrong as guilt. A machine neither merits reward, nor deserves punishment. If man is responsible, he is free; but he is responsible; therefore he is free.

6. *Aim of life.*—Each person ought to have an ideal of life, and adjust his efforts to its realization. Pleasure, of course, attends the creation of the ideal, the effort to realize it, and the realization. The effort is not directly for the pleasure, but for the purpose of realizing the ideal. The excellence of the conduct is proportionate to the perfection of the ideal and to the wisdom with which the realization of the ideal is attempted. Happiness, though not the conscious aim, is the outcome and the philosophical justification of the ideal and the effort. It is found in normal energy.

The aim is raised far above the unbridled gratification of appetite, that sure downward road to ruin. Happiness is best attained, not by direct methods, but

by indirect. No one maintains that misery is a proper object of pursuit; but pain is not to be shunned at the expense of duty; but the performance of duty, though sometimes painful, will, in the end, bring a rich reward.

7. *Rule in case of apparent conflict between self-interest and duty.*—When self-interests and duty are in apparent conflict, self-interests ought always to give way to the dictates of conscience. But the conflict is only apparent. A settled purpose to do right, carried out in well-directed executive acts, will at last yield the best results. Experience has confirmed this in all cases where confirmation is possible, and thus we are led to the belief that nature itself is a rational system, ordained and governed by an all-wise and beneficent Author. "There is a power in the world that works for righteousness."

8. *The ideal man.*—The ideal man is one well developed physically, intellectually, and morally, abounding with energy directed by wisdom, working out the problem of life with a free good will, realizing his highest possibilities. Individuals differ greatly in their natural endowments, in excellencies or defects of disposition, in appetites and passions, in integrity or depravity, in knowledge or ignorance, in industry or indolence, in heredity or environment, in strength or weakness of character, so that, in dealing with others, we have ample opportunity for doing good and abundant calls for charity.

9. *The good and law.*—Law is the rule of action. Duty is conformity to righteous law. Is the law the reason for the good, or is the good the reason for the law? Is duty the principle of the good, or is the good

the principle of duty? It is clearly duty to obey righteous law. Is the law right irrespective of consequences, or do the consequences justify the law, giving to it its righteous element, making obedience right and consequently obligatory? Not simply one consequence, but all of the consequences are to be considered.

Kant's doctrine is that duty is not founded on the good, but that the good is founded on duty—that a good will is the only absolute good, and that the duty to have a good will is the highest duty. He would not say, Do this because it will result in good, but do this because the moral law requires it, and hence because it is duty; but the law requires it for its results.

The reason for knowing that a certain conduct is right is not always the reason for its being right. Thus, if an act is known to be morally obligatory, it is known to be right, for the reason that it would not be obligatory unless it were right. For instance, knowing that an act is commanded by unquestionable authority, we know that it is obligatory, and hence that it is right; but this is the reason for knowing that the act is right, and not the reason for its being right. It is true that an act, in itself morally indifferent, is made obligatory, and hence right, because commanded by law regularly enacted; but no law can make a flagrant wrong right. A law is not good simply because law; for then there could be no bad laws, and no law would need to be repealed. It must be, at least, not bad. The fact that there are laws, both good and bad, and that bad laws ought to be repealed, and sometimes are repealed, is proof that law is based on the good, and not the good on law.

We *believe* a law to be good when we know that it is the enactment of a legislative body in which we have confidence, and that it has been signed by a wise and conscientious executive; but we *know* it to be good when we know that it will promote the general welfare, or that it is the fiat of an infallible lawgiver. In the latter case, we simply know that it is good as a matter of fact, but not the reason why it is good.

The enactment of an infallible lawgiver is not, however, the fiat of an arbitrary will whose motto is, *sic volo, sic jubeo*. The infallibility of the lawgiver is a consequence of his wisdom, which deals with reasons. Now, although we do not claim to be able to fathom the depths of Divine wisdom, or fully to comprehend all God's reasons, even when he deigns to reveal them, yet till we find something deeper it seems to be a sufficient justification of God's laws that obedience to them promotes the general welfare.

Confusion arises from the different senses of the word *good*. The central and strictly proper meaning is pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, happiness, blessedness; in short, all agreeable states of the sensibility that can be rightfully desired. *Good* is also applied to laws which tend to the general welfare and to objects which afford pleasure, and in this sense is equivalent to *useful*. It is also applied to conduct, and in this case *good* means *right*. A will to do right is *goodness*.

An act is morally *good*—that is, right—when it is believed to be duty, and when it is done because it is duty, and not from any selfish considerations.

But why is it duty to perform a certain act? The answer, a righteous law requires it, is sufficient for

obedience; but what gives the law its righteous character? The answer is, obedience to the law works for the general welfare.

A good will, as Kant contends, is indeed the central element of a good character; but a good will is a fixed purpose to do right; that is, to promote the common good. The highest good of sentient being stands, therefore, as the ultimate end of conduct.

According to Kant prudential rules are hypothetical imperatives, as these: If you would prosper in business, deal justly; if you wish to be a physician, study medicine; but the moral law is a categorical imperative, and is to be obeyed without regard to conditions or consequences. This is true when we know that an act is required by the moral law; but the reason for the law itself is the good consequences of obedience. God can say, As I will the well-being of my creatures, I enact the moral law. Man **can** say, As the moral law is righteous, I will render unconditional obedience. He can also say, I have an additional reason for obedience—the law works for the general good.

Kant's categorical imperative, Act in such a manner as you would be willing all others should act in like circumstances, has for its reason the beneficial consequences of such action. To speak the truth is required by the categorical imperative; yet Kant gives a reason why we should keep our promise: "If we break our word, we seem to admit by that very act that others have a right to break theirs to us, and in such a case it would be impossible to trust any promise, and distrust would become general." Again Kant says: "We ought to show pity to persons in distress, because we could

not desire a state of society in which no one sympathizes with another, and consequently in which we could expect no help if we should be overtaken by misfortune." Thus speaks Kant's good sense in spite of his high scheme. He fully admits the principle that in the last analysis conduct is justified or condemned by its good or bad consequences. The ultimate and sufficient reason for morality is that it results in the general welfare. "The greatest good to the greatest number" is the practical maxim for the regulation of individuals, society, or the State. Sensible people do not lose sight of consequences.

10. *Personality*.—A person is a being endowed with intellect, sensibility, and will. He is capable of greater or less perfection and happiness, and has in himself the possibility of dignity and moral worth. A mere thing is an object destitute of the attributes of personality.

Man, as a person, has a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, the fruit of his labor, and the development of his powers by a suitable education. He can not justly be deprived of these rights unless he forfeits them by crime, or becomes incapable of rational conduct, or makes himself dangerous to the safety of others. He can reasonably demand that his rights be respected, and he is likewise under obligation to respect the rights of others. Indeed, man is morally bound to care for himself in order that he may more perfectly discharge his obligations to others. He should aim at his own perfection, refrain from marring his character, weakening his powers, or needlessly diminishing his own resources, thus becoming better able to fulfill his mission in the world.

Granting that moral quality lies not in the external act nor in the result, but in the will, the aim, yet it is still true that a right aim is an aim at a good result. A good will is a fixed purpose so to order conduct that the consequence is the highest good of all concerned.

11. Need of a standard.—The need of a standard has in part been supplied:

(1) *Bentham's rule.*—Utilitarianism was rendered altruistic by Bentham's rule, "The greatest good to the greatest number." Still in measuring the moral quality of conduct by its result, there is danger, as Butler points out, of giving loose rein to every species of immorality. It is not difficult for one bent on mischief to find some sophistical reason which seems to justify his conduct. A robber can say, "I will do more good with the money than this old miser."

(2) *Kant's test*, "Allow no conduct in yourself you would not be willing should become universal," is a check to the improper application of Bentham's rule.

(3) *Mill's principle.*—Another check was given to the downward tendency of utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, in the distinction he made in the quality of pleasures. The higher pleasures outrank the lower, and ought always to subordinate them. Here, though the good is still pleasure, in its wider sense the test of rank is not pleasure, but is found in worth or dignity, experience showing that the higher pleasures bring the better consequences. Mill, however, did not find the warrant for this test in rational intuition, but in the consensus of opinion, on the principle that the opinion of the many is binding on the few.

(4) *Spencer's generalization of Mill's principle of*

quality.—Spencer says, “*Empirical utilitarianism* is but a transitional form to be passed through on the way to *rational utilitarianism*.” In a letter to Mill, Spencer says: “The view for which I contend is that morality, properly so called, the science of right conduct, has for its object to determine *how* and *why* certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results can not be accidental, but must be the necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kind to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct, and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery.”

It will be seen that the end of conduct is maintained to be happiness, and the system is still utilitarianism, but utilitarianism transformed from an empirical to a rational system.

Spencer, however, holds that the deductions from the principles are to be accepted, notwithstanding their utility is opposed by apparent facts. Still it is well to remember, knowing the fallibility of human reason, that however rational our system, or however carefully we make our deductions, it is always wise, whenever possible, to test our conclusions by their consequences, and thus to verify them. In natural science we test theory by experiment, so here by experience.

The commonly accepted virtues are fully justified by

their consequences, which guide also in exceptional and anomalous instances and in cases of conflict.

12. *The law of happiness.*—Happiness is the consequence of normal development, and of conduct in harmony with the nature of man and the constitution of the universe. Man, as a rational being, apprehends that conformity of his conduct to the constitution of nature and to the laws of his own being will confer the greatest possible happiness; but happiness does not feed on self; it is found in relation to its object—the highest, the action and reaction between self and God.

13. *Perfection.*—A human being is ideally perfect who possesses all the organs and faculties of his physical, intellectual, and moral nature, without deficiency or redundancy in health and maturity, harmoniously developed and trained to fulfill their functions. This ideal perfection is never actually reached, but only approximated. Perfection involves energy or working power, sagacity or wisdom, purity or uprightness of character, benevolence or good will. Perfection and happiness, though not identical, are most intimately associated. Progress towards perfection is the subjective condition of happiness; therefore seek not for happiness directly, but rather seek to be worthy of happiness.

An excellent character, which is clearly within the reach of people normally constituted, is the certain means to happiness; therefore by good conduct form right habits, which will crystallize into righteous character, with all its untold possibilities of good.

14. *Will and reason.*—The constant will of every rational being is to make an effort to attain satisfaction.

The function of practical reason is to find what efforts will afford satisfaction.

Cardinal Newman said: "All virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world; but they who aim at the power have not the virtue. Again, virtue is its own reward, and brings with it the truest and highest pleasures; but they who cultivate it for the pleasure's sake are selfish, not religious, and will never gain the pleasure, because they can never have the virtue."

Happiness is the outcome of virtue, and is found only when not directly sought, as the unsolicited reward of goodness. The true end is the realization of self as efficient for good, and as accomplishing good by wisely directed energy, with the attendant ultimate satisfaction. It is better to deserve happiness than to be happy. The ultimate good is, therefore, harmony with universal law, affording unalloyed satisfaction.

Chapter XII

LAW AND DUTY

O*BJECT of law.*—Law, the rule of action, has for its object the promotion of order, security, and the common interests of society.

The subjective principle of good is sympathy for our fellow-beings. The principle of evil is selfishness with its attendant cruelty. Selfishness seeks gratification without regard to the interests of others. In disregarding the rights of others it becomes cruel.

The moral law is the Divine will, which is not arbitrary, but reasonable, the dictate of wisdom and goodness. Its tendency is to repress selfishness and to promote good will and mutual helpfulness among men.

To do right is to obey the moral law. The consequence of obedience is concord, harmony, the common welfare. The consequence of disobedience is discord, confusion, social evils. The law commands in the name of reason for the sake of humanity.

Duty is what is due; that is, it is what we owe to self, to others, and to God; and hence it is what ought to be done. It is obligatory to obey righteous law, morally obligatory, but not compulsory.

Laws may be roughly classified as natural, social, civil, ecclesiastical, moral, divine. To these may be

added the mathematical, logical, psychological, metaphysical. Under natural law we have physical, chemical, astronomical, biological, physiological. It is with moral law that we are now concerned, whether written or unwritten.

A sense of obligation arises when a person believes that a certain thing ought to be done, that he is able to do it, that it will not be done unless he does it, and that its neglect will result in evil. In such a case, no opposing duty forbidding, he says, "I ought to do it." If he neglects to do it, his conscience upbraids him.

2. *Objections to the fact of duty.*—These objections are the following:

(1) *Free will a fiction.*—This objection may be thus stated: Every thing in nature is governed according to law. The universal reign of law proves that man's conduct is subject to law, leaving no place for free will. Man's actions are, therefore, necessitated by forces beyond his control; accordingly there can be no duty, no obligation.

The above argument is a glaring fallacy. It assumes that there is no free will, the very thing it tries to prove, else it could not say, Every thing in nature is governed according to law. By free will we do not mean free volition as a product, but a free ego who freely uses his will power in producing his volitions. It is not necessary to say that the ego acts without reasons, for he decides in view of reasons; but he is not compelled to decide by determining causes.

Any one who accepts one of the following statements, and rejects the other, will know whether he is on the side of liberty or of necessity: In view of motives, as

reasons, *the ego decides*; under the pressure of motives, as determining causes, *the ego is compelled to decide*. In the latter case, the *decision* is but the transmission of the impulse from the antecedent motive through the ego to the consequent volition, and the ego is simply passive.

Moral responsibility requires freedom in the subject. A moral agent may always act according to reason, and yet be free, for he is not compelled so to act. He is not necessarily a fool because he is free; but if he acts from necessity, he has no more responsibility than a threshing machine. As the ego is conscious of effort in volition, it is not passive, but active.

Where does responsibility lie? Evidently where freedom lies, in the doer. To make this clear, suppose two desirable alternatives: then we have ego, desire, preference, choice, appropriation. The desire is not free, for that is induced by the attractiveness of the objects; the preference is not free, for that is determined by the greater attractiveness of one of the alternatives; the choice, as a product, is not free, for that is made by the ego according to preference; the appropriation is not free, for that is determined by the choice; but the ego is free in making the choice, according to preference as a reason, and not as a compelling cause. As the ego is reasonable, the choice is always made according to the preference; but that is certainty, not necessity. Freedom is the condition of obligation.

(2) *Duty irrational*.—Fourier says: "What a strange idea that God has implanted within us passions, in order that we may repress them; as though a father were to develop vices in his child, in order that he may afterwards have the glory of overcoming them! What could

be less in conformity with the economy of Divine wisdom than to create a self-contradictory being, composed of two natures, one of which is commanded to reduce the other to vassalage, while everywhere else in the universe we see unity of source and unity of action. And it would not be so bad had God but given at the same time efficacious means with which to combat them! But we have nothing of the sort. Every one knows how weak is reason in the presence of passion, and those who preach to others are the first to be vanquished in the struggle with themselves. The worst evil is not their weakness, which comes from nature, and for which they are not responsible; but it is the universal hypocrisy which results from this conflict between theory and practice, since all have on their lips moral maxims which they sacrifice, without scruple, when there is any question of satisfying their passions."

Fourier concludes that the proper aim of the human race is not duty, but happiness, and that happiness is the gratification of the appetites and passions; but in order that this gratification may be enjoyed without injury, it is necessary to discover the true mechanism of the passions, and act accordingly. But it is evident that the unlimited gratification of appetite, of passion, of ambition, of the love of gain, can not be indulged without untold misery to others; but unlimited gratification will be indulged, unless law intervenes with its wholesome restraint. It is only necessary to appeal to the experience of mankind to see the consequences of lawless indulgence. To abolish law in the present condition of mankind, is to give license to every crime, and to reduce society to anarchy; but the necessity of law involves the

duty of obedience. If the human race should ever reach that degree of perfection when civil law would no longer be necessary, it would be because the duty of obedience to both natural and divine law is more perfectly observed.

Man's true nature is found in what is peculiar to him, rather than in what is common to him and the brute. His peculiar characteristics are his reason and his moral nature, and he attains his true happiness only when these hold the supremacy, but under their regency he advances surely towards perfection and happiness.

3. *Evolutionary theory of the origin of law and the idea of duty.*—It was found, by yielding to appetite, that certain things, though agreeable, were injurious; while other things were useful, though disagreeable. A natural sympathy inclines mankind to pity and kindness. Finding it necessary to abstain from certain actions, and needful to perform others, maxims of conduct were formed and arranged into a moral code. These were acted upon by subsequent generations, the tendency to accept them was strengthened and transmitted, their empirical origin was lost sight of, till finally they were taken to be intuitive truths.

How did the idea of duty originate? How came the moral maxims to be regarded as obligatory? Parents desirous of protecting their children from evils which they have themselves endured, and wishing to give them advantages superior to what they had themselves enjoyed, provide for their instruction, and frame rules for their conduct and enforce obedience. In like manner, chiefs, kings, priests, and law-makers form codes of laws, and through the reverence or superstition of the people, or by military power, enforce obedience to their author-

ity. Obedience is regarded a duty, so long as the authority is believed to be legitimate. Laws, without doubt, are often made in the interest of the ruling classes, and as the enactments of tyrants are oppressive to the people, and result in their degradation, there is reason for the opinion of those who declaim against the hypocrisy of priests and the misrule of tyrants. The religious and civil freedom now enjoyed has been won by desperate struggles, and can be maintained only by acting on the principle that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."

Still it holds true that, notwithstanding abuses, both religion and law have been greatly beneficial to the human race, chiefly by maintaining order, thus giving security to property and encouragement to industry. To escape from the evils of anarchy people will fly to despotism.

It is natural for man to worship; religion is incorporated in his very constitution. From this fact designing priests have found it easy to forge the chains of ecclesiastical despotism. Advancing intelligence breaks these chains, and secures to every man the right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.

Do we prize, as we ought, the blessings of civil and religious liberty? But liberty can be enjoyed only under the protection of law. Without the guarantee of government, anarchy and rapine would run riot, and by robbing labor of its reward would frustrate the cherished hopes of humanity. Safety is found by overthrowing priestcraft and despotism, by shunning irreligion and anarchy, and by establishing and maintaining, to use the

words of the immortal Lincoln, "a Government of the people, by the people, and for the people."

Granting that governments originated in the authority, or by the usurpation of the chief, the king, and the priest, that they are sometimes oppressive, yet in the end the people will correct abuses, enact good laws, establish order, protect property, life, and character, and enforce observance. The necessity of law implies the duty of obedience to its commands.

Obedience is forced upon a child; but as he grows up to manhood his mind rises to the idea of duty. If the primitive instincts of a man are those of a brute, if he is compelled to obedience to law by a superior force, yet he rises above this state to a higher condition from which he is forbidden by his moral nature to descend to his former level.

Even certain animals have higher instincts prompting them to the acts of migration, hibernation, storing food, caring for their young. If animals do these things, how much more should the moral law be obeyed by man, who apprehends the beauty of truth, the excellence of the social instincts, and their superiority to the selfish! Knowing this, man can not, without self-reproach, gratify his selfish instincts at the expense of his friends, his country, or the human race; the self-reproach is the smiting of conscience for the violation of his obligations. No one blames himself for the unavoidable, but for doing wrong or refusing to do right. Self-reproach is hard to bear. The approval of conscience is a rich reward.

A sense of responsibility arises whenever one sees that his conduct, over which he has control, either of

doing or refraining, would accomplish more good than evil, and thus contribute to the general order and welfare, by tending to raise humanity to a higher plane of life; but the level of humanity is rising, the duties are enlarging, the rights are better known and held to be more sacred, and thus man's possibilities for good are transformed into actualities.

4. *Nature of duty.*—Considering law as the rule of action, duty is the obligation to respect law by complying with its behests. There are, as we have seen, various kinds of law. Moral law places its subjects under obligation, but not under compulsion; they ought to obey, but have the option to obey or to disobey. The obligation and the freedom constitute the duty of obedience. The subjects of moral law are persons, not things. A thing has no option, and deserves neither praise nor blame; but a person realizes his obligation to do his duty, for the performance of which he has the approval of conscience, and for failure a sense of guilt. Though a moral agent is under obligation to do right, he is not under compulsion; he is not free from responsibility or from desert, but he is free to do or to forbear, and for the use he makes of this freedom he is accountable. He can do right or wrong, but ought to do right.

There is something awful in the remorse of a guilty conscience; it bites back; it gnaws at the heart; it is the worm that dieth not, the fire that is not quenched. Ethics provides for reformation, but not for forgiveness.

Religion alone holds out the hope of deliverance from remorse by the forgiveness of sin through the mercy of God. But is it presumption to declare that

God will on certain conditions forgive sin? "When indeed we are charged with presumption in discussing the Divine will and the Divine character, the whole basis on which we stand must have been forgotten. We assume, not that we are intruding by our own reasoning into the awful secrets of the Divine nature, but that God has been graciously pleased to reveal his nature and his will to us, in a certain measure and under certain limitations."

Chapter XIII

LAW AND DUTY.—CONTINUED

RELATION of moral law to other laws.—Moral laws sustain interesting relations to other laws. Thus a person standing on the top of a high tower has the power to leap off or not to leap. The law of self-preservation enjoins the duty of not leaping. He has the option of leaping or not leaping; but should he leap, he has not the option of falling or not falling. He falls according to the physical law of gravitation. A moral law forbade the leap, and a violation of that law was wrong. After the leap it was not wrong to fall; for then he could not refrain from falling. It was wrong only to leap.

Good food nourishes the body, and poison destroys it, according to physical laws; but a moral law enjoins the duty of taking food and of refraining from taking poison. Here the reward or penalty is the natural consequence of the act. Moral law enjoins upon free beings such conduct as they believe will accomplish good results. Right conduct, objectively considered, is conduct attended with good results. Duty is the obligation to ascertain what conduct is right, so far as this can be done, and then heartily to perform that conduct.

In case of civil law, as there is in all ordinary cases a presumption that the law is righteous, there is an ante-

cedent moral law which enjoins obedience, and the reward of obedience is in general the participation with others in the good consequences of obedience. Man can reach his highest perfection only in society regulated by prudent social customs, wholesome moral restraints, and wise civil laws.

Sometimes rewards are offered by Government for acts not positively commanded, but only encouraged, as bounties for killing rapacious animals, for the production of certain crops as sugar, or to induce men to enlist in the army or navy. But penalties of violated civil laws are positive inflictions. An act is often a violation of both civil and moral law, and a double penalty is suffered, in the positive infliction and in the remorse of conscience. A crime undetected by man can not escape the criminal's conscience nor the eye of God.

2. *What to do when we believe an act to be right or know it to be right.*—When we believe an act to be right, it becomes our duty to do it, simply because we believe it to be right. This is the case when we know that the act is enjoined by proper authority, though we may not know why it is enjoined. We know an act to be right when we know that it is not forbidden by any law, and that its consequences are good. If the act is called in question, we justify it by the consequences.

3. *Why should we do right?*—When it is said, Do right for the sake of the right, we are not to understand that abstract right is a being that receives any benefit by our doing right, but that we do right for the sake of ourselves being right, and for the good of others. If the act falls under a moral law, we need not look to the consequences; yet these are implicitly accepted as good,

and though the act is right, if the law requiring it is believed to be righteous, yet it is the good consequences which make the law righteous, and these consequences, when known, constitute the rational and final justification of the act.

These considerations show that practically we may often decide the moral character of an act without special regard to its consequences, from the belief that the law enjoining it is right, but that ultimately the righteousness or unrighteousness of the law depends on the good or bad consequences of the act that is commanded or forbidden. These consequences of the act constitute the final justification of the law, which otherwise would be the edict of an irrational law-giver; and the justification of the law is the rational verification of the morality of the act.

4. *Kant's categorical imperative.*—It may be asked, Does not Kant's categorical imperative teach that duty is obedience to the law for the sake of the law, and that to look to the consequences for the justification of obedience is to destroy the moral character of the act? Kant was not a divine law-giver, and it is time his categorical imperative is disposed of. The law has no sake. It does it no good to obey it; hence the reason for obedience is not the sake of the law; but if there is no reason for obedience the law is irrational, and obedience, save that it secures order, would be a matter of indifference.

What, then, is the reason for obedience? A person ought to obey the law for the sake of others, and for his own sake. But does not this make the action selfish, and thus destroy its moral character? Certainly not when one obeys the law, not thinking of his own

good, but of the good of others. He then obeys the law for the sake of others, not thinking at the time of his own good, though afterwards he enjoys the satisfaction of knowing that his good is involved in their happiness. Altruistic morality is surely not selfish.

But what of the morality of a person's obedience for his own sake? Such an act, if not moral, is not immoral, and is justified by the good consequences. A person's own sake is just as valuable as the sake of any other person, and in promoting it he adds to the sum of the good of being, and hence performs a moral act, which would be approved by any reasonable beholder. No moral law requires that one should be regardless of self, though it is sometimes required that a person should sacrifice his own interest for the sake of the greater good of others.

Doing good to self is also justified on the moral ground that a person in doing good to self increases his power of doing good to others. Increasing his own perfection and happiness increases his power to promote the perfection and happiness of his fellow-beings.

The law then having no sake, Kant's categorical imperative, when reduced to its principle, is resolvable in every case into an hypothetical imperative. Kant when pressed to give a reason made this reduction himself. He says: "If we break our word, we seem to admit by that very act that others have a right to break theirs to us, and in such a case it would be impossible to trust any promise, and distrust would become general." Then do right if you wish the welfare of society, and not for right's sake, which is a nonentity.

Perfection may be sought without keeping our own

happiness continually in mind, and perfection is the surest means to ultimate happiness, both for our ourselves and for our fellow-beings. We therefore obey the moral law, because obedience promotes our own perfection and happiness, and the perfection and happiness of those within the range of our influence. Obedience to the moral law should be the immediate aim; good consequences will surely follow.

5. *Duty based on reasons.*—Duty is demanded because of its consequences; but when known it becomes absolute, and is to be performed without further reference to consequences, whether they be agreeable or disagreeable. The steadfast will always to do right is to be carried into execution at every opportunity. When we wish to find the *rationale* of duty, when we seek to justify duty to the eye of reason, and satisfy a sensitive conscience, then we rest with satisfaction on the ultimate aim of our conduct—the highest good of the greatest number, and feel assured that our conduct is fully justified.

In the application of this principle, in carrying it out in practice, the details of execution, which are multi-form, must be left to the good sense of the individual. Specific directions would be embarrassing and misleading, and an insult to his intelligence. No two persons are alike. They differ in disposition, in endowment, in development; their environments are infinitely varied; the work falling to each is peculiarly his own. It therefore becomes the duty of each person to study himself, his disposition, his tastes, his abilities, his resources, his environment, and then to choose wisely the niche he is to fill, to develop his powers to their fullest extent, to

equip himself specially and thoroughly for his work, and to discharge the duties of life to the best of his ability.

The good to be accomplished is illimitable; but duty is restricted by the limitations of the individual. No man can do all good; but he can do his own duty and thus discharge his own obligations. The function of each is fulfilled by the adjustment of faculty and environment so as best to accomplish his own work. The freedom of choice of life work is related to the individual's own satisfaction; the proper performance of his duties is related also to the satisfaction of those affected by the performance. A right choice of life work is that which, in view of faculty and environment, best fulfills the functions of the individual, and thus best promotes the social welfare. By doing in the best manner his own work every one fulfills his mission, attains his happiness, encourages his fellows, discharges his obligations to society, and gains lasting honor.

6. *Foundation of obligation.*—The world is a rational system of universal order, governed by general laws, and man is a rational being capable of understanding his relations to the universe. If order is preferable to disorder, and harmony to discord, it is man's duty to conform to the general order. In promoting the welfare of his fellow-beings, so far as he is able, he best realizes what is most worthy in himself.

There are different kinds and degrees of perfection—that of minerals, vegetables, animals, rational beings. Everything has a degree of perfection which determines its place in the scale of being. Man has an excellence proper to himself, not in what is common to him and the brute, but in those higher endowments of reason

and conscience peculiar to himself. He is, moreover, a progressive being, capable of increasing in knowledge, in power, and in all moral excellence. Every man partakes of the endowments common to humanity, and has also certain traits peculiar to himself, and in his endowments as a man, and in his own individual characteristics he finds his highest good and his proper position by divine warrant.

A person can best perform his duties to society by first performing the duties he owes to himself, that of attaining by a symmetrical education the highest degree of perfection of which he is capable. Every person has in himself an element of excellence, the discovery and development of which determines his proper place in society. The great diversity of talent is wonderfully and wisely adapted to secure the good of the whole. The element essentially important in each is what is characteristic of him, rather than that which is common to him and other people. In working his best powers to their utmost, though not neglecting his weaker faculties, each one finds his happiness, does the most good, and discharges his obligations to society.

A good maxim in education is, Cultivate with the greatest care your strongest powers, for from these you will achieve success; but do not neglect your undeveloped faculties.

7. *Man's supremacy.*—Man's superiority over the lower animals gives him the rightful supremacy, and constitutes him lord of creation; but he should rule humanely according to reason. Cruelty to animals is a crime, and a cause of degradation to man himself.

Man has also higher and lower orders of faculties.

The superior nature of man has the rightful authority over his inferior nature; but there is a struggle, a conflict for mastery between man's higher and lower natures, "for these are contrary the one to the other." In this conflict between his higher and lower natures, man, though under obligation to live as a rational being, is often brought "into captivity to the law of sin and death," which worketh in his members.

Here again we can resort to Christian ethics, and to religion itself. "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh: that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

Chapter XIV

MORAL EVIL

MORAL EVIL assumes many forms—aggression, violence, cruelty, robbery, strife, crime, vice, sin. These moral evils take specific names, and overlap more or less.

1. *Infanticide*.—The desire to preserve the lives of adults in times of scarcity of food has among barbarous tribes led to the cruel practice of infanticide as a supposed duty. People on the verge of starvation might be driven to infanticide by the incentive of self-preservation, and having begun the practice from necessity would continue it from force of habit till it became the custom of the tribe.

The destruction of many of the female children also had the inducement of getting rid of a burden, since they would be useless in the chase or in war, and, as consumers, would draw on their scanty supply of food. Tribes which killed their girls often obtained wives from other tribes by seizures, or as captives in war.

Children among savage or half-civilized tribes were often killed in fits of anger. They were also sacrificed to propitiate their chiefs, or as offerings to their gods, as in case of children cast into the Ganges.

2. *Homicide*.—Homicide has been sanctioned by social custom, as the Hindoo suttees, or as the victims

sacrificed at the funeral of chiefs, or as the slaves, at the death of their masters, that they might serve him in the world of shades, or the putting to death of a messenger that he might carry a message from the chief to his dead ancestor in the world of spirits.

The sacrifice of human victims to appease their gods was made by the Scythians, the Phœnicians, and perhaps by the Greeks, in pre-Homeric times, in the worship of Artemis, as in the case of Iphigenia, the daughter of Agamemnon.

In ancient Mexico thousands of victims were annually slain on altars of sacrifice, and wars were made that the slaughtered might satisfy the hunger of the gods.

Multitudes of martyrs have fallen victims to bigotry in pagan and even in Christian persecutions. The memory of these cruelties has not yet faded from the minds of men. The religion which was to bring "peace on earth," and which we trust will yet bring "good will to men," has hitherto, through the selfish ambitions of worldly leaders, too often brought hate, and the sword, and the fagot.

The cruelties practiced against the Jews in the Middle Ages scarcely seem credible, though they are authenticated facts of history. So cruel was their treatment, that in their despair they cried out in the morning, "Would God it were evening!" and in the evening, "Would God it were morning!" Even to this day the reproach and disabilities of the Jews are not wholly removed.

Among the Fijians murder was thought to be honorable. The same was true of the Bushmen. In other

tribes paradise was thought to be the reward of the man who had slain many victims.

It was the custom among the Indians to boast of the number of scalps they had taken. With them the biggest bully is the biggest man. The victor in a tussle exclaims, "Me big Injun."

The practice of cannibalism, with its horrid orgies, was a prevailing custom among the barbarous tribes of the South Sea Islanders, also in some tribes of the Dark Continent.

3. *Dueling*.—In the most enlightened nations dueling, a deadly combat between two persons, has been a common practice. There are two forms:

In the Middle Ages, the judicial duel was a trial regulated by law as proof of guilt or innocence. The modern duel is the judicial duel stripped of its legality.

Spirited men are sensitive of their honor, and quick to take an insult. A challenge, a duel, and probably the death or serious injury of one or both the parties is the consequence.

It would require an extended history to record the instances of duels and the details of the practice. An authority says "that in the eight years between 1601 and 1609 two thousand men of noble birth fell in duels." The total number of victims would reach many thousands. A change of sentiment has inclined men to settle their quarrels, not by "the code of honor," but in a legal way.

4. *Wars*.—To satisfy the ambition of rulers, wars have in the past been the practice of the most enlightened nations, and at present these nations go to war to gratify ambition or to satisfy their sense of honor. A

war of humanity, as the late war of the United States against Spain, is a new thing in history. When all wars are discontinued, save those for the relief of the oppressed, we may look for peace on earth.

In the long wars of Europe—for example, the hundred years' war, and the thirty years' religious war—there were not only the usual attendant cruelties, but there were scattered highwaymen and organized companies of robbers, who had their fortresses in the fastnesses of the mountains, and lived luxuriously on the spoils taken from the people. Even soldiers turned brigands, and sailors became pirates. Officers cheated their soldiers, and princes robbed the nations by debasing the coinage.

The peaceful tribes, as the Eskimos, have been uniformly honest. There seems to be a close connection between war and robbery, perhaps because war familiarizes the minds of men with deeds of violence, and gives greater facility for plunder in the unprotected homes, and the greater security to the freebooter on account of the general confusion.

At the present day, though in a measure restrained by comity, or by international law and by Christian sentiment, nations are yet too ready, on the pretext of national honor, to plunge into war, regardless of its wastefulness of treasure or its destructiveness of human life.

There are, we know, the ethics of war, its laws and usages, which, in the hands of such commanders as General Grant, have somewhat mitigated its horrors. Still the ethics of war is the ethics of strife, not of peace; of enmity, not of amity. May we not hope that

the Peace Convention of the nations at The Hague, called by the Czar of Russia, is a promise of peace and good will among the nations? Let national controversies be settled by arbitration, as even now is sometimes done, and not by force of arms.

5. *Slavery*.—One of the worst consequences of ancient wars was slavery. The prisoners of war were either slaughtered or sold as slaves. In Athens and Rome, slaves at times outnumbered the citizens. In modern times the captives in the African tribal wars were bought by slave-traders from the victorious chiefs with trinkets or with rum, and sold to enlightened people for slaves. The tribal wars were often instigated by the slave-traders themselves, for the express purpose of obtaining slaves.

But the rising moral sentiment of the present age, under the good providence of God, has induced the Christian nations to brand the slave-trade as piracy, and has abolished "the sum of all villainies," slavery itself, within their borders. It now lingers as a relic of barbarism only among the benighted nations of the earth.

6. *Robbery*.—The seizure of the property of the vanquished was regarded as the right of the victors. Wars were instigated for the sake of the plunder, and soldiers encouraged to enlist by appeals to their avarice.

Robbery, however, exists in times of peace, as well as in times of war. It is a crime against the right of property. It is not a wrong practiced only in the early ages of history, but it is a common crime to-day among all nations. It is practiced by highwaymen, burglars, bank-robbers, train-robbers, forgers, defaulters, thieves,

swindlers, deadbeats, and frauds of every description, whose name is legion. Public sentiment protects wealth earned honestly and employed conscientiously. Many wealthy men are doing great good with their wealth.

The halo of romance has been thrown round the exploits of bandits and pirates, and their daring deeds, told in a well-written novel or graceful poem, have inflamed the imaginations of many an ardent youth, and incited him to a career of outlawry and crime.

The Spartans taught their boys to steal, but punished them for stupidity if detected. The crime of the boys was thought to be not in the theft, but in their unskillfulness in not escaping detection. The same sentiments have prevailed among other people.

Certain tribes do not allow stealing among themselves, yet encourage their people to rob other tribes by accounting it honorable. Such practices tend to provoke war. Among the Turcomans, celebrated robbers not only become famous, but are accounted heroes, and after death are worshiped as saints, and pilgrimages are made to their shrines.

The crew and passengers of a vessel stranded on an inhospitable shore were often plundered by the natives and reduced to slavery.

We know from English history that among the Norsemen piracy and robbery, practiced in bold, open, honest fashion, were accounted honorable. The adventurers became the sturdy settlers of old England, and to them some of us can trace our ancestry. The Norman invasion was a high-handed encroachment on the rights of the Saxon inhabitants; but the result was, no doubt, an advance in civilization. The Saxons, how-

ever, had before encroached on the rights of the Britons.

The struggle for existence is seen even in the vegetable kingdom. A large tree overshadows a smaller one near by, stunts its growth, and finally causes it to die. Weeds, unless uprooted, will destroy the garden vegetables.

In the animal kingdom unceasing war exists. The lamb eats the grass, and the wolf the lamb. The toad eats flies, the snake the toad, the hawk the snake.

"So, naturalists observe, a flea
Has smaller fleas that on him prey;
And these have smaller still to bite 'em;
And so proceed, *ad infinitum*."

"Life evermore is fed by death,
In earth, and sea, and sky;
And, that a rose may breathe its breath,
Something must die."

Not only does one species prey upon another, but hostility exists between individuals of the same species. The earth has many a waste and desert place. Some parts are devastated by floods, tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, and by earthquakes, and some countries are decimated by famine or pestilence.

Among men, nation wars against nation, or one part of the nation rebels against the government. France takes Alsace and Lorraine from Germany, and Germany retakes Alsace and Lorraine from France. The Turk conquers the Greek, and the Greek regains his independence. England taxes her American Colonies without allowing them representation, and the Colonies rebel and gain their independence. Spain oppresses her

colonies, and they sever their connection with the tyrannical Power.

Within the nation is turmoil and party strife. Now one party rules, and anon it is hurled from power. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a blow for a blow. Retaliation is sometimes postponed till opportunity is given for a decisive blow. Cherished, postponed, and planned, retaliation is revenge. Rivalry and the struggle for existence lead to aggression, and aggression to counter aggression. Wrong invites revenge. Feuds between families or tribes or clans sometimes continue for generations, and often terminate in arson or murder. The fact, however, that revenge will be taken sooner or later is no doubt a check to original aggression.

In primitive times, and even now among barbarous tribes, revenge is considered a duty, and no rest is allowed till satisfaction is attained. In modern times among civilized people revenge, though not regarded as a duty, is often cherished, and to satisfy hatred is visited on the offender. This is seen in the Vendetta, in lynch law, and in the inflictions of the White Caps.

No one but a Christian of the highest type can love his enemies. Resentment for wrong will not be laid aside till the truth of the Divine declaration is accepted: "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord."

One of the best means of suppressing evil tendencies is steady employment at some regular and useful work. Vitality is thus expended which otherwise would be employed in some kind of vicious conduct. In man's present moral condition, it is well for him that he has to labor. It would be a great relief if idle men could be employed in useful labor at fair wages.

7. *Sources of moral evil.*—These are chiefly the malevolent affections and selfish desires.

(1) *The malevolent affections* are sources of frightful evils. Of these evil affections there is a long list. Dislike, antipathy, contempt, scorn, disdain, pride, haughtiness, arrogance, envy, jealousy, malice, resentment, hatred, anger, wrath, rage, fury, revenge. To yield to these is to wrong our fellows and to injure ourselves.

(2) *The selfish desires* crave gratification, regardless of the woes caused to fellow-beings, and thus become the source of innumerable evils. These selfish desires are manifest in avarice or excessive desire for wealth, in vanity or undue craving for praise, in selfish ambition or inordinate desire for power or fame, and in unbridled appetites or passions. It is easy to see how these selfish desires work to the injury of society.

Chapter XV

MORAL EVIL.—CONTINUED

CRIME.—Crime includes those offenses against society which are punishable by civil law. It does not include all moral offenses. Those not punishable under civil law are excluded, such as ingratitude, common lying, and the like. Lying under oath is the crime of perjury. Certain great crimes, such as murder, treason, desertion from the army, are punished with death. Crimes are of various kinds and degrees, with corresponding punishments, varying with the nation. In England, the number of capital crimes is now far less than formerly, and prisoners are treated with far less cruelty.

The proper method of dealing with criminals is a great practical problem. It has political, economical, and social, as well as moral bearings. It is receiving the earnest consideration of thoughtful minds. We refer our readers to the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, also to the *International Journal of Ethics*, both published at Philadelphia.

2. *Vice and Sin.*—Vice is the opposite of virtue; hence every virtue has its corresponding vice. As moral evils, the vices may be regarded both in their internal and external aspects; that is, in character and conduct. As we speak of virtuous character and virtu-

ous conduct, so we speak of vicious character and vicious conduct. Vice as conduct embraces crime, or the infraction of duty punishable by the civil law, and sins, or the infractions of duty which break the moral law, but which may or may not be crimes, that is, punishable by the civil law.

All crimes that break the moral law are sins, but all sins are not crimes—those not punishable under civil law; but there are crimes that are not sins; for example, the crime of an anti-slavery man in refusing to aid in capturing a runaway slave, at the command of the marshal, under the act called the Fugitive Slave Law. Such a refusal was not a sin, though technically a crime. It would have been a sin to have aided in the capture. He could have avoided the crime by committing the sin. What ought a man to do in such a case?

When the Fugitive Slave Law was in force, many claimed that there is a higher law which ought to be obeyed, when in opposition to a wicked civil law. The subject called out a great discussion. In such a case a person ought to obey his conscience, at the same time remembering that his judgment is fallible, and that the presumption is in favor of the righteousness of the civil law. Each person must be the judge of his own duty.

3. *Enlargement of the list of sins.*—Conscientious persons are continually discovering additional sins, as their moral aims outrun the moral code of society, which expresses the moral sense of the average person. The advanced opinions of the conscientious and the intelligent gradually find their way into the accepted moral code. The growth of the moral sense of society gradually finds embodiment in law, and thus transforms

sins into crimes. But many sins involve their own punishment, which is regarded as sufficient, and accordingly are not made crimes, consequently not punishable under civil law. Sin, as the voluntary transgression of the moral law, involves guilt and responsibility, the indispensable condition of which is the freedom of the will. Character is formed by conduct. Man as a free being can so control his conduct as essentially to modify his character; hence he is responsible for his character.

4. *Elements of character.*—The character of a person is the resultant of several elements or components—heredity, environment, personal effort, and the providence of God.

(1) *Heredity.*—Heredity is that component of character which is received by nature—the peculiar constitution, disposition, traits, and proportionate strength of powers, which one receives as an inheritance from his ancestors.

No doubt all human beings have certain things in common—the same original powers which entitle them all to be called human beings; but there is a difference in the physical organization, in the fineness of fiber and nerve, in temperament, and in the relative strength of the original powers.

Sometimes the disproportion of faculties is so great, and the corresponding tendencies so powerful, as to be well-nigh, if not quite, irresistible. The individual is abnormal, and if the unduly strong elements are appetites or passions, he is likely to become a monster in crime. The overmastering passion sweeps away all opposition from the will, and the individual yields himself

to the unbridled gratification of his desires. As abnormal specimens of humanity, such persons are not to be judged by the ordinary standard, thus requiring large measures of charity.

It is difficult for a normal person to judge correctly or to treat fairly an abnormal one. He has no experience which can supply a standard for judgment. In many cases, doubtless, the proper destination of abnormal specimens of humanity is the hospital or the asylum, rather than the penitentiary or the gallows. The subject requires and is receiving careful attention.

In average cases there is no fatality. A man's actions are subject to his own control, and for his actions he alone is responsible. But how is a criminal made out of an average individual? By first committing slight misdemeanors, yielding to temptation from time to time, forming bad habits, and going on from bad to worse, till finally the tendencies to evil become practically irresistible. He then becomes, to all intents and purposes, an abnormal specimen, only he is responsible for his condition, as the one abnormal by nature is not responsible.

Can such a one rescue himself from his condition? He may; but he must begin to do right when he can, and avoid the sins he can avoid, changing his environment, if possible, and especially his company, and continue to work in this way till final victory is secured. Sometimes it is possible to reform at once by one great effort; if so, then so much the better.

(2) *Environment*.—That component in the formation of character which consists in the surrounding in-

fluences, including educational advantages and religious influences, is called environment. It is found in the home, the father and mother, brothers and sisters, in relatives and neighbors, street companions and occasional acquaintances, the teacher and the school, the Church and public gatherings, the show and the fair, the college and the professional school, the business pursuits and benevolent enterprises, and whatever other outside influences act on a person throughout his entire course of life.

That the environment exerts a powerful influence in molding character will not be questioned. Take two children, born the same day, one in a wealthy, refined Christian family of a city, and the other in a family of a savage tribe, and let them be interchanged, and each treated in all respects as the other would have been, and what would be the result when the boys became men? Heredity, without doubt, would show in each case; but the outcome would prove what a tremendous power there is in environment. How careful, then, should parents be in regard to the environment of their children.

(3) *Personal effort*.—A young man just about to begin his life's work is likely to be impressed with a sense of his own importance. He takes for his graduating thesis the subject, "Every Man the Architect of His own Fortune." This undoubtedly is, in a large measure, true, and is not a bad motto for a young man to keep before his mind. Much depends on the person's own effort, and on this fact lies his responsibility, and he has good grounds to found high hopes, if he does according

to his best ability; but other components contribute to the result, other factors to the product, and with these he must reckon.

(4) *The providence of God.*—It is, however, often true that a man, after meeting with many reverses and disappointments in life, and finding the outcome not as he had anticipated, concludes that he is not the architect of his own fortune, or that he is not a skillful architect. Perhaps after years of trial a new field of work opens to him, in which he finds enjoyment and an opportunity for usefulness. He now exclaims,

“There is a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will.”

A person old enough to understand somewhat of the responsibilities of life needs, first of all, to adjust his relations to God, to his fellow-beings, and to himself. He then should choose wisely his business in life; next he should make a thorough preparation for his work. Having entered upon his work, he must be industrious and energetic; he must use common sense and manage skillfully; he must be a progressive and growing man to the end of life.

The good providence of God is over us all, and it is not a superstition to look to God for help and guidance, to supplement our own efforts and management. The wisest men have had this faith. “The meek will he guide in judgment.”

Notwithstanding the best that we can do, in spite of the maxims of prudence and the laws of morality, the fact of sin encounters us on every hand, and mars many a character that otherwise would be beautiful.

Is sin a consequence of ignorance? Is it true, as Socrates taught, that every man would do what is right, if he only knew what is right? Both Spinoza and Leibnitz make immorality the product of confused ideas, and thus an error. At first view this looks plausible, and the argument in support of this opinion seems conclusive. It can be stated thus: Every man desires the greatest possible good for himself; but he can obtain the greatest possible good only by doing right; hence he would do right if he only knew what is right; that is, sin is resolvable into ignorance.

The fallacy in the above argument, as I take it, is that the wrong-doer, though he may accept the second premise theoretically—that he can obtain the greatest possible good only by doing right, yet refuses to act on it in practice, preferring present intense gratification to a distant, milder, though truly a higher good.

It is perfectly certain that in many cases the doctrine of Socrates is not true. For example, a drunkard knows full well that he is on the downward road, and that the course he is pursuing will lead to his ruin; yet with his eyes open to the consequences, such is the strength of appetite that he pushes on till he plunges into the abyss. In such cases, truer than the words of Socrates are those of Ovid:

"Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor."

But is not a drunkard in an abnormal condition? Yes, and so are a multitude of others. Are they responsible? In a majority of cases, undoubtedly they are responsible, at least for allowing themselves to drift into such conditions; and even now rescue in many cases is

not hopeless. But if his own strength is not sufficient, there is One mighty to save and strong to deliver, and none will appeal to him in vain.

The doctrine of freedom does not explain why some men become criminals, and others virtuous citizens. It explains only that, in all normal cases, each man has the power to do right, and is responsible for doing wrong. The great criminals are unbalanced; they are monsters by heredity, or have been made so by their environment, or have made themselves so by their conduct, or perhaps some have been made so by overmastering temptation. There is occasion for charity; but society must be protected from the outrageous conduct of the dangerous criminal classes.

One thing seems clear—the diseased, the imbecile, the excessively abnormal, and the incorrigibly wicked should not be allowed to contract marriage alliances. It seems wrong, in the overcrowded condition of the population of the world, to allow misery to be propagated. Depravity, the tendency to sin, is hereditary, but not actual personal sin. We are not responsible for the sin of Adam. It will quite suffice if we answer for our own sins.

The analysis of sin reveals an objective factor—some object which tempts, entices, or allures; a subjective factor—some appetite, affection, or desire of the sensibility; the action of the objective factor and the reaction of the subjective; the accompanying excitement of the sensibility craving gratification, and soliciting the will to yield to the temptation; the consent of the will; the corresponding outward act, doing the wicked deed. The will is not coerced, but chooses the evil, though

not without temptation. The sin is in the wrong decision, which objectifies itself in the outward act.

The central element of morality is a right will; that is, a will to do right—a will that embodies itself in deeds. It is the ultimate right act, and its consequence is the ultimate good—the consciousness of rectitude.

According to Fichte, all right moral action is the striving towards the ideal—the full realization of a perfected self.

According to Hegel, the source of morality is not in the subjective but in the objective will, in that impersonal power of the world of reason, shared and actualized by individual wills, the consensus of the moral opinions of the good. Development takes place in this universal world of reason by the participation of the individual reason. Hence the highest good is the development of the universal world of reason. The aim, then, should be to eliminate evil from the universe, and to bring all wills into harmony with the will of the universal reason, bringing all rational beings to the final goal—the realization of integrity of character, with its attendant satisfaction.

Part Second

PRACTICAL ETHICS

Chapter I

EGOISTIC VIRTUES

DEFINITION of virtue.—Virtue is personal worthiness. It is the steadfast disposition to pursue ultimate good by the employment of right means. It aims to realize the standard of excellence.

That there is something heroic or unflinching in virtue is implied in the etymology of the word. *Vir* is not simply *homo*, a man; but a *heroic man*, a *hero*.

2. *General characteristics of the virtues.*—These are purity, decision, independence, and heroism.

(1) *Purity.*—This signifies not only the absence of inordinate appetites, unholy affections and desires, and unclean images; but it also means the absence of hypocrisy, intrigue, double-dealing, and all meanness, and the presence of honesty and integrity of character, which speak through the eye and illuminate the countenance with truth and goodness.

(2) *Decision.*—There is in virtue the strong will to carry the righteous purpose into execution. A firm rein is held over the appetites, the passions, the affections, and the desires. There is a decided purpose not to swerve from the path of rectitude, whatever be the allurements of pleasure, the inducements of gain, or the appeals to ambition. Virtue is marked not only by the placid countenance, but by the firm lip and steady look.

(3) *Independence*.—A virtuous person is self-poised; he is not carried about with every wind of doctrine, nor swayed by popular opinion; but he is ready to stand alone, if need be, and maintain his convictions steadfast in the integrity of his spirit and in the persuasion of the righteousness of his cause.

(4) *Heroism*.—The virtuous man is heroic; he has the courage of his convictions; he will face opposition, persecution, imprisonment, or death, rather than prove false to the cause of truth. All honor to the martyr. Of such the world is not worthy.

3. *Virtue compared with merit and duty*.—Virtue is the disposition, the steadfast purpose to do right; merit lies in the particular volition to do a right thing, and in carrying out the volition into execution in the best possible manner. In contrast with duty, virtue is what a person ought to possess; duty is what he ought to perform. Virtue is the good internal state; duty is the right external conduct. Virtue is goodness; duty is righteousness. Virtue is the fountain; duty is the stream. Virtue is *to be*; duty is *to do*. According to the Epicureans, the pursuit of happiness is virtue; according to the Stoics, the pursuit of virtue is happiness. The essence of virtue is the harmony of the intellect and will in the endeavor to perfect the entire being.

4. *Virtues peculiar to various classes of society*.—There are shades of differences in the virtues of the various classes of society, as of men and women, the old and the young, the parent and the child, the teacher and the pupil, the rich and the poor, the wise and the ignorant, the strong and the weak, the one in health and the one who is sick, the one in authority and the one

under authority. The difference is not in virtue itself, but in the phase of virtue required, and in the mode of carrying it into execution.

5. *Aristotle's conception of virtue.*—Aristotle regarded each virtue as a mean between two extremes—one extreme distinguished by *excess*, and the other by *defect*. Thus, courage is a mean between rashness, the excess of courage, and cowardice, the defect. This way of regarding the virtues has some practical advantages, as it is a standing admonition to avoid extremes. We can say, if we choose, that rashness is due to a defect of prudence, and cowardice to an excess.

Likewise generosity may be regarded as a mean between the extremes, prodigality and stinginess. Aristotle says: "Everybody who understands his business avoids alike excess and deficiency."

6. *Classification of the virtues.*—The virtues may be classified as the *egoistic*, or self-regarding virtues, and the *altruistic*, or other-regarding virtues. Each of these has several subdivisions.

7. *Egoistic virtues.*—The egoistic virtues may be divided into prudence; courage, including valor and fortitude; temperance, including moderation and self-control; purity, including cleanliness and chastity; industry, frugality.

The egoistic virtues are not necessarily immoral or even non-moral, as some moralists maintain, on the ground that they are selfish. It is true that sometimes certain self-gratifications are sought, regardless of the fact that they interfere with the rights of others. This is, of course, immoral; but such a course does not show a true interest in self in promoting its highest welfare,

but in something else regarded as a means of gratification.

It is certainly right, and even duty, for a person to regard his own true interests, including all those that range from bodily health up through his intellectual progress to his highest moral and spiritual interests. No duty is more imperative, and to do this duty is true moral conduct, and the fulfillment of the first moral obligation. A person in rightly advancing his own welfare is in better condition to advance the welfare of his fellow-beings.

The egoistic virtues lead each person to find and maintain his proper position in the moral order. It is the duty of every one to find his niche, and to make sure of his footing. This gives him a base of operations as he advances from the egoistic virtues to altruistic.

Let us now consider the egoistic virtues in detail:

(1) *Prudence*.—Fear is a compound of aversion and expectation. Prudence, in its rudimental form, is a combination of fear and cunning. When fear is transformed into caution and cunning into wisdom, we have the virtue of prudence. It is wisdom or forethought employed in guarding personal interests from anticipated danger. Prudence is the fundamental egoistic virtue. "Do thyself no harm."

A conscientious man deems it right to guard his own rights and to conserve his powers, in order that he may attain to his own highest good, promote the interests of his family, advance the welfare of society, and thus fulfill his mission in the world. Employing his powers of forethought, he can see the premonitions of coming evil. Anticipating its approach from the threat-

ening signs, he employs his wisdom to thwart the wicked designs of an adversary, or to avert an impending calamity. "A prudent man foreseeth the evil and hideth himself, but the simple pass on and are punished."

There are many occasions for the exercise of prudence, as in guarding health and strength, avoiding hazardous business enterprises, making preparations to weather an expected financial crisis, guarding the morals of the family, avoiding needless antagonisms and conflicts, laying provisions in store, depositing surplus earnings in bank, insuring property or life, avoiding building in places exposed to malaria or on grounds liable to inundation, avoiding bad water or unwholesome food, and observing temperance in eating and drinking.

Thus we see that prudence is not identical with cowardice, but is consistent with both bravery and wisdom. After exercising due prudence, and making sure that you are right, then push forward with boldness.

(2) *Courage*.—Courage is the virtue required in encountering danger or in enduring suffering. It is, therefore, both an active and a passive virtue. In its active form, it is called valor or bravery; in its passive form, patience or fortitude. Valor incurs danger without wavering; fortitude endures pain without flinching. As a rule, valor is the courage of men; fortitude of women. Men bravely face danger; women patiently endure suffering, but shrink from encountering danger. A man loses his property, and becomes insane or commits suicide; a woman loses hers, and begins work anew. Bravery and fortitude lead on to victory.

In the battle of life, with its dangers and sufferings, there is much need of courage, both as valor and as fortitude. Some are called upon to face the enemy on the field of battle, and others to endure the pain of sickness.

Courage enables us to encounter difficulties, to overcome obstacles, and to endure the reverse of fortune, so common to the lot of humanity. A man destitute of courage is almost certain to be a failure.

Moral courage is required to advocate the cause of truth when unpopular, or to endure persecution for righteousness' sake.

Courage restrained by prudence will not rise to rashness, and cheered by hope it will not sink into cowardice. Hence be very courageous; avoid rashness on the one hand, and cowardice on the other. Courage is the very heart of virtue.

(3) *Temperance*.—Temperance is moderation or self-control. It has special reference to appetite. It signifies total abstinence from all injurious or unlawful gratification of appetite, and the restraint of lawful gratification within reasonable bounds. Intemperance in eating is gluttony; in drinking, drunkenness.

Among primitive people, worshipers of ancestors, or those who thought the gods may be hungry, consider intemperance a vice, since it deprives their ancestors or the gods of their share of food or drink, and hence libations to the gods. On the other hand, among the Greeks, in their Bacchanalian revels, the god of wine was supposed to be honored by their orgies.

The need of the virtue of temperance is apparent from a consideration of the evils of intemperance. The

wise man's advice is good: "Be not among wine-bibbers, nor among riotous eaters of flesh; for the drunkard and the glutton shall come to poverty." Again: "Look not upon the wine when it is red, . . . at the last it biteth like a serpent and stingeth like an adder."

It is possible to be intemperate in other forms of indulgence besides eating and drinking, as in recreation, or in fact in any kind of conduct. One may work immoderately.

The appetites have their proper functions. They incite to necessary acts, which otherwise would be neglected; but they should not have control. Their proper rank is that of subordination. In the moral realm, the will is the sovereign, and reason the chief counselor.

(4) *Purity*.—Purity embraces both cleanliness and chastity.

a. *Cleanliness* of person, if not strictly a virtue, is akin to morality. Filthiness of the flesh is closely allied to filthiness of the spirit. It is certainly commendable to have not only our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, but our bodies washed with pure water. "Cleanliness is next to godliness."

b. *Chastity* is a virtue of the highest honor. No vice is more detrimental to health, or more degrading and loathsome than unchastity. It was this vice that called down the wrath of God on Sodom and Gomorrah, those corrupt cities of the plains.

The high rank of chastity among the virtues is evident from the fact that by the mention of a virtuous woman we instantly think of a chaste woman. The high standard of this virtue among women is their highest honor; but the standard should be no lower among

men. But the actual standard is higher among women; why is this? Because of the consequences. Unchastity in woman is a greater evil than it is in man. Giving birth to a child identifies the mother. She knows her own children; a father accepts his from faith in his wife.

The future progress of the human race depends largely on the promotion of the virtue of chastity. Young people should be instructed in respect to this virtue and its opposite vice, and their morals carefully guarded. Great interests are at stake.

(5) *Industry*.—This is primarily an economic virtue. Industry promotes the prosperity of the individual; it is not only egoistic, but is also altruistic, as it is beneficial to the family and to society and the State. By absorbing the energies of the individual, it is a restraint against vicious tendencies; and in this respect it has a moral bearing, as well as in increasing the resources of the individual for good.

(6) *Frugality*.—This is also an economic virtue. But in guarding against waste, extravagance, and luxury, it conserves the resources of the individual and promotes the general welfare, and hence may be reckoned among the moral virtues.

All the egoistic virtues have an altruistic bearing, since a person, by increasing and conserving his own resources, is better able to be useful to others. The utility of these virtues is their final justification—they tend to promote the welfare of the human race.

8. *Habit* is the tendency to action acquired by repetition.

The importance of habit is evident from the fact that the virtues and the vices are formed and confirmed by

habitual conduct, which crystallize into character. The importance of habit is also illustrated by the common proverbs: Habit is second nature; Man is a bundle of habits; The force of habit is hard to break; It was done by the force of habit.

The basis of habit is the plasticity of matter and mind. An impression made upon a body tends to abide, since matter, in general, is not perfectly elastic. The mind tends to act as it has acted before, since thought forces follow the old paths, or lines of the least resistance.

(1) *The laws of habit*.—An impression tends to abide; an act tends to recur. The tendency to recur varies with the strength of the act, with the number of repetitions, with the recentness of the repetitions, with the interest taken. Continuance in well-doing develops into the habit of well-doing; continuance in evil-doing, into the habit of evil-doing. Habit crystallizes into character, which tends to permanency.

(2) *The classes of habits* are physical, intellectual, and moral.

a. *Physical habits* are illustrated by a tablecloth, which readily folds in the old creases; by a bow, which, being often bent, acquires a set. A nervous current through the brain follows an old track. A person winds his watch at a stated time; or if not, forgets to wind it.

b. *Intellectual habits* are illustrated by the fact that we think readily as we have thought before; that processes at first difficult become easy after sufficient practice, as the performance of a skillful musician or mathematician. Right habits of thought are easy to continue; wrong habits are hard to break up. A habit of attentive

observation gives an accurate knowledge of facts; clear thinking makes the cogent reasoner; a patient investigator becomes a discoverer or an inventor.

c. Moral habits.—A right act tends to recur. A continuation of right acts is right conduct. Right conduct forms good character. Good character reproduces right conduct. A right character tends to permanence. A wrong act tends to recur. A continuance of wrong acts is wrong conduct. Wrong conduct forms bad character. Bad character reproduces wrong conduct. A bad character tends to permanence.

(3) *Precepts.*—These precepts aid in forming good habits and correcting bad habits.

a. Form early in life as possible good habits, physical, intellectual, and moral, by persistence in right conduct.

b. Correct bad habits as promptly as possible, by refraining from wrong conduct, for which substitute right conduct.

(4) *Consequences.*—The consequences prove the value of the plan.

a. Right habits diminish effort, relieve from anxiety, economize energy, render the work accurate, and set thought free for something else while the work goes on.

b. Habit is an ally if right, an enemy if wrong.

c. Right habits bring their own reward; bad habits their own punishment.

d. Exceptions break the force of habit, and prevent it from crystallizing into character.

e. Good character manifests itself in well-doing, and receives the crown of life.

(5) *Rules.*—The following rules will be of service:

a. Form a good practicable plan of conduct.

b. Carry out the plan as far as possible without exceptions.

c. Seek opportunities for doing good, or make opportunities.

9. *Business.*—The following precepts will serve as guides:

(1) Find out your proper work, learn the best methods, and put them in practice.

(2) Make honorable contracts and fulfill them.

(3) Render faithful service if an employee.

(4) Pay the wages promptly if an employer.

(5) Be careful about making promises, but keep them when made.

(6) Avoid dishonesty and every species of fraud.

(7) Establish a good character, and take care of your reputation.

(8) Stand by the truth, but do not needlessly make enemies.

(9) Aim at success by industry, economy, and good management.

(10) Work for your own perfection and happiness.

(11) Work for the perfection and happiness of others.

(12) Remember that you are known to yourself and to God.

Chapter II

ALTRUISTIC VIRTUES

COMPARISON of the egoistic and altruistic virtues.—We have distinguished the virtues as egoistic and altruistic, not that the egoistic virtues have no reference to other people, or that the altruistic have no reference to self; but because the egoistic virtues relate primarily to self, and secondarily to others; and the altruistic primarily to others, and secondarily to self. The egoistic virtues are the necessary basis of the altruistic, and the altruistic the ripe fruitage of the egoistic.

2. *Classification of the altruistic virtues.*—The altruistic virtues may be divided into sympathy, justice, and benevolence. Under justice may be grouped gratitude, honesty, veracity; and under benevolence, pity, compassion, mercy, charity; the domestic affections relate both to justice and to benevolence; so do the patriotic sentiments. Suavity, courtesy, politeness, are primarily matters of etiquette, with a secondary relation to morals.

3. *Sympathy.*—Sympathy is fellow-feeling, or feeling with others as they feel. Some animals are solitary in their habits, others are gregarious. The difference turns on the preponderance of the self-maintaining or the race-maintaining tendency. When animals act from sympathy, they do this from an instinctive impulse, and not from any rational motive.

Solitariness prevails when support and safety can be

better obtained by dispersion, and gregariousness when food is more easily obtained by searching for it in concert, and protection by combined resistance against attack.

Sociality begins to prevail as the dispersive tendencies diminish, and the gregariousness becomes more advantageous. Companionship begets sympathy, which becomes a strong bond of union. As two musical instruments tuned to the same pitch vibrate in unison, and as a vibration in a string of one causes a like vibration in the corresponding string of the other, so do two individuals of the same species tend to feel in concert, and this fellow-feeling is the fundamental fact of sympathy.

Sympathy is the rudimental form of the altruistic virtues, as prudence is of the egoistic. It increases so long as the pleasure it affords preponderates over pain; it decreases whenever unpleasant effects prevail. The tendency to sympathy is found between individuals of the same species, between the sexes, and between parents and offspring. It is strengthened by sameness of nationality, by social, party, and Church relations, by equality in culture, and by harmony of interests.

Antipathies are generated by the conflicting interests of social classes, parties, Churches, societies, by rivalries between individuals, by the antagonisms of hostile nations, instigated by the selfish ambition of the rulers, causing wars; by the worldly aspirations of the leaders of religious opinions, instigating ecclesiastical bigotry. All these antagonisms have greatly hindered the prevalence of universal sympathy, so essential to the highest happiness of the human race, by aiding in the

development of the higher forms of the altruistic virtues—justice and benevolence.

4. *Justice*.—Justice is the rendering to every one his due. It grants the freedom of self-realization, provided it does not interfere with the self-realization of others. It is due recompense for something rendered, whether beneficial or injurious. It implies impartiality in its distribution; the observance of legal obligations, contracts, and definite understandings; the fulfillment of reasonable expectations; reparations for injury, and the punishment of crime. It signifies a fair return for services, taking into consideration the labor required in the service, and the value of the service to whom it is rendered.

The adage, "Be just before you are generous," seems to indicate that, in the popular mind, justice is a virtue quite distinct from benevolence, and this is, in an important sense, true. Justice relates to social life, and is therefore of public concern; while benevolence relates to private life, and is therefore of private concern. But when we raise the question, Why ought we to be just? the answer first given, Justice is due others, raises the further question, Why give others their due? The answer is, In doing so, we promote the general welfare, and to do this is the dictate of benevolence. The obligation to promote the general welfare is self-evident and ultimate.

Traces of the instinct of justice may be found among animals. A male bird feeding his mate while she sits on her eggs, affords a beautiful instance of compensatory justice. Young animals receiving benefits from their parents, in proportion to their helplessness, indi-

cates affection, not justice; but mature animals win rewards in proportion to their efficiency. In the struggle for existence, individuals perish, but nature preserves the species:

"So careful of the type she seems;
So careless of the single life."

The biological law of *natural selection* is an instance of the justice of nature. Those survive and prosper which, as a rule, are most efficient.

Natural justice is interfered with in various ways. Many species of a low type survive by the slaughter of multitudes of other species. Again, multitudes perish, the good and bad alike, from scarcity of food or the inclemency of the weather, or from the intrusion of parasites. In proportion, however, to the evolution of the organism, the ratio between efficiency and prosperity is more constant, and justice becomes more uniformly exemplified.

In these cases, individual conduct is somewhat restricted by considerations of the general good. Habits thus formed become traits of character for the species and operate as laws, the infraction of which is visited with penalties. An idle beaver is banished from the community. The working bees kill the drones. A flock of crows kill an offensive companion. A rogue of an elephant is expelled from the herd. Here we see the beginning of justice, and such acts tend to the evolution of higher capabilities.

(1) *Modification of the law connecting prosperity with efficiency.*—Mr. Spencer has pointed out a threefold modification.

a. In favor of the helpless young which are cared for by their parents in proportion inversely to their efficiency.

b. Among gregarious animals individual aggressiveness is restricted by social requirements of non-interference with the wants of the associated individuals.

c. The sacrifice of individuals is sanctioned when it contributes to the prosperity of the whole.

The first restriction applies to animals in general, the second to gregarious animals, the third in case of enemies of different species.

In the human race the law that prosperity is proportional to efficiency works for the preservation of the species, by securing the survival of the fittest, and the spread of the best races of mankind over the world. The law, as applied to man, has the same threefold restriction as when applied to animals—the young are cared for without merit, the strong are not allowed to encroach on their fellows, and the individual is sacrificed in the face of enemies when the good of the whole requires it, with this extension, the enemies may be of the same species.

Among the earlier races of mankind justice first took the form of repelling aggression, obtaining satisfaction for the infringement of rights, the punishment of crime, and resistance against invasion. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, blood for blood, life for life. The fear of retaliation checked aggression.

In the spread of the human race there would be collisions of tribes and nations. Wars were undertaken for conquest, as well as for defense. In some cases, no doubt, wars have contributed to the progress of man-

kind; but the overthrow of the Roman Empire by barbarous hordes proves that for a time human progress may be reversed by war, though, as events have shown, only to return with the greater momentum.

Each man is free to act as he will, provided he does not encroach on the equal freedom of another. What each person claims for himself, he must, of course, concede to others, else his claim will not be allowed.

(2) *Checks to injustice.*—Several factors have co-operated:

a. The fear of retaliation.—Aggression arouses retaliation. Men do not tamely submit to robbery or to any form of injustice. Aggression is taught justice by resistance. Justice is taught by the force which resists injustice. Equals can not overcome one another, and so are taught toleration. Free thought is the best means for the discovery and defense of truth.

b. The dread of social disgrace.—All the people sympathize with the one wronged, and even when they do not aid in bringing upon the aggressor summary vengeance, yet they brand him with the mark of his crime. The dread of disgrace is a check to all forms of injustice.

c. The dread of punishment.—The chief desirous of keeping his tribe strong, and the king his nation, pass laws against mutual aggression, and enforces them by penalties. The fear of penalty deters from outrage.

d. Religious or superstitious fear.—The worship of departed chiefs or kings tends to give to the observance of their laws the sanctions of religion. Still more ought the fear of God check injustice, and undoubtedly it has this effect.

Aggressions, then, are checked through fear of re-

taliation, social disgrace, legal punishment, and divine retribution. All these tend to develop and enforce a sense of justice, and to advance the interests of the human race.

In the progress of man, habits and customs change with the environment, and lead to a modification of the moral code. Superior individuals take the lead. Their advancement is followed by that of others, till the habit of the few becomes the customs of the many, when at length the custom is embodied in law and enforced by penalties.

Justice forbids encroachment on the rights of others; the activity of each is limited by the rights of his fellows. Men are equal in respect to natural rights, but not in their powers, their activities, their opportunities, or their rewards. Justice is a reasonable virtue.

(3) *Development of the idea of justice.*—When a person, by his labor or by his thought, has produced something of value, if robbed of it he feels that he has been wronged, and seeks satisfaction. If without provocation he is injured, he resents the outrage. Injury to one's friends is taken as injury to himself, and resented accordingly. This is especially true, if those injured are of his own family. Justice to self is naturally extended so as to include justice to others. It excludes all fraud, sharp practice, and double-dealing. If we expect others to respect our rights, we are under obligation to respect theirs. In fact, if we do not respect their rights, they will not respect our rights.

Justice implies that each has his own sphere, limited by the sphere of others. Equality of rights is the mutual limitation. Within his own sphere each is at liberty to

do his best in his self-realization. As powers inherited or developed differ, achievements differ; hence there will be inequality of success, but there need be no injustice, since the success of one does not interfere with the rights of another.

Every man is free to do the best he can for himself, provided in so doing he does not encroach on the equal freedom of others. Before the law rights are equal, and should be equally respected. A powerful person should be prohibited from encroaching on the rights of the weak. Law can not give equal powers to all, but it can guard the rights of all, and as far as possible abolish artificial distinctions.

What is the sphere of an individual? Is his position inherited or acquired? This depends, in part, on the form of Government. In hereditary monarchies, one may be born a noble, or heir to the throne. Under any form of Government, one may be born an heir of wealth or a child of poverty; but the sphere of the majority is largely a consequence of conduct. Each wins his position for himself.

In case of election for office, where two or more candidates contend for the same position, the general modes are regulated by customs; but the particular details of the contest must be left to the conscience of the contestants. The people generally honor a magnanimous bearing.

Mutual sympathy is developed by common dangers, common suffering, common defeats, common interests, common pursuits, common success.

There will be conflict of interest; hence the need of law and the administration of justice. Aggression must

be prohibited and punished, and the law enforced with the utmost impartiality, and with equal and exact justice.

(4) *Virtues subordinate to justice.*—These are gratitude, honesty, veracity.

a. *Gratitude* is due for favors received. The sentiment or disposition of gratitude is a virtue. The exhibition of gratitude, in a substantial form, is a duty. Ingratitude is a moral baseness. Thankfulness is primarily a matter of etiquette, though secondarily a duty.

b. *Honesty* is fair dealing. It scorns fraud. Its high sense of honor refuses to take advantage of ignorance or necessity. It renders a full equivalent for what it receives. It is a virtue of sterling worth.

c. *Veracity*, or truthfulness, is essential in the dealings of man with man. Lying is a degrading vice, fit only for scalawags and slaves.

Is lying ever justifiable? Veracity is the rule; and to those entitled to it, truth ought always to be spoken. The exceptions to veracity, as deceiving an enemy in the time of war, and analagous cases, can safely be left to the enlightened conscience of those disposed to do right.

5. *Benevolence.*—Etymologically considered, benevolence signifies good will. It does not rest in good will; but it carries the good will into execution in deeds of beneficence.

The two principal altruistic virtues—justice and benevolence—are thus distinguished. Justice is requisite for public safety; benevolence for private charity; justice relates to equity, benevolence to goodness; justice can be legally exacted, benevolence is voluntary; justice is

righteousness, benevolence is love; justice is exact in fulfilling the letter of the law, benevolence goes beyond the letter and exhibits the spirit; in practical affairs justice is primary, benevolence is secondary; justice must not be set aside, though it may be tempered by benevolence; justice commands the judgment, benevolence wins the heart; the judge must sentence the convicted criminal, as an act of justice, according to law, yet when he has the discretion, benevolence may lead him to mitigate the penalty.

Justice is demanded by the public welfare, and it must be impartial; yet the root of justice is benevolence—the desire for the public good. Though the function of government is primarily justice, or public equity, yet Government may properly undertake those great measures of beneficence, where private benevolence would be inadequate, as general education, the care of the insane, the blind, the deaf; but it should not take from the earnings of the frugal to support the indolent, for to do so would be to discourage industry, to place a premium on inefficiency, and to disturb the normal relations between conduct and consequences.

It is the duty of Government to maintain justice by securing to all the people the unhindered pursuit of happiness; but if it undertakes to furnish them with the means of happiness, it transcends its function. The shiftless classes lay the blame of their poverty on the Government, and believe that society is fundamentally wrong, and ought to be radically changed, so that all shall have equal shares in the products of labor without regard to merit; the result is *communism*. The worst

classes go further. Seeing others better off than themselves, they conclude that society ought to be destroyed; the result is *anarchism*.

Society, in its widest extent embracing the entire population, may be roughly grouped in four classes—the criminal class, the pauper class, the middle class, and the wealthy class. To diminish the criminal and the pauper classes, and to elevate the middle class, is a great problem, one worthy to engage the head and the heart of every lover of the human race. Upon the wealthy and the cultivated classes devolves a great responsibility.

Benevolence takes various special forms, as the following:

(1) *Pity* is the sympathy for others excited by their sufferings. It regards its object not only as suffering, but as weak and inferior, and hence pity is allied to contempt. The condescension implied in pity is humiliating to high-minded sufferers; but benevolence avoids display of condescension.

(2) *Compassion* is the sympathy excited by misfortune, prompting relief. The priest and the Levite, no doubt, pitied the man who fell among thieves, yet they passed by on the other side; but the good Samaritan had compassion on him, dressed his wounds, carried him to an inn, and paid for his care.

(3) *Mercy* is compassion extended to fallen enemies, or to those exposed to suffering for demerit, by one who has the means of vengeance or the power to remit or mitigate the penalty. Justice may exclude mercy, but it does not exclude compassion.

(4) *Esteem* is the regard we have for others in view

of their excellencies of character. It extends only to those regarded as worthy.

(5) *Friendship* is the mutual attachment of two persons who have predilections for one another, exclusive of relationship or the tender tie of love. It is often a very strong attachment, as in the case of David and Jonathan, or Pythias and Damon.

(6) *The domestic affections*—conjugal love, parental and filial love, and fraternal love—are charming virtues, and the corresponding duties exemplifying these virtues in conduct render home a paradise.

(7) *Patriotism*, or love of country, is gratified with national prosperity, and stirred to self-sacrificing activity in times of national peril.

(8) *Philanthropy*, or love of mankind, is broader than patriotism. It regards nothing human as foreign to itself, but is beneficent to all mankind.

(9) *Piety*, or love to God, embraces reverence, adoration, gratitude, trust, and obedience. Love to God naturally leads to love to man.

Benevolence seeks to promote the highest possible good to every sentient being within our influence. It is the crowning virtue, the fulfillment of the law, the consummation of moral excellence.

The essence of virtue is the aim to realize the highest ideal of excellence. The satisfaction in the consciousness of advancement toward perfection is the highest good.

6. *Incentives to action*.—The virtues find their basis in the deep-seated principles of human nature, the instincts, appetites, affections, and desires.

(1) The primary incentives are egoistic: instinct for self-preservation, appetite for food and drink, love for family, desire for victory, for achievement, for power, for knowledge, for popularity. These are numerous, energetic, enduring.

(2) The secondary incentives are altruistic: attachment for friends, respect for superiors, the sentiments of sympathy, justice, and benevolence. These are fewer, milder, less impulsive than the primary, but give permanent satisfaction, have the rightful supremacy, and work no evil.

The self-regarding propensities are not to be extirpated. They are essential to life; but the social instincts are entitled to the position of superiority and control.

Chapter III

DUTIES

CLASSIFICATION of duties.—Duties may be classified as personal, social, and religious.

(1) *Personal duties*.—Personal duties embrace self-conservation, self-culture, and self-conduct.

a. Self-conservation relates both to the body and to the mind.

The body is to be cared for by guarding its health, strength, agility, longevity, and beauty. The health is to be guarded by avoiding unnecessary exposure to dangers, inclemencies of the weather, and contagious diseases, abstaining from narcotics, intoxicating drinks, unwholesome food, and supplying the body with wholesome food and drink, suitable clothing and shelter, and pure air, taking sufficient exercise, rest, and sleep, and securing moderate temperature and cleanliness of person. Good health is the basis of strength, agility, longevity, and beauty. A cheerful disposition, freedom from worry, and trust in God tend to preserve good health.

The mind should be kept free from all prejudices, hobbies, superstition, bad passions, and morbid conditions of every kind, and its sanity guarded with the utmost care. Congenial domestic, social, and religious relations exert a favorable influence on the preservation of the health, both of the body and the mind.

b. Self-culture.—The body and mind are not only to be kept free from deleterious influences and maintained in health, but are to be cultured and kept in a vigorous condition.

The strength of the body is augmented by exercise, alternated by rest, by taxing it, but not by overtaxing. The agility of the circus-rider is a marvel, and shows what training can do for the body. Athletic sports, properly guarded, ought to be encouraged. A vigorous body is a substantial basis for a vigorous mind. Good health is the requisite basis, not only of strength and of agility, but also of beauty. Intellectual and moral health gives spiritual beauty, which speaks through the eye and animates the countenance with the radiance of truth and goodness. Intellectual culture is a fruitful theme. The field of knowledge is vast and greatly diversified, and supplies the means for the cultivation of all our intellectual powers, perceptions, memory, imagination, reason.

As means of culture, we have the family, the school, the church, literature, society, business, the professions and pursuits of life. Nature, science, art, literature, open their varied and inexhaustible treasures. Notwithstanding all these aids, culture, if it be genuine, must be largely self-culture.

The duty of moral and spiritual culture is apparent. Mistakes of the heart are more fatal than those of the head. A young man can make no greater mistake than to believe that he must be dishonest if he would succeed in business. Dishonesty is not the road to success, but to ruin.

An honest, thoughtful man deserves respect, and is entitled to his opinions, whatever they may be; but society has the right to suppress conduct dangerous to its welfare.

The will needs the guidance of reason in regard to its general purposes and particular volitions. The general purpose always to do right will decide in advance many special volitions, since it will not allow dishonesty, untruthfulness, or immorality in any form. To know what to choose, what to do, how to carry out a plan, requires a cultivated intelligence.

Self-culture should aim, by exercise, due in amount and kind, to develop the powers of the soul in their relation to one another, in view of the mission of life, calling in as aids glowing enthusiasm, personal interest, and laudable ambition.

c. Self-conduct involves self-control and self-direction.

Self-control rightly aims, not to eradicate any of the faculties of the soul, but to purify and regulate them. We have no needless or hurtful powers; but our passions are often unduly excited, and exhibit hurtful manifestations. Abnormal excitement is to be allayed, and the lower activities subordinated to the higher.

Self-direction marks out the line of conduct to be pursued, and guides special activities. Here the will, prompted by goodness and guided by wisdom, assumes control of the person, and adjusts his relations to God, to his fellow-men, and to himself.

The right choice of life work is a matter of the utmost importance; for herein lies success or failure. In

deciding this question, a person should study himself, his powers, his tastes, his adaptations, the means at his command, and choose accordingly.

Having chosen his life work, he needs to make a thorough preparation, both general and special. Then having found his place, he must work persistently and skillfully, and be a growing man all his days.

Every person, however wealthy, should learn some trade or gain a knowledge of some business, which may be a means of support in case he should lose his fortune. Many persons have profited by this precaution. No one should suffer himself to live an idle life. Idleness tends to immorality.

Money-getting, though important, is not the chief end of man; and the business of life should not be chosen with this as the sole object, but should be made a matter of deliberate, conscientious choice. Money is a means, not an end. Mammon worship is a fashionable religion; but the miser's heaven is a room with bolts and bars, with a strong iron chest full of gold. The devotee enters, bars his doors, blinds his windows, opens his chest, worships his hoard, but with a palpitating heart, fearing that the robber is at the door; but death is in swift pursuit, and will soon snatch him away from his treasure.

Devotion to the life work wisely chosen, not because of its supposed respectability, but because it is useful, and corresponds to aptitudes and desires, is almost a guarantee of success.

The egoistic virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and purity are to be exhibited in conduct, whatever be the avocation in life or the special duty required

to be performed; and these prepare the way for the social duties, calling out the altruistic virtues of sympathy, justice, and benevolence.

(2) *Social duties*.—These are duties to the family, to society, to the State.

a. *Domestic duties*, though somewhat alike for all the members of a household, yet vary with individual cases, as husband, wife, father, mother, children, brothers, sisters.

Marriage is a mutual and voluntary compact between one man and one woman, to forsake all others, and to live together as husband and wife till separated by death. The parties are supposed to be capable of giving a free and deliberate consent to the union, and neither of them married or betrothed to a third party. Great bodily defect, mental imbecility, insanity, hereditary disease, near consanguinity, or extreme youth or old age should be considered a bar to marriage. An ideal marriage is founded on affection, its obligations are sacred, and home ought to be a paradise.

On the husband and father devolves the duty of supporting the family, and providing for the education of the children. The wife and mother rules the house and cares for the children, especially in their tender years. Natural affection prompts all the members of the family to mutual good will and helpfulness, and to the duty of manifesting the domestic virtues in corresponding conduct. The homes of a people are the strength of the nation.

b. *Society duties* fall naturally into groups, as the following:

The duties of teachers and pupils are analagous to

those of parents and children. Upon the teacher devolves the duty of governing the school and instructing the pupils. He needs self-possession and tact. Good scholarship is an indispensable prerequisite. In fact, he needs to know much more than the things he is called upon to teach. Not relying altogether on his scholarship, the conscientious teacher will make a careful preparation for each day's work. He should not only understand what he teaches, but be able to make things clear. A reputation for scholarship, well sustained, will contribute largely to his success; yet he needs not only the reputation, but the possession.

The teacher has a wide range of knowledge open to him, from which to draw resources—the common branches, the languages, the mathematics, the natural sciences, the political and social sciences, history, literature, art, philosophy, and theology. If the teacher is enthusiastic, he will inspire a like enthusiasm on the part of his pupils, who will then not only respect their teacher, but will make rapid progress in their studies.

The pastor and people sustain to one another sacred relations. The pastor is the shepherd of the flock. To be the instructor and guide of his people, he needs not only general knowledge and culture, and special knowledge of theology, but a deep religious experience. To instruct others properly in the divine life, he needs communion with his God. I pull off the shoes from my feet, for I stand on holy ground.

It is the duty of the members of the Church to support the pastor, and to co-operate with him in all his labors of love, and to entertain towards one another feelings of fellowship and good will. In this world of

toil and sorrow and sin the Church is a city of refuge, where multitudes gather till the storms of life be overpast.

Other voluntary associations exist—clubs, literary associations, scientific associations, secret orders organized for protection, success in business, mutual improvement, or social advancement. In all these the principles of ethics and the virtues find many applications, and the duties full scope.

General society, however, affords the most ample field for the application of the virtues in the discharge of moral duties.

We have our friends and neighbors and acquaintances, who can be brought more or less under our influence, and will be for better or for worse. We meet with strangers; and what shall be our attitude towards them? Shall we meet them with a cold stare, or shall we greet them with a kindly welcome? We probably have enemies; how shall we treat them? Shall we hate them, and return evil for evil, or shall we love them, and pray that God may give them a better heart? How shall we treat the unfortunate and the outcast? Shall we drive the tramp from our door, or give him something to eat, and encourage him to work?

Shall our influence tend to raise or to lower the tone of public sentiment and the standard of morality? What shall be our attitude towards needed public improvements, and what towards needless extravagance? What can we do towards encouraging a course of high-toned public lectures? What can we do to found, enlarge, or improve a public library? What can we do for the poor or for those struggling against adverse circumstances?

How can we enlist the sympathy of the wealthy in behalf of the needy?

Employers and employees owe reciprocal duties. Employers should give fair wages, and pay promptly; and employees should render faithful service. A share in the profits, when rising above a certain per cent, would render the workmen more efficient. Arbitration could supersede strikes and lockouts.

c. Civic duties relate to the tribe or the nation, whose respective heads are the chief and the executive, whether president, king, queen, or emperor.

The nation, called also the State, is the outgrowth of the family, which is the unitary social group. As an organization to protect rights and promote the welfare of the people, the State is ordained of God; but its special form, whether a republic, an oligarchy, or a monarchy, absolute or limited, is left to the people themselves. The State is a natural development; it originated without the formality of a social compact. Each State has, under the providence of God, its mission in the world. It disseminates its principles, protects its citizens, and affords them ample scope for activity; and for this service the citizen is expected to be loyal and patriotic.

The State, consisting of the entire body of the people as an organic whole or nation, is represented by the Government, a body of men selected by the people, to which are delegated powers necessary for the protection of society and the maintenance of the rights of the people, in whom rests ultimately the sovereign power.

The Government is usually divided into three coordinate branches—the legislative, the judicial, and the executive.

The legislative branch, in our Nation, consists of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives; in England, it consists of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The two houses make the laws for the whole people.

The judicial branch interprets the laws, decides upon their constitutionality, applies them to particular cases, and presides in trials civil or criminal, and passes sentences on offenders.

The executive—for example, the President with his Cabinet—sees that the laws are enforced. In our country the President has a veto power over legislation, which can be overruled only by a two-thirds' vote of the legislative body. The Executive with his Cabinet, especially the Secretary of State, manages the correspondence with other nations, and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints foreign ministers, the judges of the Supreme Court, and some other important officials.

No better statement of the functions of civil government can be found than that expressed by the opening paragraph of our Federal Constitution:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

The State, as represented by the Government, owes duties to its citizens, to itself as a nation, to other States, and to God who has given it its mission in the world.

The duty of the State to its citizens is to secure their

rights, to guarantee their freedom, to protect their lives and property, to foster enterprise, to provide for the general education of the youth, and to disseminate useful knowledge among the people.

The State has duties to itself, in securing its self-development, in ascertaining and accomplishing its mission in the world, and in maintaining its independence and dignity against the aggressions of other States.

The State owes duties to other States, as made known by international law, relating to the comity of nations, to treaties, alliances, arbitrations, and to the various relations of peace and war.

The State owes duties to God. It is ordained of God for great ends, and it is its duty to see that these ends are accomplished. Its laws are based on the laws of God. It should encourage religion, and guarantee to every citizen freedom to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience.

The citizen owes to the State the duties of respect and love and support, and obedience to its righteous laws. Though mindful of the fact that one man is more liable to mistake than a majority of a legislative body, yet the citizen, especially when sustained by a respectable number of his fellow-citizens, may seek the repeal of obnoxious laws through the legitimate channels of legislation. He may obey the law till repealed, or disobey and take the consequences.

It is seldom that open resistance to law is called for, as this is rebellion or revolution. An attempt at revolution is justifiable only in those extreme cases where the Government is clearly wrong and oppressive, and then only when it is probable that the revolution will be

successful; for if it should fail, the evils would only be aggravated.

The citizen should seek to gain knowledge in regard to the nature of the Government, its workings in the different departments, the measures proposed by the various political parties, that he may vote intelligently, and aid the Government in the management of its affairs, and in carrying out its mission in the world.

"Westward the course of empire takes its way." Our own Nation, having gathered up the wisdom of the ages, is to be the leader of the nations in the arts of peace, and in disseminating the blessings of science and true religion over the face of the earth.

(3) *Religious duties*.—These are due to God, to the Church, and to the world.

a. Duties to God embrace repentance, faith, and obedience.

Repentance is more than sorrow for sin, because involving punishment. It signifies reformation, sincere and hearty and decided. Man was created in the moral image and after the likeness of God; but man's moral nature has been disordered by sin. Each individual has inherited this moral depravity, and after reaching the years of accountability has in some form or other, and probably in many ways, violated the laws of God. He has disfigured, though not wholly lost, the image of God. Reason and conscience remain, and imperatively urge the duty of reformation.

Faith is trust in God. The foundation of true faith is a knowledge of God as the creator and upholder of all things, as the source of all power, wisdom, and goodness. Reason affirms an ultimate reality, self-existent

and eternal, the origin of all other realities. If nothing is eternal, there never would have been anything. The eternal reality must be the adequate source of all other realities.

God, the all-powerful, wise, and holy being, is entitled to our entire confidence. He will not forsake those who trust in him. Indeed, if we do not trust in him, we have no foundation for confidence. "All other ground is sinking sand."

Obedience naturally follows repentance and faith. God's laws were enacted, not for his benefit, but for our good, and in keeping them there is great reward. The laws of nature and of mind are the laws of God, as well as those of revelation. Most of the evils which afflict the world would disappear, if all would heartily obey the laws of God. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

The root of morality is the principle of love; but we need a guide in the application of the law of love to our neighbor, and this guide we have in the Golden Rule: "Whatsoever ye think it right that others do to you, do ye likewise unto them." Piety requires the devotion of our whole being to God—the body, the intellect, the sensibility, the will. This is our reasonable service.

Prayer is by no means a useless service, as some suppose. It is based on a sense of our weakness and ignorance, and of our dependence on God as our Friend, who is wise and good and powerful. Prayer embraces invocation, confession, adoration, thanksgiving, and petition. The justification of prayer is that it is the natural expression of the soul; that the practice is al-

most universal; that those who declaim against it, pray when reduced to straits; and that experience testifies to its benefits.

"Prayer is the simplest form of speech
That infant lips can try;
Prayer the sublimest strains that reach
The Majesty on high."

Objections to prayer are sometimes made on the ground that it is a request that God would suspend his own laws. This is a mistake. We do every day what nature would not do, and what otherwise would not be done. Do we suspend the laws of nature? If we can do what otherwise would not be done, much more can God. When I lift a body from the ground against gravity, I do not suspend the law of gravitation. The fact of gravity still remains, and gives the body weight; but I overcome this force by a greater force in the opposite direction, and so raise the body. When God, in answer to prayer, brings something to pass which otherwise would not occur, he suspends no law, and throws no more confusion into the operations of nature than I do when I lift a stone up from the ground.

Prayer, then, is justified by the fact that it is prompted by a universal instinct; that it elevates the character of man; and that it is a means of obtaining great blessings. The testimony of millions of Christians that God does answer prayer can not be impeached.

b. We owe duties to the Church, the human agency divinely commissioned to carry forward God's work in the world. We ought to support the Church in all her benevolent enterprises; attend the services of the

Church; uphold the principles and practice of religion in the community, and discourage irreligious principles and immoral practices.

c. We owe duties to the world, especially to those people less favored than ourselves, in sending to them a higher civilization and a better religion, and thus help answer the Lord's Prayer, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven."

Chapter IV

REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS

DEFINITION of reward.—Reward is utility bestowed on a person, for his benefit, in consideration of service rendered. It operates as an incentive to useful conduct. Thus, wages is the reward of labor; and promotion is the reward of distinguished service.

2. Definition of punishment.—Punishment is evil inflicted by authority upon a transgressor for wrong, as a requital for guilt. It operates as a restraint from injurious conduct. Thus, imprisonment is the punishment for forgery, and hanging is the punishment for murder.

3. Service and reward.—Service is favor rendered by one party to another. Service deserves reward. The reward expresses the satisfaction and obligation of the party to whom the service is rendered, and the merit of the one rendering the service. Indirectly it is an incentive to the person rewarded to render another service, and to others to perform like services. It thus contributes to the general welfare, and this is the final justification of reward.

4. Injury and punishment.—Injury is evil brought by one party upon another. Injury deserves punishment. The punishment expresses the dissatisfaction of the party

injured, the demerit of the one doing the injury, and what is due ill-desert. Indirectly it is a restraint upon the person punished against repeating the offense, and upon others against committing like offenses. It thus contributes to the general welfare, and this is the final justification of punishment.

5. *Government in relation to reward and punishment.*—Government is established to promote the general welfare, which is accomplished by the enactment and enforcement of laws. Disobedience to law is an act of rebellion against Government. If disobedience should become general, the Government would be overthrown, and anarchy and untold evils would be the consequence.

The criminal defies civil law; the sinner transgresses moral law. Both introduce discord. Penalty tends also to repentance, to restraint, and therefore to harmony. Punishment is due the criminal on behalf of society. It is, therefore, the duty of Government to enforce the laws by appropriate rewards and penalties. Government embodies civil law; God moral law.

6. *Classification of services.*—Service is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary service is occasional or regular. Occasional services are such as aid in capturing outlaws, informing against criminals, help in case of fires, cyclones, earthquakes, shipwrecks, and the like. Regular services are such as are rendered between employers and employees, official or professional service, and such like.

Extraordinary services are such as discoveries, inventions, improvements, increasing the efficiency of the army and navy, negotiations of foreign ministers, new methods of industry, heroic actions, and the like.

7. *Classification of rewards.*—Rewards may be classified by the service rendered, or more simply, as occasional and permanent. Occasional rewards are bestowed in return for special service, and are stimulants to like services, though irregular in their effects. Permanent rewards are more regular in their effects. Those awarded by Government are provided for from a general fund, and for an indefinite number of persons on account of a succession of services.

The most common use of reward occurs in the transactions of individuals. Pay is the reward for personal service. In trading or in buying and selling the reciprocal delivery is the reward of the mutual transfer of ownership.

The Government, in behalf of the public, has likewise a demand for a variety of services, in the form of work or goods, for which it returns an equivalent reward to the persons rendering the services.

8. *Materials of reward.*—These are, money or its equivalent, honor, power, and exemption. These are all means of satisfaction.

(1) *Money or its equivalent* is the usual material of reward, and is that given as wages, salaries, pensions, and the like. Money is the most convenient form of reward, as it is the universal medium of exchange and the measure of value. With money any form of material good can be purchased.

(2) *Honor* is the distinction due to merit, and is conferred upon the recipient in the form of office, title, decoration, public thanks, diplomas, medals, prizes, premiums. A graduated scale of rank marks the degree of merit. If worthily bestowed, it is a source of enjoyment

to the recipient, and of gratification to his friends. It adds to the respect the people have for their Government as a source of benignity, and opens up new sources of hope. Advance in rank, according to merit, is a powerful stimulus to faithful service.

(3) *Power* is not always distributed according to merit, as in monarchical Governments with a hereditary king and nobility; but in such a Government power should be so distributed when it can be done without interfering with the general order. This is done in England, whose premier is often selected in consideration of distinguished ability, as in case of Disraeli or Gladstone, not from the nobility, but from the great middle class of society.

In the United States the President has often been selected in consideration of distinguished military service, as in case of Washington, Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, and Grant.

Men love power for a triple reason—it gratifies ambition; it gives scope for the exercise of ability; it gives the honor of distinction. There are all grades of power from the highest to the lowest, thus giving scope to every variety of talent.

(4) *Exemption* is release from civil or military burdens or from incurred punishment. A certain age exempts all persons from military service and from poll-tax, and sex exempts all women. But in these cases exemption is not a reward of merit. In former times the clergy were exempt from military service and from civil prosecution for crime. Exemption from service is a reward proportioned to the burdensomeness of the service.

9. *Reward and punishment combined.*—To secure obedience to certain regulations, rewards and punishments are sometimes combined with good effect. For example, to aid in the capture of a fugitive from justice, for the sake of the offered reward, often encounters the odium of public prejudice; but this prejudice is disarmed, if with the reward for capture is coupled a punishment for refusing to aid. That a person has a right to protect himself from punishment is admitted, if lawfully done.

The combination of reward and penalty is seen in school work, in the practice called *challenging*. A class is arranged, and the pupil at the head begins the recitation; then the next recites; and so on as long as no mistake is noticed. If any pupil makes a mistake, the next corrects it if he has noticed it and can correct it, and takes the place of the other, who goes down one position. If one fails to correct the mistake, the next corrects it if he can, and takes the place of the one who first made the mistake, and so on. Each one who fails is depressed one, if any one below is able to make the correction. If option is given to correct the mistake, or not to correct it, without passing to the next, there would be only the stimulus of reward; and by correcting and advancing in rank, a pupil might be regarded as selfish; but it will be conceded he has the right to protect himself from degradation. In this case, penalty re-enforces reward, and is liable to all except the one at the foot, who is too low to admit of further degradation.

On the other hand, it may be important to re-enforce punishment by reward; thus, when delinquency in obedience may be concealed and the punishment avoided, in which case it fails of its purpose, the offer

of a reward is a positive incentive to obedience, and may be effective when the penalty alone would fail.

10. *Union of interest with duty.*—In the long run, no doubt, it is the interest of every one to do his duty. This arises as a natural consequence of obedience to the moral law on the one hand, and of disobedience on the other, depending ultimately on the constitution of nature and of man in accordance with the ordinance of God. The good and evil consequences of conduct encourage obedience and discourage disobedience, but are not strictly positive rewards and punishments, as they may not express either the approval or disapproval of any lawgiver. A person who deliberately thrusts his hand into the fire feels the pain from the burn. The pain, no doubt, tends to prevent such acts, and thus to save the person from injury; and this, in the wisdom of God, may be the final cause or purpose of pain; but it does not necessarily signify moral displeasure on the part of the Creator, since the person would feel a like pain from a similar burn received in rescuing a child from the fire.

The union of interest and duty is something more than a duty enjoined by law, with the penalty annexed for disobedience. It signifies such a provision in the law that conformity thereto shall be productive of certain benefits, which shall cease when the law is no longer observed, as is the case in regard to pensions or annuities given under certain conditions.

11. *Self-executing laws.*—An isolated law does not execute itself, but it may be so enforced by another law that it will be executed without further intervention on the part of the Government. A teacher, for example,

is required to have a certificate of qualification before teaching in the public school. This law is executed by another requiring him to present his certificate when he draws his pay. The law requiring prepayment of postage is self-executing—a letter is not sent unless it is stamped. The kind treatment of others is more generally practiced because of the trouble that will come to one in consequence of his unkindness.

12. Reward and expenditure.—It is wrong to be lavish in bestowing rewards; for they are always given at the cost of expenditure. Salaries, bounties, pensions, premiums, prizes, all draw on some source of revenue. Honor gives prominence; but the elevation of one is the relative depression of others. Power is conferred on one, perhaps, at the expense of the liberty or security of the many. Exemption of one from burdens imposes greater burdens upon others. These considerations do not condemn rewards; for they may be richly deserved, and to withhold them would be to discourage merit; but they do show why they ought to be judiciously bestowed.

13. Rewards ex post facto.—As the object of reward is to induce service, it may be thought that the reward should always be offered before the service is rendered, and that it should not exceed the amount promised. This may be right as the usual rule; but it would exclude liberality for extraordinary service, or for heroic service spontaneously rendered, and would withhold a powerful incentive to the performance of like services. The justification of *ex post facto* rewards is, therefore, the generosity it develops in the giver, which becomes contagious, and the inducement to good conduct it im-

parts to others. When properly bestowed, an *ex post facto* reward is a bountiful act, fruitful in good consequences.

14. *Comparison of rewards and penalties.*—Ordinary good conduct brings its own reward; hence those engaged in their own business need no other reward than that which naturally follows. Mismanagement of business brings its own penalty, and ordinarily receives no other.

Reward is the proper incentive in procuring services, punishment in preventing transgression; reward is the spur, punishment is the rein. A threatened punishment often prevents the forbidden transgression, and the punishment is not required; a promised reward calls out the service, and the reward must be bestowed.

The source of reward is limited, and may be exhausted; the source of punishment is unlimited, and can never be exhausted.

The occasions for special rewards are comparatively few; the possible transgressions against which punishments are denounced are many.

Reward appeals to hope, and calls out the best efforts; punishment appeals to fear, and represses bad tendencies.

Reward incites to higher attainments; punishment can bring up only to the ordinary level.

In early training, punishment may be the beginning of discipline; then a mixture of reward and punishment; then, by degrees, the punishment can be withdrawn, and reward alone employed.

Chapter V

REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.—CONTINUED

REWARDING and punishing as arts.—The great art in distributing rewards and punishments is to adjust the reward to the service and the punishment to the transgression. Several principles are involved:

(1) *Constant connection*.—If possible, a constant connection should be established between the service and the reward and between the transgression and the penalty, so that the one shall follow the other. A service should not lose its reward, nor a crime fail to receive its punishment. Under the Divine government this doubtless is true; it should be, at least approximately, true under human administration. It is the certainty, or, at least, the high probability of the reward or penalty that acts as an incentive to duty or a deterrent from crime, rather than the value of the reward or the severity of the punishment. In the realm of morals, virtue never fails of its reward, nor vice of its punishment.

(2) *Proportionality*.—The reward should be proportionate to the service, and the punishment to the transgression; that is, a light service should receive a small reward and a greater service a greater reward; a slight transgression should receive a light punishment, and a great crime a heavy penalty. In other words, the re-

ward should vary directly as the service, and the punishment as the transgression. This is justice recognized by the judge who has discretionary power in passing sentence on the convicted criminal.

(3) *Natural consequence*.—As far as possible, the reward should be the natural consequence of the service and the punishment of the transgression. The young man who has made a good drawing with imperfect instruments is properly rewarded by a present of a new set of instruments of finer quality. The brigadier who shows his ability by winning a battle is made major-general. The boy who tries the quality of his new knife on the furniture is naturally punished by being deprived of his knife for a time. "He that sheddeth man's blood, by man also shall his blood be shed." The reason for rewards and penalties is better understood when they are not arbitrary, but follow as the natural consequences of right or wrong conduct.

2. *Rewards improperly bestowed*.—Rewards are pernicious when their tendencies is to produce hypocrisy, or to encourage mendacity, or to excite evil passions, or to interfere with the performance of duty. To grant privileges on condition of subscribing to a certain creed, whether it is believed in or not, is a premium on hypocrisy. To give a reward of merit on the testimony of the recipient is to encourage mendacity. To reward informers, or spies, or eavesdroppers, is to encourage intermeddlers and to excite hatred in those against whom the information is given. To offer a prize for an essay of such high character that its production in the allotted time would require all the time of the contestants, would interfere with other duties.

It is questionable whether it is right to offer a prize for the best article in support of a certain opinion. Would it not be better to reward the investigator who discovers the truth, than the advocate who supports an opinion? Let his dissertation be an impartial investigation of the entire subject with the sole aim of discovering the truth. To love the truth, to seek for it, and to be loyal to it, mark the man of high ethical character. Such a man is mindful of his own fallibility, considerate of the opinions of others, open to convictions, but not hasty in accepting new doctrines.

3. *Theories as to the object of punishment.*—Several theories have been proposed:

(1) *The retributive theory.*—This theory maintains that the person who has violated the law deserves punishment, and that he ought to be punished, though the punishment results in no good, either to the culprit himself or to any other person.

It is true enough that the transgressor is guilty; but the question is, Why inflict pain, which is itself an evil, if the infliction does no good? If no good results from punishment, benevolence forbids its infliction. The retributive theory in itself can not be justified. Guilt marks the subject of punishment; the retribution must fall on the offender, otherwise punishment fails of its object. A knowledge that the guilty is punished is a restraint to crime, and this good result is a justification of punishment.

(2) *The deterrent theory.*—The punishment should be made so severe that the remembrance of it will deter the offender from repeating his crime, and that the fear of it will deter others from similar crimes. This view

was brought out by the judge in addressing a convicted horsethief upon whom he was about to pass sentence: "You are punished, not for stealing a horse, but in order that horses may not be stolen." Protection to society is the justification of punishment, according to this view. No doubt, punishment is justified by its good consequences; but unless there is ill-desert, no good consequences follow punishment; it should fall only on the guilty; it is wrong to injure the innocent for the sake of society; but for one voluntarily to suffer for the sake of others is truly noble. The judge should sentence the horsethief *for stealing a horse, and in order that horses MAY not be stolen.*

In case of transgression, the offender has marked himself as the one who ought to be punished. To select the innocent for punishment would not deter from crime, since one under temptation could say: "There is no danger of my punishment; at most the danger is next to nothing, since punishment is inflicted, not because deserved, but to prevent crime, and some other person, though innocent, will probably be selected." To select the criminal for punishment actually serves as a deterrent; for then one under temptation will say: "If I commit this crime I shall be punished, unless I can escape detection." He then weighs the supposed good he thinks he will get from his crime against the evil of a possible detection, and acts according to the sway of the balance, either to retreat for fear of punishment, or for hope of gain to commit the crime, and relying on his cunning takes his chances of escaping from the punishment.

We have seen that punishment is attended by good

results only when the subject of the punishment is the culprit himself. For the selection of the subject, we fall back on the retributive theory, and say we do the culprit no wrong since he deserves his punishment. The deterrent theory justifies the punishment by the protection it affords society, provided the criminal is the one punished.

To be deterrent, and hence protective, the punishment must be sure and swift and severe and impartial. Even the vindictive feeling aroused by crime tends to make the punishment sure. Let a great outrage be committed in a community, and all hands turn out to catch the culprit. The increased probability which the vindictive feeling gives to the detection of crime has led certain moralists to urge this as a justification of the retributive theory of punishment.

(3) *The reformatory theory.*—This means more than that punishment frightens the wrong-doer from repeating his offense; for it gives him an opportunity for reflection and religious instruction, and it may lead to his reformation. The name *penitentiary* embodies this idea, and that punishment, as imprisonment, merely gives the opportunity for the other forces to work the reformation. The prisoner has time for reflection.

Punishment itself is morally efficient. The criminal is a moral being; and if punishment will lead to his reformation, directly or indirectly, he ought to be punished for his own sake, though he would not demand it as his right.

Not simply restraint, but genuine reformation, is the end here sought for in punishment. The governing power, whether parent, teacher, or State, stands as the

embodiment of law, and is charged with the duty of its enforcement. The infliction of punishment tends to convey to the mind of the transgressor a due sense of the righteousness of the law and the depth of his guilt. This is the first step towards repentance. He must be made to feel his guilt.

If a person is punished for doing what he believes to be his duty, he will regard the punishment inflicted upon him as persecution, and consider himself a martyr, and not a criminal.

When the criminal realizes that the authority which punishes him rightfully embodies the moral law, and that his punishment is just, his attitude is changed, and his reformation rendered possible. The punishment re-enforces the sense of his obligation to obey the law, which was probably felt before, though too feebly to prevent the crime. Realizing that he was guilty in breaking the law, thus wronging his own better nature, and doing a great injury to society, and that his punishment was inflicted, not from malice, but from a sense of duty, he may possibly listen to the voice of conscience, heartily repent of his conduct, and become a better man.

(4) *Elements of truth in each theory.*—All the theories of punishment have in them elements of truth. The retributory theory emphasizes the ill-desert of the offender, and designates him as the one who ought to receive the punishment. The deterrent theory looks to the general welfare. The reformatory theory considers the good of the criminal.

In civil government the punishment has especially for its object the protection of society, and only incidentally the reformation of the criminal; but the punish-

ment, if possible, should be made certain, otherwise *lynch law* will take the matter in hand, followed by all the evils attending haste, and passion, and violence.

In family government, punishment has chiefly for its object the correction of the offender and his training in habits of virtue, and incidentally the protection of the other members of the family.

In school government, punishment has for its object the co-ordinate ends—the correction of the disobedient, and the welfare of all the pupils of the school.

In many cases the degree of punishment should not be rigidly fixed by the law-making power, but should be left within certain limits to the discretion of the court. The sliding scale gives liberty to adjust the degree of penalty to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances of the crime. The legislative, judicial, and executive powers are sometimes united in the same person, as the parent or teacher.


It has sometimes been thought better to appeal to the hope of reward, than to the fear of punishment; or if punishment is employed, to emphasize the pain rather than the disgrace, on the consideration that disgrace is degrading. But does not reward, as a bribe, appeal to selfishness? Is not the appeal to the pain of punishment also an appeal to selfishness? An appeal to the disgrace of punishment is an appeal to the moral nature, and to the estimate in which bad conduct is held by others. The delinquent is disgraced by the punishment in his own estimation and in the opinion of others; but if he reform, he is not degraded by the disgrace, but elevated by being made ashamed of his wicked conduct. Even the obloquy that casts contempt on a profligate

wretch sometimes causes a reaction of his better nature, and leads to his reformation.

It will not do to say that if an offender is ashamed of his conduct and promises to reform, he ought to be released from punishment. If this plan was adopted, the wrong-doer would pretend to be ashamed and promise reformation, in order to escape punishment. To punish him will assist him to be ashamed, and will help him to reform, and will restrain him from like offenses, and perhaps from other offenses in the future. At all events, he suffers justly; the law is righteous. Therefore let the punishment fall upon the transgressor on account of his ill-desert; and let it be sure and swift and severe and impartial.

Part Third

HISTORY OF ETHICS



Chapter I

GREEK ETHICS

PRE-SOCRATIC.—Of the pre-Socratic philosophers, we notice:

(1) *The Ionic philosophers* (600-400 B. C.)—The speculations of Thales and the other Ionic philosophers were cosmological, not ethical. They sought for the principle of the physical universe, but did not discuss the moral nature of man.

(2) *The Eleatic philosophers* (550-450.)—The Eleatic philosophers, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, *Zeno*, and *Melissus*, were metaphysical and dialectical. They brought out the antitheses of the one and the many, the permanent and the changeable, being and not-being, rational knowledge and sense knowledge. They ridiculed the anthropomorphic conception of the gods, but did not discuss ethical questions. Their system afforded logical training, and thus prepared the way for ethical speculations. Their principle was *being*—unchangeableness.

(3) *Pythagoras* (circa 580-500).—In teaching that virtue is expressed by a square number, a square symbolizing the proportion of requital to desert, Pythagoras anticipated the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, that goodness in conduct avoids excess and defect, and thus secures proportional results. Pythagoras laid great

stress on external requirements of conduct. His principle was *number*.

(4) *Heraclitus* (cir. 460-370).—In regarding trust in the divine order of nature as the ground of satisfaction, Heraclitus anticipated the Stoics. He recommended obedience to natural law, as revealed by reason. The complacency attained by yielding to the divine order, Heraclitus regarded as the highest good. His philosophic principle was *becoming*—unceasing change according to law.

(5) *Democritus* (cir. 460-370).—In declaring that delight is the highest good, Democritus anticipated the Epicureans. He found happiness, not in sensational pleasures, but in cheerfulness and tranquillity. Democritus was the originator of the atomic theory. His principle was the *full* and the *void*—atoms and empty space.

(6) *The Sophists* (cir. 450-400).—*Protagoras and Gorgias*, the most distinguished sophists, taught that there are no universal moral principles; that man is a mere creature of sensation, including under that term appetites, desires, and the experience of pleasure and pain; that good conduct is that which gives agreeable sensations; that each man is the measure of truth for himself; that one opinion is as good as another; and that the rule of conduct is to do that which promotes self-interest. They were the first to advocate *egoism*. "In teaching for pay, they encountered prejudice and were regarded as mercenary. Their principles were: *Man is the measure of the universe; Act according to your nature.*

2. *The Socratic*.—Under this head we shall include

for ethical consideration Socrates, the Megaric, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic schools, Plato and Aristotle.

(1) *Socrates* (470-399).—Socrates in making the good of the individual the object of interest, stood on common ground with the Sophists; but he differed from them in holding that man is more than a creature of sensation, in that he is endowed with reason, whose function is thought and whose aim is truth. Of the two elements of the good—the transitory pleasures of sensation, and the permanent satisfaction of truth—Socrates preferred the permanent to the transitory, though he did not deny that pleasures have a certain value.

A sensation is felt, or rather it is a particular feeling, and nothing else. A thought, for example of a sensation, is an idea of the sensation as resembling an indefinite number of other sensations, and thus deals with relations. A thought of a sensation may be present when the sensation itself is absent. The truer nature of man is not sensation, his lower nature, which he has in common with the brute; but thought, his higher nature, which is characteristic of himself.

With the Sophists, Socrates said, Act according to your nature. But what is the true nature of man? The Sophists said *sensation*; Socrates said *thought*. He held, therefore, that thought, the true nature, the higher nature, should hold in restraint sensation, the lower nature. The permanent has more value than the transitory. *It is the good.*

Virtue consists in the choice of the good; but to discriminate the good requires knowledge; hence virtue

depends on knowledge. If it is not resolvable into knowledge, it is at least resolvable into wisdom.

The reasoning of Socrates in substance is this: Virtue results in happiness, and vice in misery; but every man seeks to secure his own happiness, and to avoid misery; therefore, every man would be virtuous if he had the proper knowledge. Hence virtue may be taught, and has a universal value. In this also he differed from the Sophists, who, denying universal truth, made each man the sole judge of his own good.

The good that Socrates sought after was *eudemonic* rather than *hedonic*, though he did not altogether despise the latter; yet the good was *egoistic*, at least in theory, rather than *altruistic*. A man is to be just for his own sake, rather than for the sake of others. Benevolence finds no place in an egoistic system. The satisfaction a man has in the consciousness of his justice is a permanent good, much to be preferred to the transient pleasures enjoyed from the gratification of appetite.

Socrates for himself preferred virtue to pleasure, and chose the permanent good of rational thought, instead of the transient gratification of appetite and desire; but did he realize the strength of the enticement to immediate gratification for the average man, and the feeble hold that a future, though a more permanent good, had upon his will? Wisdom, no doubt, dictates that every one, for his own sake, should pursue virtue instead of vice; but it is not true that every one will do this, even when he knows that in the long run it will be to his advantage; hence it is not true that virtue is resolvable into knowledge, and vice into ignorance. A vicious man, knowing full well that the permanent good of vir-

tue is of far greater value than the immediate, intense, transitory pleasures of vice, yet yields to the solicitations of evil, and thus forfeits the permanent rewards of virtue. He can apply to himself the language of Ovid:

"Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor."

Xenophon tells us that Socrates declared that man to be most praiseworthy who anticipated his enemies in maleficence and his friends in beneficence.

Socrates taught obedience not only to the inner moral requirement, but to the external legal order, and this he exemplified in submitting to the sentence of death when he might have escaped.

If his theory was egoistic, his example in instructing others was altruistic. In this we see that the man Socrates was greater than his system.

(2) *The Megarians*.—The founder of this school was *Euclid*, a disciple of Socrates. He is not to be confounded with the more famous Euclid, the mathematician of Alexandria. Euclid was a good logician; he employed in argument chiefly the *reductio ad absurdum* method of reasoning.

Euclid held with Socrates that the good is the ultimate end to be sought. But what is the good? Euclid replied that which the Electics called *being, what truly is*, the hidden secret of the universe; perhaps, to adopt a modern statement, the power in nature that works for righteousness. He thus gave to ethics a metaphysical basis, and this is the latest modern tendency.

(3) *The Cynics*.—The principal philosophers of this school were *Antisthenes* (444-371) and *Diogenes* (cir.

412-323), who was a pupil of Antisthenes. They were called *Cynics* from *Cynosarges*, the name of the gymnasium in which Antisthenes taught. Diogenes was often called *the dog*, ὁ κύων, from which fact some have derived the word *cynic*. The word *cynical* is used to denote a snappish disposition.

The Cynics followed Socrates in placing a low estimate on the short-lived pleasures of sensation; but they carried his doctrine to extremes by renouncing the comforts of life, which may be innocently enjoyed. It is not necessary for one to go ragged and dirty and barefoot, like Antisthenes, or to live in a tub, as did Diogenes. The Cynics anticipated the Stoics.

(4) *The Cyrenaics*.—The chief representative of this school was *Aristippus* (435-356). He accepted the doctrine of Socrates that the good is personal enjoyment; and not distinguishing between the transient and the permanent, but resolving all enjoyment into hedonic pleasure, he went to the extreme, opposite to that chosen by the Cynics, and thus anticipated the Epicureans.

It seems strange that two such opposite schools as the Cynics and the Cyrenaics could find the root of their doctrines in the teaching of Socrates, yet such is the fact; it proves the breadth of the mind of Socrates. The Cynics seemed to be never so completely happy as when they were miserable; and the Cyrenaics resolved happiness into pleasure of the lowest sort.

It remained for Plato and Aristotle to develop the doctrines of Socrates, to elucidate the virtues, and to place the science of ethics on a solid foundation.

(5) *Plato* (427-347).—Plato accepted the doctrine

of Socrates that virtue is identical with knowledge. He makes ethical good, or virtue, central in a comprehensive theory of the universe.

Plato recognized four virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice; but he finds no place for benevolence, unless in his later work, the *Laws*, in which he insists on purity in the marriage relation, and the kind treatment of slaves.

Wisdom, or the virtue of reason, should characterize the higher classes, the statesmen who make the laws, and the philosophers who develop the theory of politics.

Courage, or the virtue of the spirited part of the soul, should be possessed by the soldier who fights for his country.

Temperance, or moderation, is the virtue which should regulate the appetites and desires of all classes.

Justice grows out of the union of all the other virtues, and its practice and enforcement is the especial duty of the rulers. It limits and regulates the conduct of all classes, and is the guardian of the rights of all.

The higher classes require their appropriate virtues and all other virtues; but the lower classes do not need the higher virtues. Thus soldiers and laborers have no need of wisdom.

In his earlier dialogues, as the *Republic*, Plato is more ideal, and assumes the union of all the virtues under the direction of wisdom, giving the practical virtue of prudence. In the later dialogue, the *Laws*, he supplements the four divine virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice—by the four human utilities—health, beauty, strength, and wealth.

In the world of *ideas*, which are patterns after which material objects are formed, all is harmony; but in the world of *matter*, the physical objects, which are only imperfect copies of the original patterns, often conflict and occasion disorder. But matter is not wholly an evil; for beauty clothes itself in material forms, and addresses the mind through the senses. Æsthetics, the science of beauty, is closely allied to ethics, the science of the good. *Idea* in Plato is nearly equivalent to *concept*, only it has an objective existence.

To comprehend the Platonic ethics we must understand that of the Sophists, to which it was especially opposed. If man be nothing but an aggregate of sensations, as the Sophists taught, then he can have no other purpose than sensational pleasure, and selfishness is the sole principle of action; but if his higher and truer nature is reason, to which courage, appetite, and desire are subordinate, then other and higher purposes than selfish gratification ought to control his conduct.

A Sophist would say to a Platonist, If what you call justice and virtue bring happiness, then by all means be just and virtuous, or seem to be so, which would do just as well; but virtue is conformity to nature, and man is nothing but a bundle of sensations; therefore the pursuit of pleasure is the only real virtue, though the pursuit leads to what you call vice and injustice.

The whole discussion turns on the answer to the question, What is true human nature? If man is nothing but an aggregate of sensations, then the Sophists were right, that the pursuit of pleasure is the true morality; but if man's true higher nature is reason, then the polemic of Plato against the Sophists was triumphant.

In the Republic, Plato illustrated his theory of ethics by the State, which is made up of rulers, soldiers, artisans, mechanics, agriculturists, and the like. He showed that as the State can prosper only by maintaining justice—that is, order and due subordination to the rulers, no class being allowed, by an act of injustice, to encroach on the rights of the other classes—so the soul of man, having reason, courage, appetite, and desire, can attain to its highest good only by the supremacy of reason in directing courage, and controlling appetite and desire. The true morality of an individual, analogous to justice in the State, is the intentional effort so to adjust and subordinate his powers, and to order his conduct, as to realize the highest possibilities of his true nature. In this realization man finds his satisfaction.

Plato is richly worthy of the most attentive study, not only for his philosophy, but for the graces of his style. Says Frederick Harrison:

“I never doubt that the greatest master of prose in recorded history is Plato. He alone (like Homer in poetry) is perfect. He has every mood, and all are faultless. He is easy, lucid, graceful, witty, pathetic, imaginative, by turns; but in all kinds he is natural and inimitably sweet. He shows us, as it were, his own *Athena*, wisdom incarnate, in immortal radiance of form.”

Chapter II

GREEK ETHICS—CONTINUED

(6) *Aristotle* (384-322).—Aristotle was more realistic and less supersensuous than Plato. Instead of *idea*, which Plato considered the divine pattern after which a thing is made, Aristotle substituted *form*, or the combination of all the common qualities of all the objects of a class. The form can be found by passing from individual to individual of a class, dropping the attributes peculiar to the individual, and retaining only those not found wanting in any individual of the class. Aristotle also called the form the *formal cause*, since it is that combination of qualities which causes an object to belong to a certain class.

It is not the *idea* of virtue that Aristotle discusses, but virtue itself as existing in man. Ethics thus assumes a realistic character. Aristotle does not consider abstract goodness—what is good in itself, or in an ideal world, but what is good for man in the present state of existence, as a member of society, or as a citizen of the State.

With Plato, Aristotle held that an individual can not attain to his highest good apart from others, but only as a citizen; hence politics is the culmination of ethics, and man is a political animal. Yet Aristotle preferred a

contemplative to a practical life, and ranked the philosopher above the politician.

The identification of the good with happiness, Aristotle regarded as self-evident. Virtue is a deliberate moral choice of the mean between the two extremes of excess and defect; it is moderation under the guidance of reason and the control of the will. Virtue is the means of happiness.

The theoretical virtues, depending on reason, are knowledge, skill, insight, understanding, wisdom; the practical virtues, directing morals, are courage, temperance, prudence, liberality. These moral virtues, relative to ourselves, are means between two extremes, which are the vices of excess and deficiency. Thus courage is the mean, relative to ourselves, between the vices of foolhardiness, an excess of courage, on the one hand, and of cowardice, a deficiency of courage, on the other. Relative to the highest good, virtue is an extreme; it aims at the highest excellence.

Justice is partly a theoretical virtue and partly a practical one, depending, as it does, both on the reason and on the will.

Aristotle combats the view of Socrates that virtue is resolvable into knowledge, and that no one will do wrong except through ignorance. He held that Socrates did not sufficiently allow for the strength of appetite and desire. Virtue is rather good will than accurate knowledge. He, however, agrees with Socrates in regarding reason as the characteristic attribute of man, and this fact classes him with the Socratic school. The supreme good Aristotle held to be the happiness which springs from reason, the higher or true nature of man.

Virtue is to be strengthened by right conduct. Youth are to be trained in the practice of virtue by such conduct as will lead to the formation of right habits. Hence Aristotle emphasizes the importance of right conduct. Virtue, as moral character, is not innate, but is acquired by conduct. Now, a person before his moral character is formed may be taught that it is best for him to be just and temperate; then "he becomes just by doing what is just, and temperate by conduct that is temperate; and if one did not so act, he would not have so much as a chance of becoming good." Right conduct forms right habits; right habits form good character; and good character is a perpetual fountain of genuine satisfaction, which is the highest good.

In finding virtue in moderation, the mean between two extremes, Aristotle makes temperance, or self-control, which Plato regarded as the lowest of the virtues, to be the essence of all virtue.

Aristotle held that an undeveloped human being had as yet no moral character; that he has no principle within, which necessarily makes him virtuous or vicious; but that he has a nature which may run in either of these directions. The direction which the individual takes, whether towards virtue or vice, granting all due influence to the environment, is decided by his own free will.

The merit of being the first moralist to recognize the function of the will belongs to Aristotle. He held that the essence of virtue is a good will—that is, a will which, seeking the guidance of wisdom, chooses the right, but is neither identical with reason nor independent of it. Knowledge, therefore, though not identical with virtue, is essential to success in the pursuit of the

objective means of happiness. We have seen that Aristotle held that the ultimate good, or the end of human pursuit, is happiness. In what does happiness consist? Aristotle gives four theories:

1. The good is a separate entity which may be attained by participating in the divine ideas. This is Plato's theory; but Aristotle considers it too vague to be of any practical value.

2. The good is sensual pleasure. This will do for brutes, but not for man; for reason, not sensation, is the proper nature of man.

3. The good is honor. Honor is good, but not all good nor the highest.

4. The good is intellectual contemplation. This is the truest of all, yet incomplete. Aristotle, however, adopts it, and supplements it by other ends, thus forming what he regarded as the true doctrine of happiness. To ascertain the condition of happiness, we must first find man's true nature. Man is an organized being; so are plants and animals. Man is a sensitive being; so are animals. Man is a moral being, and his reason is his characteristic or proper nature.

Man's proper work is not, therefore, simply to maintain his organic life, which is the work of the plant; nor is it man's proper work to obtain pleasurable sensations, which is the work of a brute; but his proper work is to develop his true nature, his rational powers, and to live according to reason, and in so doing he attains to true happiness.

It was a great merit in Aristotle to insist on the practice of virtue. By the practice of virtue, by the choice of the good by the will under the guidance of wisdom,

man *creates and makes permanent a virtuous character for himself*. If the character is decisive of subsequent conduct, a person who by conduct forms character can control his subsequent conduct. Being instructed when he is yet plastic, before his character is crystallized, he is free to follow reason in his conduct. From right conduct follow right habits, good character, right subsequent habits, and conduct, and the highest happiness, the consciousness of rectitude.

It is a matter of surprise that Aristotle took no notice of benevolence, unless he faintly recognized it under the head of liberality; yet he spoke of the affection that binds men together. What he calls good will, was not what we call benevolence, but a choice of all the virtues.

Aristotle is a practical moralist. He says: "The object of our inquiry is not [only] to know the nature of virtue, but to become ourselves virtuous." Aristotle's ethics is, even at this day, well worthy the attention of those who are interested in ethical questions. It reads like a modern book.

3. *Post-Socratic*.—Of the post-Socratic schools of ethics we have the two principal ones—the Stoic and the Epicurean.

(1) *The Stoic Philosophy*.—Its founder was Zeno (342-270). This school of philosophy took its name from *στοά*, the porch where Zeno taught. The Stoic philosophy goes back to the Socratic through the Cynics, who taught that the well-being of the sage is independent of such things as health, beauty, wealth, pleasure.

The Stoics, however, insisted on serenity, tranquil-

lity, magnanimity, and wisdom, that secure the philosopher from the disturbing accidents of life. Their maxim was, *Live according to nature*; but they aimed not so much to state maxims of duty, as to exemplify virtue in character, as found, for example, in Socrates and Zeno.

Health, wealth, good birth, fame, and the like, though good in a good man, were evil in a bad man, and were, therefore, in themselves indifferent. Pleasure, desire, grief, fear, are sources of evils. The good man's character must be secure from the influence of these things, and such maladies must be eradicated from his soul.

The Stoic's characteristic was neither *sympathy* nor *antipathy*, but *apathy*—indifference to the joys, the sorrows, or the circumstances of life.

It is a curious question, why in certain emergencies the Stoics encouraged suicide as an escape from the ills of life, since the sage is to be indifferent to pain. By suicide he seems to desert his post of duty, assigned to him by the wisdom of God. The answer is, that pain is not to be desired, but rather to be avoided, and that certain disabilities, as loss of health or limb, were indications of Providence that he was no longer on duty, since his disability to perform duty was a providential indication of his release; and by the act of suicide, he proved that life itself is regarded as one of the indifferent things.

The unity of the virtues was not with the Stoics the identity of the virtues, but their combination in the unity of a moral personality. As with Plato, so with the Stoics, wisdom was the principal virtue.

The motto of the Stoics, *Live according to nature*,

or more definitely, Live in conformity to the laws of your own nature, the laws of society, and the laws of God, as reason reveals them, was a motto adopted by other schools of philosophy, and is still in vogue.

So the Sophists said, Live according to nature; so said Socrates; but in one case nature meant *sensation*, in the other case *thought*.

The tendency of the teaching of the Stoics was egoistic, but cosmopolitan, and in this respect they took the lead. They valued their friends, and advocated the common friendship of all the good. Notwithstanding the many good points of Stoicism, it was still a one-sided system.

The great teachers of Stoicism were Zeno the founder, Chrysippus, Seneca, Epictetus, and the Emperor Marcus.

(2) *The Epicurean philosophy*.—The founder was Epicurus (341-270).

Just as the Stoic philosophy was an improvement on the Cynic, so was the Epicurean an improvement on the Cyrenaic. As the Cynics were forerunners of the Stoics, so were the Cyrenaics of the Epicureans.

Notwithstanding their extreme divergence in the main, yet at least in two respects the Stoics and the Epicureans ran in parallel courses—in the prominence of the personal element, and in the emphasis placed on the negative aspect of happiness, the absence of disturbing influences; but with the Stoics, the evil or disturbing influence was *passion*, with the Epicureans it was *pain*. The Epicureans maintained with Aristippus, the Cyrenaic, that pleasure is the sole good and pain the sole evil; that a pleasure is not to be rejected unless it results

in an overbalancing pain; and that a pain is not to be sought unless it results in an overbalancing pleasure. Hence a philosopher should discriminate between the pleasures, and seek for the durable that do not give final pain. This is sound teaching, for which Epicurus ought to receive due credit.

The pleasures of friendship and of society are much to be preferred to the gratification of the appetite or to any form of sensual indulgence. The pleasures of the intellect, found in the cultivation of science, or in the study of philosophy, are far superior to those found in the gratification of ambition or in the success attending any public career.

Though Epicurus himself was temperate in his enjoyments, yet the tendency of his system, as shown by its history, is to sensual gratification.

The common opinion that an *epicure* is a voluptuary, one given to luxurious living, especially to the pleasures of the table, shows the drift of sentiment in regard to the tendency of the system. The Epicureans would say, Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.

The low tendency of Epicureanism is also seen in the teaching that the only restraint from crime is the dread of detection and punishment. This dread is, no doubt, a powerful restraint of which Government must avail itself, especially as many can be restrained in no other way; but every person should be taught to heed the voice of reason, and follow the dictates of his better nature.

As the serenity of the mind is disturbed by the fear of the gods, and by the fear of death, Epicurus, who seemed desirous to remove all disturbing influences,

taught that the gods were too happy in their own sphere to trouble themselves with the affairs of men; that the universe is not the creation of the gods, but that it is to be explained by the mechanical interaction of atoms, as taught by the philosopher Democritus; and that the fear of death is needless, since when we are alive death is absent, and when death is present we no longer exist.

Notwithstanding certain analogies between the systems, the difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism is radical. It is the distinction between feeling and thought, sensation and reason, the flesh and the spirit. The Stoic assigns superiority to thought, reason, and the spirit; the Epicurean to feeling, sensation, and the flesh. It is easily seen that both systems are one-sided. Stoicism, carried to the extreme, results in pride, asceticism, apathy; Epicureanism, carried to the extreme, degenerates into luxury, sensuality, debauchery. We can not get on without feeling, sensation, and the body; neither can we succeed without thought, reason, and the spirit. Avoiding the extremes, blending the systems, giving the control to thought, reason, and the spirit, we are not far from the true system of ethics.

The contrast between Stoicism and Epicureanism is also brought out by the so-called paradoxes of the Stoics:

1. Nothing can happen contrary to the will of a wise man; for a wise man's will assents to the will of God, and nothing can happen contrary to the will of God. The Stoic seems to forget that sin, or moral evil in general, is a violation of God's law, and is, therefore, contrary to God's will. To be consistent, the Stoic must deny the existence of sin, but this view conflicts with

fact. The Epicurean would say, God cares nothing at all about the matter; and that, therefore, the Stoic can not repose on the Divine will, which, in the case supposed, does not exist.

2. Pain is no evil. The only meaning that can be attached to this is that pain is no moral evil. The Epicurean would say, Pain is the only evil.

3. Apathy is the only proper state of a wise man. This can be true only when we mean by apathy liberation from perturbation, or excessive passion or disturbance; but with the Stoics apathy was too liable to become, as it was held to be in the popular estimation, not the liberation from perturbation, but the absence of sympathy. The Epicureans would say, Avoid the cause of disturbance, and you will have tranquillity.

After the rise of the two schools—the Stoic and the Epicurean—the schools of Plato and Aristotle did not cease to exist, but they were no longer dominant. Ethical philosophy was divided into four branches. The labors of Aristotle were so great and so diverse, that little was left for his disciples to accomplish. Accordingly the peripatetic philosophers made little progress, contenting themselves with teaching the importance of virtue to well being. The Epicureans, in accepting the dogmas of their founder, without question, ceased to investigate, and sank into a school of pleasure.

The Academics, or Platonists, were in affinity with the Stoics, yet they claimed that health, wealth, reputation, and power were good, while the Stoics only allowed them to be preferable to their opposites. Philosophy drifted into eclecticism, and finally into skepticism.

Chapter III

ROMAN ETHICS

THE Romans as philosophers.—The Romans were not original in ethics, or in any form of philosophy. In fact, the Romans at first resisted the introduction among them of the new advance in thought. Thus the Greek philosopher, Carneades, on the occasion of a famous embassy to Rome, charmed the Roman youth by his eloquent vindication of justice; but the next day he astonished them by refuting his own argument. No wonder that Cato, the stern old Roman, moved that the Greek philosophers be banished from Rome, as they would corrupt the young Romans.

2. *Lucretius* (94-55).—From the poet Lucretius we learn that Epicureanism was the ethical system that first gained followers at Rome. The poem of Lucretius, entitled “*De Rerum Natura*,” is evidence of the enthusiasm with which he and kindred minds hailed the doctrine of Epicurus as a deliverance from superstitious fears. The acceptance of the atomistic explanation of the universe, proposed by Democritus, as the teaching of science, would banish the gods from the world, and give tranquillity to the minds of men. This is all right, so long as the gods are regarded as wicked and hostile to mankind; but those who believe that God is wise and good and all powerful have no desire to have him banished.

The effort of Lucretius was to overthrow theology, or rather mythology, by the facts of science, and his effort has its parallel in modern times.

3. *Cicero* (106-43).—Cicero accepted the doctrines of the Academy in its skeptical, or rather, perhaps, in its eclectic phase. The works of Cicero, especially the “*De Officiis*,” are valuable in conveying to us a knowledge of ancient thought; but as an original ethical philosopher, Cicero did little of importance. Indeed, he claimed only to have presented the philosophy of Greece in the language of Rome.

With the Stoic Panætius, Cicero distinguished between expediency (*utile*), and virtue (*honestum*). Five virtues were recognized—wisdom, justice, beneficence, fortitude, and temperance, each of which he characterized and advocated. It was, however, in the ethics of jurisprudence that Cicero’s attainments as a lawyer gave to his writings historical importance.

According to the ancient teaching, the notions of the good and virtue were self-evident and fundamental; but according to the later view, ethics is conceived as a knowledge of the moral code—a law, natural, rational, and divine, binding upon man as a member of the community of moral beings. This law is not only an objective code to be obeyed, but a subjective principle rationally apprehended, and serving as a guide in the performance of duty—objectively, it is the law of equity; subjectively, it is conscience.

Cicero states the case of a fleet laden with grain sailing from Egypt to Rome, at a time of great scarcity of grain. One ship, a faster sailer than the rest, arrives at Rome one day in advance of the others. He now

raises the question whether the master of the ship, who is also the owner of the grain, should exact the highest price possible for his wheat, or inform the Romans that other ships laden with wheat will shortly arrive, and so be compelled to take a lower, though still a remunerative, price for his grain. After discussing the case, Cicero decides that the ship-master is morally bound to inform the buyers of grain that other ships laden with wheat would shortly arrive at Rome; and in this opinion Cicero was right.

4. *Roman Stoicism*.—Stoicism had a closer affinity with the Roman mind than any other form of philosophy. The elder Stoics were employed in delineating the characteristics of ideal virtue. The actual philosopher was not always the ideal sage. After answering the speculative questions: What is wisdom? What is virtue?—then come the practical questions: How shall I obtain wisdom? How shall I attain to virtue? The answer is to be looked for, if not found, in the writings of the philosophers.

(1) *Seneca* (3 B. C.-65 A. D.)—Seneca did not claim to be a sage, but only that he was making progress towards wisdom and virtue. The way to wisdom, by overcoming evil tendencies, he held was not difficult to find; but to obtain victory over evil requires a ceaseless struggle. It is a warfare in which there is no truce. Every defeat calls for stricter discipline in the practice of self-denial and a renewal of the struggle. Herein is revealed the weakness of Stoicism as compared with Christianity. Following the teaching of Stoicism, the aspirant after virtue struggles alone; following the

teaching of Christianity, he seeks help from God, nor does he seek in vain.

Seneca taught that, though the struggle for virtue should continue, yet no general perfection is attainable till "it seems good to God to make an end of old things, and ordain the better; then shall the ancient order be revoked, and every creature be generated anew, and a race ignorant of guilt be given to the earth."

(2) *Epictetus* (cir. 45-103).—Epictetus, a native of Hieropolis, in Phrygia, was a slave of Epaphroditus, a freedman and favorite of Nero. Though a bad master, Epaphroditus sent Epictetus to attend the lectures of C. Mussonius Rufus, an eminent Stoic of Rome.

After the expulsion of the philosophers from Rome by Domitian, Epictetus retired to Nicapolis, in Epirus, a city built by Augustus in commemoration of his victory at Actium, where he opened a school and lectured on philosophy. Epictetus wrote nothing himself, but his lectures were reported by his pupil, Arrian, who took copious notes of the lectures of his teacher as the words fell from his lips.

The philosophy of Epictetus was ethical, and his inquiry was, How shall I live? His answer was, Live reasonably, according to nature. This is the common answer of all the schools; but it is general and, consequently, vague.

As to the existence of God, Epictetus says: "There are some who say a Divine Being does not exist; others say that he exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no thought about anything; a third class say such a Being exists, and takes forethought, but only about

great things and heavenly things, and not about anything on the earth; a fourth class hold that a Divine Being exercises forethought, both about things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a general way only, and not about things severally. There is a fifth class, to whom Ulysses and Socrates belong, who say, I move not without His knowledge. . . . The wise and good man then, after considering all these things, submits his own mind to Him who administers the whole, as good citizens do to the laws of the State."

Epictetus held that the essence of good and evil is found only in the will. Good consists in doing right and avoiding wrong; evil in doing wrong and avoiding right. Hence it follows that things uncontrollable by us are to us neither right nor wrong, and concerning such things we should not be fearful, but bold; but things controllable by us are to us either right or wrong, and, therefore, concerning such things we should be fearful, lest we do wrong or fail to do right.

This is the reverse of ordinary thinking; for one says, I will take care of things controllable by myself, and have no need of fear; but things uncontrollable by myself may happen contrary to my will, and therefore I have reason to fear them.

It is evident, however, that the good or evil, as contemplated by Epictetus, is ethical good or evil, the right and wrong in choice and conduct; but that the good or evil, according to ordinary thinking, is non-ethical, consisting in pleasure and pain. Adopting the view of Epictetus, that good is identical with the ethically right, and evil with the ethically wrong, we would say with him that we should fear only in case

of things controlled by ourselves, lest we do wrong or fail to do right; but in things uncontrollable we should be bold, since we can do neither right nor wrong. Adopting the view that the good is identical with pleasure, and evil with pain, we should be bold in things controllable, since we can take care of them; but we should fear concerning things uncontrollable, since we are not able to prevent the harm that may come to us. Practically Epictetus was right. To do right is to insure the highest good, *the consciousness of being right*; but this consciousness is not hedonic pleasure, but ethical satisfaction, which is eudemonic good. The righteousness of will and conduct is the ethical element, and is all we should be anxious about. The satisfaction from the consciousness of righteousness is the great reward and is the final justification of right conduct. From the ethical point of view, all other things are indifferent.

Epictetus did not claim that the good was ever actually attained in the experience of any sage, but that the true life is an earnest progress towards the perfection of virtue. The ethical satisfaction is in the progress.

(3) *Marcus Aurelius* (120-180).—The Stoic Emperor Marcus thus summed up his creed: "Everything is harmonious to me that is harmonious to thee, O universe; nothing is too early or too late for me that is in due time for thee; everything is fruit to me that thy seasons bring forth, O Nature; from thee are all things, to thee all things return." Thus he expresses his rule of life, "Reverence the gods, and help men." But how is this confidence in the Divine wisdom reconcilable

with the Stoic indifference to mundane things? All things are controlled by wisdom; yet all things are ephemeral, and all changes worthless.

As to the immortality of the soul, Marcus seems undecided whether to consider death the extinction of being or a transition to another state of existence. He says of himself, "In a little while thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus." He also adds: "How can it be that the gods, having ordained all things rightly and benevolently towards men, should then allow good men to perish? Were it just they should survive, it would also be possible; were it according to nature, nature would have it so."

Christianity and Stoicism agree in asserting: "It is not possible, either through want of power or through want of wisdom, that good or evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and bad." The solution of Christianity is that the future life will correct the inequalities of the present. The solution of Stoicism is that the inequalities of the present life are matters of no concern, and have no significance for the sage, whose attitude towards pleasure or pain, affection or desire, satisfaction or grief, hope or fear, is that of indifference. Of more value than all the positive virtues is that of *apathy*.

5. *Plutarch* (cir. 48-120).—Plutarch combined the Pythagorean and the Platonic doctrines. The bad world soul strives against the good, just as, according to Christianity, Satan strives against God. The wise are sustained, not only by natural religion, but by dreams, oracles, warnings, for which the soul should prepare

itself by abstinence and repose. Here we find an approach toward mysticism.

6. *Plotinus* (205-270).—Plotinus, though professing great reverence for Platonism, yet developed a system called *Neo-Platonism*. Plato identified the perfect, the good, with the real, the definitely conceivable and knowable; and the imperfect, the bad, with the unreal, the inconceivable and unknowable. The real is thinkable in proportion as it is real. The more the mind abstracts from particulars, the more real is our knowledge.

Plotinus called *ἄλη*, or formless matter, the first evil, from which is derived *σῶμα*, the body, the second evil.

The lowest form of virtue, the civic, as delineated in Plato's republic, is employed in controlling the animal impulses due to the residence of the soul in the body; but the higher virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance are reached when the soul, uninfluenced by the body, is governed by reason and restored to the Divine likeness.

Plotinus urges that, as thought involves comparison and difference, and hence duality, it can not be a primary fact. Hence God is the essential unity prior to this duality. Therefore the soul, in apprehending God, must transcend all thought, and lose itself in Divine ecstasy. This is the essence of mysticism. According to Porphyry, Plotinus attained this exalted state four times.

Neo-Platonism is analogous to the philosophy of the Jewish Alexandrine school, as taught by Philo two hundred years before in expounding the doctrine of

the *Logos*, which took on a Christian form, as stated by St. John.

7. *Porphyry* (cir. 233-306).—Porphyry, diverging further from the Platonic doctrine than his master, Plotinus, held that the purification of the soul required the absolute mortification of the bodily appetites. Porphyry had great talent for historical research. He profoundly studied the Christian writings, and was a bitter opponent of the Christian religion.

“That man shall not live by bread alone the world had learned before Neo-Platonism; but Neo-Platonism has enforced the deeper truth—a truth which the older philosophy had missed—that man shall not live by knowledge alone.”

Chapter IV

CHRISTIAN ETHICS—PATRISTIC

MEANING of patristic ethics.—By patristic ethics we mean the ethics taught by the Church fathers from the days of the apostles to the development of the scholastic philosophy in mediæval times.

In accepting the Jewish Scriptures as inspired, the Christian fathers accepted the ethics of the Old Testament as authoritative.

2. *Old Testament ethics.*—Two questions arise: What does God command? What does God forbid? Why he commands or forbids is a question of secondary importance, which Jew or Christian is at liberty to answer for himself, if he is able; but the answer is no essential part of revelation.

Disobedience was the sin that caused the loss of paradise; violence and corruption were the sins punished by the deluge; and unchastity that led to the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The law against murder was a definite statement after the flood: "Who-soever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."

God made a covenant with Abraham, which he sealed with the rite of circumcision. "Walk before me, and be thou perfect. I will make my covenant between me and thee, and will multiply thee exceedingly."

Esau despised the covenant of promise, and lost his birthright. "What profit shall this birthright do to me? . . . And he sold his birthright unto Jacob." What did he get? A mess of pottage.

As the law was adapted to the degree of civilization, polygamy was not prohibited.

The Decalogue enjoined the duties due both to God and to man; but the ecclesiastical law gave the details of the religious ritual rather than ethical rules.

The invasion of Canaan under Joshua is paralleled by the invasion of America by the Europeans in modern times. The same thing is now going on in Africa. These are instances of the survival of the fittest. We judge the Israelites, and do the same thing.

Prosperity, as shown by the history of Israel, followed obedience, and adversity disobedience. The besetting sin of the Israelites, that into which they were continually falling, was the sin of idolatry; and this sin was not purged till the Babylonian captivity. Another sin was avarice, robbery, and the consequent blood-thirstiness, as shown in the cry of the prophets, "Woe to them that join house to house, that lay field to field." But the great sin which brought about the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the nation was the rejection of their promised Messiah. "It shall be well with the righteous, but the wicked shall not go unpunished."

The Old Testament ethics, in its best form, is of a higher type than it is usually assumed to be. Take Psalm xv, as quoted in Part I, chapter iv. Take also Psalm xxiv, 3-5: "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? He

that hath clean hands and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully." Again, Isaiah i, 16, 17: "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow."

3. *New Testament ethics.*—The New Testament strikes the highest note of morality in purity of heart, love to God and man, including enemies, in the law of love and the Golden Rule, and devotion to the cause of Christ. The inner life is to manifest itself in outward deeds of love to others.

The Church fathers taught that God, the common Father of mankind, made of one blood all the nations of the earth, and thus constituted all men brethren by the ties of nature; that he revealed his will in the Holy Scriptures, and established the Church as the community of the faithful, and thus organized a spiritual brotherhood, whose aim should be to bring all men into one common fellowship; and that he promulgated a new system of ethics, based on the law of love, to be applied in practice under the guide of the Golden Rule.

The basis of morality, according to Christian teaching, is the will of God expressed by the Divine law revealed in the Scriptures.

Vague notions of a Divine law, eternal and immutable, were obscurely expressed in the ancient systems of philosophy, from Socrates to the time of Christ. Hints of this law were found in the enacted laws and changing customs of the nations; yet it was but obscurely apprehended even by the philosophers, who

based it on reason, by which alone they thought it could be discovered and reduced to an intelligible form.

Christian ethics, on the other hand, is based on the authority of God and enforced by the sanction of rewards and penalties. In passing from pagan to Christian ethics, we thus find an entire change of base from reason to the will of God, as expressed in his revealed Word.

In the early Church the foundation of morals is, therefore, found in positive law, which, so far as the reason of the law could not be found, was regarded as expressive of the will of God. It remained to the Christian teachers to amplify and interpret the rules of morality, to apply them to the details of conduct, and to enforce obedience by the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. The essence of the law is love to God and love to man; but the details of conduct, under the law, are multiform.

The ceremonial law of the Levitical economy was rejected; but the moral precepts, given through Moses and the prophets, were held to be binding. To these were added the commands of Christ and the teachings of the apostles. In keeping these laws, Christians had faith to expect Divine assistance.

Baptism, the type of regeneration called the new birth, was administered to all entering the Christian community.

To the ultimate sanctions of future rewards and punishments were added, by the Church authorities, the temporal sanctions of penance and excommunication. The gradation of the punishment corresponded

to the estimated degree of guilt. This led to a detailed classification both of offenses and of ecclesiastical sanctions.

The regulation of the ceremonies grew more elaborate till, at length, the Christian ritual rivaled that of the Jewish ceremonial law, which had been cast aside. In the meantime, a corresponding emphasis was laid on external duties or good works. Both inward faith and outward works have their value, and never should be divorced. Without the inward principles of faith, hope, love, the outward works are merely perfunctory performances, and without the outward works the inward fire goes out. Between inward holiness and external righteousness there is essential harmony; but conflict will arise whenever either is insisted on to the exclusion of the other.

The advocates of faith and inward holiness, remembering that Christ insisted on purity of heart, and that Paul opposed Jewish legalism, placed no stress on good works, and thus led the way to dangerous antinomianism, and finally to gross immorality. The other extreme, emphasizing good works, neglected the religion of the heart, and lapsed in legalism, first technical, and finally unfruitful. To bear fruit requires a living plant; but "every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire." "By their fruits ye shall know them."

The essence of religion is love. It requires a transcendent object of adoration and a form of worship. Love is nourished, and good works are stimulated by faith. Both faith and love are sustained by hope, that

anchor of the soul sure and steadfast. Christian morality, based on faith in God, is the outward expression of an inward life.

4. *Pagan and Christian conceptions of morality compared.*—Morality was conceived by pagan philosophers as wisdom; but by Christian teachers it was conceived as beneficent deeds flowing from a benevolent heart. The pagan philosophers had, in their list of virtues, no place for benevolence. The nearest approach they made to it was in liberality or in friendship. Of love for enemies they had no conception. Socrates taught that a wise man will anticipate both his enemy and his friend—his enemy in striking first, and his friend by doing first an act of kindness. The precept of Christ reached the heart of the matter: "Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that spitefully use you and persecute you."

The Socratic philosophers identified virtue with wisdom, because it seemed to them inconceivable that one should do that which he believed would injure him, or refuse to do that which would contribute to his welfare; yet we know that, to obtain present gratification, or to escape present pain, men refuse to do right, or choose to do wrong, knowing that, in the long run, they will be greatly the losers.

Sin is not ignorance, but wickedness. It is always unreasonable. This unreasonable action is, in part, accounted for by the greater intensity of the present motive and by the force of habit. It also springs from a corrupt heart and from a will that consents to the evil for the sake of the selfish gratification anticipated. The

heart—that is, the affections and the desires—is the common fountain of good and evil. “Out of the heart are the issues of life.”

The ethics of Christianity requires repentance for sin and obedience to the Divine law. The fruits are unworldliness, purity of heart, love to God and to man, patience in tribulation, and a life of beneficent activity.

The effects of Christianity on society were seen in checking the evils of slavery, restraining all forms of immorality, in the use of wealth in providing for the poor and the sick, and in disseminating the principles and practices of brotherhood. Many Christians erred on the side of asceticism in regarding hermits and monks as typical saints, or in becoming such themselves; and so monasticism spread.

Seven deadly sins were specified: Pride, avarice, anger, gluttony, unchastity, envy, and vanity. Other sins were regarded as venial; that is, as faults capable of forgiveness.

5. *Pelagius* (cir. 385-435).—The Pelagian controversy and the discussion concerning the freedom of the will led to the consideration of the relation of human and Divine agency in the salvation of man. The proclamation of the gospel to men for their acceptance presupposes free will, since they receive the reward of acceptance or the consequence of rejection; but this seemed inconsistent with the doctrine of the absolute dependence of man, for salvation, on Divine grace. Pelagius contended for the freedom of the will, and taught that, with the assistance of the light of revelation, and by the aid of Divine grace, it was possible for a Christian completely to avoid sin. The Church,

however, did not indorse this doctrine, and it was repudiated as a heresy.

6. *Augustine* (354-430).—Augustine pressed the doctrine of the inability to keep the law of God to such a length as to make it irreconcilable with the freedom of the will, and with Divine benevolence; but this would release man from responsibility. Augustine deemed that these difficulties were sufficiently met, if freedom of choice between good and evil was bestowed on Adam. In Adam, therefore, humanity chose evil once for all; and hence all men are condemned to actual sin and consequent punishment, except those whom God elected, by his sovereign grace, to share the benefits of redemption through Christ.

The remarkable abilities of Augustine gave to these opinions great weight, and led to their acceptance by at least a portion of the Church, notwithstanding the difficulties involved in identifying a depraved nature inherited from Adam with actual sin, and in reconciling the goodness of God with the condemnation of a large portion of mankind to hopeless ruin.

According to Augustine, faith springs from the germ of love graciously imparted; and from the union of faith and love arises hope, looking to the fruition of eternal blessedness in the presence of God. Following the essential virtues of faith, love, and hope were the fourfold virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice; but these virtues were to be regarded only as various forms of love to God.

Prudence is sagacity in choosing the things pleasing to God, and in rejecting those displeasing; temperance is love to God, avoiding excess; fortitude, spring-

ing from the love of God, is the endurance of hardships; justice is the rendering to all their due, because pleasing to God.

The love of God, from which springs love to man and respect for self, is the true wisdom and the source of enjoyment to the redeemed soul. This love is the result of the mystic union of the soul with God, and is true religion.

7. *Ambrose* (cir. 340-397).—According to Ambrose and the early Church fathers, wisdom has for its root faith in God. Fortitude is endurance in tribulation, firmness in temptation, and courage in the conflict with wickedness. Temperance is moderation in all conduct; and justice not only renders to others their due, but rises to the height of benevolence. Augustine traced all these virtues to one source—the love of God.

The Christian ideal of the highest good is not simply eternal existence, but eternal rectitude, involving the blessedness of eternal satisfaction—not simply eternal self-realization, but the eternal realization of steadfast righteousness, which is the highest good. Christian ethics, therefore, is concerned not only with the life that now is, but also with that which is to come.

Chapter V

CHRISTIAN ETHICS—SCHOLASTIC

NATURE of scholastic ethics.—The scholastic ethics was an attempt made by the mediæval theologians to justify Christian ethics to the eye of reason, by transforming dogmatic precepts into rational principles.

The triad of virtues—faith, hope, love—along with wisdom, justice, fortitude, temperance, the four cardinal virtues of the old philosophers, formed the framework for the treatment of ethics by the ecclesiastical writers. Over against the seven virtues were arrayed the seven deadly sins—murder, lust, covetousness, gluttony, pride, envy, idleness. The seven gifts of the Spirit (Isa. xi, 2) were also considered.

The separation of the monastic and common duties, as higher and lower, also the distinction between deadly and venial sins, applicable both to the clergy and laity, made the scheme of practical ethics very complicated. The deadly sins required special penance, but the venial might find forgiveness through prayer, fasting, and almsgiving. Penitential books were prepared as guides in the confessional, based partly on traditional practice and partly on the decrees of synods; and thus was laid the basis for casuistry, which reached its development in the fifteenth century. These rules, though useful,

promoted an external view of morality, which, however, found a counterpoise in the mystic piety taught by St. Augustine, and later by Bonaventura, Eckhart, Tauler, and others.

2. *Joannes Scotus Erigena* (cir. 810-877).—The system of Erigena, the earliest distinguished philosopher of the Middle Ages, was derived from Plato and Plotinus, transmitted through an unknown author who styled himself Dionysius the Areopagite. The ethics of Erigena shows the same ascetic characteristics as that of Neo-Platonism. He held that the existence of the world is illusory, and that the true aim of life is perfect union with God. This view led naturally to the mysticism of succeeding centuries. It did not, however, meet with general approval, and was finally condemned by Pope Honorius III.

3. *Anselm* (1033-1109).—Anselm taught that the freedom of the will was not strictly lost by the fall of man, but that, in consequence of sin, it exists only potentially, as sight in the dark. The potential freedom inherent in man's rational nature is made actual by the grace of God, as sight, which is only potential in the darkness of night, is made actual by the light of day.

4. *Abélard* (1079-1142).—Abélard distinguished sin as conscious consent to evil. He made righteousness of conduct depend solely on the intention, and regarded all outward acts as morally indifferent. Involuntary propensities, though bad, are not sins; but we ought to overcome the seductions to evil.

There is danger in regarding external actions as morally indifferent, so long as a person believes his intentions to be right, since it tends to make him careless

of his conduct. But Abélard explained that by good intentions he meant intentions to do what is actually right, and not merely what seems to be right. How does a person always know what is actually right? He must act, in many cases, on what seems to be right; but one meets his obligations if he seeks earnestly for light and acts according to his best ability. Abélard laid great stress on disinterestedness, and considered even love to God pure only when free from the desire for happiness which it will bring.

5. *Hugo of St. Victor* (1077-1141).—In opposition to Abélard, Hugo taught that, since love involves a desire of union with the beloved, it is necessarily interested; and since union with God involves eternal happiness, the desire for God can not exist apart from the desire for happiness. The truth is, it is right to desire happiness and to seek for it, if in so doing we do not wrong any other person.

6. *Peter the Lombard* (—1164).—In his manual, entitled "*Libri Sententiarum*," Peter attempted, by subtle distinctions, to reconcile conflicting authorities. He endeavored to give a complete exposition of Christian doctrine by stating with each proposition the arguments *pro* and *con*, drawn from Scripture and the writings of the fathers. These scholastic distinctions, though showing acuteness, were drawn out at such length as to become matters for ridicule.

7. *Thomas Aquinas* (1225-1274).—Accepting Aristotle as authority in philosophy, and Augustine in theology, Thomas Aquinas elaborated a comprehensive system.

He taught that all conduct is directed to some end,

which, in case of rational beings, is represented in thought and aimed at by the will under the guidance of reason. The ordinary ends, riches, power, honor, pleasure, fail to give satisfaction. Happiness can be found only in God, the highest good; hence the desire for the knowledge of God is justified as, in the highest sense, rational; but as such knowledge is beyond the reach of reason, it can be gained only by those who are right in heart and moral in life. The morality of an act is determined, in part, by its end or motive, and, in part, by its harmony or conflict with the rational order of the universe. In acts objectively indifferent the morality is determined by the motive.

Following Aristotle, he divides the natural virtues into intellectual and moral, and the intellectual into speculative and practical—the speculative dealing with principles, as the right use of reason, and the practical dealing with others, as justice, and dealing with ourselves, as prudence, temperance, fortitude. Above these rank the Pauline triad: faith, love, hope. Free will implied by duty is supplemented by Divine grace.

Thomas distinguished the passions as concupiscible and irascible—the concupiscible those excited at once by their objects, as love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sorrow; and the irascible those aroused by obstacles, as hope, fear, boldness, anger, despair. The sins are those against God, our neighbor, and ourselves, mortal and venial sins, sins of omission and of commission, sins of heart, speech, and act, and the vices of excess and defect.

Thomas distinguished law as fourfold: The eternal law or regulative reason of God; natural law, relating to rational creatures; human law, adapting natural law

to the various wants of society; and Divine law, given by special revelation. As natural law is vague, it needs to be re-enforced by human, regulating the detail of conduct; and, as neither considers the state of the heart, the seat of good and evil, they require to be supplemented by the Divine law. The discussion of law led to modern independent ethical speculations.

8. *Duns Scotus* (1266-1308).—Scotus held that, if the will is bound to reason, it can not really be free, and that a truly free choice is indeterminate, bound neither to reason nor to folly. He maintained the thorough-going freedom of the will by declaring it independent of reason, as likewise is the Divine will; hence the order of the universe is to be regarded as arbitrary.

Though right in holding the freedom of the will, Scotus does not account for the usual, but not strict, uniformity of its decisions in case of actions clearly reasonable. The usual uniformity proves that the will, for the most part, takes the advice of reason. The exceptions show that the will is not bound by reason, but is free. The explanation is that motives are not strictly causes compelling volition, but reason soliciting rational decision. The will—that is, the ego using its will-power—decides freely in view of reasons. The ego, not the motive, decides or causes the volition.

As just stated, the very fact that the decision of the will is not strictly uniform in all similar cases is an indication that it is free; for if not free, it would be bound by reason, and its decision would be uniform, and could be predicted, as other events governed according to law, which is not the case.

A man is not necessarily a fool because he is free.

If he is a reasonable being, he will act reasonably, not from necessity, but freely. It is reasonable to believe that the Divine Being has decided, once for all, that in every case he will act reasonably, and that he always does so act, freely, but not by constraint.

9. *William of Occam* (——-1347).—Following Duns Scotus, William of Occam advocated the doctrine of the arbitrary nature of free will, though such a doctrine seems fatal to the moral government of God.

He was a staunch advocate of *nominalism*—a theory which held that universals have no objective existence independent of the individuals of the class, making the name of the class the only universal, and hence the name, *nominalism*. It was opposed to *realism*, the doctrine of ideas taught by Plato. Another theory was proposed to account for universals, based on the fact that there is in every individual of a class a combination of attributes which entitles the individual to be considered a member of the class. The notion of this combination of qualities is called a *concept*, and the theory, *conceptualism*.

These disputes somewhat shook faith in scholasticism, and theologians began to talk about the reasonableness of faith rather than of the doctrine.

10. *The mystics*.—Along with scholasticism, if not a part of it, was *mysticism*, whose seeds were in the Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy.

(1) *Hugo of St. Victor*, mentioned before, held that when, by Divine grace, the soul has reached that point where it loves itself and its neighbor only for God's sake, then the eye of the soul is opened, and God is seen in his true nature.

(2) *Bernard of Clairvaux* (1091-1153).—Bernard discriminated four stages through which the soul is led in seeking after God: Desire for God's aid in trouble, gratitude for his help, love for his goodness, and love for God himself. He held that the ascent to the higher life is through love and humility, and that, in the contemplation of Divine truth, moments of ecstatic vision will be granted the soul as anticipations of what it will hereafter enjoy.

(3) *Bonaventura* (1221-1274).—Bonaventura gives six stages: Contemplating the power and wisdom of God, as displayed in the external world; considering the relation of the world to man; reflecting on its own faculties, and seeing in itself, as a mirror, the true Being of God; receiving, by Divine impartation, through the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity, such a sense of the Divine nature as creates ecstatic adoration and unspeakable joy; then apprehending God, no longer in a mirror, but in his true essence; finally God is contemplated as absolute goodness, whose essence is communicated to the soul, which enters into its rest of ineffable union with God.

(4) *Eckhart* (cir. 1260-1327).—Eckhart taught that, apart from God, there could be no true being, and, of course, no true morality.

(5) *Tauler* (1300-1361).—Tauler insisted on personal relationship to God, freedom from the thralldom of authority, and the worthlessness of mere good works without the renewal of the inward life. Tauler, however, understood that true love means not only ecstasy of feeling, but the glad performance of duty; for when the black death visited Strasburg, he remained at his

post, and encouraged his terror-stricken fellow-citizens.

Mysticism, in advocating freedom from the thrall-dom of authority, prepared the way for the release of ethical investigation from the shackles of theological dogmas, and was the initial step to the Reformation, which was the emancipation of human thought.

II. Casuistry.—The application of ethical principles to the endless details of practical life called out manuals of *casuistry*, which aimed to settle disputed points and to answer doubtful questions. It was called for to settle difficult questions, when there was an intention to obey the laws, or when there was a desire to evade them, and in case of conflict of desires. It was cultivated also by Jews and Mohammedans.

A layman could not be supposed to understand all the minute distinctions of theological jurisprudence, in respect to which even doctors did not agree. He was considered to be sufficiently freed from the charge of immorality, if the authority of a single doctor could be found in his favor. The tendency of this, however, was to relax the strictness of individual conduct by seeking the support of authority when a certain gratification was desired.

12. The Reformation brought the principle of reliance on private judgment into sharp conflict with that of obedience to authority. It was a reaction against the elaborate system of the Church, and a return to the primitive simplicity of Christianity; it substituted the teaching of the Scriptures for the traditions of the Church; it held to individual responsibility, and denied priestly control over purgatorial fires; it emphasized the antagonism between the way of salvation by faith,

and absolution through gifts and penances; it considered all Christian duties imperative, and denied not the duty, but the merit of obedience, and the reality of the works of supererogation; it denied that the code of morality was lower for the laity than for the clergy.

Though differing in these respects from Catholicism, yet Protestantism was scholastic, and its ethics in dealing with the details of conduct still to some extent employed the methods of casuistry. Both Catholics and Protestants based the obligations to morality on authority—ultimately the authority of God; but in the one case the authority was communicated to the people through the Church, and in the other through the Holy Scriptures.

The Reformation, however, gave a stimulus to the attempt to find an independent basis for the moral code, founded not on external authority, but on reason and the moral experience of mankind. The development of rational ethics was also stimulated by the renaissance of classical learning and the advance of the natural sciences.

Chapter VI

MODERN ETHICS—ENGLISH

FROM BACON TO LOCKE—EMPIRICAL OR RATIONAL

1. *Bacon* (1561-1626).—In the emphasis he placed on the inductive method of investigation, Bacon effected the transition from mediæval to modern thought. His influence has been great, both in science and in philosophy. He completely separated morality from religion, and considered it the business of ethics, not to discuss the ultimate good or to classify the virtues, but to investigate the sources and motives of accepted morality and to determine the details of its application.

The natural law dwelling in every man as the light of nature, Bacon regarded as the source of morality, but did not decide whether the knowledge of this law is rationally apprehended or is due to experience—a distinction involving the opposite tendencies and methods of the intuitional and empirical schools.

The estimate placed upon the forms of moral good arises from the experience of their utility. The good, according to Bacon, is identical with the useful, which has for its end the happiness of the individual and the welfare of society. The good and the useful are, however, not identical. The good is the end, the happiness, satisfaction, or welfare sought; the useful is the means to the end.

Which is to be preferred, the welfare of the individual, or that of society? Bacon says that nature herself has answered the question, by striving to preserve the species, often at the expense of the individual. It follows, therefore, that true morality is action for the common good.

Four points are to be noted in Bacon's view of ethics:

(1) The secularization of ethics, or the separation of morals from religion.

(2) The disuse of metaphysical presuppositions, and the search for the motives of conduct.

(3) The exaltation of the welfare of society over that of the individual.

(4) The identification of the good with the useful, the moral with the beneficial.

2. *Hobbes* (1588-1679).—Hobbes held that self-satisfaction is the motive of all action; and that satisfaction is best secured, not in a condition of anarchy, but in social order. Law, whether natural, civil, or divine, is ordained to secure order, and tends to promote the common welfare, which is the welfare of all the individuals. A breach of the law is, therefore, due to ignorance, since no one intentionally disregards his own interests. In this we recognize the doctrine of Socrates.

In case of apparent conflict of the laws, natural, civil, divine, which is to be regarded as supreme, and who is to be the arbiter? Hobbes answers, 'The civil law is supreme, and the civil government the final court of appeal. Civil law has in view the common welfare, while the individual is seeking his own satisfaction; but individual opinion, blinded as it often is by apparent

self-interest, is more likely to be in error than the consensus of opinion expressed in the law and interpreted by the courts. Religious opinion, not sanctioned by the law, is superstition. Morality, therefore, consists in obedience to law, and ultimately to civil law. Men obey law, because by obedience they secure the greatest good for themselves.

This egoistic conception leads to the view that the state of nature is a state of war; that every man by nature is an Ishmaelite, whose hand is against every man's hand, and every man's hand against his. Hence the only safety for the individual is in a society governed by laws for the common protection.

Though ignorant egoism leads to anarchy, enlightened egoism seeks security by political order regulated by law; but as this is attained most effectively where many wills are subject to one, it follows that absolute monarchy is the best form of government. The political crisis of 1640, no doubt, led Hobbes to regard the individual conscience as anarchical in its tendencies, and the civil law as the final test of morals, and monarchy as the best form of government, and absolute monarchy as the best form of monarchy; hence the doctrine of the divine right of kings.

Hobbes regarded the Golden Rule, which he stated in the negative form, Do not that to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself, as the immutable law of nature. Natural law seems, therefore, to be independent of civil enactment, and cognizable by reason, or the light of nature. It is worthy of remark that Grotius makes this natural law, which ought to be observed, the basis of *international law*. The civil law

theory of Hobbes conflicts with his statement that the Golden Rule is the immutable and eternal law of nature.

According to Hobbes, the theoretical basis of ethics is egoism; that is, it is reasonable each individual should aim at his own advantage; but to secure his own advantage, reason dictates that he should obey law, since the law in determining what is good for society determines also what is good for the individual, and the opposition between the common welfare and the welfare of the individual is removed.

Hobbes's intellect was logical, keen, penetrating; and his language clear and precise. A life of feeling had no existence for him. His great work was rightly named "Leviathan."

3. *Cudworth* (1617-1688).—Cudworth was Platonic and rationalistic.

In his treatise on "Eternal and Immutable Morality," Cudworth endeavored to prove the eternal and essential distinctions of good and evil; and hence that these distinctions were not dependent on any will, human or divine. He held that ethical principles have an objective existence, and, like mathematical axioms, are intuitively apprehended by human reason.

With Cudworth, feeling has no place in ethics, reason alone determining duty. His system was not empiricism, based on contingent facts known by experience, but intuitionism, based on necessary truth known by reason.

If distinction is made, as should be done, between good and evil as ends, and right and wrong as means, it is evident that conduct, as means, is right or wrong, because involving good or evil ends as consequences.

We judge the subjective rightness or wrongness of conduct by the intention, but the objective rightness or wrongness by the consequences; but conduct whose character, as right or wrong, has been firmly established by the consensus of opinion, must not be hastily judged from supposed consequences. We must beware of doing evil that good may come; but it is probable, if not certain, that in the long run the supposed good consequences of a wrong act would be more than overbalanced by evil results. There is something in man, whether called instinct, reason, or faith, that assures him that there is a power in the universe that makes for righteousness, and to that power we can trust the consequences of doing right and avoiding wrong.

Cudworth's system is opposed, not only to that of Hobbes, who based morality on the enactment of civil law, but to those systems that regarded morality as dependent on the will of God.

4. *Henry More* (1614-1687).—In his "Enchiridion Ethicum," More supplies Cudworth's lack of a systematic exposition of ethical principles. He gives a list of principles:

Good things differ in quality, as well as in quantity and duration. It is better to be deprived of good than to suffer an equal amount of evil. Future good or evil, if certain, or even probable, is to be regarded as well as present good or evil. The amount of good varies as the number receiving the benefit.

The systems of Cudworth and More may be regarded as reactions against that of Hobbes, whose fundamental principle was: Self-interest is the justification of conduct; and self-interest is best secured by civil law.

Why should one conform to an ethical principle, when he believes that in so doing he acts contrary to his own interests? Hobbes answers that his belief is due to ignorance, and that in the end it will be best for the individual to obey the law. More answers that though the obligation to do right is apprehended by the reason, yet the sweetness and flavor of right conduct and of the resulting good is appreciated by the *boniform faculty*; that it is in this sweetness that the motive to virtuous conduct is found; and that ethics is the art of living happily, since true happiness consists in the satisfaction from a consciousness of virtue.

More does not give a distinct place among the virtues to benevolence, but his nearest approach to it is liberality.

Hobbes and More agree in making happiness the aim of virtue; in this respect they differ from Cudworth, who allows no place in ethics to feeling. Right conduct, the means to happiness, is, according to Hobbes, known through civil law; but according to More, by the intuition of reason.

5. *Cumberland* (1632--1718).—In his treatise, "De Legibus Naturæ," Cumberland has the honor of being the first to lay down the principle that *the common good of all* is the ultimate end of all moral action. He thus states his principle, which he calls the *Law of Nature*: "The greatest possible benevolence of every rational agent towards all the rest constitutes the happiest state of each and all, so far as depends on their own power, and is necessarily required for their happiness; accordingly, the common good is the supreme law."

Cumberland deserves great credit for giving benevo-

lence its due prominence among the list of virtues. He also includes under the term *good* not only happiness, but perfection. The truth is, however, that strictly speaking, perfection sustains the same relation to happiness that right does to good, or means to end. His system was not especially intended for deducing rules of conduct, but for the support of accepted morality. In opposition to Hobbes, he held that peace, not war, was the primitive state of man. In common with More, he found place for emotion, in opposition to Hobbes and Cudworth.

The principle that the common good is the supreme law he does not assume as an *a priori principle*, but proves it inductively, and refers it to God as the law-giver, who supports the law by the sanctions of rewards and penalties. The sanctions act on the will of man as incentives in the form of internal and external rewards of virtue and punishment of vice. Cumberland was an original thinker, and his system was not without influence on the speculations of subsequent moralists; but the prolixity of his style, and the lack of clearness in his views, have hindered the general usefulness of his work.

6. *Locke* (1632-1704).—In his great work on the *Human Understanding*, Locke opposed the doctrine that moral principles are innate; but he regarded them as maxims “which require reasoning and discourse and some exercise of the mind to discover the certainty of their truth.” He undertook to disprove the innateness of moral ideas by showing the diversity of opinions entertained by different persons in regard to them.

Locke held self-love to be the ultimate motive of moral conduct, and derived the moral instincts from the

susceptibility of feeling to pleasure or pain. To assume a primary benevolence is superfluous, since moral actions are accounted for by reflection on the consequences of moral conduct. The endeavor of individuals to secure happiness has resulted in the general welfare. Every one in wisely seeking his own good promotes the common good. The motive to moral action is self-satisfaction, the consequence is the welfare of society.

Locke classifies law as natural law, including divine law, civil law, and social law, or public opinion. The knowledge empirically obtained concerning what conduct is useful or hurtful, Locke regards as natural law, the guide to moral action. This is God's law, which we have learned by experience: "Moral good or evil is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law whereby good or evil is drawn upon us from the will and power of the law-maker." But in opposition to Hobbes, he held that ethical rules are obligatory, irrespective of civil law, and that they may be scientifically constructed on principles known by common sense acquired by experience.

In making pleasure and pain the only springs of action, Locke lays stress on feeling; still the intellect performs the important part of selecting ends and devising means, while the anticipation of pleasure or pain supplies the condition or motive of moral action. Though the gifts of nature were originally free, yet they became private property in consequence of labor which has been bestowed upon them, and morality requires that we respect the right of others to enjoy the fruits of their own labor.

Chapter VII

MODERN ETHICS—FRENCH AND GERMAN

FROM DESCARTES TO WOLFF—METAPHYSICAL

*D*ESCARTES (1596-1650).—Ethical systems on the Continent, more than those of England, were subordinated directly to metaphysics, and indirectly to theology.

Descartes held to the freedom of the will—the human will as well as the Divine. The requirements of morals he regarded as God's commands, but that man is free to obey or to disobey.

Descartes included all mental processes under the term *thought*; hence, with him, clear thinking and clear willing are identical. If man were a pure spirit, his thinking would be clear and his moral conduct correct. Man's divergence from moral rectitude is to be traced to the interaction of the mind and body, as shown in the feelings. Clear thinking is thus thwarted, so that we desire what clear knowledge would show to be undesirable.

The moral and the immoral have each a twofold relation—to the intellect and to the sensibility. The moral coincides with clear knowledge and with the supremacy of the will over the feelings; the immoral is identical with the obscure, or with the abdication of the sovereignty of the will over the sensibility. Since the

feelings arise from the union of the soul and body, their disturbing influence can not be wholly suppressed; but the emotion of wonder—that is, curiosity, or desire for knowledge—aids the will in directing moral pursuits.

Since Descartes held that matter has no dynamic properties, its sole attribute being extension, it is not clear what he means by the *interaction* of soul and body, or how the mind can perceive external material objects. He refers to the intervention of God, making perception a miracle; but this view was dealt with by his successors, Geulinx and Malebranche. It is more in accord with Cartesianism to speak of the union of soul and body than of their interaction. Descartes's style was clear and beautiful, simple, limpid, and direct.

2. *Geulinx* (1625-1669).—To meet the difficulties of the relation of matter and mind, Geulinx proposed a theory called *occasionalism*. On the occasion of the presence of a body, God intervenes and gives us a sensation, thus exciting our attention, and then presents us with the idea of the body. The body and soul then are passive under the control of God; hence free will does not belong to man, at least absolute free will; but, granting the will a relative freedom, its surrender to the Divine will is a duty which man cheerfully performs as soon as he understands his true relation to God. The right moral attitude is the result of *true insight* and the *feeling of humility*.

3. *Malebranche* (1638-1715).—The theory of occasionalism was adopted by Malebranche, who extended it farther than Geulinx had done. He refers every event in nature to the direct agency of the Divine will. In such a system human freedom can find no place. Even

the Divine will itself is restricted by identifying it with the order of nature. God could have left the world uncreated; but, having willed to create it, no other world order was possible. Being a manifestation of God, the world is necessarily good.

What account does Malebranche give of sin, an evil that can not be ignored? It was contemplated in the Divine plan of the world order; but the incarnation of Christ, outweighing, on the side of righteousness, the fact of sin on the side of evil, was more than a compensation. As an effect of obscure knowledge, growing out of the finite nature of man, sin was inevitable. It was permitted because the compensation involved a greater good. It is only our faulty knowledge that impels us to evil; but as we come to know God more perfectly, we are drawn to him by an irresistible attraction.

Malebranche distinguished between the intellect and the will, which were identified in the system of Descartes. To know God is the function of the intellect; to love him is that of the will. Here Malebranche confounds will and affection. Our attitude towards others should be that of respect and benevolence, because of their relation to God.

In referring all events to God, Malebranche's doctrine bordered on pantheism; but he was restrained from crossing the border by his training as a theologian.

Malebranche's analysis of perception was in advance of any preceding attempt. He was a fine writer, and has justly been called the Plato of French philosophy.

4. *Spinoza* (1632-1677).—Spinoza based his ethics on his metaphysics.

As with Plato, so with Spinoza, the problems of philosophy are the problems of religion. To both philosophers God is the fundamental reality. By Plato, God was thought as the good; by Spinoza as the sole substance. The mystic element of religious consciousness Plato did not assimilate by his dialectical method; but Spinoza rationalized it by transforming it into the concept of God. Locke disregarded the mystical element, and resolved religious experience into the practice of utilitarian ethics.

In Spinoza's system there is no room for free will. Since God, the Infinite Being, is a necessary substance, his attributes and modes, the determining factors of things, are likewise necessary, and so are the determined things and events. The terms *moral* and *immoral* have signification only in the realm of the finite, and chiefly in the relation of feeling to thought; but in the totality of the universe their distinction disappears. Morality is, therefore, not based on the direct command of God; but the sphere of spiritual freedom or slavery for man is found in the chain of particular causes and events, in consequence of his relation to finite things and to God, the Infinite Substance.

Morality is identical with adequate knowledge and active emotions, and immorality with inadequate knowledge and passive emotions. As soon as clear knowledge of passive emotion is gained, it ceases to be passive, and the suffering vanishes. The man then recognizes that he is one with God, that the affections of his body and soul are only modifications of the Infinite Being, and that his love for finite beings is but a manifestation of the love of God. Knowledge of God is the

highest knowledge, and man's love of God is a part of the infinite love of God for himself. Nothing in nature can overcome this love, since it is active emotion in consequence of the soul's self-knowledge.

Virtuous action is directed by reason; and virtue involves, as its own reward, that highest blessedness identical with the love of God. Virtue is not gained by controlling impulses, but by rational insight, which is the only source of power to control impulses. To follow the guide of reason is to be virtuous, and thus to maintain oneness with God, which is the purest enjoyment. The virtuous man is friendly to others, not from sympathy, which, as a passive emotion, is not good, but at the behest of reason.

Spinoza's identification of God with substance and the manifestation of God with nature gave great offense to his contemporaries, who regarded him as an atheist under the guise of a pantheist. Spinoza, however, was, no doubt, in his way, deeply religious.

5. *Leibnitz* (1646-1716).—Leibnitz was ambitious to reconcile philosophy and theology, and, by a comprehensive philosophy, to harmonize conflicting creeds, and to unite the hostile Churches of Christendom. He was a man of vast learning and great influence, and, though endowed with deep penetration of mind and wonderful originality of thought, his method was eclectic and his spirit conciliatory. He did not escape the danger which besets all eclectics, of combining incongruous elements in his system.

Like Spinoza, Leibnitz based his ethics on his metaphysics, and constructed his metaphysics for the sake of his ethics, so as to justify his ethical postulates. He

differed from Spinoza in his view of substance. As a pantheist, Spinoza conceived substance as the absolute unity of infinite existence. As an individualist, Leibnitz conceived substance as the absolutely independent individual monads in their gradations from lowest to highest, constituting the infinite diversity of existence.

Leibnitz accounted for the apparent interaction of matter and mind by the hypothesis of *pre-established harmony*; that is, the world of matter and the world of mind were so constructed and adjusted that, though each runs its course independently of the other, there is always a correspondence between their states, like two clocks so perfectly made and adjusted that, though they run independently, yet their hands point out the same time, and they strike at the same instant. Thus, I will to move my hand, and it moves; for the two worlds of matter and of mind are so adjusted that the hand moves according to the laws of the world of matter, just as I will it to move according to the laws of the world of mind.

On the hypothesis of pre-established harmony, how can one man be responsible for striking another? If it is answered, Because he wills to strike, it can be asked, How can he be responsible for willing to strike? The volition itself is caused by antecedent conditions, according to the laws of mind, over which he has no control. It is perfectly evident that, in such a case, there can be no blame, no responsibility. The true answer is, The volition was caused by the man himself acting freely, though, perhaps, not without reason. It does not require great metaphysical acumen to dis-

tinguish between motive as a reason and cause as efficiency.

Leibnitz held that since God is perfect, he would produce the best possible world; hence, the present world order is the best possible, and God could have produced no other; and though the creation of a different world was metaphysically possible, it was morally impossible.

The question now arises, How can the present world, so full of evil, be the best possible world? Leibnitz answers that a world of finite things is impossible without evil, otherwise there would have been no evil, since, from the character of God, we are warranted in affirming that he would create the best possible world. One effect of evil is that the good, by contrast, seems more excellent than it otherwise would, and is better appreciated. Again, evil is a defect necessary in all degrees of development till perfection is reached, which it never is by finite beings. God is not the author of evil, ^{except} ~~only~~ in the sense that he is the Author of a system in which evil is necessarily involved.

Spinoza's ethics is egoistic. The knowledge of God is, for the individual, the highest virtue, and the accompanying emotion of love its supreme reward. Love to man is an inferior virtue. The ethics of Leibnitz is altruistic. Though the love of God is a duty, yet, as we can not show beneficence towards God, since he does not need anything we can do, love to man, shown by our efforts to do good, is the chief requirement of practical morality.

Virtue includes all excellence; but the highest vir-

tues are those of reason and love, so cultivated that we have an increasing knowledge and love of God, of ourselves, and of our fellow-men. Virtue and blessedness are attainable in their richness only in society; but the personal excellencies are first to be cultivated, since they are the necessary conditions for the exercise of the altruistic virtues of justice and benevolence. Hence individual excellence is the ideal end which moral effort should first strive to realize; yet perfection, the goal of moral effort, can only be approximated by successive degrees of advancement.

The idea of development does not appear in Spinoza's system; but in the system of Leibnitz the idea of development or progress towards perfection is central and fruitful in its practical effects.

The ethics of Leibnitz may justly be called *progressive perfectionism*.

6. *Wolff* (1679-1754).—Wolff collected the scattered thoughts of Leibnitz, and formed them into a comprehensive system. Leibnitz's perfectionism, known chiefly through the writings of Wolff, became, for more than a generation, the watchword of the ethical philosophy of Germany.

With both Leibnitz and Wolff perfectionism was restricted to the individual. The question was not considered whether progress towards moral perfection is not also a law of the development of the race.

Under the influence of the principle of utility the intellectualism of Leibnitz became transformed into the utilitarianism of common sense, according to which perfection was valued in proportion to its utility.

Chapter VIII

MODERN ETHICS—ENGLISH

FROM SHAFTESBURY TO ADAM SMITH—PSYCHOLOGICAL

S*HAFTESBURY* (1671-1713).—In the harmony of the social affections and the self-regarding elements of human nature, Shaftesbury sought for the principle of morality. The center of ethical interest was transferred from abstract reason, where it was placed by Cudworth and the intuitionists generally, to the affections and desires.

Man is not exclusively selfish; for a large part of his satisfaction comes from the consciousness of kindly affection for others and in lending them a helping hand; but disinterested affection needs the guidance of reason. The overindulgence of a fond mother is likely to spoil her child.

Goodness consists in the various affections and desires, in due proportion, the egoistic and the altruistic impulses working together in harmony under the control of the will, guided by reason.

Shaftesbury distinguishes three classes of impulses—natural affections: sympathy, complacency, good-will, love; self-affection: love of life, of pleasure, ease, praise, affluence, society, and the resentment to aggression; unnatural affection: malevolence, barbarity, depraved appetites, abnormal affections and desires.

The natural affections, or altruistic impulses, aim directly at the happiness of others, yet indirectly yield abundant satisfaction to the individual manifesting them in the pleasurableness of the benevolent emotions themselves, in the sympathy with the happiness of others, and in the enjoyment of their friendship.

The self-regarding affections aim directly at personal enjoyment, and, in their place, are useful, but, unless kept within due bounds by regarding the rights of others, they degenerate into selfishness, avarice, sensuality, and bring upon the person exhibiting them the ill-will and resentment of those who otherwise would be friends. They fail to benefit the individual when they begin to injure society.

The unnatural affections should be repressed or banished altogether, since they not only do not tend to either individual or social welfare, but are injurious both to the subject and to others affected by them.

Shaftesbury's principle, which he called *moral sense*, was the keystone of his ethical system. The cultivation of the natural affections and the control of the self-affections develop an affection towards the virtues themselves—a love of goodness for its beauty and intrinsic excellence, and an aversion to the malevolent affections because of their ugliness and intrinsic badness. The æsthetical element in Shaftesbury's system shows the affinity between beauty and goodness. Shaftesbury says, "No speculative opinion is capable immediately and directly to exclude or destroy the moral sense; yet this sense may, in a measure, be weakened by immoral habits or perverted by a false religion."

Shaftesbury marks the beginning of a new era in

ethical method. Thenceforward the current of investigation was psychological rather than metaphysical, as seen in the discussions of Butler, Hutcheson, and Hume.

Shaftesbury's system, however, was acceptable neither to the radical freethinker, as Mandeville, who held that private vices are public benefits, nor, on account of its Deistical tendencies, to Christian theologians.

2. *Butler* (1692-1752).—The view of Hobbes, that "the natural state of man is non-moral, unregulated," and that "moral rules are means to the end of peace, which is a means to the end of self-preservation," brings the natural instincts and the necessity of order into conflict, in which safety is found in civil law.

The view of Hobbes, that the natural state is one of unregulated selfishness, but that submission to civil law, on account of its utility, is binding on man as a reasonable being, Butler regarded as dangerous, since those who hold uncontrolled egoism to be natural are quite likely to assume that it must be reasonable, and therefore right, that nature should have the preference over arbitrary civil law. Butler guarded against this danger by showing that the deepest impulse of human nature is not to seek selfish gratification. He showed that the social or altruistic affections are no less natural than the egoistic appetites, desires, and affections, and, accepting the Stoic view, he maintained that pleasure and pain are not primary ends, but only incidental results attending the attainment of the objects of desire. Hunger leads to the eating of food, the object of which is the nourishment of the body. Hunger is allayed as a consequence, and pleasure is the accompaniment.

For selfish gratification men often sacrifice what they know to be their true interest; yet such conduct is regarded as immoral, since a reasonable being should control his wayward impulses.

The supposed psychological fact that man, by nature, is simply a selfish savage, is a fiction; and therefore the deduction that the civil law is the only standard and basis of morality is false. Neither does it follow that nature, if given preference over law, would lead to the subversion of society; for man's primary impulses are not all egoistic, and those that are egoistic are not all hedonic, as men also seek rational enjoyment for themselves, as well as the good of others.

Human nature is not, as maintained by Shaftesbury, a system of forces in which, to secure the best results, equilibrium is to be preserved between the egoistic and altruistic tendencies, but one in which the moral powers—reason, conscience, and will—have the rightful supremacy. The lower impulses, properly regulated by the higher powers, are useful and even indispensable. Thus resentment against injury and injustice leads to self-protection, and renders effective the administration of justice.

Butler recognizes benevolence as one of the regulating virtues, though he does not regard it as all of virtue; but he seems rather to give preference to self-love and conscience as the chief regulating principles. He says: "Reasonable self-love and conscience are chief or superior principles in the nature of man;" and between these "it is impossible that there should be any inconsistency. Our ideas of happiness and misery are, of all our ideas, the nearest and most important to us. . . .

We can justify to ourselves neither this nor any other pursuit till we are convinced it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." But self-love needs the check of conscience. Even a "skeptic not convinced of the happy tendency of virtue," who nevertheless recognizes the authority of conscience, can see that duty is to be preferred to self-interest, since the dictates of conscience are clear and certain, while the calculation of self-interest gives only probable consequences; and in case of conflict "the more certain must entirely supersede and destroy the less certain."

The dictates of self-interest and conscience must, however, be held to harmonize, till it is shown that they conflict, which can never be done, because of the uncertainty of all egoistic calculations. The final union of virtue and happiness and of vice and misery is anticipated in the good and ill desert we attach to virtue and vice; and in this belief we are more and more confirmed as experience enlarges, thus affording a progressive verification. The duality of the regulating principles, self-love and conscience, as recognized by Butler, is in striking contrast with the sole regulating principle of reason in the Greek and Roman systems of ethics. This dualism is obscurely noticed in Clarke's *reasonable conduct*, in Shaftesbury's *obligation to virtue*, and more distinctly in Wollaston's *moral good and natural good*.

As to the justification of considering self-love a regulating principle, Butler remarks, it "belongs to man as a reasonable creature, reflecting on his own interest and happiness." It is man's duty to look after his own interest and happiness; for in so doing he is in better

condition to help others. The view that benevolence is ultimately a desire for one's own pleasure, Butler showed, is the same mistake as to consider hunger a desire for the pleasure of eating. The appetite precedes and conditions the pleasure, which consists in the gratification of the appetite, which is the exciting cause, not the pleasure. The case is clear in regard to reason and conscience. What reason shows to be right, conscience dictates to be done.

The justification of conduct from its benevolent intent, or its supposed fitness to do good, Butler regards as dangerous, and liable to lead even to immoral action—to do evil that good may come. We should rather follow conscience in conforming to established moral principles, assured by a rational faith that the consequences will be good. The ultimate justification of any conduct is, theoretically, the good that comes of it; but practically, as we can not always estimate the good, we must take for our guide the established rules of morality, guided by conscience, our own common sense, and the consensus of opinion.

3. *Hutcheson* (1694-1747).—In his treatise, styled "Inquiry Concerning the Original of Our Ideas," Hutcheson identifies virtue with benevolence.

He distinguishes between the calm and the turbulent passions, whether private or social. The most excellent disposition "is either the calm, stable, universal, . . . or the desire of moral excellence, which, in man, is inseparable from universal good will."

In a secondary sense, certain other virtues merit approval, as candor, veracity, honor, fortitude. Still others are commendable, though scarcely ethical, as

knowledge, intelligence, skill, talent, genius, decency, suavity, dignity, courtesy.

Self-love, though not strictly virtue, which is disinterested benevolence, yet, if enlightened, seeks the harmony of public and private good. In this way a reflex of pleasure is realized, which is no small source of enjoyment; but if we do good for the sake of the pleasure, it becomes a refined selfishness, and the pleasure is lost. Disinterested beneficence brings pleasure, so much the more exquisite, because unsought. What of beneficent acts done from selfish motives? Such acts are objectively, but not subjectively, good. They are beneficial to society; but the doer loses his highest reward, yet he may receive, with others, the external benefit which, though good, is not the reward of virtue.

4. *Hume* (1711-1776).—Hume held that the duty of allegiance to government can not be based on the obligation of fidelity to compact, since Governments were not formed by compact, but, in general, by usurpation or conquest. Even if, in a few cases, an ancient compact had been made, the present generation of civilized people can not be considered bound by an agreement made long ago by a savage or half-civilized ancestry. The duty of fidelity to Government grows out of the present service it renders society by affording protection to the people.

Reason alone does not furnish the principle of approval or disapproval whereby we judge moral action. Nor is it found in self-interest; for when no self-interest is involved we approve or condemn actions that occurred in distant times or at remote places, according as they excite in us sympathy or antipathy. Moral

sense is a social sentiment of satisfaction or uneasiness, without regard to personal advantage or loss. Considerations of public interest alone determine the approval we render to justice, veracity, integrity, and fidelity, or the disapprobation we bestow upon injustice, mendacity, hypocrisy, and dishonesty.

Utility is the justification of law. The protection of property encourages industry. Enforcement of contracts begets confidence. Laws are enacted, amended, or repealed, according as the changes are deemed useful. Private utility is approved as well as public. By utility, Hume means tendency to ulterior good, and not simply conduciveness to present happiness.

Though utility is the justification of certain virtues, yet there are other virtues, such as courtesy, cheerfulness, and the like, that are esteemed, not so much on account of their utility, as from the agreeable feelings they excite in us through sympathy. Even benevolence, which is approved on account of its utility, is also approved through the sympathy we have for this amiable affection. We even admire benevolence when we censure it because carried to excess; and this admiration is seen even in the terms of censure, as when we say of an excessively benevolent man, "He is too good." Conscience is explained by moral sense and sympathy.

Hume scarcely finds a place for disinterestedness. He says: "In general it may be affirmed that there is no such passion in the human mind as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, or services, or relation to ourselves; public benevolence, therefore, or a regard for the interests of mankind, can not be the original notion of justice."

Hume held that "reason is no motive to action, neither is moral sentiment, unless it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes our happiness or misery. But all duties, which true ethical theory require, are for "the true interest of the individual." The moral man derives happiness from "peaceful reflection on his own conduct." This is the approval of conscience. The essence of moral approval is the pleasure which is a consequence of right doing from disinterested motives. Hume does not always distinguish intellectual endowments from moral virtues.

5. *Adam Smith* (1723-1790).—Adam Smith held that sympathy is the ultimate element of moral sentiment; that no qualities of mind are virtues save those agreeable to the person himself or pleasing to others; that it is propriety that first enlists our sympathy; and that utility and the virtues of justice and benevolence enhance the sentiment of approval.

Fellow-feeling is agreeable, even in sympathy with suffering; but immoral qualities awake in us antipathy and disapprobation. We approve a beneficent act for the reason that it is beneficial to the recipient, and awakens in him sentiments of gratitude. We find merit in the generous benefactor, good in the benefaction, and gratitude in the recipient. In witnessing an injurious act we feel antipathy towards the aggressor, find evil in the aggression, and sympathize with the injured person.

Conscience is blinded by appetite, passion, affection, and desire; but against these the rules of morality afford protection.

The principles of morality are the laws of God, discovered by induction, and adopted by the common

sense of mankind. That these principles are salutary, experience has abundantly shown; and their ultimate justification, in the eye of reason, is the good consequences that attend their observance. Every man, by helping himself, by a providential order, helps his neighbors.

Chapter IX

MODERN ETHICS—GERMAN

FROM KANT TO HARTMANN—IDEALISTIC AND CRITICAL.

KANT (1724-1804).—In his "Critique of Pure Reason," Kant undertook to demolish the prevailing system of metaphysics, and to limit all knowledge at the border of experience. He admits that Hume awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers; yet he could not accept Hume's view that utility and sympathy form an adequate basis for morals, or explain the phenomena of conscience. Kant's method is critical.

Denying any transcendental knowledge of God or of the world, such as Plato, the theologians, or modern metaphysicians had assumed, Kant attempted to elaborate a system of idealistic ethics, without any support from metaphysical systems of philosophy or the dogmas of theology.

According to Kant, the sole moral motive is respect for the moral law, which is a *categorical imperative*, "Thou shalt, or thou shalt not." The command does not, like a law of nature, express a *necessity*, a *must*, but an *obligation*, an *ought*. It therefore implies freedom to obey or to disobey.

Kant states the law thus, "So act that the maxim of thy conduct might serve, at the same time, as a principle of universal legislation."

Though the law, as a categorical imperative, requires unconditional obedience, yet it does not follow that the law is arbitrary, without reason, or that the reason is not the good consequences of obedience. When the law is applied to any particular case, the reason for the law is found in the consequences of obedience or of disobedience. Take the command, Thou shalt not lie. Kant says: "I can not will lying to become a universal law, for then I myself would not be believed." Again, "Hate can not be taken as a universal principle, since then no one could hope to obtain the assistance he needed." The law has *a* reason; hence the duty of obedience, though we may not know *the* reason.

The fact is, the moral law does not require us to disregard egoistic or utilitarian considerations. Even hedonic aims have a place. It is not wrong for a hungry man to desire a good dinner. It would, however, be wrong for him to steal another hungry man's dinner.

Many questions in morals we may, no doubt, decide immediately or by intuition, or by the generally-received maxims of morality, without considering the consequences; yet in other cases, a regard for the consequences is the only means we have of reaching a right decision.

Kant says, "Nothing can possibly be conceived of in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a *good will*." The decision to obey the moral law is good will; but why? Because of the good result in making our own perfection and the happiness of others the end of our volitions and of our conduct. Good will is goodness; the result is the good.

Kant deduced the doctrine of immortality from our aspiration after perfect goodness. Exact conformity of the will to the moral law can not be attained in this life, owing to the disturbing influence of the sensibility; therefore we are justified in the hope of the continuance of our existence, that we may forever approach the ideal of perfect holiness.

Again, belief in the existence of God is justified by the requirement of due proportion between virtue and happiness, which can be secured only under the administration of a being infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness.

2. *Fichte* (1762-1814).—According to Fichte, morality is based on the effort of the ego to attain complete autonomy by extending the advancing limit of its action to a goal infinitely removed. All moral action is a striving towards the ideal which may be indefinitely approximated, though never fully attained. The practical ego is active, the knowing ego is contemplative.

Fichte stated the moral law thus, "Always strive to fulfill thy mission." A new element is, therefore, added to ethical thought—the idea of development, or moral progress. By striving to actualize the moral world, the ego realizes itself, in successive stages of development, as a conscious personality, related to other personalities by the mutual obligations of the moral law.

The external world is the self-limitation of the ego, the medium of its activity, and the theater of its power.

In regard to freedom, Fichte says, "I now believe in freedom with all my heart, and am convinced that only on this supposition duty and virtue of any kind are possible." Freedom is an attribute of each person; and the

chief function of the State is to guarantee this freedom to all the people. The State thus becomes a new unity, and all the nations of the world are destined to form the still larger unity of humanity.

In opposition to the lower pleasures of selfishness we have the higher reward of rational satisfaction. Enjoyment arises from moral activity striving to transcend the limitations of our nature. Deliberate action, from a sense of duty, is the highest form of conduct. A moral act is marked, not by pleasure, but by the approval of conscience, which is a higher enjoyment or rational satisfaction.

Thought approved by reason we regard as true; conduct approved by conscience as right. What, then, is right? That which conscience recognizes as duty; hence the rule: *Do that which your conscience requires.* Conscience is not infallible, but it is to be followed as our best light, just as in other matters we follow judgment, which is not infallible.

We should strive to give morality a visible form, for which the world supplies the material. We are a part of the universal order which Fichte identified with God. He says: "The living and operative moral order is itself God; we need no other, and can conceive no other." In proportion to our progress, the universal being, which Fichte should have called the moral power, the cause of moral order, rises into prominence, and we are overshadowed in the infinitude of God, in whom we live, move, and have our being.

The idealism of Fichte, at first individual and subjective, becomes more and more pantheistic and relig-

ious, and the ethics of the individual transforms itself into the ethics of history.

3. *Hegel* (1770-1831).—Regarding nature and spirit and physical life as movements in a logical development, Hegel disregards the antithesis between the active and the passive ego, as held by Fichte, and blends the practical and theoretical realms into one, which he calls the rational. The natural world and the moral are, in a lower and a higher form, the manifestations of the world soul in a series of concepts logically developed. Hence the opposition between the natural and the moral disappears; there is no distinction between what ought to be and what is; the real is the rational, and the rational is the real.

With Hegel reason is the true reality—the absolute, whose modes are nature and spirit, and whose manifestations are being and thought. Philosophy is logical idealism dealing with the concept as its subject and goal, a system of identity of thought and being, a doctrine of development of the threefold rhythm of thesis or positing, antithesis or opposition, and a synthesis or union of the two in a higher, a comprehensive, a richer concept. In this view of philosophy, Hegel combines Kant and Schelling.

Hegel differs from Spinoza in essential respects: Spinoza takes for his problem the ethics of the individual; Hegel takes for his the ethics of the race—the family, society, the State, humanity. Spinoza's problem is subjective; Hegel's objective. Spinoza derives everything from one unchangeable substance; Hegel introduces the idea of development, not with Fichte, the sub-

jective development of the individual; but the objective development of the world soul, as exhibited in universal history.

Subjective ethics assumes that society and the State are for the sake of the individual; objective ethics assumes that they are ends in themselves. It is a great question whether the State is for the individual, or the individual for the State. Taking this question from the human point of view, it seems clear that the State is for the individual—that is, for all the individuals. The interests of all outweigh the interests of any one, and that is the reason why one is justified in laying down his life for his country when duty calls for the sacrifice, or why the country should demand or even receive so great a sacrifice. From the human point of view, the State has no interests apart from the people who constitute it. From God's point of view, as the world reason, the family, society, the State, humanity, have a value as a realization of a divine ideal, and to mar this realization is to injure the Divine Creator. It therefore becomes the duty of the individual to contribute to the realization of the perfection of the divine ideal in the development of humanity. If this is really Hegel's thought, he has indeed formed a lofty conception. The development of human organizations, to the neglect of individual interests, unless they partake of a universal world-reason, however, detracts from the interest with which ordinary minds regard the subject of ethics; yet to minds highly imaginative, or endowed with great power of generalization, it possesses the fascination of ideal æsthetics, or the sublimity of the creations of lofty genius.

4. *Schleiermacher* (1768-1834).—A reaction against

the extreme objective view of Hegel was inevitable. It found expression in Schleiermacher, who set reason over against nature, and placed the content of morality in the operation of reason upon nature. The union of reason and nature constitutes the good. Every different form of reason, externally operative upon nature, is a different kind of good. The *summum bonum* is the totality of all the forms of the good. Virtue is the power which reason has over nature. Duty is the conformity of reason to the law, which gives reason dominion over nature. The good, duty, and virtue, are, according to Schleiermacher, the three leading moral ideas.

These views differ from Fichte's in this: that with Fichte nature is a limitation which the moral will strives to transcend, but without success, save in extending the horizon of moral vision; but with Schleiermacher nature is necessary to the moral activity of reason. The two, reason and nature, constitute the factors of which subjective moral development is the product.

The unification of reason and nature begins with the inorganic kingdom, as seen in chemistry, physics, geology, and astronomy; it is continued in the organic kingdoms, vegetable and animal, as seen in biology, or in the special forms of botany and zoölogy; it has fuller development in man, in whom the divine reason is reflected, by the greatest fact found in all nature—the reason of man.

In man, reason in its lower form is impulse; in its higher it is will. Will is subdivided into organizing power and symbolizing power. The organizing power of will strives to actualize the law of reason in the external world, as in accumulating property. The symboliz-

ing power of the will resorts to nature for sensuous symbols of action, as in speech and art.

Corresponding to these four activities, one in nature and three in man, are the four organizations—the State, society, the school, the Church, respectively related to the four cardinal virtues—prudence, perseverance, wisdom, and love, and to the four spheres of obligation—legal, professional, social, spiritual.

Kant gave no content to his ethical formula, *Let your act be fit for universal imitation*. Schleiermacher gave the contents of moral action with complete fullness.

Fichte regards the subject of moral law as ever the same; Schleiermacher regards each person as peculiar, and emphasizes the necessity of individualizing morals. He held that morality is universal only so far as human nature is the same; but the application of the moral law to individual cases must vary with the characteristics and circumstances of the subject. Schleiermacher, however, does not treat morality from an exclusively individual standpoint. But each person has his peculiarities, his talents, his vocation; and it is his duty to act well his part, and thus fulfill his mission in the world. A higher importance is attached to the duty of the individual than simply to provide for his own welfare, for he has duties to society, to the State, to humanity.

5. *Krause* (1781-1835).—The philosophy of identity, as advocated by Schelling, dominated the thinking of Krause, who also accepted the doctrine of intellectual intuition, in the form of Neo-Platonism, or theosophic ecstasy. Influenced by the revelations of Swedenborg, he inquires into the condition of humanity in other worlds. He calls his philosophy *Pantheism*, signifying

that he did not lose sight of God in the universe, nor of man in the union of God and nature.

Good originates by the action of the divine will through human wills, and is, therefore, a universal law, and ought to be willed for its own sake. Evil is the result of individual limitation, and is, therefore, a temporary disorder, destined gradually to disappear with the progress of the race, when the social life is in harmony with the moral law.

From God proceeds the historic life of humanity, the organization and classification of society, and the peculiarities and callings of individuals. The individual is subordinate to society, society to the State, the State to humanity.

Law regards not only external conditions, but also internal; its office is to enable every person, by a full development of his powers, to fulfill his mission in the world. The historic life of humanity reproduces, on a larger scale, the life-periods of the individual—germination, growth, maturity, decline, transition to a higher plane, and so on in an endless repetend.

Krause, like Hegel, attached great importance to the problems of objective morality, in society, in the State, in humanity, regarding law as the organic unity of all the conditions of life related to human freedom.

6. *Schopenhauer* (1788-1860).—Attaching little importance to the individual, Schopenhauer assumes that morality is objective in the State and in the history of humanity. The individual is transitory, and exists only for the race, though stimulated by the delusion that he is promoting his own welfare. Schopenhauer's philosophy is pessimistic.

The life of the race oscillates between generation and extinction, and the only constant is pain and misconception. The State, by punishing crime, holds in check the selfish tendencies of individuals. Every one strives to overreach others, but he only deludes himself. Satisfaction comes only by self-renunciation and a cessation of all effort; but the pleasure is merely a relief from pain. There is no other source of morality than the universal world-will, in which individual distinctions are disregarded.

Sympathy is Schopenhauer's moral principle, but its origin is a mystery. Its essence consists in imagining ourselves in the place of others, and consequently realizing their joys and their sorrows as our own, thus losing the personal in the social.

7. *Hartmann* (1842——).—The actual world, Hartmann maintains, is due to an irrational act of the unconscious will or intelligence. He rejects the view of Schopenhauer that pleasure is only release from pain, but still holds that such pleasure greatly preponderates over positive pleasures, and that they are greatly inferior in intensity to the pains from which they are the relief.

Hartmann enters more fully into the empirical proof of the miseries of life than Schopenhauer. He shows that the fatigue of the nerves from prolonged action increases the pain and diminishes the pleasure; that pleasure is always brief, while the unrest of desire is lasting; that regret, chagrin, envy, jealousy, hatred, are painful; that health, wealth, youth, freedom, are valued only as the negatives of sickness, poverty, old age, slavery; that business pursuits, family relationships, are simply the

less of two evils; that riches, power, honor, are unsatisfactory; that the only thing that brings more pleasure than pain—the cultivation of science, literature, or art—can be enjoyed only by a few, whose superior intelligence and sensibility expose them to the envy and hatred of rivals.

Hartmann hence concludes that the pain in the world greatly preponderates over the pleasure; and that there is no reasonable hope for improvement, but rather the reverse. His ethical conclusion is, therefore, that we should endeavor to bring about the extinction of the human race.

Chapter X

MODERN ETHICS—ENGLISH

FROM CLARKE TO MARTINEAU—INTUITIONAL

SAMUEL CLARKE (1675-1729).—We now go back to Clarke, whom we omitted from his chronological position, that he might be considered with the intuitionists, with whom he is properly classed. Cudworth, More, and Cumberland were left in their positions as links between Hobbes and Locke.

A few years only after the publication of Locke's treatise, Clarke made an attempt to "place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration, from self-evident propositions, as incontestable as those of mathematics." The obligations of morality, Clarke held to be eternal and immutable and "incumbent on man from the very nature and reason of things themselves." From the "necessary and eternal different relations that different things bear to one another, there result *fitness* and *unfitness* of the applications of different things or different relations to one another."

As self-evident obligations, Clarke mentions piety towards God, equity and benevolence towards others, and sobriety towards self. By sobriety, or care for self, we are better able to care for others, and this ability is enhanced by piety towards God. The rule of justice

Clarke states: "Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I, in like cases, should do for him." Also, "A greater good is to be preferred to a less, whether it be my good or another's."

Clarke could say that a rational being *ought* always to act in conformity to his rational intuitions, not that he always does so act; for he often acts contrary to reason. Therefore reason does not always determine moral action. Spinoza, and perhaps Leibnitz, would say that the irrational action is due to inadequate knowledge, as Socrates also said; but the fact is, a man with a clear knowledge of duty often acts contrary to reason, as he himself will admit, and he does this knowing the consequences. What, then, determines the wrong act? Is it appetite, or passion, or desire? If so, how can the man be responsible? If he is responsible, the motives are not strictly causes; they solicit, but do not compel action. The man makes the decision himself, though he makes it at the solicitation, but not at the compulsion, of motives. To predicate responsibility requires that we postulate freedom.

The sanctions of morality, the rewards and punishments, no doubt, re-enforce the will, and aid it in making a right decision; but in the long run righteousness is for the interest of every one, and adequate knowledge is a powerful support, if not an unfailing guarantee, to a righteous life. Faith in God is a mighty power for good whenever we find that the requirements of duty conflict with present pleasure.

It is not necessary to abandon egoism to establish

morality. Selfish egoism that seeks gratification, even if at the expense of another, or at the expense of a higher good to self, is clearly immoral; but it is perfectly right to seek pleasure if in securing it no greater good is sacrificed or no overbalancing evil is incurred. Enlightened egoism does not conflict with rational altruism. They are opposite sides of a life of duty.

The fitness or unfitness which Clarke urges are too wide in extent, taking in æsthetical considerations as well as ethical; they are too meager in content, and do not necessarily take in the element of obligation. It may be fit that an artist should add a new feature to his picture, but he is not under obligation to do it. It is not only *fit* that a man should rescue his friend from drowning, but he *ought* to do it, if possible.

Clarke speaks of moral obligation as concerned with eternal relations, like those of mathematics. Eternal relations can exist only between eternal things. Geometry deals with the forms of space, which are eternal. Space is the empty condition of body and motion; but is necessary in itself, and would be, though body and motion had no existence. The relations of the forms of space are eternal truths, and are not dependent on contingent facts. But moral obligations relate to moral beings, and have no existence apart from those beings. In morals, good and bad, right and wrong, relate to the will, to the character, to the conduct of moral beings. They admit of degrees, and are not reducible to truth and falsity, which admit of no degrees. We approve of the right; we assent to the truth.

Perhaps Clarke would have justified his eternal obligations thus: It is eternally true that whenever there be

moral beings, they are under obligations to act with the fitness justified by their relations to one another.

2. *Price* (1723-1791).—Price published his "Review of the Questions and Difficulties of Morals" two years before the publication of Adam Smith's "Theory of the Moral Sentiments;" but Price, as an intuitionist, belongs to the group we are now considering.

Price's system is analagous to Cudworth's and Clarke's. He does not find the basis of his system in the general development of ethical thought, but regards the conception of right and wrong as intuitive and incapable of analysis, and at once clearly apprehended by reason as self-evident, though he does not insist on the analogy of mathematical and ethical truth.

Price recognized the emotional element emphasized by Shaftesbury, yet he regarded it as subordinate to the intuition of right and wrong. He held right and wrong to be real objective qualities of action, but that moral beauty and deformity are subjective ideas, representing feelings due to the intuitions of right and wrong, but springing from emotional sensibility. The intuition is paramount, though co-operating with instinct in supplying the motives to virtuous conduct.

Merit and demerit are accompaniments of right and wrong conduct, and deserve reward and punishment. Yet the merit or the demerit does not depend on the objective rightness or wrongness of the act, but upon the intention to do what is conceived to be right or wrong. A person is not blameworthy for an unintended evil, unless ignorance of the facts is the result of willful neglect to seek accurate information. An act may be subjectively right, though objectively wrong.

Price does not question the obligations to self-love and benevolence. He says: "There is not anything of which we have more undeniably an intuitive perception than that it is right to pursue and promote happiness, whether for ourselves or for others;" yet he held that there are other principles at once intuitively apprehended by reason. Honesty, veracity, gratitude, and justice are obligatory, without reference to their tendency to promote happiness. These virtues being accepted, we now ought to exhibit them, and need not think of their tendency to produce happiness, yet without this tendency, which is their final justification, they would never have been virtues.

Finding it difficult to show that the moral maxims are self-evident, Price appeals to common sense, which differs from rational intuition in being the consensus of opinion, however acquired. Thus, in regard to veracity, referring to common sentiment, he says, "We can not avoid pronouncing that there is an intrinsic rectitude in sincerity." In regard to justice, he accepts the traditional opinions which base the right of property on *first possession, labor, inheritance, donation*.

3. *Reid* (1710-1796).—In his *essay* on the active powers of the human mind, Reid distinguished between the rational or governing principles of action, and the non-rational impulses. The governing principles are self-love and conscience—self-love seeks the good, or perfection and happiness for ourselves; and conscience forbids injustice, inculcates justice, and approves of benevolence. The testimony of a good conscience is the purest and most valuable of human enjoyments. Reid

says, "No act can be morally good in which regard for what is right has not some influence."

The non-rational impulses need regulation, but are legitimate, and in fact indispensable. They are divided into mechanical instincts, or habits, that operate without will or thought, and the animal principles which operate upon the will, but do not imply any act of judgment in determining their ends. The original principles are:

1. *Appetites*, distinguished as periodical, and accompanied with a sensation of uneasiness when unsatisfied, and of pleasure when gratified.

2. *Desires*, as for pleasure, power, superiority, esteem, knowledge, wealth.

3. *Affections*, both benevolent and malevolent, as love and hatred.

Neither Butler nor Reid, though admitting benevolence as amiable and praiseworthy, regarded it as the whole of virtue. Even the malevolent affections, as indignation, anger, hatred, Reid regarded as not without utility. They resist aggression, afford protection, and aid in bringing criminals to justice.

Reid held that the moral faculty is not innate, except in germ. It needs "education, training, and habit" to enable it to fulfill its function. He does not object to the term *moral sense*, as employed by Shaftesbury, to denote the moral faculty, provided we mean by this term a source, not of mere feeling, but of ultimate moral truth. The moral sense is common sense applied to morals. He says: "In order to know what is right and what is wrong in human conduct, we need only listen

to the dictates of conscience. A person is morally justified in acting according to his conscience, though its dictates are based on mistaken views. In this case the act is subjectively right, though objectively wrong. It is, however, assumed that the individual did not willfully neglect to inform himself concerning the truth which should guide his conduct."

Reid lays down certain maxims relating to virtue in general; that there is a right and a wrong in voluntary conduct; that we ought to be careful in ascertaining our duty; and that we ought to strengthen ourselves against the temptation to deviate from the path of duty. He states five axioms: That we ought to prefer a greater to a lesser good; that we ought to prefer a lesser to a greater evil; that no one is born for himself alone; that right and wrong must be the same to all in all circumstances; that we owe veneration and submission to God.

Reid argues that injuries to others, abridgment of liberty without cause, attacks on reputation, breach of contract, are intuitively known to be violations of natural rights, without reference to consequences; that the right of property is the consequence of the natural right to life or to liberty. Justice and social customs are based on public utility.

4. *Dugald Stewart* (1753-1828).—In the "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," Stewart followed, in the main, the system of Reid, modified somewhat by the theories of Shaftesbury, Butler, Adam Smith, and Price.

Stewart classified duties under three heads—duties to God, duties to our fellow creatures, and duties to ourselves. He emphasized the obligation of justice, as dis-

tinct from that of benevolence. Under justice he included integrity and honesty, but he did not discuss them in detail.

The right to property Stewart based on the principle, that the laborer is entitled to the fruit of his own labor. In treating of veracity and fidelity to promises, he strove to prove that, aside from their utility, there is in human nature an intuitive love of truth and a sense of obligation to keep our promises, and a natural expectation that the promises of others to us will not be broken. The efficient cause of morality is conscience, the final cause is happiness.

Stewart surpassed Reid in psychological analysis, and though he did not make any original contribution to the science of morals, yet he expounded the ethics of common sense with a precision of statement and an elegance and finish of style not approached by any of the preceding writers of the intuitional school.

5. *Whewell* (1794-1866).—In his “*Elements of Morality*,” Whewell adopted, in the main, the views of his predecessors of the intuitional school, save that he rejects self-love as a fundamental principle, and consequently refuses to accept happiness as an ethical end. Here we trace the influence of Kant, who held that to aim at happiness detracts from the purity of the motives of moral conduct.

According to Whewell, five ultimate ethical virtues are left, from which deductions can be made which may serve as moral guides. These virtues are benevolence, justice, veracity, purity, and order, corresponding respectively to personal security, property, contract, marriage, and government. The five virtues are supple-

mented by two general principles—earnestness and moral purpose.

There is no need of discarding happiness as an end of moral action. Of course, the aim and the effort should be to be worthy of happiness; but the very expression, *worthy of happiness*, implies that happiness is desirable. What is the wrong of injustice? It makes some one unhappy. But let it be remembered that the lower pleasures should be subordinated to the higher, and that the highest satisfaction is a consciousness of rectitude.

6. *Martineau* (1809-1900).—In his “Types of Ethical Theory,” Martineau classed himself with the intuitionists. His masterful work is so complete that a consideration of it will suffice for what remains to be said of this school. Besides reviewing and criticising other systems, Martineau discussed the grounds and developed the system of intuitional ethics. He also did a good work in grading the motives or springs of action.

Martineau holds that, “As to moral quality, we judge persons, not things; that instead of measuring the worth of goodness by the scale of external benefits, our rule requires that we attach no moral value to these benefits except as signs and exponents of the goodness whence they spring; and that we graduate our approval by the purity of the source, not by the magnitude of the result.” That is, morality is found not in the good or bad as ends, but in the right or wrong as means, yet the end as good or bad determines the means as right or wrong.

In opposition to the mass of English moralists, Martineau taught that we learn our first moral lesson by reflection, and not by observation. He says: “That

in which we discern moral quality is, we have found, the inner spring of action; and that this is not apprehensible by any external observation, but can be known, in the first instance, only by internal self-consciousness. Of other men's actions, the visible part which follows the mental antecedents is the first element that comes before our view; all that precedes is beyond the reach of eye and ear, and is read off only by inference from the external sign. That sign would be unmeaning were not the thing signified already familiar by our own inner experience." Yet moral judgments are completely formed only in society. "I learn my own moral or human affection in the mirror of a kindred nature, and from the natural language of a brother man read off at once his passion and my own."

As to the conditions of morality, Martineau says: "A plurality of inner principles is an indispensable condition of a moral judgment;" also, "A plurality of simultaneous possibilities." Again: "Either free will is a fact or moral judgment is a delusion. We never could condemn one turn or act of thought, did we not believe the agent to have command of another; and just in proportion as we perceive in his temperament or education or circumstances the certain preponderance of particular suggestion, and the near approach to an inner necessity, do we criticise him rather as a natural than as a responsible being, and deal with his aberrations as maladies instead of sins. The ordinary rule, which in awarding penalties of wrong takes into consideration the presence or absence of violent temptation, assumes a personal power of resistance, never wholly crushed, but sometimes severely strained."

"Were we, in our moral problems, as much at the mercy of the laws of association as we are in our efforts to remember what we have forgotten, or to invent what is wanting in a design, we ought surely to look on the guilty with the same neutrality as on the failing memory or the infertile imagination. This is indeed prevailingly admitted by those who reduce the human being to the dominion of natural law. The application they acknowledge is in itself as absurd as to applaud the sunrise or to be angry at the rain; and the only difference is, that men are manageable for the future, and are susceptible to the influence of our sentiments regarding them, while the elements are not; so that it may be judicious, with a view of benefits to come, to commit the absurdity of praising what is not praiseworthy, and censuring what is not to blame. Thus to reduce the moral sentiments to a policy providing for the future, instead of a sentence pronounced upon the past, is simply to remove them, and amounts to a confession that they can not coexist with a theory of necessary causation."

"It is not till two incompatible impulses appear in our consciousness and contest the field that we are made aware of their difference, and are driven to judge between them. One is higher and more worthy than the other, and in comparison with it has the clear right to us. . . . We can not follow both, and we can not doubt the rights and place of either. Their moral valuation intuitively results from their simultaneous appearance. . . . If the first pair of impulses that compete for our will disclose their relative worth, by simply assuming that attitude, it is the same with all the rest."

Dr. Martineau presents the following table of mo-

tives, beginning with the lowest and gradually rising to the higher. In case of conflict, the higher should have the preference. In this way only can conscience be satisfied:

1. Secondary passions—censoriousness, vindictiveness, suspiciousness.

2. Secondary organic propensions—love of ease and sensual pleasure.

3. Primary organic propensions—appetites.

4. Primary animal propensions—spontaneous activity.

5. Love of gain—reflectively derived from appetite.

6. Secondary affections—Sentimental indulgence of sympathy.

7. Primary passions—antipathy, fear, resentment.

8. Causal energy—ambition or love of power, love of liberty.

9. Secondary sentiments—love of culture, love of the beautiful.

10. Primary sentiments—wonder and admiration.

11. Primary affections—domestic and social affections.

12. Sympathetic affections—pity and compassion.

13. Primary sentiments—reverence for God, for law, and for truth.

Chapter XI

MODERN ETHICS—ENGLISH

FROM HARTLEY TO SIDGWICK—UTILITARIAN

*H*ARTLEY (1705-1757).—It is necessary to go back to Hartley, in order to treat in connection the group of writers advocating utilitarian ethics. According to Hartley, benevolence is the primary virtue. We ought, therefore, to “direct every action so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power.”

Hartley applied the laws of association in explaining the complex processes of thought and feeling. He showed how, out of the elementary pleasures and pains of sensation, are developed by association the more complex pleasures and pains of imagination—such as result from ambition, self-interest, sympathy, antipathy, theopathy, and moral sense. Other philosophers, as Locke and Hume, had noticed the effect of association in modifying mental phenomena, but Hartley was the first to make a systematic use of the principle to explain the psychology of ethics. The associated facts, in Hartley’s view, were not mere conglomerates, but were compounds in which the elements coalesce and modify one another—not like a mere mixture, but like a chemical union.

Sensations, according to Hartley, constitute the pri-

mary facts of all psychical phenomena. Coexisting sensations form cohering groups of complex emotions or ideas, higher in grade than the diverse sensations of which they are the products. Thus the higher moral sentiments and the higher moral pleasures become more involved as we ascend the scale, and the higher becomes the pleasure, and the further the reach of consequences for good. Similar consequences, though with downward tendencies, apply to vices.

Hartley held that the very fact that sensation forms the foundation of moral sentiments, is proof that bodily pleasures are inferior to the satisfaction arising from the consciousness of moral rectitude, and that as we ascend the scale of virtues, the higher the reward. Hence, one aiming at his own happiness would, if he acted rationally, aim at the higher virtues. Socrates said that he would, if he knew, and that vice is a consequence of ignorance. He would, if he acted rationally; but the fact is, people sometimes act irrationally, with their eyes open to the consequences. Is it possible for one to aim at his own happiness, and at the same time aim to attain to that highest virtue of disinterested benevolence? Do not the two aims clash? Let one aim at disinterested benevolence, and his own happiness will follow.

Hartley does not make self-love the primary basis of moral conduct, or self-interest the primary object of pursuit, but holds that to do so detracts from the higher pleasure of love to God and to man. We must begin, however, with our own development, and by securing our own interests, otherwise we shall not be in condition to help our fellow beings; yet Hartley thinks that the function of self-love in human development is for the

purpose of "begetting in ourselves the dispositions of benevolence, piety, and moral sense, which virtues are not likely to be excessive." Therefore, our ideal aim should be to carry the subordination of self-interest further and further, till we reach "perfect self-annihilation and the pure love of God." This approaches the Buddhistic teaching: Strive to attain *Nirvana*, or unconscious repose.

The general rule, Produce the greatest happiness and the least misery possible, needs to be supplemented by the maxim: Conform to the received virtues and principles of morality. In case of conflict between motives, let the lower be subordinated to the higher.

2. *Paley* (1743-1805).—In his "Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," Paley says: "Obligation signifies to be urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another." In the case of moral obligation, the command is from God; the motive to obedience is the belief in future rewards and penalties. Paley's system seems to be a compound of theistic and utilitarian ethics. He says that "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness." The commands of God are to be learned both "from Scripture and the light of nature." But Scripture enforces morality chiefly by the sanctions of future rewards and punishments.

Moral conduct is tested by its tendency to promote or diminish happiness. At the same time, Paley urges the importance of general rules as guides to conduct, and thus evades the difficulty of calculating the consequences, which utilitarianism seems to require, and which is the most formidable objection to the system;

nevertheless, good final consequences, fairly made out, constitute the ultimate justification of conduct.

Paley did not distinguish pleasures as higher and lower, but estimated them by their quantity—that is, by their degree of intensity and duration. The criterion of a moral rule is its conduciveness to general happiness. The universal incentive to action is to secure happiness for one's self or to avoid misery. The rule for the guidance of conduct is the will of God; but the motive to obedience is the sanction of rewards and punishments to be realized in a future life. Paley's system in brief is this: *Be good, because it pays.*

3. *Bentham* (1748-1842).—In regard to morality, Bentham held that actions are estimated solely in reference to pleasurable or painful consequences. He says: "In making these estimates, we consider the intensity and duration of the pleasure or pain, also their certainty or uncertainty, and their propinquity or remoteness." We see that Bentham advanced beyond Paley, by introducing additional elements; but he did not consider quality apart from quantity. He says: "The quantity of pleasures being equal, *push-pin* is as good as poetry." Though Hartley was the originator of associational philosophy, Bentham was the originator of systematic utilitarian ethics. His motto was, *The greatest good to the greatest number.*

Having summed up the pleasures and pains of any line of conduct of a given individual, the difference on the side of pleasure or pain will give us the total good or bad tendency of that conduct with respect to that individual. Then consider the same conduct with respect to other individuals affected, and we shall ascer-

tain the total tendency of the act for good or evil. The difficulty with this ingenious theory is, that the first consequences become causes of second consequences, and these of the third, and so on, in endless series, so that it becomes impossible to estimate all the consequences, especially when applied to other people.

As to motives, Bentham held that men are induced to pursue a certain line of conduct by the expectation of the pleasures or pains to themselves from natural, civil, or social causes. He says: "It is, in fact, very idle to talk about *duties*; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive; and talk about it as we may, the word will not stand for a rule of conduct. A man, a moralist, gets into an elbow chair, and pours forth pompous dogmatisms about *duty* and *duties*. Why is he not listened to? Because every man is thinking about his *interests*. It is a part of his very nature to think about interests; and with these the will-judging moralist will find it his interest to begin. Let him say what he pleases—to interest, duties must and will be subservient." Bentham certainly has the merit of frankness. He gives the following lines to aid the memory:

"Intense, long, certain, speedy, pure,
Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure;
Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end,
If it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view;
If pains must come, let them extend to few."

Bentham's utilitarianism is primarily egoistic, and secondarily altruistic. Egoism for diet; altruism for desert. The test of right and wrong is the greatest happi-

ness of the greatest number. Justice is not the end of government, but the means to the end—happiness.

4. *John Stuart Mill* (1806-1873).—The utilitarianism of Mill differs from that of Bentham, chiefly in two respects—Mill is more altruistic, and he considers the *quality* of pleasures as well as the *quantity*. Pain, as the negative of pleasure, he dismisses from the discussion of utilitarianism, as understood whenever implied.

Mill holds that each man desires pleasure; that the strength of the desire varies directly as the magnitude of the pleasure; that the only proof that anything is desirable is that people actually desire it; that each person's happiness is desirable to himself; that each individual, whose moral nature is properly cultivated, desires the general happiness; that he has a feeling of unity with his fellow-creatures, which makes it natural that his aims should be in harmony with theirs.

Mill says: "The desire for the general happiness is, in most individuals, much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether; but by those who have this feeling of unity with others it is taken as an attribute which it would not be well to be without. This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness, morality. That is, it is better for each individual to desire and strive to promote the general happiness."

This looks like finding in egoism the basis of altruism. But how does the desire for the general happiness benefit the individual who desires this happiness? The benefit may come in two ways: Subjectively, the desire for the general welfare promotes the perfection of the individual who entertains this desire; objectively, each

person is benefited by the prosperity of others, and the desire for the general prosperity naturally leads to efforts to bring it about. The subjective reason seems more ennobling, but it has force only with those who aim at a higher character. The objective reason is self-interest; but it is not without justification, since it is right for every one to look out for his own interest, especially when in so doing he also promotes the interests of others.

When Mill says that they who have altruistic feeling are convinced that it would not be well for them to be without it, he does not assert that they believe that their own happiness is proportionate to their desire for the general happiness; for he says: "One does sometimes best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice of his own. The conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable."

In asserting that happiness is the good, Mill is an Epicurean; but in commending the conscious ability to do without happiness, and the absolute sacrifice of one's own, he is a Stoic. He was broad enough to take in both views.

According to Mill, the *quality* of pleasure is to be considered as well as the *quantity*. In fact, compared with the claims of quantity, those of quality are superior. The pleasure taken in the happiness of others, or that found in making sacrifices for our friends, is certainly superior in quality to that derived from the indulgence of appetite, or from any form of sensual pleasure. The higher quality is more than a counterpoise to the greater quantity. Whether it admits of strict proof or not, it is reasonable to believe that in the end the choice of the

higher satisfaction of virtue will, in dignity, be more than a recompense for all that is lost in the intensity of the lower pleasures.

The principle that the ultimate aim of moral conduct should be to promote the highest welfare of the greatest number, often becomes a guide when the common maxims fail, as in the choice of a calling for life work, the distribution of property, or the choice of our political or ecclesiastical affiliations. Public and private interests limit and modify one another, and the balance of interests decides the course of conduct. We estimate the conduct of other people by its bearing on the public welfare. In making general happiness the ultimate aim, it is not necessary to overlook private interests. To do the greatest possible amount of good requires that we develop our own powers, and conserve or increase our own resources. Benevolence may be the leading principle, yet it needs the direction of sound judgment. By securing our own cultivation and guarding our own interests, we are in better condition to be of service to others. Having the disposition, the will, the energy, the industry, then the work is done.

Without claiming for it infallibility, the consensus of opinion has great weight, and is, to the majority, the standard of appeal. Mill says: "Through all departments of human affairs, regard for the sentiments of our fellow-creatures is, in one shape or other, in nearly all characters the prevailing motive. And we ought to note that this motive is naturally strongest in the most sensitive natures, which are the most promising material for the formation of great virtues."

Mill holds that virtue is more than benevolence or

sympathy with our fellow-beings. He says: "The mind is not in a state conformable to utility, unless it loves virtue as a thing desirable in itself." Virtue in conducting to pleasure, or in avoiding pain, comes, by the law of association, to be esteemed for its own value. By habit the tendency to virtue may become so strong that the practice will be continued, even though great sacrifices are required to satisfy the conscience in regard to the obligation.

Heredity is the transmission of tendencies from ancestors, through the customs of society, till the tendencies become instinctive, and the corresponding ideas or beliefs apparently intuitive. They are really intuitive to the individual, though evolved by the experience of the race.

The social feelings are a compound of sympathy with the pains and pleasures of others, and the habit of consulting their welfare, enforced by the knowledge of mutual dependence. Our sense of justice and injustice involves extended sympathy, and a desire for personal and general security.

Utilitarian and intuitive ethics supplement each other, each doing service in the failing case of the other—one giving the expedient, the other the right.

5. *Sidgwick* (1838-1900).—In his great work, "The Methods of Ethics," Sidgwick discusses critically and so fairly the various methods, as to seem for the time their special advocate; yet by just criticism he shows his independence. His final summing up, however, proves him to be a utilitarian.

To follow Sidgwick through, step by step, would re-

quire a book as large as his own. We shall content ourselves, therefore, with recommending all students of ethics carefully and critically to study "The Methods of Ethics." He has also published a volume called "Practical Ethics," made up of essays and lectures which are well worth the reading.

Chapter XII

MODERN ETHICS—EVOLUTIONARY

SPENCER AND OTHERS

SPENCER holds that the control of certain feelings by other feelings is the essential trait of moral consciousness. As experience makes manifest the evils of yielding, without consideration, to the impulse for present gratification, and exhibits the advantages in providing for the future, human beings learn to subordinate the lower, simpler feelings to the higher and more complex.

Inductions from experience become the basis for deductions, which serve as guides to conduct. The voluntary relinquishment of immediate and special pleasures, for the sake of remote and general good, is a fact of profound significance, and has important applications to social conduct and ethical life. Surrender of present pleasure may be made, not only for the hope of greater future good, but through fear of civil punishment, social ostracism, or divine retribution.

Habitual decisions, in view of ethical considerations, result in the confirmation of moral character. Ideas and trains of association affect the nervous system and produce changes in the brain, which continued for successive generations permanently change the organism, and this change of organic structure, with the correspond-

ing mental states, are transmitted, and the tendency to act in the same way becomes instinctive, and the corresponding ideas intuitive to the individual, though they have been developed in the race by the processes of evolution.

Beings with organs adapted to their environment survive; others perish. The utilitarian makes *happiness* the end of ethical conduct; the evolutionist, *health*. The preservation and perfection of the individual and society may be regarded as the proximate end, and happiness the ultimate end of rational effort.

Spencer, however, regards conduct tending to preserve life to be good only on condition that life has a "surplus of agreeable feeling." This is evident, for life without enjoyment is a matter of indifference to its possessor. It might, however, bring enjoyment to other beings; but if so, enjoyment to these beings would be the end; hence the enjoyment of somebody is the end, which is the principle of utilitarianism. Those who make something else than happiness the end, as perfection or the efficiency of the social organism, forget that these things afford satisfaction, and if they did not, no one would care for them. When Spencer shows that good or bad consequences are not accidental, but result from the constitution of things, he transforms utilitarian ethics from an empirical to a rational system. The outcome of evolutionism is utilitarianism; that is, evolution is the philosophy of utility; it is the explanation of ethical progress.

To take the efficiency of the social organization as the end, as *Leslie Stephen* does, is good and wholesome; but this efficiency is only the *proximate*, not the *ultimate*,

end. This is implied in the word efficiency itself; it signifies capability of accomplishing a result. Efficiency of social organism or even perfection would have no value, if it did not give some one satisfaction. It is evident, therefore, that the good in some form for some one, whether that good be called pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, enjoyment, righteousness, holiness, or blessedness, must be the end of all ethical action. The objection to this view is, that it will run into hedonism; but if made *eudemonic* and *altruistic*, it satisfies all reasonable demands. Mr. Fiske says: "The consummate product of a world of evolution is the character that *creates happiness*, that is replete with dynamic possibilities of fresh life and activity in directions forever new. Such a character is the reflected image of God, and in it are contained the promise and potency of life everlasting." The highest satisfaction of the greatest number stands against all assaults as the ultimate end of moral conduct.

Let it be remembered that happiness, pursued too directly for egoistic purposes, loses much of its value. It comes as an accompaniment of altruistic action, prompted by benevolence. It has been objected by Hyslop that happiness can not be the end, since it can not be *directly* pursued without loss; but the manner of pursuit, whether direct or indirect, is a question of means, not of end. A good will seeks to realize perfection for self, and to secure it for others. Happiness will take care of itself; it will come without being directly sought, and will be all the more enjoyable when it comes as the unexpected, or at least the unsought, reward of beneficent deeds. Mill said: "I do not attempt to stimulate you with the prospect of direct rewards, either

earthly or heavenly; the less we think about being rewarded in either way, the better for us."

If in average cases pleasure and pain are in equilibrium, the value of life is zero. If pleasure overbalances pain, life is desirable; if pain overbalances pleasure, it is undesirable. A recent writer has suggested the word *meliorism* as indicating an improving condition, neither the best nor the worst possible—a middle-of-the-road position between optimism and pessimism.

If evolution is progress towards the goal of a higher condition, the chief excellency in man is not to be found in what is common to him and the brute, but in what is peculiar to him as man and in his most advanced stage of progress. "On earth there is nothing great but man; in man nothing great but mind."

How is conscience evolved? In savage communities a check upon aggression is found in the fear of retaliation. Also the chief discovers that quarrels within his own tribe weaken its power to contend successfully with other tribes. He therefore endeavors to prevent aggression by penalties. Disobedience to the chief comes to be regarded as a great crime, and is severely punished. After the death of the chief his ghost is supposed to avenge disobedience to his will. The transition to the fear of supernatural beings is easy. Superstitious fear of imaginary beings, or even reverence for God, is a restraint against crime. The threefold restraint—social, political, and religious—co-operate in the evolution of conscience. It is thought that crime which is so restrained must be wrong. A man with undeveloped conscience may be kept from murder by the fear of the halter or the dread of future punishment; but to the

moral man, the wrong to the victim, to his friends, to society, to himself, is a sufficient restraint.

In a letter to Mill, Spencer says: "To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that corresponding to the fundamental position of a developed moral science, there have been and still are developing in the race certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of utility gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organization—just as I believe that this intuition, requiring to be made definite and complete by personal experience, has practically become a form of thought apparently quite independent of experience; so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which by continued transmission and accumulation have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experience of utility. I also hold that just as the space intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them, so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of moral science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them."

It will be seen that evolution reconciles utilitarian and intuitionist ethics, as it reconciles empirical and rational psychology. Conduct considered obligatory, because of its service to society, is enforced by conscience, by public sentiment, and sometimes by civil law. There is a moral force in the social will, or the consensus of opinion, which an individual can violate only at his peril. The social will is, however, something more than the sum of individual wills, which would be a conglomerate of discordant volitions. It is these wills brought into harmony on some point, by discarding discrepancies and uniting on agreements.

Pleasure is an object of pursuit, a stimulus to action; but pleasure in possession satisfies, and effort ceases. Pleasure in prospect begets a craving for it, which is a stimulus to action. If pain exists, there is a desire to get rid of it, and this stimulates activity, which ceases with the pain.

Pure selfishness leads to strife, to warfare, which brings us face to face with extermination. The necessity of union for the preservation of the race is apparent. Preservation with its possibilities of happiness being desirable, the duty of co-operation, mutual helpfulness, and obedience to law becomes evident, and is enforced by public opinion and the sanction of penalty for its violation. Morality is evolved whenever people begin to act in concert.

Right is the means to a good end—an end truly desirable; wrong is the means to a bad or undesirable end. To do right or wrong is to work for a good or a bad end.

Assuming matter and motion and force, also space and time, and nothing else, can we account for knowing,

feeling, and willing? Atoms respond to the presence of other atoms. Is this due to forces in the atoms, or to external forces? If the force is within, is it blind or conscious? If blind, there is no knowledge or volition or feeling. Blind means no knowledge; hence no volition, for volition is based on knowledge; also no feeling, for feeling implies consciousness of feeling, and consciousness is knowledge. In the case supposed, there can be no new facts not derivable from blind atoms; hence no knowledge, for neither a combination of atoms nor their interaction is knowledge. But as knowledge, feeling, and volition are manifest along with matter, as in a living human being, and not derivable from blind matter, either matter is not blind, or these phenomena have some other source than the atoms.

According to Huxley, the cosmic process reaches its results without mercy and without remorse. It has no pity, no conscience. The ethical progress combats the cosmic by endeavoring to save what the cosmic would destroy. The cosmic process lets those live that are fit to live; the ethic endeavors to make all fit. The one is heartless; the other is ruled by heart. If the forces are fundamentally the same in the two cases, it takes a new direction, guided by conscience, in the second case. In the moral realm the ruling principle is benevolent foresight. *Fit to survive* means not only *naturally* fit, but *morally* fit. Man, as *lord of creation*, can adapt nature to moral purposes.

The endeavor to make the unfit fit is itself a factor in the process of evolution. To save the unfortunate is better than to destroy; it develops foresight, incites to new activity, and strengthens the benevolent impulses.

As conditions are continually changing, fitness means progressive fitness, keeping pace with progressive evolution. The struggle for existence under progressively favoring conditions becomes a struggle, not with a doubtful issue, but one with assured victory. All this implies a care for self, and a preparation for altruistic action, which brings the highest rewards. The natural impulses and instincts are not opposed to the higher ethical development, but constitute its necessary basis of action. First that which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual; first the egoistic, then the altruistic. The struggle for existence would not be continued were existence not desirable; and so long as life is desirable the struggle will continue, but it will be more and more a pleasant exercise till it becomes a delightful effort, in a manner increasingly worthy, attended by still higher consequences for good. Man is the crowning glory of evolution. A worthy man is nature at her best. Efforts will never cease. In fact, happiness consists not in rest, but it comes as a reflex of rightly directed energy; but energy to be rightly directed requires wise forethought. Progressive morality therefore requires progressive knowledge.

Natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, working through many generations, modifying the structure to meet the demands of function, is supplemented by skill in the invention and application of tools, machines, and engines for the performance of work which the natural powers of man can not accomplish, and this in part obviates the necessity of change of structure, since man with his present structure by proper tools can accomplish what was before impossible. Man not only adapts

himself to his environment, but he adapts his environment to his needs, as seen in shelter, food, clothing, light, and warmth.

The evolution of environment is as much a fact as the evolution of organism, and has much more to do with ethics, since in the evolution of environment the will, the moral executive factor, is directly concerned. Human selection, as well as natural selection, is a factor most potent in its influence. Man is not an alien in nature; he is its crown and its glory. The co-operation of the human with the cosmic gives the grandest results. The end of the cosmic is the moral. Under the realm of nature, underlying the sphere of intelligence, is "the power, not of us, that works for righteousness." Evolution itself is under the guidance of divine wisdom; and conscience in man is God's voice telling him he ought to do right, but not what is right; for that is left for man to discover by his own reason.

What is the pedigree of conscience? Suppose we say that "men have been scared into a sense of moral obligation by the baton of the primitive policeman, the ostracism of primitive society, and the hell of primitive priests;" that conscience, whose components are sociability and intelligence, has been made obligatory because the claims of society are greater than those of the individual, and are enforced by more powerful sanctions. This may explain the way a sense of obligation has been developed in the race, since conscience is largely a matter of education; but it does not explain conscience itself, or the ground of obligation. Why ought I to do this, or ought not to do that, when the doing or the not doing seems detrimental to my own interests? Is it

because God has commanded it? But God's commands are not without reason. Postulating the wisdom and goodness of God, we must admit that he commands in the interest of the universe. The interests of the many outweigh the interest of the individual; hence in case of conflict his interests *ought* to give way to theirs. In such a case, is it unreasonable to believe that a surrender of self for the common good does not escape the notice of God? The individual may not realize, and it is perhaps better that he should not realize, that he who sacrifices his interests for others reaps a higher reward. He that loses his life for conscience' sake shall find life eternal.

In every conscientious person's soul the voice of conscience is heard saying, *Thou shalt not do wrong; thou shalt do right.*

Chapter XIII

GREEN'S "PROLEGOMENA TO ETHICS"

THOMAS H. GREEN (1836-1882). — Professor Green, of Oxford, England, in his "Prolegomena to Ethics," made a profound impression on the ethical writers of his time. He endeavored to find for ethics an independent philosophical justification, not based either on dogmatic theology or on natural science.

Green found the ultimate end of moral conduct in *self-realization*—that is, the realization, in actual experience, of the normal possibilities of human nature, with their attendant satisfactions. He distinguished sharply between self-realization and pleasure, and held that what one really seeks is self-realization, and not pleasure. Elsewhere he says, "Self-satisfaction is what one seeks." Yet evidently self-satisfaction is not identical with self-realization, but is a result of it, and that only if self be realized as worthy. Self-realization would not be sought, but rather avoided, if it afforded dissatisfaction, which would be the case if self were found unworthy. It is not, therefore, self-realization as such that we seek, but such self-realization in the exercise of our powers that yields self-satisfaction, and because it yields self-satisfaction, or ultimately, it is self-satisfaction. Is not this self-satisfaction what Mill calls higher pleasure? It

is not sensation; it is not hedonic pleasure; it is the enjoyment of the consciousness of self-worthiness.

Green objects to the consideration of the quality of pleasure, and holds that on utilitarian grounds one pleasure is better than another, only because it is greater in quantity. He says: "It is altogether against utilitarian principles that one pleasure should be of more value than another, because the man who pursues it is better." One pleasure is of more value than another, though equal in degree, since the *pleasure* is better, because more worthy of the man. Granting that two pleasures of equal quantity are not immoral, and that either may be legitimately chosen, but that one exerts on the man a more elevating influence than the other, is it not a higher pleasure, and is it not to be preferred? Green admits that this is valid reasoning, if self-realization, and not pleasure, is the end of action; but we have seen that self-realization is the end of action, only when yielding self-satisfaction. Self-realization, when painful, or simply not pleasant, is not sought. It is sought only when enjoyable and because of the enjoyment; that is, it is the self-satisfaction resulting from *worthiness* that is sought. It is clear that satisfaction is the end, and that personal worth is the means to the end. If self is worthy, self-realization with its attending satisfaction may be regarded the end of action.

If now it be asked whether people do not often pursue a course which because of demerit affords self-dissatisfaction, it must be confessed that they do; but they do not pursue that course for the sake of the demerit or dissatisfaction, but for the sake of some hedonic pleasure or lower gratification. The ethical requirement

is, that they choose personal worthiness, the motive for which is self-satisfaction, or pure enjoyment. The higher end *ought* to be chosen in preference to the lower, because it yields better results.

It is now clear that self-realization alone, as such, can not be the proper end; for self-realization may be brought about through demerit as well as through merit; the way to self-realization divides into two branches—one way of attaining it, the way of merit, is right, since it reveals a worthy self, worthy because choosing the right; and the other way, the way of demerit, wrong, since it reveals an unworthy self, unworthy because choosing the wrong in preference to the right.

Realization of a worthy self is found, as Green says, in "some perfection which is to be attained, some vocation which is to be fulfilled, some law which is to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable, whatever the individual may for the time desire."

Realization of a guilty self affords self-dissatisfaction; its language is:

"Had I but died an hour before this chance,
I had lived a blessed time; for, from this instant,
There's nothing serious in mortality;
All is but toys: renown, and grace, is dead;
The wine of life is drawn, and the mere lees
Is left."

Practically, it is best to keep the satisfaction out of view, and to make the ideal of personal worth the penultimate end of our aim—an ideal still in advance—"not as though I had already attained, either were already

perfect." Dwelling on our excellencies begets spiritual pride, and that is odious in the sight of God and man. It is true that man is the image of God, and exists in him and for him. So far as possible man's aim should be to realize the divine ideal; for God is the being "with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical in the sense that in excellence he is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming." God is, in fact, the spiritual principle in nature and in knowledge. It is Green's merit to emphasize this fact.

A perfect development is possible only in common with our fellow-beings. The notion of a common good is more than a gregarious instinct, as in brutes; it desires, not only *to be* with others, but *to do* them good. It has a distinctive altruistic character, which is as much an original element of our nature as the egoistic instinct. It is the good of others that we seek and enjoy; and this very fact is a witness to our own goodness. If we did not enjoy the good of others, we would not only not seek it, but we would not be good. The true ethical procedure is, therefore, to seek directly the good of others; and in so doing we reap our reward. For ourselves, we should aim at perfection rather than at happiness. Of course, we know that personal worthiness is the surest road to happiness; but this fact need not be kept constantly in mind. The common interests are our interests; the common good is our good. The two are joined in ethical wedlock; and "What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."

If we know that our own good is secured by promoting the good of others, it may be asked, Is not our object in promoting the good of others to secure our

own? It may be so, and doubtless sometimes is so; but then the richness of the reward is lost. Yet the proceeding is not immoral. In seeking the common good, we are, if enlightened, conscious of the truth that our own good is involved. It is best, however, to withdraw, for the time, our thoughts from that feature, and let that consideration sink into an indistinct vagueness, approaching the vanishing limit, while the good of others is made vivid, and is pursued with ardor. Herein is our reward. It comes unsought, and perhaps unexpected, giving it a value which we more highly appreciate and enjoy.

Green thus presents his doctrine of the will: "A man, we will suppose, is acted on, at once, by an impulse to avenge an affront, by a bodily want, by a call of duty, and by fear of certain results incidental to his avenging the affront or obeying the call of duty, each passion suggesting a different line of action. So long as he is undecided how to act, no moral effect ensues. It ensues when the man's relation to these influences is altered by his identifying himself with one of them, by his taking the object of one of these tendencies, for the time, as his good. This is to will, and is, in itself, a moral action, though circumstances may prevent its issuing in that sensible effect which we call an overt act. . . . Whether its object—the action to which the moral act is directed—be the attainment of revenge, or the satisfaction of a bodily want, or the fulfillment of a call of duty, it has equally this characteristic, the object is one with which the man identifies himself, so that, in being determined by it, he is consciously determined by himself."

Green makes responsibility come in when a man identifies himself with the desire. This is choice, or volition, or decision, which the man freely makes for himself. The preceding desire is not choice; it is a solicitation, a craving of the sensibility. The choice is an act of will made by the man himself. The person makes the choice, and, if wise, he will make a right choice, in view of reasonable motives, which are not causes compelling action, but reasons for volition.

Again, Green says: "An act is an effort by which a self-conscious individual directs himself to the realization of some idea as to an object in which, for the time, he seeks self-satisfaction." Here Green makes, not self-realization, but self-satisfaction, the end. Again: "Self-satisfaction is the form of every object willed; but the filling of that form, the character of that in which self-satisfaction is sought, ranging from sensual pleasure to the fulfillment of a vocation conceived as given by God, makes the object really what it is. It is on the specific difference of the object willed, under the general form of self-satisfaction, that the quality of the will must depend. It is here, therefore, that we must look for the basis of distinction between goodness and badness of will." A good will seeks a good object, and a bad will a bad object.

Again: "When the idea of which the realization is sought is not that of enjoying any pleasure, the fact that the self-satisfaction is sought in the effort to realize the idea of the desired object does not make pleasure the object of desire. It may very well be that a man pursues an object in which he seeks self-satisfaction with the clear consciousness that no enjoyment of pleasure

can yield him satisfaction, and that there must be such pain in the realization of the idea to which he devotes himself, as can not be compensated in any scale where pleasure and pain alone are weighed by any enjoyment of an end achieved. So it is in the more heroic form of self-sacrifice. Self-satisfaction is doubtless sought in such sacrifice. The man who faces a life of suffering in the fulfillment of what he conceives to be his mission could not bear to do otherwise. So to live is his good." It is not sensational pleasure he seeks, but the accomplishment of a worthy purpose in which he finds his satisfaction.

In speaking of Mill's theory, Green says: "Every one must feel that the utilitarian theory receives a certain exaltation from his treatment of it." That is, by making a distinction in the quality of pleasures, Mill elevates utilitarianism. But Green goes on to say: "Just so far as cool self-love, in the sense of a calculating pursuit of pleasure, becomes dominant, and supersedes particular interests, the chances of pleasure are really lost, which accounts for the restlessness of the pleasure-seeker and for the common remark that the right way to get pleasure is not to seek it." The right aim is to be worthy. The consciousness of worthiness is the highest satisfaction. "If, then, the presentation of virtue, as an ultimate object, and not merely as a means, does determine desire, there are desires which are not excited by anticipations of pleasure." That is true of sensational pleasure. The attainment of virtue affords satisfaction. If it did not, virtue would not be an object of desire. This satisfaction Mill calls *higher pleasure*. If the word "pleasure" is to be restricted to

agreeable sensations, then Green's criticism is just; but Mill extends its application to the higher form of happiness.

A lower and a higher motive sometimes conflict, and a man, knowing that he should choose the higher, prefers the lower. His will does not harmonize with his reason; in choosing the lower motive, he misses the higher good. "Unless a man could think of himself as capable of governing his actions by the consideration of his desires, some should, while others should not, be gratified, the distinction of praiseworthy and blameworthy would be unmeaning to him."

Green objects to pleasure as the good on account of its fleeting character. He says: "Could a person, while reflecting on himself, so far as to conceive the need of a lasting good, fail to reflect also on the fleeting nature of the pleasures of which he contemplates the succession?" Pleasure may not be *the* good, but it is *a* good. The fact that pleasures are fleeting and successive does not detract from their value. In this way richness and variety are secured, and the *ennui* of monotony avoided. Does it detract from the value of a panorama or the interest that we take in it, because the scenes pass, one by one, each succeeded by another? To some extent, the same is true of the highest good—a consciousness of personal worth. Though personal worth ought always to abide, yet we do not wish to be forever making it an object of contemplation.

The fullness, the variety, the unceasing change of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions, for a single day, is a more marvelous panorama than any ever painted on canvas.

We ought not to be satisfied with the pleasures of sensation, which satisfy the brute, nor say with Pope,

“Reason’s whole pleasure, all the joys of sense,
Lie in three words: Health, peace, and competence.”

We find a higher enjoyment than pleasure in the satisfaction taken in our own success or in the success of our friends, in possessions, attainments, achievements, in the deserved good opinion of our fellows, in the contemplation of the true, the beautiful, and the good.

What, then, should be sought? The highest moral character, a thoroughly trained intellect, and good health, as subjective conditions; then, as objective conditions, a competence of wealth, satisfactory social relations, and, above all, a oneness with God and co-operation with him in the great work of lifting humanity to the high plane of righteousness. So much for the preparation, and now for action. In moral effort we are to consider not only the immediate end, but so far as we can the remote consequences; then scan the motives, make a right decision, direct the aim, execute the act with energy and skill. In doing this we attain the ultimate good, and may call it, with Green, *self-realization, in actual experience, of the normal possibilities of human nature, with their attendant satisfactions.*

Chapter XIV

MODERN ETHICS.—OTHER MORALISTS

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (1706-1790).—Perhaps no attempt to reach moral perfection has ever surpassed that made by Benjamin Franklin. He says: "I wished to live without committing any fault at any time, and to conquer all that either natural inclination, custom, or company might lead me into. As I knew, or thought I knew, what was right and wrong, I did not see why I might not always do the one, and avoid the other. But I soon found I had undertaken a task more difficult than I had imagined. While my attention was taken up, and care employed in guarding against one fault, I was often surprised by another; habit took the advantage of inattention; inclination was sometimes too strong for reason."

The intensely practical turn of Franklin's mind is seen, not only in desiring to make ideal perfection actual, but in the plan whereby he attempted to realize his ideal. He says: "I concluded at length that mere speculative conviction that it was our interest to be completely virtuous was not sufficient to prevent our slipping; and that the contrary habits must be broken, and good ones acquired and established before we can have any dependence on a steady uniform rectitude of conduct. For this purpose I therefore tried the following method."

Franklin gives the following list of virtues with their precepts:

(1) *Temperance*.—Eat not to dullness; drink not to elevation.

(2) *Silence*.—Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid trifling conversation.

(3) *Order*.—Let all your things have their places; let each part of your business have its time.

(4) *Resolution*.—Resolve to perform what you ought; perform without fail what you resolve.

(5) *Frugality*.—Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself; that is, waste nothing.

(6) *Industry*.—Lose no time; be always employed in something useful; cut off all unnecessary actions.

(7) *Sincerity*.—Use no hurtful deceit; think innocently and justly; and if you speak, speak accordingly.

(8) *Justice*.—Wrong none by doing injuries, or omitting the benefits that are your duty.

(9) *Moderation*.—Avoid extremes; forbear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.

(10) *Cleanliness*.—Tolerate no uncleanness in body, clothes, or habitation.

(11) *Tranquillity*.—Be not disturbed at trifles or at accidents common or unavoidable.

(12) *Chastity*. . . .

(13) *Humility*.—Imitate Jesus and Socrates.

Of his plan of acquiring all these virtues, he says: "My intention being to acquire the *habitude* of all these virtues, I judged it would be well not to distract my attention by attempting the whole at once, but to fix it on *one* of them at a time; and when I had mastered that, then to proceed to another."

Franklin kept a book account of his progress. He says: "Though I never arrived at the perfection I had been so ambitious of obtaining, but fell far short of it, yet I was by the endeavor a better and a happier man."

2. *George Combe* (1788-1858).—Combe was the first advocate in Great Britain of the phrenological doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim. The work by which he is best known is entitled "The Constitution of Man Considered in Relation to External Objects."

Combe was a highly gifted man. His writings are attractive in style and elevated in thought. As a philanthropist, he took great interest in education and in the treatment of the criminal classes. The doctrines which he advocated, though unpopular at the time, have become to be more favorably regarded.

His "Moral Philosophy" was published in 1840. His fundamental principle is, that the laws of nature are at once independent and harmonious, and that man best fulfills God's will and subserves his own interest by discovering the laws of nature and those relating to man—the physical, the intellectual, and the moral—and by conducting himself in harmony with their requirements. If an unseaworthy vessel, old and leaky, should put to sea, the passengers would probably not be saved from the natural consequences, though some of them were missionaries to a foreign land. Whatever law we obey, we receive the reward of that obedience; whatever law we violate, we receive the penalty of that violation. Combe argued against the injustice of punishing one as an example to deter others from crime.

3. *Francis Wayland* (1796-1865).—Wayland defines ethics thus: "Ethics, or moral philosophy, is the science

of moral law." What is law? Wayland says: "Law is a form of expression denoting either a mode of existence or an order of sequence. . . . A moral law is, therefore, a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results." Does Wayland mean by "a form of expression" the language expressing the law? If so, there would be no law till the expression was formed; if not, it would be better to say, A moral law is the order of sequence. The law of falling bodies existed before it was discovered and formulated. The laws of nature existed before they were discovered and stated by men of science.

Wayland lays emphasis on the word *established*, and hence concludes that an order of sequence established supposes an establisher. His ethics is therefore theistic, and as seen in the sequel, Christian.

What is moral action? Wayland says: "It is a voluntary action of an intelligent agent who is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or of distinguishing what he ought from what he ought not to do." Is every voluntary act of such a being moral? A moral being may perform actions morally indifferent, as whether one goes to town on horseback or in a buggy. It would be better to say, A moral action is the voluntary action of an intelligent being, performed in view of the fact that it is right or wrong. Wayland says, "The right or wrong of an action exists in the intention."

Wayland asks the question, "Whence do we derive our notion of the moral quality of action? . . . I think it is not proved that an action is right because it is productive of the greatest amount of happiness. It may be

so, or it may not, but we ought not to believe it without proof." What is the force of the words *ought not* in the above sentence? Wayland goes on to say: "To me the Scriptures seem explicitly to declare that the will of God alone is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures, and that this will precludes every other inquiry." God's will is undoubtedly always right, and a knowledge of his will is a guide to conduct; but there is a reason for God's will, and it is not unreasonable to believe that the reason is the greatest amount of happiness, and Wayland was not warranted in saying, "We ought not to believe it to be so without proof." What of those who through all the ages have neither had the Scriptures nor known the will of God?

Wayland discusses the nature, function, and authority of conscience, and the law by which it is governed; he gives rules for moral conduct, treats of virtues in imperfect beings, discourses on happiness, self-love, the necessity of enlightening the conscience, treats of natural religion and its relation to revealed religion, and argues for the authenticity of the Holy Scriptures.

Under Practical Ethics, Wayland treats of our obligations to God and to man; he maintains that in the relation of things, as God has constituted them, is found the rule of duty, as in the relation of parent and child, the benefactor and the beneficiary, the Creator and the creature. To know these relations is to know the will of God and our duty.

4. *Laurens P. Hickok* (1798-1888).—Hickok classes the theories relating to the rule of right as objective and subjective. Under objective theories he includes the authority of the State, the revealed will of God, the in-

herent nature of things, and the highest happiness. Under subjective theories he places self-satisfaction, mutual sympathy, conscience, or the inner sense of right and wrong, and immediate intuition.

The rule of right is to aim at the good. "We find two distinct kinds of good—one as it ministers to animal gratification, the other as it fills the sentiment of reason. One good is a *means* to be used for an end, and is thus a *utility*; the other good is an *end* in itself, and not admitting of use to any further end is thus a *dignity*." What gratifies the animal nature is, of course, a means; the gratification is an end, yet certainly not the highest end. What fills the sentiment of reason, which Hickok calls a dignity, is also a means; it gives satisfaction, which is the end.

Of rational good, Hickok considers the gratification of the taste for the beautiful, the satisfaction from the cultivation of science, the imperatives of the spirit's own excellence, and concludes that "the highest good—the *summum bonum*—is worthiness of spiritual approbation." This is the proximate form of the highest good, and is that which should be sought after, the ultimate form is the self-satisfaction from a consciousness of personal worthiness. If personal worthiness did not involve satisfaction, it would not be an object of desire.

Hickok maintains that the essential attributes of the ultimate right are simple, immutable, universal; that rights never conflict; that only a person can have rights; that right in mathematics and right in morals are not identical, but analagous; that the will is free when it keeps in subjection every colliding appetite; that the

will is enslaved when it makes the gratification of the appetite the ultimate end; that the moral disposition is indicated by the choice, according as it decides for animal gratification or for spiritual worthiness.

Hickok shows that pure morality involves pure mindedness, decision, and independence; that duties are personal when relating to self-control and self-culture, or relative when including kindness and respect for others, and that we owe duties to nature and to God. Hickok's ethics revised by President Seelye is an excellent book.

5. *Mark Hopkins* (1802-1887).—Hopkins makes *Love, or Benevolence*, the fundamental principle of ethics, as the title of his book, "The Law of Love and Love as Law," definitely signifies.

He thus accounts for the different systems of ethics: "A striking fact, as association, or a powerful principle, as self-love, is seized upon and made to account for everything." Again: "The moral problem is made by some an inquiry concerning the moral nature; by some, concerning the nature of virtue; by some, concerning the source and nature of right; by some, after an ultimate rule; and by some, the nature and foundation or ground of obligation. This last I think preferable."

Hopkins contends that it is impossible to construct a complete ethical system "that is wholly intuitional or wholly teleological. Intuitional systems have their basis in the moral reason; teleological systems have their basis in the sensibility; it is clear that the ideas from each must be inseparably intertwined in every system."

Again, Hopkins holds that we find the good in the

sensibility, and goodness in the will. "Nothing that proceeds from the sensibility can be goodness; nothing that proceeds from the will can be a good." It requires both to form a moral system; neither alone is sufficient. "It has been supposed that either goodness or a good—holiness or happiness—must be ultimate in a moral system. The truth is, each is ultimate. Goodness is wholly from the will, and is ultimate for that. A good is wholly from the sensibility, and is ultimate for that." But goodness consists in willing to do right, which issues in the good—the satisfaction in the consciousness of rectitude. Without the good there can be no goodness, and without an act of goodness the highest good can never be realized. Virtue is found in the goodness, not in the good; and it is with virtue that ethics is chiefly concerned. The ultimate for ethics is goodness; the end of goodness is the good.

The controversy between Hopkins and McCosh on the ground of obligation, as printed in the Appendix of the "Law of Love," is a matter of no small interest. Its reading is to be recommended.

6. *James H. Fairchild* (1817- —).—Fairchild defines moral philosophy as the science of obligation. The meaning of the term *obligation* is illustrated by the synonyms, ought, duty, right. "A moral being is a being to whom obligation pertains." The attributes of moral agency are intellect, sensibility, and free-will.

Fairchild distinguishes good as absolute and relative. Relative good is, however, better termed *utility*. "Well-being, satisfaction, happiness, then, is the true good—the *summum bonum*."

Fairchild makes benevolence the cardinal virtue, or

rather all the virtues to be only special modification of the one virtue—benevolence. In this respect he is in accord with Hopkins.

He insists on the simplicity of moral action, by which is meant that virtue and sin can not coexist in the same heart; but where, as in many instances, good and bad conduct follow in quick succession, does not this doctrine involve an incredibly rapid change, back and forth, of the moral character?

The practical duties are well treated. It is indeed true, that whatever theory of morals is adopted, ethical writers are one in regard to the duty of practical morality.

7. *D. S. Gregory* (1832-——).—Gregory defines ethics as the science of man's life of duty. In his work entitled "Christian Ethics," he takes the position that "the will of God, as the expression of his perfect character, is the ultimate ground or reason why the requirements of the supreme rule are right and binding."

Gregory's system is therefore *heteronomous* or *authoritative*, as the ultimate is not human reason, but the will of God; but as Gregory holds, the will of God may be inferred, not only from the Sacred Scriptures, but also from the constitution of nature and of man, as seen by the light of reason.

Gregory divides ethics into theoretical and practical, and has made a minute classification of his work. In fact, he has carried out his divisions and subdivisions to such an extent that the reader becomes bewildered. His book, however, is both able and wholesome, and will well reward the perusal.

8. *John Bascom* (1827-——).—Bascom defines ethics

as the science of duty; duty the law of conduct; and conduct the action of a rational being, springing from character on which it reacts, and which it thus modifies, develops, and establishes.

Bascom discusses the relative merits of utilitarianism and intuitionism, and decides in favor of the latter. He maintains the superiority of intuitionism for these reasons: That it gives clearness and distinctness to the sense of obligation; that it solves the riddles which beset utilitarianism; that it furnishes an earlier and more authoritative law; that it affords more favorable conditions for growth; that it better combines theory and practice; that it adopts, for practical guidance, the verified principles of utility, uniting them in a coherent theory under the guidance of reason; that it assigns a higher principle of integrity to the individual; that it makes the sense of obligation inherent in human nature; that it raises the meaning of the expressions, right, duty, obligation, righteousness, holiness, from the plane of prudential calculation to that of rational intuition, where the voice of reason is in harmony with the voice of God. These are extensive claims for intuitionism. But all these things are for the sake of the individual, that he may enjoy the satisfaction that comes as the reward of a righteous life.

Bascom's treatment of ethics can not be regarded as complete, since he considers only the two systems—utilitarianism and intuitionism, ignoring theistic, evolutionary, and eclectic ethics.

9. *Archibald Alexander* (1772-1851). — Alexander holds that conscience intuitively perceives that some actions are right and others wrong; that the moral fac-

ulty is original and universal; and that moral ideas can be derived from no other source.

He thus objects to utilitarianism: "Virtuous conduct leads to happiness, and is always beneficial, yet our idea of its moral character is not derived from this consideration, but from the nature of the action itself."

The objection to intuitionism, that there is no agreement between different nations as to what is moral or immoral, he answers by saying: "Moral differences are perceived by all, and total disagreement is not found. All think the will of God ought to be done, but some, in killing children or in burning widows, are mistaken as to his will."

Chapter XV

MODERN ETHICS—OTHER MORALISTS— CONTINUED

HENRY CALDERWOOD.—In his "Moral Philosophy," Calderwood "offers an exposition and defense of the intuitional theory of morals, with a criticism of utilitarianism."

He discusses the intuitional and development theories of knowledge; the impulses and restraints belonging to the nature of man; the nature of the will; the moral sentiments; the disorders of man's moral nature; the metaphysics of ethics; and the application of ethics to the practical problems of society. Calderwood's work is able and worthy of study.

2. *John Stuart Blackie* (1809-1895).—In his book, entitled "Four Phases of Morals," Blackie discusses the ethics of Socrates, Aristotle, Christianity, and utilitarianism.

(1) *Socrates* is considered, next to the Founder of Christianity, as the preacher of righteousness. The main difference between Socrates and the sophists was that he was positive and constructive, and they negative and destructive. The aim of Socrates, says Blackie, "was nothing less than the establishment of a firm philosophy of human life, a sure guide for human conduct, and a strong regulator of society."

Blackie shows that Socrates laid the foundation of philosophy in definition and induction; that he taught that man is a sympathetic being, and though his selfish instincts would lead him to isolation, hostility, and extermination, yet sympathy, love, and fellowship would finally gain the ascendancy; that man is a reasoning being, a discoverer of truth, a seeker of happiness; and that as wickedness unavoidably leads to misery and virtue to happiness, men would do right if they knew what right is, and therefore wickedness is to be identified with ignorance, and virtue with knowledge. Socrates did not consider that men often choose the present intense pleasure of vice, rather than the remote and milder reward of virtue.

(2) *Aristotle* is commended for his good sense in recommending men to seek their highest good, not in what is common to them and brutes, but in what is peculiarly human, that is, in reason and the moral nature; he is also commended for his doctrine that virtue is a mean between the two extremes—excess and deficiency. Generosity is neither prodigal nor miserly.

(3) *Christianity* is discussed from two points of view: “The strong conviction, the fervid passions by which the moral machinery is set in motion, and the particular virtues which its method of operation brings on the stage.”

The Christian moral system is the practical part of a religion. The Church is the kingdom of heaven on earth; it does not reason, it commands in the name of God: “Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” God is the center of the system; immorality is a departure from God; morality is a return. By the preaching of repentance men are pricked in their hearts, turn to God,

and are saved from their sins. The power which regenerates the moral nature is not reason, but the Divine Spirit sent down from heaven. Morality is re-enforced by motives drawn from the doctrine of a future life.

The aggressiveness of Christianity, in its attempt to convert the world, keeps the fire burning on its altars, and is thus essential to its very life.

The struggle between the flesh and the spirit, the higher and the lower natures, has with fidelity promise of victory for the spirit, and the truth of the promise is verified by facts such as no other system of morality can show. It has delivered thousands from the thralldom of sin.

The virtues inculcated are not merely external, ritualistic, ceremonial, but the inner virtues of the heart—humility, self-denial, self-control, purity, love. There is, however, danger of carrying certain virtues to extremes, as when self-denial runs into asceticism or monasticism; but in becoming Christians we need not cease to be men.

(4) *Utilitarianism* is taken to task for two faults—ignoring the past, and exaggerating its own importance.

The maxim of utilitarianism, *the greatest good to the greatest number*, is a taking rallying cry. Blackie asks, "Who ever doubts it?" He regards it as an "appropriate war-cry for an oppressed democracy fighting against an insolent oligarchy; to this praise it is justly entitled, and in this sphere it has, no doubt, been extensively useful; but as a maxim pretending to enunciate a fundamental principle of ethical philosophy, it has neither novelty nor pertinence." An assertion is not proof.

"To say that morality consists in happiness" meets Blackie's decided objection; but no utilitarian ever as-

serted that morality is identical with happiness, only that morality consists in an endeavor to promote happiness.

What is the distinctive feature of utilitarianism? Blackie replies, *externalism*. He quotes Bentham: "What one expects to find in an ethical principle is something that points to some *external* consideration." He quotes Bain: "Conscience is molded on *external authority* as its type;" and again: "Utility sets up an *outward standard* in the room of an inward, being the substitution of a regard for *consequences* for a mere *unreasoning sentiment or feeling*." He quotes Mill: "The contest between the morality which appeals to an *external* standard, and that which grounds itself in an *internal* conviction, is the contest of progressive morality against stationary; of reason and argument against the deification of mere opinion and habit."

To the above Blackie replies: "Utilitarians assume that the advocates of innate morality hold it to be a thing that acts apart from or contrary to reason; that moral progress is possible only under the action of an ethical system founded on the doctrine of consequences, whereas experience has proved that a morality of motives such as Christianity contains, is as much capable of expansion and of new application as any other morality; that all our sentiments and feelings, that is, the whole emotional part of our nature, is to be supposed false till its right to exist and energize shall have been approved by reason." The truth seems to be that each side in this controversy sees no good in the other. Formal rightness is the will to do right; material rightness is determined by the consequences, which when known determine formal rightness.

3. *Paul Janet* (1823- —).—Janet's fundamental principle is that moral good presupposes natural good, which serves as its foundation.

He finds, with Schleiermacher, three fundamental moral facts—the good to be pursued, the pursuit, and virtue acquired by the pursuit. Contrary to these are the three opposites—evil, interdiction, vice. Virtue presupposes duty, and duty presupposes the good. Hence the three problems: What is good? What is duty? What is virtue?

(1) *What is good?*—Janet admits that pleasure is a good, but denies that, as sensation, it is the sole good; yet he distinguishes pleasure by quality as well as by quantity, as John Stuart Mill has done. In this sense, pleasure includes not only agreeable sensations, but happiness, the satisfaction that comes from intellectual activity, the pursuit of virtue, and the consciousness of rectitude.

Janet would accept Kant's assertion, "There is but one thing which is absolutely and unequivocally good, and that is a *good will*," if by good Kant means *morally* good, which no doubt he does; but he holds that other things may be naturally good, as intelligence, resolution, self-control, moderation, which are good things in themselves, though a bad use may be made of them, in which case it is the *use* that is bad, not the things.

(2) *What is duty?*—Janet objects to the utilitarian theory of duty, because it gives no rule, save the general one, *Be guided by the consequences*; but as the consequences can not always be foreseen, this rule is often vague and uncertain. There are, however, certain cases,

as in making laws, or in practical affairs, where the consequences are the only guide. In case of the ordinary virtues or vices follow the rules of accepted morality. In all cases the good is the foundation of the right.

Janet approves Kant's principle of duty—that "the sole legitimate root of morality springs from the idea of law," yet he complains that Kant gives neither motive nor reason for his categorical imperative, "Act in the manner, that in like circumstances you would be willing others should act." The truth is, when Kant applies his imperative he falls back on utilitarian principles. Thou shalt not lie; for if lying should become universal, the result would be disastrous; hence the virtue of veracity. The categorical imperative is made imperative because of the consequences in avoiding evil and securing good.

(3) *What is virtue?*—Janet's theory may be condensed thus: Virtue is the fixed purpose to will and to do according to the dictates of wisdom. It chooses good; it avoids evil; it seeks the guidance of reason.

Janet, however, is not responsible for the following: Motives solicit a choice of ends; the choice is the selection of the end in view of motives; the intention is the decision to realize the choice; the execution of the intention is the overt act or external conduct. A motive is good or bad according to the end; a choice is right or wrong, according as the motive is good or bad; the intention and the conduct are right or wrong in agreement with the choice. In judging conduct, we go back to the intention as directed by the choice as characterized by motive as distinguished by the end. Responsibility attaches to the person for his conduct, since he

is free in making his choice of motive. The whole process needs the guidance of wisdom—a compound of knowledge, skill, and rectitude.

4. *W. L. Courtney.*—In the Preface to his “Constructive Ethics,” Courtney says that his object is twofold: “To exhibit, in a fairly popular form, the chief characteristics of the different stages through which modern moral philosophy has passed, . . .” and “to suggest the proper basis on which alone a satisfactory ethical system can be reared.” He holds that ethics must be rationalistic with a metaphysical basis, involving the absolute, which he calls God.

He declares that the quarrels of thought, in its progressive march, can be resolved into three invariable elements — interpretation, criticism, reconstruction. Thus the systems of Thales, Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, and the atomists were interpretations, that of the sophists was criticism, those of Plato and Aristotle were reconstructions. From Bacon and Descartes, through Locke to Leibnitz, we have interpretation; Kant is critical, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are reconstructive. The order of history is also the order of an individual mind.

Courtney combats subjective idealism: The sensations have an alien source; for they are thrust upon us; we can recall their ideas, but not the sensations themselves. If the ego creates its own objects, it creates other egos; if it does not, if there are other independent egos, there may be other things, at least idealism has not proved that there are not, and upon it the burden of proof lies. Again, why should several egos create

the same object, or why should an object of sight be also an object of touch?

Courtney says: "We must assume some *universal consciousness*, or absolute Spirit, or God, which can account for the fact that my world is essentially identical with yours, and mine and yours share with all other intelligences. . . . The absolute principles which ethics presuppose, and on which they rest, can not be the conscious personal ego." Here Courtney passes beyond the obvious necessity of an external universe, apprehended by rational intuition, as the condition of the phenomenal, to the hypothesis of a universal consciousness or absolute Spirit, and thus enters the region of absolute idealism, which is the metaphysical basis of his system of constructive ethics. Do we need a transcendental system of ethics? Is not the ultimate basis of morals the obligation to secure the highest possible good for ourselves and for those within our influence?

Courtney criticises hedonic egoism: "To do an action because of the pleasure it brings is precisely the way to lose the pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, which is that we are told to aim at, is exactly that we must not aim at if we desire to secure it—a paradox indeed." This is not the only paradox which expresses a truth. It is a question of method, not of end. Pleasure comes as a consequence of right conduct; it is the conduct which requires attention; the pleasure will follow.

Courtney criticises the higher form of utilitarianism: "If virtue be in reality only the means to happiness, and men are wrong-headed enough to invert this relation, then the increase of intelligence should enable us to

clear ourselves from this logical error. As knowledge widens we ought to be able to estimate virtue at its proper worth, and subordinate it to that happiness which is the only rational end of human activity. The course of human history and the development of the civilization of a people prove an opposite conclusion. Growth, progress, improvement of all kinds increase in a nation in proportion as men learn to estimate virtue above happiness, and find in self-sacrificing industry the only secret of a nation's welfare." This is forcibly put. But do men engage in self-sacrificing industry for the sake of the self-sacrificing industry? They engage in it for the welfare that follows. Suppose men did not appreciate virtue as beautiful and right, and did not find satisfaction in it, would they make it an object of pursuit? They find satisfaction in the pursuit and attainment of virtue and in other consequences which follow, and were it not for the satisfaction, it is needless to say virtue would never be an object of pursuit. It may be asked, then, why not pursue satisfaction directly, and by itself? It does n't exist by itself; it is a consequence of virtue, and can be secured only by the virtuous.

Courtney makes a great concession to utilitarianism in saying: "When we approach the considerations of human action from the political and social side, the utilitarian view is, perhaps, the only practical one." As ethics is pre-eminently a social science, is not utility, therefore, the truly practical test? Again, he says: "We may further grant that questions of casuistry, questions of conflict of duties, are best settled by an appeal to utility. There is no better test than experi-

ence of the consequences of actions to decide the issue when duties collide."

In closing his remarks on Kant's system, Courtney says: "I do not care to do injustice to a noble and symmetrical work of art by insisting on the commonplace criticisms which any facile historian of philosophy would be eager to urge. There are systems of philosophy, just as there are human characters, which ought to be judged by their strongest, and not by their weakest, features."

Courtney notices the works of Jacobi, Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, the scientific systems of Spencer, Stephen, Sidgwick, Clifford, and others, and the pessimistic theories of Schopenhaur and Hartmann.

Courtney closes by saying: "Morality requires the supposition, not only of an absolute, but of an absolute and self-conscious spirit. . . . The ethics which are based on God are safe against the pessimistic suggestion that life is naught and moral action absurd."

Courtney might have added, with great force, that the ultimate end—the highest good—is neither self-realization nor self-satisfaction, but the satisfaction that comes from fellowship with God.

Chapter XVI

MODERN ETHICS—OTHER MORALISTS— CONTINUED

LOTZE (1817-1881).—Lotze's views on ethics are found in a small volume entitled "Practical Philosophy," translated and edited by Professor George T. Ladd. The Practical Philosophy includes not only "those general propositions according to which the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the disposition is estimated," but "the rules of that prudence of life which secures the acquisition of different forms of outward good."

By an analysis of human nature we find the "supreme laws of moral conduct, which are obligatory on every person in relation to every other. . . . Fundamental ethical laws, if they are to have any value, must be immediately obvious and certain to the individual man. . . . Benevolence is the supreme principle of moral conduct."

Certain maxims, accepted by the wise and good of all ages, may now, as their soundness is unquestioned, be acted upon by the individual independently of all consequences; yet these very maxims have their final justification in their consequences—that is, in the very fact that their observance is essential to the good of the moral universe.

With regard to pleasure as an end, Lotze says: "Important as the connection of pleasure with the principles of ethics undoubtedly is, it is hardly sufficiently so to put in its appearance, without further ceremony, as the *chief* principle;" and yet he says: "Whatever may be the more intimate mode of the still obscure connection between the ethical laws and pleasure and pain, this much is, at this stage of discussion, already made certain, that an indissoluble connection exists, and that all talk of absolutely obligatory form of conduct, which should have no reference at all to resulting consequences, is perhaps very nobly meant, but is a formal service that arises from a complete misunderstanding." Again: "There is nothing at all in all the world which would have any value until it has produced some pleasure in some being or other capable of enjoyment. Everything antecedent to this is naught but an indifferent kind of factor to which a value of its own can be ascribed only in an anticipatory way, and with reference to some pleasure that is to originate from it."

It is not absolute pleasure, or pleasure in the abstract, that is enjoyed, but this or that pleasure. "Just as we do not see color in general, but only red or green, or some other, so there is never any pleasure absolutely which is merely greater or less; but every actual pleasure is besides distinguished *qualitatively* from every other, just as green is from red." Pleasures are *concrete*, and differ in *quality* as well as in quantity. The satisfaction from doing a kind deed is higher than that from the gratification of appetite.

The fleeting character of pleasure is no disparagement, but rather an advantage, since, like kaleidoscopic

views, it avoids monotony, and gives richness and variety to life.

The criticism is sometimes made that personal worthiness is not a fact, but rather personal unworthiness, and that the supposed consciousness of worthiness is the self-deception springing from pride. Is it not possible to strive to do right and to avoid wrong, and with rectitude of aim to endeavor to live a righteous life? Genuine rectitude of character is possible, and may be actual, and its realization is the highest good.

Lotze takes up the question of the freedom of the will, and says: "We have an idea of different modes of conduct, and, further, an idea of their different values, and finally have made a decision between them, the last of which we attribute—no matter now, whether rightly or wrongly—to the free determination of our will;" that is, to the ordinary view the will and the consequent conduct are free.

Again: "Moral judgment imputes our conduct to us, not merely as having *perfectness* and *deficiency*, but *merit* and *guilt*; and that, therefore, it is not the necessary consequence of our spiritual states, but has originated through a free act of the will."

"That quite decided form of determinism, which makes all the actions of animate beings, proceed, according to general laws, from their inner spiritual states, with the same necessity as physical effects do from their blind causes," is inconsistent with the feeling of penitence and self-condemnation, unless these feelings can be resolved into that of discomfort; but *remorse* is more than discomfort—it is a *sense of guilt*. A man injured by the fall of a limb has discomfort, but no remorse. By

a selfish act he brings a calamity upon his neighbor, and his conscience upbraids him. If determinism is true, conscience is an anomaly in human nature, and the words *ought* and *ought not*, which, to an unsophisticated mind, have the most indubitable and incontrovertible significance, lose their distinctive meaning.

The fact that an act is *willed* does not give it moral quality, unless the person is free in willing the act. "It is erroneous to say that true freedom is identical with necessity," because there is no external compulsion when the person acts of necessity according to his own nature. This is not moral freedom, which implies that the agent "must, at every moment, be able to turn about, step out of this path, break off the consecutiveness of its development with an entirely new beginning."

It is not consistent with freedom "to condition all subsequent acts upon an earlier one," nor "to ascribe to the spirit itself a *quondam* freedom of self-determination, by which it fixed for itself that character which now discharges itself forth unalterably into its consequences." The loss of freedom in the present state is not compensated for by an unknown *quondam* free act. Conscience upbraids us for a wrong act in the present state, which we are conscious of performing, and not for a previous hypothetical act in a former state of which we know nothing.

Is not freedom forestalled by the reign of law, by the antecedent certainty of the law of causation that every event must have a cause? Lotze replies, "It can not be asserted that experience alone teaches the validity of the law of causation for all parts of the course of nature; for many regions are unknown."

Again: "If two motives, *a* and *b*, have been weighed in mind, and thereupon an action, β , is executed, which corresponds to *b*, then, of course, afterwards the appearance always originates, for our point of view, as though β were naturally brought about by *b*, and its ascendancy over *a* with a strict necessity. But for the intensities of the motives, *a* and *b*, we possess no measure at all by which we might be able to measure them off previous to the occurrence of the action. That *b* has been the stronger of the two is one hypothesis which we make *ex post*. . . . If there has been an act of free will which decided for β , then everything will appear exactly the same in the procedure."

"The causal connection, such as makes any freedom impossible, gives the *infinite regress*, and that makes us suspect the absolute validity of the law of causation. . . . We are compelled to admit that motion does not attain to actuality as the result of any cause whatever, but it is motion, without cause and from the beginning. . . . Then there is no reason why perfectly new beginnings of a subsequent origin, that have no foundation in what is prior, should not also show themselves within the course of things." It is certainly not good metaphysics to say a new beginning—that is, an event that has no foundation in what is prior, can show itself in the course of things; for that would mean that *nothing* can spring into existence, but the event may be caused, not by a preceding event, but by a being.

Again: "Another question is whether a will thus free answers our ethical demands. . . . As soon as the knowledge of the value of different forms of con-

duct exists, it is precisely by this means that the will of the spirit who decides for the one form or the other becomes responsible."

For the following discussion of the bearing of the law of causation on the freedom of the will, Lotze is not responsible. The law of causation is certainly true, otherwise nonentity can jump into being; but nonentity, being nothing, can not jump. Now, a volition is an event, and is, therefore, caused, but caused by the person, not by the motive. It, however, does not follow that, because a person caused the volition, he was caused to cause it. The cause of the volition being a person, not an event, requires no further application of the law of causation.

The writer who has exerted a greater influence than perhaps any other in regard to the question of necessity and free will is Jonathan Edwards. Three objections, at least, bear against Edwards's views: He confounds desire, a state of the sensibility, with volition, an act of the will; he makes motives causes of volition, instead of reasons in view of which the person causes the volitions; he confounds liberty of execution, or the conduct which is consequent upon the volition, with the freedom of the person in causing the volition. A person may desire an object very greatly, yet because it belongs to another, he may not will to take it; therefore desire is not volition.

To the question, What causes the volition? the answer is, *The person*. To this answer Edwards objects that, if the person causes his volition, he must act in order to cause it; that is, he must act in order to act, and act in order to cause that previous act, and so on,

which involves an infinite number of acts, an impossibility in finite time, and, therefore, a person does not cause his volitions. But the above reasoning applies to any other act, as well as to a volition; and therefore a person does not act at all! Edwards's argument, in proving too much, proves nothing. The fact is, a person does not have to act in order to act; he simply *acts*. Of course, he has to *be* in order to act.

Edwards knows no other freedom than for a man to do as he pleases; but the freedom to do is external liberty to act in order to carry out his will. It is not the freedom of the will.

It is, however, legitimate to inquire *why* the person wills as he does, but not *what causes* him thus to will. To answer this we go to the motive, which is the *reason* why the person wills in that way, but not the cause compelling him to will. The person wills. The energy which makes the choice, directs the aim, forms the intention, performs the act, proceeds from the person himself. The choice, the aim, the intention, the act, are all right or wrong according as the motive is good or bad. The conscience of the person acquits or condemns him, since he is assured that he freely made his choice of end, though not without the motive, as a reason, yet without compelling cause. The law of causation, though affirming that every event has a cause, does not affirm that every actor is caused to act. No amount of sophistry can make a person believe that, when his conscience smites him for making a certain choice he was compelled to make it, and is, therefore innocent. As an actor, he begins a series of causes and events which may run on indefinitely.

Statistics showing the number of crimes of various kinds committed in a year in a population, say of one hundred thousand, reveal the state of society, and show what may be expected the next year; and the expectation would be met, whether the crimes were necessitated or freely committed. They reveal the fact, not the cause.

2. *Borden P. Bowne* gives several reasons for the confusion of tongues which the history of moral science presents. First, irrelevant psychological questions; secondly, a very general desire to deduce moral life from a theory, instead of deducing a theory from moral life. . . . The chief source of the confusion is the failure to bring our abstractions to the test of concrete applications.

The practical part of Bowne's work has two leading thoughts: One is the necessity of uniting the intuitive and the experience schools of ethics, in order to reach any working system. The other is that the aim of conduct is not abstract virtue, but fullness and richness of life. With good will alone "the moral life is carried on in a vacuum, and loses all real substance and value. And when we abstract conduct from the personality in which it originates, and which it expresses, we have a base, sordid externalism." A true union of good will and right conduct "will stand fast and bear fruit in the earth."

Bowne adopts the fruitful view of Schleiermacher, that there are three leading moral ideas: The good, duty, and virtue. "Where there is no good to be realized by action, there can be no rational duty; and with the notion of duty vanishes also that of virtue. Again,

where there is no sense of duty, but only a calculation of consequences, we have merely a system of prudence. This may be well enough in its way, but it lacks moral quality." Nevertheless, to gain power for the accomplishment of good, no wrong being allowed, it is right to be prudent, it is ethical to regard the expedient.

"The three leading ideas are alike necessary; but historically there has been a tendency to recognize some one of these ideas and to ignore the others."

"In much ancient ethics the idea of the good was fundamental." Hence the rules: Live according to nature. Follow the golden mean. "In modern times this view generally appears as utilitarianism. Not infrequently, through failure to emphasize the notion of duty, this view becomes a system of calculating prudence and practical shrewdness, and falls below the moral plane altogether."

"The vagueness and one-sidedness of this view led to a very general desire to make the notion of duty or obligation the basal." Justice, good will, truthfulness, and the like, ought to rule. This is the doctrine of intuitionists. But duty does not stand alone. Its business is to realize the good. Were it not for the good, there could be no duty.

"The third idea, that of virtue, has been less prominent as the basis of a system." Virtue is not self-subsisting; it is the steadfast performance of duty in the pursuit of the good. Perfection is the ideal towards which indefinite approximations can be made. Satisfaction arises from a consciousness of progress towards the ideal.

Bowne distinguishes two standpoints: The inductive

and the theoretical. The first describes moral experience; the second forms a rational system. "One seeks to find the notion of duty in the good to be reached; the other seeks to make duty an absolute self-sufficing imperative."

Action may be considered in its consequences as wise or unwise, or in its motive as moral or immoral. An act may be objectively sagacious, yet subjectively it may lack moral quality. "Right action may or may not have external success, but it must have a right internal spring. . . . The morality of a person depends upon his motives; but the morality of a code depends on its consequences."

The external act is right or wrong, according to the motive; but a good will can not be abstracted from the end. "Abstract good will is an empty figment. Without doubt, the good will is the center of moral life; but the good will must will something." We are to regard both the form and the outcome of conduct. "If there should be irreconcilable opposition, the law of well-being has precedence of the law of form. . . . The two must be combined before we reach any complete moral system. . . . The good will must aim at well-being, and well-being is realized in and through good will."

One consequence of moral action should not be overlooked—its reaction and effect upon the actor. The aim at a good end and the effort to realize it, from the prompting of a good motive, invariably contribute to the progress of the actor towards perfection.

If one does the best he knows how, he is formally right, but he may be materially wrong. "Formal right-

ness, of course, is ethically the more important, as it involves good will; but material rightness is only less important, as without it our action is out of harmony with the universe. . . . Our leading moral judgments are of the will. . . . We demand not only that the will be right, but that the affections and emotions be harmonious therewith."

What is the good? Is it the desirable? Is it pleasure? Is it happiness? Is it virtue? We may say the good is the desirable, if by desirable we mean the truly desirable, or what ought to be desired. "Some have found the good in pleasure (hedonism); others have found it in happiness (eudemonism); still others have found it in superiority to both pleasure and happiness (cynicism and, to some extent, Stoicism); and others again in personal dignity and excellence of virtue (current intuitive systems)."

Pleasure, as a passive sensation, has its value. "With the child, as with the cattle, simple passive gratifications are the leading form of experience."

It is rational and right to seek happiness, whether in external success or in the reaction of the personality upon itself.

Virtue is central, and never to be left out. The will to do right, which is the best thing, is within the reach of all. But virtue in the abstract is barren. "For man, as a dependent being, the attainment of his highest good will always depend on something besides virtue, on something beyond himself." Virtue requires a field of operation. We are to do right in relation to others. Special aims are to be realized. Individual development, public improvement, the restraint of evil, the elevation

of the moral standard, afford ample scope for effort; and in successful effort we find our reward. "Nothing can outrank a morality whose aim is the attainment of the largest and the fullest life."

Bowne proceeds to the discussion of the need of a subjective standard. The individual calculating ethics make every one a law unto himself; it is the ethics of the Greek sophists. Who is to judge another? Taking in conscience, we improve the situation. Still we have a calculating prudence. We are still after the loaves and the fishes. Sin is imprudence. "In such a scheme we miss one essential element of moral character—the love of goodness for itself, and not for its extrinsic or adventitious character." We love goodness because to do so harmonizes with our own higher nature, and attunes us in harmony with the universal law which works for righteousness. Pleasure may be innocently enjoyed, and happiness the more. We are not to indulge in degrading pleasures, nor to seek enjoyment at the expense of our neighbor. We may innocently plan for pleasure, as in a picnic or an excursion party.

The utilitarian school has its place. "The most important work of this school has been done in the field of legislation and political reform."

"The true ethical aim is to realize the common good; but the contents of this good have to be determined in accordance with an inborn ideal of human worth and dignity. . . . Every ethical system has to fall back upon some form of moral insight to interpret its principles."

Bowne takes up subjective ethics, and shows that conscience is not an oracle, ready always "infallibly to

discriminate between right and wrong, and to issue infallible commands. . . . Few atrocities are so great and few absurdities are so grotesque as not to have the sanction of conscience at one time or another."

Whence, then, is the idea of obligation? "The best derivative account of the idea of obligation is that which regards it as the expression of a hypothetical necessity. . . . If I wish to teach, I must pass an examination. . . . I may escape the obligation by declining the end."

"If there be an end we are not at liberty to forego some good we are obliged to seek, a law we may never transgress, then we have no longer a hypothetical necessity, but a categorical and absolute one." Whence does this obligation arise? "The idea of moral obligation arises within the mind itself. . . . The right to which obligation refers is simply a perceived good. . . . The free spirit thus imposing duty upon itself gives us the only meaning and experience of moral obligation. Instead of being an opaque mystery, it lies in the full light of self-consciousness. . . . The idea may be attached to unwise or mistaken conceptions of duty, but its presence is just that which lifts the instinctive life of impulse to the moral plane."

But what is the guide to objective right action? Bowne answers: "Benevolence, or good will, and requital, or the good desert of good will and the ill desert of the evil will;" that is, benevolence and justice. Of these the duty of benevolence is clear and fundamental. Justice is for the general welfare, and is, therefore, applied benevolence.

Having taken so much space with the foundation

principles, we can now only say that Bowne discusses the development of morals, moral responsibility, merit and demerit, ethics and religion, ethics of the individual, ethics of the family, ethics of society, and closes by saying: "The abstract ethics of the closet must be replaced by the ethics of life, if we would not see ethics lose itself in barren contentions and tedious verbal disputes."

Bowne's system is one of the very best of all those we have reviewed.

Chapter XVII

MODERN ETHICS—OTHER MORALISTS

FRIEDRICH PAULSEN, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Berlin, divides his treatise into four books. The first traces the history of Ethics from the times of the Greek philosophers to the present; the second discusses fundamental principles; the third applies these principles to the virtues and duties of life; the fourth treats of social and political questions. The work, except the fourth book, has been translated into English by Professor Thilly, of the University of Missouri; and this translation is taken as the text for this review.

Paulsen considers that the conception towards which the thought of the age is tending is teleological, and says: "It is limited and defined by a double antithesis—on the one side, by *hedonistic utilitarianism*, which teaches that pleasure is the thing of absolute worth, to which virtue and morality are related as means. In opposition to this, *teleological ethics* contends that not the feeling of pleasure, but the objective content of life itself, which is experienced with pleasure, is the thing of worth. Pleasure is the form in which the subject becomes immediately aware of the object and its value.

"*Intuitionistic formalism* is the other antithesis. This regards the observance of a system of *a priori* rules, of

the moral laws, as the thing of absolute worth. In opposition to this, teleological ethics contends that the thing of absolute worth is not the observance of moral laws, but the substance which is embraced in these formulæ—the human historical life, which fills the outline with an infinite wealth of manifold concrete forms.”

Ethics is a practical science. “Its function is to show how human life must be fashioned to realize its purpose, what forms of social life and what modes of individual conduct are favorable or unfavorable to the perfection of human nature, to determine the end of life, or the highest good, and to point out the ways or means of reaching it. . . . The highest good is a perfect life. . . . The way to reach the highest good is by the cultivation of the virtues and the performance of the duties of life. . . . The nature of the highest good is in reality not determined by the intellect, but by the will.”

As to method, Paulsen says: “Ethics does not deduce and demonstrate propositions from concepts, but discovers the relations which exist between facts and which may be established by experience;” that is, ethics employs the method of the natural sciences.

Is reason or feeling the source of moral life? Paulsen answers, “Both are involved;” yet he says: “What is a good life will, in the last analysis, be decided by immediate incontrovertible feeling, in which the innermost essence of the being manifests itself. . . . It will not, therefore, be possible to give a scientific definition of the highest good which shall be valid for all.”

Ethics is a normative science. “Its propositions become primary principles of judgment and rules of con-

duct in so far as they represent the conditions of human experience." It does not aim to reduce all men to one uniform pattern. Allowance must be made for individual idiosyncrasies. "Nature and inclination will take care that the individual receives his rights; but whatever be the peculiarities of the individual, "anger, envy, falsehood, inconsiderateness, produce certain disturbances in life, while prudence, politeness, modesty, uprightness, amiability, tend to produce good effects on the life of the individual and that of his surroundings."

Paulsen gives a historical sketch of ancient, Christian, and modern ethics, which we pass over as not material to a knowledge of his system.

Paulsen introduces Part II by laying down certain psychological and metaphysical principles, which we pass, and proceeds to discuss the good and the bad; but for the sake of brevity we shall aim to do justice to his system in more condensed language. He asks, What is the ultimate ground of moral distinctions? What is the ultimate end of will and action? The first question has received two answers—the *teleological* and the *formalistic*. The teleological answer explains the difference between good and bad by the effects which modes of conduct produce upon the agent and upon others. Acts are good or bad as they tend to promote or destroy human welfare. The formalistic answer is that the terms good and bad, in their moral sense, designate an absolute quality of the will, as it respects or does not respect the law of duty, without regard to consequences.

Paulsen accepts the teleological view, but discards the name *utilitarianism*, which he had used in former

editions of his book, as inseparably connected with *hedonism*, and employs, instead, *teleologic energism*, which suggests the *Platonic-Aristotelian* theory of the universe, from which this form of ethics takes its rise. Every man has his purpose in life; and in finding this purpose ethics will afford him aid by unfolding the powers and possible attainments of human beings.

Paulsen affirms that the end of the will is not feeling, but action. But is action ultimate? Action is for the good it will bring, and that good is human welfare. No one acts merely for the sake of acting. Formalistic ethics holds that action is good or bad in itself, irrespective of consequences. It is true that action is not to be judged by its immediate consequences, but by its natural tendency. Rest evidently is not the end. The function of rest is to recruit our energies, and to prepare them for renewed action.

A man is not to be judged solely by what he does, but by what he would do if he were well informed and had the opportunity of doing; but he is under obligation to inform himself. An act is objectively right or wrong as it tends to good or evil; it is subjectively right or wrong as it is believed to tend to good or evil, the agent having taken due care to inform himself. In the first case, we inquire into the effects; in the second, into the motive.

It is said that St. Crispin stole leather of a rich merchant to make shoes for poor children. What of his moral conduct? What would be its effect on public welfare? The objective value of conduct is determined by its relation to the highest good. But does not this mean that the end justifies the means? Yes, if rightly

understood. It is not any supposed good end you please, but *the end*, the highest good, the welfare of the human race. It does not mean that we are to violate an established principle for a supposed good that would be realized. The evil resulting from the violation, in bewildering the common mind in regard to moral distinctions, and the habit it would engender, of seeking for sophistic reasons for immoral conduct, would more than overbalance any supposed good consequence. But when any new measure is proposed, not in violation of any moral principle, the consequences, so far as they can be determined, are the only guide to action. As no one can estimate all the consequences, good and bad, near and remote, subjective and objective, we ought to beware of doing evil that good may come. The temptation to do this is strong when partisan feeling is in the ascendant.

A boy stole potatoes from a rich neighbor, and, roasting them, shared with his hungry brothers and sisters. His grandmother, who was at the point of death, could not die in peace till he confessed to his neighbor, and was forgiven. The loss of the potatoes was a trifle to the rich man; but what would have been the probable effect of the theft on the boy had he not confessed? He had learned, by the theft, a way of supplying his wants, and, in case of a new want, would likely have stolen again, and yet again, until he had become a confirmed thief. What should the boy have done when his brothers and sisters were hungry?

The highest good is not pleasurable sensations, but the perfect development and exercise of living powers, with their attendant satisfactions. There is an impulse

for activity as well as a desire for pleasure; but pleasure is a sign that the will has reached its object. The artist wills to finish his work, and with the finished work he is satisfied. Would he finish the work if it afforded no satisfaction? The completion of the work is the proximate end for which he strives. The ultimate end is the satisfaction of which he is assured. It need not be the object of immediate attention, and the idea of it may even disappear from consciousness.

To be rid of pain or discomfort is an aim of action. Not pleasure or pain in the abstract, but special pleasures and pains are incentives to action, and play an important part in the economy of nature. Pain is a warning; pleasure is a bait. Their ends are to arouse those energies which tend to the preservation of the individual and the progress of the race; but when sought as ends they bring punishment for the perversion of nature's purpose. We need something to arouse our strongest passions, and to excite us to make our best efforts; hence the interest we take in the heroic and the tragic.

Virtuous activity is the thing of absolute worth. The high pleasure, or, if you please, satisfaction taken in such activity, is at once its evidence and its reward. What, then, is the highest good? "The goal at which the will of every living creature aims is the normal exercise of the vital functions which constitute its nature. . . . Man desires to live a mental, historical life, in which there is room for the exercise of all human powers and virtues." Such a life affords the highest satisfaction. The life is the means, the satisfaction is the outcome and the reward. The moral worth is the life. Would man desire such a life were there no accompany-

ing satisfaction? Hence we conclude that the highest good in man is found in the possession, normal development, and proper exercise of all human faculties and virtues, especially the highest—reason, wisdom, justice, benevolence. The highest good in man we may believe to be in harmony with the highest good of the universe, and therefore pleasing to God.

Paulsen states the propositions of pessimism thus: (1) The total value of life is below zero. (2) Life has more pain than pleasure. (3) That life is as worthless as it is unhappy. (4) The unhappiness increases as civilization advances. After discussing these propositions, Paulsen concludes that virtue and welfare overbalance vice and failure. Life is not to be deemed worthless because it does not reach absolute perfection and happiness; for the value of life is not only to be found at the goal, but in the entire race. Opposition and trouble are incentives to action, and hence conditions of progress.

Paulsen takes up evil, and declares that "it supplies us with the appropriate conditions of growth, furnishes our capabilities with the necessary tasks, and gives to our life, if we only wish it, a rich and beautiful content." He adds, however, that evil can be justified only in a general way. Natural evil may possibly be thus justified, but it is difficult to justify moral evil; yet Paulsen makes the attempt. "If it were wholly eliminated, human historical life would lack an indispensable element. . . . The social virtues presuppose the natural selfishness of the sensuous man. Justice and benevolence imply self-denial." Self-love is, no doubt, beneficial;

but can we justly defraud? A world abounding with wicked people may be a favorable place for the exercise of virtue; but does this justify the wicked in their evil deeds? Wickedness in others may not hurt the good; it may even be a means of developing their virtues. But is wickedness good for the wicked?

Duty and inclination are frequently in conflict, in which case conscience, like the voice of God, supports the claims of duty. The social claims are seen to be superior to those of the individual. As the claims of the many overbalance those of one, conscience, which has been artificially developed by custom, rightly subordinates the original selfish impulses and instincts, and works to an end, not blindly, like original instincts, but consciously, as transformed instinct, and with a sense of obligation. Custom forms the original content of duty; hence duty first appears as an external act enforced by authority. In the outcome, individual interests are promoted by conforming to the claims of duty, and, as this is seen, the individual will cheerfully conforms to the social, and the incentive to duty is the combined force of custom, conscience, and personal will. But when, in exceptional cases, duty and interest appear to conflict, conscience asserts the claims of duty by saying, 'Thou shalt not follow inclination; but when there is no inclination opposing duty, conscience says, 'Thou shalt perform duty. The rule of duty is found in the unconscious growth of custom. It is not a rational, axiomatic principle, though, when developed by social experience, it will have the support of reason, as a true ideal of life is created. Conscience, which at

first estimated duty by custom, now measures it by its ideal. Duty at first conforms to justice, but finally to benevolence.

Paulsen rightly rejects the opinion that egoism and altruism are mutually exclusive. What one does for himself has an influence on others, and what he does for others affects himself; and these secondary effects are generally recognized by the agent and taken into consideration before the action; but the altruistic acts are more distinctly ethical. With the evolution of morals, the altruistic tendencies increase at the expense of the egoistic impulses.

The relation of virtue to happiness is not accidental. Virtue gives internal peace, and tends to external prosperity. The pessimistic view is that evil-doers are they who prosper in the world, and have more than heart can wish; but a little that a righteous man hath is better than the riches of many wicked. Outward success, if considered paramount, is a menace to character and to ultimate welfare. The wicked stand on slippery places; their footing is insecure, their fall probable.

The relation of morality to religion is intimate. This is seen as a historic fact; but superstition, or religion in its lowest form, as fetichism or idolatry, has no connection with morality. The great religions, Judaism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, all have their systems of morality. Religion and morality have the same root in human nature—the yearning for perfection. The doctrine of immortality, with its hopes and fears, has had a powerful influence on morals, as well as the acceptance or rejection of theistic views. The science of ethics will have its independent develop-

ment, but the practice of morality, especially among the masses, is both extended and confirmed by religion. Science deals with phenomena and their laws, but does not reveal efficient causes, nor final causes or purposes, thus leaving room for metaphysics and theology; it frees us from superstition, but does not destroy faith in God, which is the basis of theistic ethics.

In regard to the problem of the freedom of the will, Paulsen distinguishes between psychological and metaphysical freedom; that is, the freedom to cause one's own decisions and acts, and the freedom of particular decisions from any cause whatever. As evil came into the world, not from God or outside necessity, it originated from man himself, who freely made choice of evil instead of good, though not without the permission of God. As no event can happen without a cause, the metaphysical view may be dismissed without further consideration.

As to the psychological view, we should distinguish between will as the power of choice and will as an act, more properly called volition. As an event, volition is not free from the action of cause; but what is its cause? Is it the motive, or is it the person himself? The motive is the reason for the choice; the person is the cause of the choice. Without constraint or restraint, the person chooses between certain ends; but he chooses in view of motives, which are reasons soliciting choice, but not causes compelling decisions. The person is not compelled to make the choice, but as a free cause freely makes the choice, not without reason, but without compulsion.

If it is asked, Does not the character of the person

decide his choice? the answer is, 'The person with such a character makes the choice; but the character of the person, though the consequent of many antecedents, is largely made by the person himself; and he has power to modify his character by changing his conduct. By consciousness and reflection he can ascertain his peculiarities of character; and if he is dissatisfied with these peculiarities, he can by his conduct so change his character as to make it more satisfactory to himself. It is mere sophistry to attempt to justify wrong-doing, or to throw off responsibility under the plea of necessity.

As ethical writers are in substantial agreement as to practical morals—the virtues and vices and duties—this part of Paulsen's treatise is passed over with the remark that he has discussed the subject in an able and interesting manner.

2. *Wilhelm Wundt*, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig, opens his first volume on the "Facts of the Moral Life," by referring to the distinction between the *explicative* and the *normative* points of view in the treatment of scientific problems, and classes ethics with those sciences regarded as normative disciplines. In the normative sciences certain facts are distinguished as having special value. The explicative sciences treat of *what is*; ethics treats not only of what is, but what *ought to be*.

Wundt's method is largely historical. He first brings forward language as the oldest witness of the course of development of all human ideas. The derivation of ethics from *ἠθικά*, from *ἦθος*, character, disposition, as related to *ἔθος*, custom, points clearly to the sub-

ject-matter of ethics, the inward character or disposition, and the outward conduct.

In language, the antithetical terms, good and bad, right and wrong, praiseworthy and blameworthy, mark distinctions of profound significance. A religious reference is often found in words expressing moral approval or disapproval. Language leads us, by various paths, to the conclusion that moral ideas, as now known, are the products of a long course of development, and have gained their specific contents gradually, as they have freed themselves from the intermixture of foreign elements.

A question now arises, Were the germs of later morality included in the primitive ethical conceptions? The history of the ethical vocabulary can not directly answer this question; but the fact that the physical endowments of health and strength have for all time been associated with certain moral conceptions indicates that, like the laws of thought, these conceptions have found a general acceptance. The principal sources of evidence are, however, found in religious conceptions and social phenomena governed by custom and legal norms.

As to the meaning of the word religion, Wundt gives three hypotheses:

(1) The *autonomous* theory that "religion is an independent domain, above and beyond those of metaphysics and ethics, . . . an immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finitude in infinity, of all temporal things in things eternal; a feeling of absolute dependence."

(2) The *metaphysical* theory that "identifies religion with the speculative knowledge of the universe; or that religion is the knowledge possessed by the finite of its nature as absolute mind; or that religion is a belief in supernatural beings."

(3) The *ethical* theory that "religion is the realization of ethical postulates;" or that "religion is the realization of our duties as divine commands."

The autonomous theory subordinates morals to religion; the ethical theory subordinates religion to morals; the metaphysical theory demands proof where the ethical theory is satisfied with the conceivable.

Wundt says: "All ideas and feelings are religious which refer to an ideal existence that fully corresponds to the wishes and requirements of the human mind." Myths contain religious elements as well as other components not directly religious. The relation of morality to religion is like that of religion to the myth. The myth originally includes theories of nature, religion, and morals, in undifferentiated unity. The religious elements of the myth include the ethical, which become partly detached from them later on, when the time of the myth is nearing its end. Not till then can morality be regulated by law and custom independently of religious superstitions.

The sources of myths are various—a desire to interpret nature, a belief in spirits, and linguistic analogies. The mythology of a people is a combination of many separate myths, formed by poetic imagination. It may take the form of fetichism or polytheism. The worship of ancestors, heroes, and the gods is prompted by instinct and the desire for protection and help. The belief

in a future life, with its rewards and punishments, could not fail to have a powerful moral influence.

"The world of sense is the world of moral action. The supersensible world is the world of rewards and punishments. . . . There is a gradual purification within the thoughts that center round the ideas of rewards and punishments. . . . The development of the idea of purification reaches its climax in the idea of a universal spiritual life continued with an ideal cosmic order."

The ideas of reward and punishment disappear from the ideal future life, only to appear in the present. The severest punishment is the remorse of a guilty conscience; and the highest reward is the consciousness of uprightness of character. The ascription of the moral order to divine regulation resolves moral precepts into religious commands. These are the findings of investigation so long as morality looks to religion for its support. In their original forms religion and morality were closely connected; but in their more advanced stages their separation seems possible. Some motives, however, must be discovered for moral conduct, and these may be found in the customs of social life and the sanctions of civil law.

"The line of demarkation between man and brute is drawn on the side of consciousness by the connection of individual with general thought, just as it is drawn on the side of the will by the plurality of incentives and the freedom of choice." Instinct is ingrained, custom is voluntary, and is largely modified by circumstances, though having its root in religious and social instincts. "Mankind is prepared for the adoption of new ends of

life, by modes of conduct already existent. Customs may have a legal standing, or may be estimated by common opinion as good, bad, or indifferent.

Habit is personal or individual, and hence peculiar; usage relates to the family, the community, or the municipality; custom pertains to the tribe or nation; fashion is a conventional mode or style, temporarily prevalent. Usage and custom induce habits; but habit can not create custom. Fashion is fickle, while usage and custom are conservative. An individual may modify, but he can not create language, myth, or custom.

Wundt shows how custom conserves certain forms of action, as the conduct of the individual for his own sake or for that of society, also the action of a social group for the welfare of society in their own vicinity or of humanity.

The requirements of food, shelter, and clothing, when the climate makes it a necessity, are primary wants demanding activities which take the recurring form of custom. Work is required; class distinctions appear, especially with the agricultural mode of life, and division of labor begins. The labor originating in the compulsory work of the slave develops into the skilled workmanship of the free artisan, which, with the introduction of machinery, becomes less a drudgery, and like the play of children, more an agreeable exercise of bodily or mental powers.

Along with these activities are evolved forms of social intercourse, the usages of polite society, the cultivation of the arts and sciences, and the regulation of national life by legislative enactments. Family interests and religious belief give to social customs the force of

moral obligations, which are enforced by common opinion, and in certain cases by civil law.

In heroic ages the aspiration of the nobler characters is after honor or fame, and their maxim is, "Act unselfishly from selfish motives;" but the transfer of the controlling influence from egoistic motives to altruistic leads to the maxim, "Act unselfishly from unselfish motives." The punitive power of the State enforces the cardinal virtue of justice. Despotism is overthrown by the establishment of constitutional government, and the liberty of the citizen is secured. The State, directing its activities to the realization of the common welfare, becomes the supreme teacher of morals. Public spirit is necessarily altruistic; but at the same time the State affords opportunities for the pursuit of egoistic interests. The development of a sense of justice and the consensus of opinion act as a check to abuses, and guard the well-being of the people. The perfection of the State prepares the way for the union of humanity.

The humane sentiments are cultivated through the forms of friendship, hospitality, and charity. The necessity for labor has been a restraint on evil tendencies; but with the improvement in the means of industry the hard necessities of labor have relaxed, the cultivation of the mind has gone forward, and man has been brought more fully into sympathy with nature. With the march of intellect, the social and moral standards have been elevated, and the claims of human brotherhood more fully recognized. The logical result is in harmony with the principles of Christianity—reverence for God and good will to men.

We pass over Wundt's history of ethics, given in his second volume, though well worthy of careful study, and give only his classification of ethical systems.

The systems of ethics may be classified as to *motives* and as to *ends*.

1. As to *motives*, we have ethics of feeling, ethics of understanding, ethics of reason.

The ethics of feeling is based on an original disposition; the ethics of understanding on reflection awakened by experience; the ethics of reason on an innate power whose ethical function rests either on an empirically developed insight into the most general ends of human action, or on innate ideas. Hence,

Ethical Intuitionism.		Ethical Empiricism.	
Ethics of Feeling.		Ethics of Understanding.	
		Ethics of Reason.	

2. As to *ends*, we have *heteronomous* or authoritative systems resting on external commands, and *autonomous* systems arising from original disposition and natural conditions of development. The distinction is not in the end itself, but in the way it is given. The heteronomous systems rather avoid stating the end, but emphasize obedience to the law, without any question as to end.

Only autonomous systems yield a systematic classification as to ends. Here we have two forms: (1) When the ends can be directly realized; (2) when the ends are the result of development. Hence, we have

I. Heteronomous Ethical Systems.

(1) Political Systems. (2) Religious Systems.

These systems emphasize law, and either give no

end, or affiliate, in respect to end, with one of the autonomous systems.

II. Autonomous Ethical Systems.

- (1) *Eudemonism*, under the form of
 - a. Individual eudemonism or egoism.
 - b. Universal eudemonism or utilitarianism.
- (2) *Evolutionism*, under the form of
 - a. Individual evolutionism.
 - b. Universal evolutionism.

Chapter XVIII

MODERN ETHICS—OTHER MORALISTS

JOHN S. MACKENZIE, Professor of Logic and Philosophy in University College of South Wales, has written a valuable book on ethics, principally for private students. He defines ethics as the science of conduct, and says: "It considers the action of human beings with reference to their rightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or evil."

He defines the *right* and the *good*, and says the highest good is the supreme or ultimate end to which our whole lives are directed. He gives the scope of ethics as a normative science, and says: "It is neither a practical science nor an art; it is rather philosophical than scientific, since it is the study of the ideal in conduct."

MacKenzie discusses at some length the relation of ethics to the other sciences, and devotes a chapter to the divisions of the subject and the plan of his work. In the chapter on *Desire and Will* he treats of the general nature of desire, the relation of want and appetite, of appetite and desire, describes the universe of desire, the conflict of desires, the relation of desire and wish, of wish and will, will and act, the meaning of purpose, and the relation of will to character.

MacKenzie points out the different meanings of the words intention and motive, shows their relations, and

discusses the question, Is the motive always pleasure? He criticises *hedonism*, distinguishes between concrete pleasures and abstract pleasure, and investigates the object of desire. He shows how reason can be a motive, that some motives are not rational, and how motives are constituted.

MacKenzie holds that character is the most important element in moral life; that conduct signifies those acts that are deliberately willed; and hence that conduct corresponds to character. Since circumstances also affect conduct, it follows that conduct is the product of character and circumstance. While character largely determines conduct, it is true that conduct, especially when determined by circumstance, modifies character.

Moral habit is a habit of deliberate choice—a habit of willing. Right willing requires thought. Freedom of the will is liberty to decide according to character, without external constraint. Established character gives uniformity of conduct, and renders it predictable. Animals have spontaneity; man has a higher freedom, the highest form of which is rational freedom, where the will, emancipated from the control of appetite and passion, is guided by reason. Will involves energy, and tends to pass into executive action.

MacKenzie traces the evolution of conduct from the germs found in animals, through the acts of savages, its guidance by custom and law, and by reflection on moral ideas, to the full development of moral consciousness in enlightened men.

The moral judgment develops from the gregarious instincts of animals, to the consciousness of "the tribal self," of which the individual regards himself a part, held

by the social bond of custom, which develops and guides his conscience. Positive and moral law unite to uphold the standard with which the will of the individual, though sometimes in conflict, must finally agree. The individual conscience will thus, in the main, agree with the social standard, and in case of divergence the growth of the reflective judgment will be stimulated, as is shown in the history of the progress of civilization.

As to the *objects* of moral judgments, we pass judgment on voluntary action, also on the character of the actor. Is the moral judgment concerned with the intention or with the motive? Utilitarians generally answer, the intention; intuitionists, the motive. MacKenzie decides that the moral judgment is partly concerned with the motive, but really with the character. The intention relates to *what* is expected to be realized, the motive to *why* the result is sought. The intention decides the responsibility; the motive reveals moral character.

As to the *subject* of moral judgment, there are different moral spheres, or "universes," or points of view, from which a judgment can be made. The point of view may be that of an impartial spectator, or of an ideal self.

MacKenzie gives a careful survey of ethical thought, and treats of the types of ethical theory, the various conceptions of moral law, the doctrine of Kant, the standard of happiness and of perfection, theory and practice, the social unity, moral institutions, the duties, the virtues, individual life, moral pathology, moral progress, and concludes with a chapter on the relation between ethics and metaphysics.

2. T. H. Muirhead, lecturer in Mental and Moral

Science, Royal Holloway College, begins his "Elements" with "The Problem of Ethics," and raises the question, "How can there be a problem at all?"

He defines thus: "Ethics is the science of character, as habit of conduct or will;" "Habit is the solution of practical problems."

So long as the solution and the problem are congruous, the ethical question remains in abeyance; but new problems arise of which the early habits afford no solution, and doubt is thrown upon the validity of custom. Hence "wonder," the source of all science, seeks new solutions, and thus begins the science of ethics.

The *conditions* under which practical problems arise are found in three stages, or periods: The period of *formation* of customs and habits, corresponding to childhood of individual life; the period of *action*, in which customs are adjusted, corresponding to early manhood; the period of *reflection*, in which new problems are solved, corresponding to mature manhood. In the first period, we have the growth of morality; in the second, the equilibrium of moral forces; in the third, the development of systems of reflective ethics. Historical facts are given to illustrate these conditions.

The effect of the reflective study of ethics is twofold: partly destructive, as reflection criticises the ethics of common sense; and partly reconstructive, as it elaborates new systems.

The question arises, Can there be a science of ethics? Certain writers hold that "if the will be free, the whole conception of a science of ethics falls to the ground;" for a science enables us to predict, which we can not do in case of freedom of will. Ethics judges conduct to be

right or wrong, and this it can do, if the will is free. In fact, only in case of free will can conduct be morally right or wrong. Ethics declares what *ought* to be, and proclaims the rule of conduct, and predicts the consequences of obedience or disobedience to the righteous law. Hence free will, while excluding prediction of conduct, does not exclude the prediction of the consequences of conduct.

Another objection arises: People ignorant of the science often pass correct moral judgments and exhibit correct moral conduct. These people have common sense and a conscience, and have unconsciously imbibed the moral sentiments which have become current.

"Ethics brings the moral judgments into organic relation with one another, and with the known facts of experience. . . . Ethics has to do with the description and classification of moral judgments. It can not further explain them. They rest on an innate feeling or instinct that defies further analysis." Intuitionist ethics refers the primary judgments to the intuitions of reason; theistic ethics, to the will of God.

As to the scope of ethics, Muirhead says: "It is regulative; it treats man as conscious; it is closely related to philosophy; it involves a reference to a cosmic order; it is a practical science; it has to do with what ought to be, rather than with what is; it is more authoritative than civil law, extends over a wider field, and has a deeper significance."

Muirhead defines conduct as voluntary action. To the objection that we pass judgment on habitual actions that are automatic, not voluntary, he replies: "There was a time when such actions were voluntary. Conduct

also demands a purpose or end. Then moral conduct is a voluntary act directed to a good or bad end."

Muirhead thus gives the antecedents of a voluntary action: Feeling, desire, or aversion, deliberation and choice. If the execution is deferred for a time, we have simply resolution.

"A man is not good because he makes good resolutions, nor bad because he makes bad ones. It is only when the resolution passes into conduct that it justly becomes the object of a moral judgment." Civil law demands punishment only for the *overt act*. A man is not guilty of a crime till he commits it; but a man who intends to murder, or to rob, or to commit any other outrage, is not morally innocent, though he is frustrated in his attempt to carry his wicked resolution into execution.

Muirhead says truly: "It is a common mistake to think of a desire as an isolated element." A desire is for an object; it is related to motive and choice and execution and consequences; it is *for self*; it reacts and modifies self. The whole combination is the *sphere* or *universe* of the desire.

"The mistake of conceiving of will and desire as controlling or controlled is connected with the more fundamental one of conceiving of the will and the self as externally related to one another. . . . The will is dependent on desire, and all desire is related to self and character. . . . The will is the self." The will, as volition, is an act of self; the will as power is not, of course, a faculty detached from self, but is the ability of self to choose or decide. There is more in self than *action*; for action is not self-supporting. A boy runs,

a dog runs; but ^arunning does not run; neither does willing will. A self is not a bundle of feelings, thoughts, and volitions; it is a subject involving a combination of capacities and powers manifested in an endless variety of activities.

The will of which conduct is the expression does not "stand to the character in merely an external relation;" it is not "determined by it as by a natural cause;" nor does it act "in an independent line of its own without relation to character;" for "character is the habitual mode in which will regulates the system of impulses and desires which looked at subjectively is the field of its exercise. . . . There is the distinction of character as relatively fixed at the time of action, and character as something that grows and changes from moment to moment. In its former aspect volition must be conceived as determined by character; the individual act must be taken as the expression or embodiment of character."

How is a man responsible for his conduct? "A man's voluntary action may be taken as an index to the moral qualities of the man himself." The hypothesis of the determinist, who supposes "actions to flow from previous conditions, as physical effects from their causes, or that of the libertarian, who isolates the will from character, as a mysterious power of unmotivated choice—is incompatible with human responsibility." The volition is not isolated from character, for character is manifest in the volition; neither is the motive the *cause* of the volition; it is the *reason* in view of which, as related to his character, the person decides and determines his conduct. There is no coercion in the matter; the

person often weighs motives and deliberates and suspends judgment for a time, and finally decides, it may be, in view of the bearing of the decision and conduct on his own attainment of an ideal character, which he hopes to realize.

Muirhead considers conduct in two aspects: "It is will, and it is action." Does the rightness or wrongness of an act depend on the motive, on the intention, or on the consequences? In regard to this question, philosophers are divided. Mill says, "The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the act." Bentham defines motive as "that for the sake of which an action is done." "The intention includes both that for the sake of which the action is done, and that in spite of which the action is done." "A man sells his coat to buy bread; he intends to sell the coat and to buy the bread; the procuring the bread is the motive, not the parting with his coat." A man is, of course, responsible for all he intends. Objectively considered, conduct is measured by consequences.

As judgment is passed on voluntary action, it may be said to be passed on will and on self as expressed in the act of will; and as character is a general habit of will, it is passed on character, and on motive as related to character.

In the order of dependence, the right rests on the good; that is, the means is for the end; yet the law, or rule of right, is first in the order of time. "The first idea of morality is obedience to law laid down for human guidance by a superior will." In primitive times "the law is conceived as external. Later the internal law of conscience supplements the external law of au-

thority. When reflection has more fully done its work, it is seen that the law is related to the end, and that the justification of the law is found in the good consequences that follow obedience. Hence the three points of view—the law as external authority, the internal law of conscience, and the law as related to the end.”

Under theories of the end, Muirhead discusses the end as pleasure, the end as self-sacrifice, evolutionary hedonism, and the end as the common good.

Under moral progress he considers the standard as relative, the standard as progressive, and the standard as ideal.

As to evolutionary ethics, Muirhead says: “What is required to complete the evolutionist theory is (1) once and for all to renounce hedonism and all its works; (2) to add to its empirical demonstration that the individual is essentially social, a teleological demonstration that his good is essentially a common good.”

Muirhead has prepared an able review of Aristotle's ethics in a work entitled “Chapters from Aristotle.”

3. *Professor John Dewey*, of the University of Chicago, has prepared two books on ethics—the first entitled “Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics;” the second, “The Study of Ethics—A Syllabus.”

Our space will allow only a summary of the contents of these books. In fact, to review them in detail would require a volume.

Of the first, Dewey, himself a teacher, says: “Other teachers, indeed, may agree that a general outline is better than a blanket-mortgage spread over and forestalling all the activity of the student's mind;” and of the second: “The present pages undertake a thorough

psychological examination of the process of active experience, and a derivation from this analysis of the chief ethical types and crises—a task, so far as I know, not previously attempted.”

In the first book, Part I, *Fundamental ethical notions*, Dewey treats of (1) *The good* under the heads: hedonism, utilitarianism, evolutionary utilitarianism, Kantianism, problem and solution, realization of individuality, ethical postulate; (2) *The idea of obligation*, under which are considered the theories of Bain, Spencer, and Kant, then developing its real nature; (3) *The idea of freedom*—negative, potential, and positive.

Part II.—*The ethical world*—social relations, moral relations.

Part III.—(1) *The formation and growth of ideals*, conscience, conscientiousness, development of ideals; (2) *The moral struggle, or the realizing of ideals*, goodness, as struggle, badness, goodness and badness; (3) *Realized morality, or the virtues*, cardinal virtues, conclusion.

Of the effectiveness of the first volume, the present writer can speak positively and favorably, having used it with satisfaction in his own classes.

In the second book we have under discussion:

I. The nature of ethical theory.—(1) Subject-matter of ethics; (2) Rise of ethical theory; (3) Relation of moral theory to practice.

II. The factors of moral conduct.—(1) Conduct, as referred to the agent; (2) Reference of conduct to the sphere of action; (3) Twofold formula for conduct; (4) Moral functions; (5) Ethical postulate.

III. A general analysis of conduct.—(1) The nature

of impulse; (2) The expression of impulse and its consequences; (3) Will, or the mediation of impulse; (4) Ethical interpretation of this process.

IV. The moral consciousness.—(1) The subject of the moral judgment; (2) The predicate of the moral judgment.

V. Moral approbation, value, and standard.—(1) Natural good; (2) Moral good; (3) Development of volition from the side of idea; (4) Development of intention or the rational content; (5) Development of motive; (6) Nature of effort or tension; (7) Theories of abstract ideas; (8) The hedonistic theory of value; (9) Feeling as end or ideal; (10) Happiness and desire; (11) The nature of desire; (12) Pleasure and motive; (13) Pleasure as criterion; (14) The standard of happiness; (15) Standard, ideal, and motive.

VI. Reflective approbation.—(1) Conscience; (2) Moral condemnation; (3) Various aspects of conscience; (4) Conscience as the moral sentiments; (5) Nature of conscience as moral knowledge.

VII. Nature of obligation.—(1) Psychology of obligation; (2) The Kantian theory of obligation; (3) Hedonistic theory of obligation.

VIII. Freedom and responsibility.—(1) The psychology of freedom; (2) The ethics of freedom and responsibility; (3) Determinist and indeterminist theories.

IX. Virtue and the virtues.—(1) The twofold statement of virtue; (2) The classification of virtues.

Professor Dewey has succeeded admirably in clothing these bones with living flesh. Every student of ethics should have Dewey's books.

In an article for the *Monist*, Dewey states the posi-

tion of Huxley, in his *Romanes Lecture*, on *Evolution and Ethics*, thus: "The rule of the cosmic process is struggle and strife. The rule of the ethical process is sympathy and co-operation. The end of the cosmic process is the survival of the fittest; that of the ethical, the fitting of as many as possible to survive. Before the ethical tribunal the cosmic process stands condemned."

Dewey maintains that man is not in conflict with his entire natural environment, but that he modifies one part with reference to another; that what was done by animals unconsciously, as by chance, is done by man consciously and by forethought; that evolution is not only a modification of organization in adaptation to environment, but the evolution of the environment—a continued introduction of new conditions; that the conflict between habits and aims does not allow habits to fossilize, but keeps them flexible and makes them efficient instruments of action; and that thus, by this ceaseless activity, wise foresight, and deliberate action, the progress of the race is insured.

How can unconscious evolution in nature, without a directing intelligence, work to a rational end? Is not the cosmic order itself a proof of an ultimate rational cause, the very power in the universe that works for righteousness, and gives the law of evolution, and that worketh all things after the counsel of his own will?

Chapter XIX

MODERN ETHICS—OTHER MORALISTS

NEWMAN SMYTH.—In his work on *Christian Ethics*, Smyth says: "Christian ethics is the science of living well with one another, according to Christ. . . . It differs from scientific ethics by searching for its premises, and finding its laws in the observed facts of the Christian moral consciousness and in its historical development. . . . Its object is not to discover a philosophy of virtue, but to bring to adequate interpretation the Christian consciousness of life. . . . It will be a comprehensive survey, from the moral point of view, of the founding, upbuilding, and promised completion of the kingdom of God."

Smyth treats of the relation of Christian ethics to metaphysics, to philosophical ethics, and to psychology, also to theology and religion, and to economics.

He says Christian ethics assumes the philosophical postulates: (1) that human nature is constituted for moral life; and (2) the sense of obligation, or authority of conscience. It also assumes the theological postulates: (1) The positions of Christian theism; (2) a divine self-revelation in man, through nature, in the course of history, culminating in Christ; and (3) an ethical idea of God. He also refers to the special requirements for the study of Christian ethics.

What is the ideal of Christian ethics? What is the supreme good? Smyth answers: "The Christian ideal has been given historically; in its first revelation to men it was not that which they had thought, or imagined, or reasoned, it was that which they had seen and heard." The historical revelation shows that "(1) The ideal was given to men in the person of Christ; (2) It is presented to us through Christian life and testimony; (3) It has been realized and applied to life in many directions during the course of Christian history, and is still further to be realized and interpreted in the progress of Christian life and thought." These points are fully elaborated.

According to the prophetic literature of the Old Testament, the highest good is the social welfare and national prosperity of Israel, realized in righteous obedience to the laws of God under the reign of the Holy One of Israel.

The Messianic view of Judaism had failed to reach a true ethical universality. It had clothed itself in political forms, and instead of a reign of love among men, it expected the reign of Israel over the nations.

The Christian ideal is disclosed in the doctrine of the kingdom, that it is now here on earth; that the ideal life is the life in Christ; and that the realization of this ideal has the calm certainty of knowledge. Christianity teaches that the supreme good is personal; that it is for humanity; that it is superhuman; and that it is to be manifested in the hearts and lives and institutions of men.

The moral ideal of Jesus is expressed in the precept, "Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Perfection is the ideal, blessedness the consequence. The Fatherhood of God implies the

brotherhood of man. The love to man is to be vital, warm, personal.

The Christian ideal of the highest good has its final fulfillment in eternal life. This is the antithesis of Buddhist teaching, that life is undesirable, and that, therefore, the consummation to be sought is the attainment of *nirvana*, the extinction of conscious being. The Christian view is that personal life is not to be lost; that it will be a deliverance from evil; that it is the life growing out of the spiritual birth; that it involves the fullness of personal relationships; that it is realized in righteousness and love; that it is begun in this life and is partly a present possession; and that it is to be the fruition of perfect blessedness in the life to come.

The Christian ideal has its perfect embodiment in the personality of Christ, and is now realized in the spiritual consciousness of his followers, as holiness of heart manifested in righteousness of life. It is coextensive with all spheres of activity; it encourages every laudable enterprise; it stimulates every form of beneficence. The Christian ideal is the supreme ideal.

A comparison of the Christian ideal with other ideals awards the palm to the Christian. As revealed in Christ, it has been made known to the world under the guidance of the Spirit of God. It has advanced by stages towards a fuller realization and universal acceptance. The Old Testament was a progressive revelation of which the New is the fulfillment and completion. The advance from the prehistoric stage, through the legal to the spiritual, shows a growth of conscience, a development of moral ideas, and an elevation of the standard of moral conduct.

In the Christian era of moral development it is seen that the *Word* was the promise and potency of pre-Christian history; that there is an indwelling of the Spirit of Christ in humanity; that Christ is evidence of God's love; that God becomes more real in the cosmical significance and ethical environment of Christianity; that thus is effected the reconciliation of man to God; and that *faith* is the efficient principle by which man realizes the blessings which God has in store for him.

The Christian ideal is realized in the welfare of society and the happiness of the individual, by the cultivation of the Christian virtues and the development of fraternal love. The Christian character begins with the new birth, and grows into the full maturity of spiritual life. Christian progress is promoted by following the example of Christ; by overcoming evil; by the co-operation of Christians; and by enlarging the spiritual dominion of man over nature.

The ideal of beneficent love is realized in all the spheres of human life. It works from personal centers; it is manifest in the benevolent enterprises of the Church; it is active in family life and Christian society; it operates on a larger scale in the State when permeated by Christian influence.

In Part II, under the head of *duties*, Smyth discusses at length the Christian conscience—its specific character; its education; and questions concerning conscience. He also classifies, defines, and discusses the various kinds of duties.

2. *Davidson*, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen.—In his work on Christian Ethics, Davidson takes for granted the conceptions and

principles of general ethics, as presupposed in Christian ethics.

Christianity accepts the *Decalogue* as the summary of moral law, especially as condensed by Christ in the two comprehensive duties of love to God and love to man.

Christ emphasized the worth of the individual, and points out the way of ethical progress through conflict and self-denial, thus giving new life and power to moral truth. He commended the gentle virtues of meekness, patience, and forgiveness, and taught that the heart is the fountain out of which are the issues of life.

The brotherhood of man requires not only good will, but benevolence embodying itself in beneficent deeds, the incentive being the love for Christ.

Christianity throws light on the problem of evil, and inspires man with the hope of eternal life.

Davidson shows that Christian ethics is original; that it can not be separated from religion; that happiness resides in character, and is transformed into blessedness; and that Christianity, instead of giving license to sin, as some maintain, supplies the highest incentive to holiness.

The incentives to virtue are found in the consequence, both of a righteous and an unrighteous life; but the life and the consequences are necessarily involved in the inward character—the real nature of the man himself. Moral progress is a growth from within; it is tested by temptation, and is confirmed by overcoming evil.

Faith is spiritual vision leading on to victory; hope is the anchor of the soul holding it steadfast to its purpose; love is the essence and fullness of every virtue, and as never failing, it goes out in blessings on all mankind. Love is the essence of God, the crowning virtue of man.

3. *James H. Hyslop*, Professor of Ethics in Columbia University.—In his introductory chapter, Hyslop defines ethics to be the science of character and of conduct, of good will and good results in human action. It investigates man's highest good; it is closely related to several other sciences; it is occupied with the problems of man's moral nature and whatever is contained in a moral ideal.

He gives a historical sketch of the development of ethics from its origin to recent times.

He shows the importance of definition, and defines the principal terms, as virtue and vice, good and evil, right and wrong, morality, duty, and obligation.

The psychological field of moral consciousness is presented in outline. The conditions of morality are stated as intelligence, freedom, and conscience. The subjective and objective meanings of morality are discriminated, and the ambiguity of the term *act* pointed out. The difference is shown between the criterion of responsibility and that of morality.

Hyslop discusses the terms, motive, act, end, result, choice, and volition; he discusses, at considerable length, and with great ability, the question of the freedom of the will, and decides in favor of freedom. He shows that freedom, responsibility, and punishment go together; that responsibility implies freedom of some kind; that it involves the imputation of an act to an agent; that the agent causes the act and elects to do it, when he could have elected an alternative; and that he is, therefore, praiseworthy or blameworthy, as his own conscience testifies, since he recognizes his subjective control, or freedom of action. In this Hyslop is correct.

Responsibility has limitations, in environment, hered-

ity, defective knowledge, or undeveloped moral capacity. When these limitations afford no sufficient exculpation, punishment rightly follows evil doing.

Hyslop has a lengthy discussion on the nature and origin of conscience, in which he gives a definition of conscience, the history of its conception and of the term, the various meanings of the word, the analysis of conscience, its functions and authority, and a discussion of the theories regarding its origin.

He criticises the theories of the nature of morality, as maintained in the various systems of ethics, and concludes that each theory supplies an important element in the complex result known as morality. Pleasure or happiness is a good, but is not a sufficient guide, neither is it the sole good, since perfection is a good, even an ultimate good. Perfection and happiness form a couple which should abide together as one. Strictly, perfection is not ultimate, but penultimate, since no one would care for it if it did not give satisfaction; it is true, however, that the satisfaction is found in the perfection.

The relation between morality and religion has been the occasion of no little controversy. Some hold that morality depends on religion; others that religion depends on morality; a third class maintains that morality is independent of religion; a fourth class identifies them. Hyslop sums up the discussion thus: "The object of religion is the supernatural, that of morality is human welfare, and conformity to the sense of duty. Religion is not the ground, but the sanction of morality, and is, moreover, not the only sanction of it. The psychological or subjective elements of religion and morality are the same or closely related, but the objective elements are

different. The two fields of phenomena intersect and interpenetrate, but only in the popular and concrete use of the term religion. The ideal character of the divine is a reflection of a previously developed moral consciousness, and not the reverse."

In his theory of *rights* and *duties*, Hyslop says that rights relate not to actions, but to powers; that right is a claim to the forbearance and protection of others in certain specific cases, or it is a privilege which exempts the subject from blame or censure in the exercise of it; that the former is social and its violation censurable and punishable, while the latter is individual and moral, and its violation only censurable.

Rights are limited in relation to nature, against which man has no rights, but powers; they are also limited by reciprocity and by degree of responsibility. Rights are natural or acquired. Natural rights include those of life, liberty, and the products of one's own industry. Acquired rights, as the political, include those of franchise and eligibility to office.

Duty is what ought to be done; it is imperative and involves responsibility. Rights imply the duty to respect those rights. Is duty a moral imperative apart from relation to others? It is a man's duty to maintain his dignity for his own sake, and thus to be worthy of self-respect, and it is to the interest of others that he should do this, even if they can not demand it as their right. No man is isolated from the universe, and to degrade himself is to lower the average moral standard, and is therefore a wrong to humanity. When one member of a society degrades himself, he injures every other member by casting suspicion upon them in the eyes of the

world. It is the duty of every one to treat his own personality and that of others as an end of inestimable worth. If God takes an interest in human beings, to degrade one's self is to God a grief and a wrong.

It is a duty to defend one's life, liberty, reputation, and property, to secure self-culture by the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of beauty, to acquire self-control by the cultivation of virtue; to do justice, both as a matter of legality and equity; and to manifest benevolence by friendship, magnanimity, love, and deeds of beneficence.

4. *Noah K. Davis*, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Virginia.—In his treatise entitled "Elements of Ethics," Davis begins with a chapter on Psychology, followed by one on Philosophy.

He says: "Ethics assumes a basis, develops a system, and elaborates rules for the conduct of men individually and collectively. In view of its basis, ethics is the science of rights; in view of its system, ethics is the science of obligation."

He regards the speculations of evolutionists as hazardous, though pleasing, and says: "We are rather concerned to know what morality is, and purpose to study its phenomena as manifest in mankind of to-day and of history."

With regard to Christian ethics, he says: "A science may not borrow its essence, nor appeal to authority in support of its doctrines. More especially, we should not confuse science and revelation."

Davis assumes human nature as the basis of ethics. "There are certain fundamental and essential features of

humanity which no process of suppression or violation can wholly efface.

"A right and an obligation exist only as they co-exist. . . . Rights are logically prior; they condition and originate the corresponding obligations."

Davis shows that every person has rights which others are under obligation to respect; that the primary rights, each of which involves the others, may be summed up as the right to life, to liberty, and to property, or the right to be, to do, and to have. "A man has a right to the free use of his powers in the gratification of his normal desires." He says: "Freedom lies in the power of choice. It renders possible not only moral obligation, but an infinite variety of self-determined activities. . . . Freedom is subjective, liberty is objective."

Liberty is restricted by the rights of others; and it may be interfered with in many ways by internal or external considerations, or by means warranted or unwarranted.

"A right is conditioned on a social relation. A wrong, however, is conditioned on a right." The word *trespass* is used with some latitude as coextensive with wrong, the various forms of which are specified.

Davis shows how an obligation is related to law, and how it is enforced by the sanctions of rewards and penalties.

Davis gives a careful treatment of right and wrong as moral qualities of voluntary personal action, also of justice, duty, and virtue, of selfishness and service, of charity and welfare, and of Deity. He says: "The existence of God is a postulate of ethics."

The second part of the book treats of organization—the man, the family, the community, the State, and the Church.

5. *Frank Thilly*, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Missouri.—In his “Introduction to Ethics,” Thilly begins by showing that science, by analyzing and classifying things and occurrences, reduces confusion to order, or makes a cosmos out of chaos. Not content with knowing facts, science searches for causes. Hence science has for its subject matter the analysis, classification, and explanation of phenomena.

Thilly says: “The subject matter of ethics is morality, the phenomena of right and wrong. . . . That we place a value upon things, that we call them right or good, wrong or bad, is the important fact in ethics, is what makes a science of ethics possible. . . . Ethics may now be roughly defined as the science of right and wrong, the science of duty, the science of moral judgment and conduct.”

He then gives the relation of ethics to psychology, to politics, and to metaphysics.

As to method, he says we must look outward and inward for moral facts, which we are to study and interpret.

The division of ethics into theoretical and practical corresponds to the distinction between science and art—the principles and the practice.

The value of ethics is seen in the fact that it assists us in distinguishing right from wrong, and gives us an ideal standard of attainment.

Thilly gives a historical sketch of the theories of conscience from the mythical view, through the various schools of ethics to the present time.

In his own analysis and explanation of conscience, Thilly shows the importance of psychological analysis. We find the feeling of obligation, of approval or disapproval, and the cognitive judgment. What is the genesis of these elements? Children, having an innate moral capacity, are taught the knowledge of right and wrong, which has been discovered by the experience of the human race, generated through fear or hope.

The effect of experience has been transmitted, and is inherited as a tendency or bias to accept certain opinions as self-evident or intuitive.

It has been thought that conscience will be felt to be more authoritative if it is considered as the voice of God. It does not detract from the force of moral obligation to know how conscience was generated. An insight into its origin no more destroys the authority of conscience, than the understanding of the psychology of courage makes a man a coward. If God has employed evolution in developing conscience, it is no less the voice of God.

What is the ultimate ground of moral distinctions and of moral obligation? Why does conscience declare a certain act right or another wrong? What makes an act right or wrong? The theological school answers, The will of God; the intuitive or common sense school, The inherent goodness or badness of the act; the teleological school, The effect of the act. The last is Thilly's view. He says: "The ultimate ground of moral distinctions lies in the effects which acts tend to produce."

But what kind of effects are ultimately desirable? If we say pleasure, we have hedonism, egoistic or altruistic; if we say perfection, we have energism, egoistic or

altruistic. But we can take the higher forms of pleasure, better called happiness or satisfaction, then we have eudemonism.

Energism is the theory of perfection. The realization of a worthy self, given in the consciousness of rectitude, affords complete satisfaction, which is the ultimate end, the highest good.

Thilly gives an able discussion of the highest good, enforcing the teleological view. He advocates optimism as opposed to pessimism. He attempts a reconciliation of freedom and determinism. "The will is determined in the sense that it has uniform antecedents, that it does not act capriciously and without reason, but according to law. The will is free in the sense that it is not coerced by anything outside of itself." That is, the will determines its own volitions, in view of reasons, according to law, which may be accepted as true. As to volitions they, as effects, are determined; determinism holds true, but the determining factor is not the motive, but the person, who decides in view of the motive as a reason.

Chapter XX

OTHER MORALISTS—EVOLUTIONISTS

C. *M. WILLIAMS.*—In Part I of his “Evolutional Ethics,” Williams presents condensed reviews, though with sufficient clearness, of the moral systems of Darwin, Wallace, Haeckel, Spencer, Fiske, Rolph, Barrett, Stephen, Carneri, Höffding, Gizycki, Alexander, and Ree.

In his Introduction to Part II, he says: “In the very beginning the theory of evolution may be said to have three distinct branches, represented by the Nebular theory in astronomy, Haeckel’s Ontogeny, and the biology of Lamarck, Darwin, Wallace, and Huxley; and to these should properly be added the sociological ethics of Spencer.”

Of the relation of evolution to science, he says: “Modern science has so grown to and by the theory of evolution that the overthrow of the latter means nothing more nor less than the destruction of science itself in its highest results.” He admits, however, that evolution does not account for the origin of life. He says: “Science has no desire to be dogmatic. It readily acknowledges the total absence of direct and established proof at this particular juncture of the beginning of life.” He adds: “What significance a primal creation merely of lowest organisms can have for either a defense of hu-

man dignity or for Christian theology, it is difficult to perceive." If nature can not evolve life from inorganic matter, the logical inference is: a supernatural being is the origin of life, and if God created primal organisms, it is reasonable to believe that he guides their evolution.

In his chapter on "The Concepts of Evolution," Williams says: "To Darwin himself the struggle for existence was always between unities represented by complete organisms, whether as isolated individuals, or in family, tribal, or national groups. Everywhere in his calculations, appearing unchanged in his results, is found the unknown quantity of variation from ancestral type, the known factors being heredity and natural and sexual selection in the struggle for existence.

Besides the external struggle for existence of organisms with organisms, there is the internal struggle, the competition and antagonism of organs, as shown by Lewes in his essay on the "Nature of Life." The muscular system may develop at the expense of the brain, or the reverse. Disproportionate exercise of certain organs may be called for by changing external conditions, and the change required in the work of an organ would, if continued for generations, lead to a change of structure. This corresponds to Spencer's definition: "Life is a continual adjustment of inner relations to outer relations." Of this definition, Williams says: "Though emphasizing an important side of evolution, it is evidently incomplete. Evolution is not only the adjustment of inner relations to outer relations; it is also the adjustment of outer relations to inner relations, as well as of inner relations among themselves. . . . The great question is, then, how much is to be allowed for original tendency in

primal organisms, and how much is to be reckoned to the account of the action of the environment in the course of evolution."

Again: "The general experience of mankind has recognized, in a thousand ways, that the individual is a creature of habit. The strength of the muscle, the cunning of hand or eye or ear, mental acuteness, and even liability to temptation in any direction, or on the other hand moral strength, all are coincident with exercise.

"It is also obvious that when, from our point of view, we distinguish between the organism as acted on by the environment, and the environment as acting, we make a distinction that may be both useful and necessary for many purposes, but that is yet an arbitrary one. . . . The two are interactive; and from their interaction arises change, as resultant, in both organism and environment."

In regard to the seeming mystery of the complex processes of life, Williams says: "We understand the simple parallelogram by which the physicist represents to us the action of two forces at incidence; . . . but when we come to consider the formation of a crystal, and watch the regularity of shape and grouping, this very uniformity which had been before an explanation now seems all at once to represent an insoluble mystery, separating the processes forever from those others. The more complicated the process becomes, the more the mystery appears to increase, until we build up out of a negative ignorance some positive new entity to baffle us. . . . The passage from the inorganic into the organic, and back into the inorganic is, in fact, no more mysterious than the evaporation of water and its recon-

densation. . . . We carry our human importance into all science, and so invest, with greater weight and mystery, ignorance that concerns our life and that of allied forms."

Again: "The abstraction of *natural selection* is too often elevated to a separate entity, a particular power residing in the environment. It is, on the contrary, a mere fiction, a device for assisting our comprehension of complex action and reaction. . . . There is always a physical function connected with the psychical, and the relation of the two is not an accidental or variable, but a constant one. . . . Whatever the metaphysical truth as to the freedom of the will, such freedom can not interfere with the constancy of nature." Man can lift a weight against gravity; but the weight of a body is still a constant force; yet a person has freedom of will in controlling his psychical activities; he does this, not without motives, which are reasons for action, but not compelling causes.

In his chapter on "Intelligence and End," Williams raises the question as to "where the point lies at which the boundary line is to be drawn between reason and an automatism of instinct or organic action. . . .

"If we begin with man, and assume intelligence to be the cause of design—of the purposeful, the self-preserving—in his action, we shall be likely to infer intelligence as the cause of self-preserving function in all animals, and shall find great difficulty in drawing any distinct line between intelligence and automatism. . . . If we begin with inorganic matter and assume automatism to be the cause of its motion, we are likely, ascending the scale of organic existence, to interpret much of

its function as due to material action and reaction, and may again from this side find great difficulty in drawing the line where intelligence begins. . . . Assuming that consciousness is the cause of movement by which man attempts to arrive at his ends, what reason have we for supposing consciousness to exist outside of man? Assuming mechanical action and reaction to be the cause of movement in inorganic nature, what reason have we for assuming this to be the cause of action in organic existence? . . . Materialism is as much metaphysics as spiritualism; and the materialist who condemns metaphysics condemns himself."

Williams says: "We may furthermore protest against the elevation of any negative, as for instance Spencer's Unknowable, to a term signifying a positive existence." But Spencer says the ultimate reality is that Power whose existence is of all things most certain; it is not a negative. Williams closes this chapter by saying: "We know matter and motion only as united; we know no state of absolute rest. . . . We have no proof of the absence of consciousness outside of animal life, and no proof of the non-existence of transcendental causes, though likewise no proof of their existence."

In regard to the *will*, Williams says: "The most essential characteristic of the will, as a psychical faculty, is that it is connected with action which has in view some end consciously sought. . . . The arresting action of the will, as the control of lower by higher centers, is its most important function. . . . The physiologist calls attention to the fact that the so-called freedom of the will has for its basis physiological processes, all

of which are in accordance with the strict uniformity of nature, all subject to law, and all, as we believe, capable of exact prediction from the conditions which produce them, if we but comprehend these conditions. . . . The survival of any organism, at a given period, is determined by the fitness of that organism for the conditions of the environment at that period. The form and function of the animal are thus at each moment determined by the environment. . . . The individual appears to himself to will ends, whereas they are all determined for him by the survival of the fittest, whose function he inherits and carries out, subject to the modification of the peculiar elements of his own environment. . . . We may consider all evolution of higher function as increased adaptation; that is, as harmony with an ever wider circle of nature, the reason appearing as corresponding concomitant knowledge of this widening circle to which the function is adjusted. . . . Evolutional ethics demonstrates the constancy of character, the persistence of habit, the uniformity of change, under the influence of environment. If there is no persistence of character and uniformity in its action, we have no reason, as various authors have shown, for trust or distrust, for praise or blame; and I think we may add, none for love or dislike, reverence or contempt, enthusiasm or coldness, in the contemplation of character or conduct." Here Williams reverses the common opinion that if a person acts from necessity, he deserves neither praise nor blame. Freedom implies the absence of necessity, not that a person will act contrary to his character. A person is not necessarily lawless, because free from compulsion. A thief will steal if he has oppor-

tunity; an honest man will not; each acts according to his character; but a man can change his character, else reformation is impossible.

Williams says: "We can not explain why two activities are concomitant. . . . Any explanation of facts beyond analysis, except as we assume some transcendental intuition, is impossible."

A person can look forward to the desirable ends of excellency of character and consequent conduct and happiness, and in view of these ends he can act, and thus change his habits, modify his character, govern his volitions, and control his conduct. In any act of the will, the motive does not make the decision; the person makes it according to his character, in consideration of motives; but because free to determine his own volitions he is not necessarily fickle, or capricious, or lawless. A reasonable being acts reasonably.

Williams treats of the mutual relations of thought, feeling, and will in evolution. As to the relation of pleasure and pain to the will, he says: "We can not consider indefinite feeling alone as the mover of the will to an end. The pleasurable or painfulness is predicated of some definite end or event, and corresponds to definite actualities perceived in the object or event, or imagined with the help of former experience."

"Pleasure follows the line of evolution of function, strongest pleasure appearing in the direction of most strongly developed function, so that, just as any conflict of tendencies to function in the brain must result in conquest by the strongest tendency, the line of action must always correspond with that of the greatest pleasure. . . . If all habit comes in time to be pleasurable, if

pleasure merely follows the line of exercise of function, whatever that line may be, and ends are thus matters of habit, and habit is a matter of action and reaction of all conditions, then it is evident that the force of the teleological argument is at once destroyed. We can not pass beyond nature by this route to the inference of a transcendental cause." But conscience speaks with authority, with a menace or an approval, declaring that the ego is responsible for its decisions, that it is not an automaton acting by constraint, but a free personality acting without compulsion, though not without reason.

In his treatment of egoism and altruism in evolution, Williams holds that altruism is developed from egoism, first from the family relations, from which it is extended to the tribe and the race.

He contends for the influence of heredity, in evidence of which he narrates the facts relating to the *Jukes family*; yet he allows for environment, the influence of which is shown by conclusive evidence on every hand.

In regard to the evolution of conscience, Williams holds that motives are mixed, the selfish with the unselfish. Reason is involved, and determines right and wrong. Sympathy leads to efforts for the bestowal of benefits and the prevention of injury. Altruistic conduct, originating in the domestic affections, at length seeks the general welfare, and by reflex action affords satisfaction to the doer. As it is seen to promote the good of all concerned, it is believed to be right, and thus develops conscience, which adds the sense of obligation by approval of right conduct and disapproval of wrong.

To appreciate moral conduct is to learn to be moral. The highest form of moral conduct is to do good to others for their sakes. Satisfaction is found in their welfare, showing how intimately blended are altruistic and egoistic motives. If one found no satisfaction in doing an act of kindness, it would, as a matter of indifference, not likely be performed. It is true, however, that one does not do good to others for his own sake, but for their sake, yet in doing them good enjoyment unsought comes to himself.

The standard of conscience is advancing with the progress of the race. Egoism is not lost with advancing altruism, but is becoming more refined in its action.

Williams traces the moral progress of the race from savagery to civilization. Even in enlightened Greece, cruelties were practiced on the helpless and barbarities on slaves, criminals, and prisoners of war. In Rome gladiatorial shows and contests with wild beasts were the sports of the populace.

The Middle Ages were disgraced by the barbarous punishment of criminals, the persecution of Jews and heretics, the burning of witches, and the partiality of the laws discriminating against the poor and in favor of the rich.

Even now we seem to be only at the threshold of civilization; but the unrest of the times is a groping after better things. Higher ideals begin to inspire the masses. Enlightened nations are coming to a better understanding, so that we may say not the past with its darkness, not the present with its evils, but the future with its hopes, is the golden age of man.

As morality is progressive, it follows that the emi-

nently good man is not the man of average morality, but the leader of moral progress, who carries forward the standard in advance of his age.

As the evolution of human society relates, not to one nation only, but to the whole world, progress is hindered by the uncivilized and non-progressive races.

To what extent should the moral make sacrifices for the general welfare? Not to make any sacrifice would delay progress, and this would involve loss to the moral themselves.

The theory of evolution is a large addition to the progress of thought, and is a source of hope for the future.

Williams objects to Christian ethics, especially to the morality of the Old Testament because of its cruelty, and to the doctrine of the atonement of the New Testament, as encouragement to sin. It will suffice to reply that we do not justify the cruelties of the Hebrews, and that forgiveness of sin is promised on condition of repentance, which means reformation—a new and righteous life.

The disagreement of opinion in regard to moral progress is not as to what the ethical ideal should be, but as to the method of its attainment.

In the sociological contest between the individualist and the socialist, the claim of the individualist can not be allowed that his doings are of no consequence to society, nor is the demand of the socialist for a revolution in social conditions likely to be realized. Practical reforms will be inaugurated from time to time as their importance is understood by the majority of the people. Great problems relating to the care of the unfortunate,

the treatment of criminals, the relations of the sexes, the education of children and youth, will continue to be presented, and their adequate solution will require the united wisdom of the better classes of society.

2. *Clifford*.—In treating of the scientific basis of morals, Clifford says: "The moral sense is the pleasure or displeasure taken in conduct felt to be right or wrong. The maxims of ethics are the imperatives: Do this because it is right; avoid that because it is wrong. The particular things commanded or forbidden by a person's moral sense depend on his character. That seems right or wrong which pleases or displeases his moral sense. There is a general agreement in the ethical code of persons of the same race at a given time; but considerable variations in different races at different times."

The maxims of ethics are hypothetical, and are derived from experience on the assumption of uniformity in nature.

Self signifies the conscious subject; it also denotes an aggregate of feelings bound together by habitual association. The body is taken as belonging to self. Remote motives revolve about self, and thus tend to become simple and immediate. In this comes the conception of the family, city, and tribal self, which by extension in higher natures becomes the self of humanity. The disposition which makes these higher selves supreme Clifford calls *piety*.

Self then serves as a *peg* on which desires are hung. The individual self is the peg on which are hung remote desires affecting the individual; the tribal self is the peg supporting desires implanted by the needs of the tribe.

Those tribes that encourage piety; that is, dispositions and conduct conducive to the common interests, survive; tribes that fail to do this perish. When an individual does an act harmful to the community, the desire of his individual self is stronger than that of the tribal self. On reflection, the tribal self wakes up, and the individual condemns his conduct. This self-condemnation is *conscience*, and the accompanying dislike of himself is *remorse*.

Like or dislike is to be distinguished from its expression, which is attached to the feeling by links of association. The expression serves the purpose of retaining or repeating the thing liked or of removing the thing disliked, and this purpose is served by the tribal approbation or disapprobation. It promotes the welfare of the tribe to encourage piety and to discourage impiety. The process by which this is done is direct or reflex; by the direct process the offender is cut off, but by the indirect he is punished in view of his reformation. The person in either case is held responsible for his conduct.

Clifford holds that the ethical maxims are hypothetical. They are learned by the tribe from the experience of their utility; and being acquired, not directly, but by tribal selection, they appear to the individual unconditional or categorical; but their hypothetical character is apparent on reflection. If an individual wishes to live with his tribe, he must conform to its customs; if he does not conform, his conscience upbraids him.

The maxims of ethics are based on uniformity. Volitions occur according to law; they are not uncaused; they are caused by the person himself according to his

character and circumstances. Will as volition or choice or decision is not free, but caused. The person alone is free to cause his volitions; he is free from external compulsion or restraint, and is at liberty to make his decisions according to the light of reason.

Clifford thinks that ethics is a matter of tribe or community, and that there is no self-regarding virtue. But certainly a person can cultivate his virtues, first for his own sake; and, secondly, for the sake of the community. It is his duty, for the sake of others, to make himself as strong, as wise, as good as possible.

Ethical investigation demands two postulates—the uniformity of nature, and the existence of other persons, conscious like ourselves. On our belief in these postulates we are obliged to act. To the facts of moral life in ourselves and others we can apply the scientific method.

That a person be morally responsible for an action, Clifford holds that three things are necessary: "He might have done something else, that is to say, the action was not wholly determined by external circumstances, and he is responsible only for the choice which was left him; he had a conscience; the action was one in regard to the doing or not doing of which conscience might be a sufficient motive."

Here it is well to note Clifford's definition: "Conscience is the whole aggregate of our feelings about actions as being right or wrong, regarded as tending to make us do the right actions and avoid the wrong ones."

The *crux* of the matter lies in the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary. A man coughs;

that is involuntary, and he is not responsible. He steals; that is voluntary, and he is responsible.

Clifford classifies actions as involuntary or voluntary; involuntary, in which the choice of motive is involuntary; and voluntary, in which the choice of motive is voluntary. In each case the responsibility is in that part of the character which determines what the act shall be. Responsibility is not for involuntary action, but for voluntary.

The passions, desires, aversions, pleasures, pains, are to be distinguished from the deeper self, called reason, will, ego, which is responsible, not for the motive, but for the choice of motive.

A person, however, is responsible for many circumstances, for many restrictions on his own freedom, for those which he voluntarily produced.

To suppose the character of the action is not connected with the character of the ego, is to render the act lawless, and the attempt to change the character needless, at least so far as the conduct is concerned. It is not necessary, however, to hold that the ego is *determined*; that is, *compelled* by the motive. He is not passive in choice, but active. He freely acts in accordance with a reasonable motive. A reasonable being will act reasonably, without compulsion. The thing that is free is not the choice, which is made, but the person who makes the choice. In like circumstances a person of given character in making his choice will freely act uniformly, according to character. A person's character is, however, subject to modification by the person himself.

The function of conscience is the preservation of

the community, and we rightly train our conscience by learning to approve those actions which tend to the advantage of the community in the struggle for existence. Clifford says: "The first principle of natural ethics is the sole and supreme allegiance of conscience to the community." He holds that efficiency, not happiness, is the end of moral action, yet he admits that in the long run happiness will be the outcome of efficiency. If no good, except preservation, came to the community from efficiency, preservation itself would be a matter of little consequence.

Clifford is strenuous in his advocacy of veracity. The exceptional cases should remain exceptional. Falsehood should not be propagated because believed to be useful. Falsehood can not be necessary to morality. Faith in humanity and in the duty of truthfulness must finally prevail.

Clifford says: "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one to believe anything on insufficient evidence." It is sometimes necessary to act on probabilities; for in this way we often find evidence for future belief.

The reputation of a man for veracity may warrant the belief that he intends to speak the truth; but it is not sufficient to prove that he knows the truth.

The fact that believers have found joy in believing a doctrine, proves that the doctrine is comforting to them, not that it is true.

It is right to doubt the uncertain, to question the implications of a doctrine, to investigate new problems, to correct imperfect views, to enlarge and test our knowledge, and to apply it for the benefit of mankind.

How far can we trust to inference that goes beyond experience? From the experience we had yesterday, we infer what will happen to-morrow; but we know the experience of yesterday only through memory, which sometimes fails us; the inference that a like thing will happen to-morrow also assumes that the future will be consistent with the past. Every belief goes beyond experience; but what beliefs are legitimate, and what is their warrant? Clifford gives a summary answer: "We may believe what goes beyond our experience, when it is inferred from that experience by the assumption that what we do not know is like what we know. We may believe the statement of another person, when there is reasonable ground for supposing that he knows the matter of which he speaks, and that he is speaking the truth so far as he knows it. It is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence; and where it is presumption to doubt and to investigate, there it is worse than presumption to believe."

Clifford defines religion as a system of doctrines, a ceremonial or cult, with a priesthood, a body of precepts and a moral code. He condemns in strong terms a religion which requires belief without evidence, and the pagan religions which represent their gods as immoral, also the so-called Christian doctrines of original sin, vicarious sacrifice, and eternal punishment. He holds that it is immoral to uphold a false doctrine, because of its supposed favorable influence on morals. Priestcraft he unsparingly denounces; but he applauds the Sermon on the Mount, and such preachers of righteousness as Charles Kingsley and James Martineau.

Clifford admits that belief in God and in immortality is a source of refined and elevated pleasure; but maintains that conscience, instead of being the voice of God, is the voice of humanity, organized as an instinct in the evolution of the race; that it is not a creed, but a habit formed by social co-operation.

Chapter XXI

OTHER MORALISTS

S. *ALEXANDER.*—In his “Moral Order and Progress,” of which we give a condensed summary, Alexander gives a twofold division of the work of ethics: To supply a catalogue of the virtues, duties, and the corresponding moral judgments; and to discuss the signification of these judgments.

He notes the convergence of the ethical schools—utilitarianism developing into evolutionary ethics on the one hand, and into Kantian idealism on the other. The convergence is not merely of precepts, but in scientific treatment and in the result a recognition of proportion in the organic connection between the individual and society.

Egoism was followed by altruistic utilitarianism, which enlarged the moral end. Evolutional ethics still further enlarged the end, by accounting for the relation of the individual to the moral law, to society, and the State, as shown in historical research and biological investigation.

The idea of freedom has a two-sided development, relating to the rights of the individual and to the rights of society as a collective body.

How did moral judgments come to be, and how are they maintained, developed, or changed? The an-

swer depends on the answer to other questions: What is the good? Why is it good? How does goodness come into being, how is it maintained, and how does it advance?

Moral judgments pertain to voluntary action relating to a good or bad end, the idea of which is present to consciousness. The terms good and bad are properly applied to ends, but sometimes to voluntary acts, though to acts, so far as they have a moral bearing, the terms right and wrong are more appropriately applied. Feelings, as affections and desires, have a moral bearing as well as choice, conduct, and consequences. External conduct has its internal correlate in the intention, which is morally significant, even in case of failure to realize the end, as when the intended act is prevented or the proposed end frustrated.

Alexander says moral character exists only in conduct—in internal conduct, or choice and intention, and in external conduct, or outward act. Common sentiments find expression in common habits and customs. Character resides in the person, and is more permanent than conduct; it expresses itself in conduct; that is, in choice, intention, and execution. The person is responsible for his conduct and its foreseen consequences.

Motive has moral character only as it is adopted as a reason for action. Conduct and character are the two factors of the moral personality. As regard for self, prudence, so far as consistent with public welfare, is a virtue, and therefore a duty. Ethics in passing from the utilitarian to the evolutionary system, has replaced the ideal of the end, as pleasure by that of social health, which is a living fountain of perpetual satisfaction.

Individualism and universalism in morals tend to harmony—individualism is becoming more socialistic, and universalism more individualistic, as it is seen that the individual receives benefit from the prosperity of society, and society from the welfare of the individuals of which it is composed. The general prosperity should, therefore, be the common aim.

The acts of a good man are adjusted to one another. A good character finds expression in a systematic order of harmonious volitions and actions, which satisfies every part of its nature. A good man is one whose character and conduct are well balanced. The ideal of a moral life, though not fully attained, is the end towards which progress is continually made. Every right act is so far a realization of the ideal end, which is, therefore, not to be conceived as infinitely removed in time, but as the whole life manifested in a series of right acts as the expression of a character tending to perfection. The moral aim, then, is to have a present and continued good character, expressed in present and continued right conduct. A good moral life is therefore an increasing variable, daily approaching ideal perfection as its limit.

Morality is the most important function of the individual as a member of society. Each individual has his special work, and duty varies in the different individuals according to their endowments, circumstances, and the requirements of the social order, so that there should be an equilibrium between the members of society, as there should be between the acts of the individual. The self-regarding virtues have a social bearing, and to disregard them involves evil, and is, therefore, immoral.

People pass judgment on others, especially on their acquaintances; but as actions become more complex, and their motives more concealed, they are left, more and more, to the conscience of the individual, though one will deceive himself if he imagines that his true character is not known to his associates. Every moral act leaves its impress on the character of the agent. The actions of an individual are good or bad according as they are so adjusted as to promote or retard the progress of society. Each person ought first to adjust his acts to one another, and then himself to the social order, so as to be in harmony with himself and with society.

In the formation of character people are both passive and active—passive as the character is modified by circumstances; active as they contribute to its formation by their own voluntary acts. The social ideal has its concrete counterpart in the social organization, which good men conspire to render more and more an adequate expression of their ideal—the true independence of the individual in harmony with his co-operation with society. Obligation is the duty of adjusting our conduct so as to promote the true progress, and hence the welfare of the social organization.

With an upright man duty and inclination are not antagonistic. At the call of duty he subordinates his own interests to those of society. In morals right and duty are identical; and though individuals differ as to particular moral acts, the consensus of opinion of the wise and good represents quite correctly the true moral standard.

It is the goodness of the good man that approves of goodness in another, or disapproves of badness. The

goodness or badness is not, however, a new quality of action, but is a conformity or non-conformity to the social order. The good man from habitual conscientious conduct at length spontaneously acts in conformity to the social welfare.

The conscience is the tribunal from which moral judgments are pronounced. The surety of moral order is the general cultivation of a refined conscience. The social conscience is the criterion by which conduct is estimated. Self-love and self-sacrifice are harmonized by the fact that a person is ennobled by his efforts in behalf of the common welfare.

Altruistic instincts are as original as the egoistic; neither are these instincts nor their corresponding acts necessarily antagonistic. The moral man exerts his energies in doing what is appropriate, without attempting nicely to balance the egoistic and altruistic consequences. The good sacrifice their own pleasure for the welfare of others; and though they realize a higher good, yet it is not for this that they make the sacrifice. Good conduct is voluntary, and the will is strengthened by every right act which tests the moral purpose.

Character approximates perfection in proportion as it expresses itself in that conduct which, in view of all the circumstances, is believed likely to produce the best possible consequences. The consequence of conduct is seldom a single result, but is more commonly a combination or a series of results whose aggregate is not like the single monomial sum of similar terms, but like a polynomial sum of dissimilar terms connected by the sign plus.

The results of conduct are various, differing in qual-

ity as well as in quantity, their variety and variability adding to their value. Happiness, though not excluding pleasurable sensations, is chiefly the ethical satisfaction from the consciousness of rectitude, accompanying present right conduct, or derived from reflection on right conduct in the past.

Pleasure and pain involve both active and passive elements—active attending voluntary action, passive when caused by environment. Pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, perfection, are all involved in the complex end—the greatest good of the greatest number.

Acts are spontaneous or instinctive, as well as reflective. Their explanation is found in the evolution of organism, and the formation of habits and customs through many generations of ancestors.

The fact that pleasure is diminished if directly sought, does not prove that it is not involved in the end of action, or that it is unwelcome when realized, but that it is wiser to look after the cause than to be solicitous for the effect. The effects of right conduct are indeed manifold.

Is life worth living? The end of ethical effort—health, achievement, satisfaction—is to make life worth living; and every good man's aim should be to make it worth living to the greatest possible number.

Actual moral conduct is more variable than the moral standard, which, as the consensus of the ethical views of those who form public sentiment, is subject to a slow change, usually perceptible only after a considerable lapse of time. Morality is embodied not only in the virtues, but in habits, customs, and institutions, which vary in different nations and in different periods.

Moral progress signifies an advance in ideal and conduct as opposed to retrogression, or even to a halt. It is a change from the present status to a higher condition, by a more perfect adjustment of means to ends, as tested by the consequences. The motive for the acceptance or rejection of a proposed plan of conduct, is its congruity or incongruity with character and circumstance, though the tests of its fitness may be the pleasures or pains following its adoption.

A suitable reform, advocated by popular leaders, attracts the majority, and the new ideal comes triumphant from a struggle of ideas and the survival of the fittest. The evil or the obsolete is defeated in its struggle with the good and the progressive; but it is not wise to attempt a project doomed to defeat, though in itself good, since it will only postpone the time of its triumph. A true reformer is one who forecasts the movement of society, and times his effort and secures the adoption of his measures. Discussion and agitation and education are necessary to inform the public mind and prepare it for decision.

Evil is not good for a bad man, but to overcome evil strengthens a good man. As a rule, goodness accords with interests. It is the victorious ideal; but sometimes a bad man seems to be successful. He eludes punishment, or is not restrained by censure, or the moral sentiment of the community is too weak to bring him to justice; but his success is only temporary.

Moral sanctions do not chiefly consist in rewards and penalties, but in the character of human nature as it has been evolved in the experience of past generations through the struggle and adjustment of social forces.

Responsibility, involving the harvest of consequences, re-enforces the obligation of right conduct. The will, as volition, is determined by character in view of motive; but the will by retrospect and forethought can modify character. Punishment strengthens a weak will and assists in changing conduct and eventually character; but a proper education is the true method of forming character. The ideals of different races and nations will approximate towards harmony; but there will remain enough difference to cause a healthy action and reaction.

2. *Frederick D. Maurice* (1805-1872).—Maurice is the author of a historical work on "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," in two volumes.

This treatise, though somewhat vague in its statement of the various theories, yet manifests wide sympathies and a desire to discover the truth contained in all schools of philosophy, declaring that eclecticism is a necessity of the age.

Liberal in theology, Maurice valued religion for its reformatory power and its determination of the inclinations and feelings. He thus sympathized with the liberal tendencies of the times, and valued truth wherever found. He appealed to the heart, the conscience, and the reason.

Maurice was somewhat of a mystic, but justified his mysticism by saying that his intuition was not private, but a universal faculty of the human heart. What is the test of a true intuition, by which it can be distinguished from a mere fancy of the imagination? This is the question to which Maurice is continually endeavoring to find an answer. It is the apprehension of the

inner light, the revelation of God to the soul; it is what St. Paul declares to be the love of God shed abroad in the human heart. As a matter of individual experience, a concrete fact, it is difficult to formulate as a doctrine. The subjective experience is, however, the true interpretation of a historic religion. This experience has not been unknown to the wise and good of all past ages. The true light enlighteneth every receptive mind.

The discovery of a truth does not create the truth; for it pre-existed. Its discovery is a revelation; its apprehension and appreciation is the highest characteristic of man, who, whatever be his origin, is the glory of the earth. The true wisdom of man is to make himself morally the best possible.

The true light that has enlightened the nations has varied, not in essential property, but in form, according to the characteristics of the people. The Athenians worshiped the unknown God. We show our faith in truth when we "study manfully the inquiries of men in all directions, starting from all points." Much is gained from every school of philosophy or system of ethics, even from the various creeds of theology, or the speculations of metaphysics. The partial truths found in the various systems, relating to conscience, self-interest, sympathy, sense knowledge, rational knowledge, investigation, proof, induction, deduction, utility, happiness, perfection, all present phases of truth resting upon deeper principles of human nature.

The error of each phase of thought is to call all other phases erroneous. The finite is as much the negation of the infinite, as the infinite is of the finite. The extremities of a straight line are only arbitrary limits.

The line itself goes beyond these limits infinitely in both directions. Wisdom has been working in all systems of thought, and in them we find explanations of individual experience. This wisdom works in the minds of men, prompting them to search for the ultimate principles, to cultivate language, to search for the real, the eternal, the true, the beautiful, the good, to develop religious systems, to found societies, and to found and consolidate empires. The past and the present have supplied the seeds for the future. To find a home in a particular opinion or system is to find a prison. If we would have freedom, we must transcend the narrow creed of a single system. We need teachers of various schools. The spirit of wisdom is our guide into all truth.

It is, however, a mistake to search only for the conclusions of the various schools of philosophy; for these conclusions are premature attempts to terminate the search for wisdom, by assuming that the whole truth has been found. Much more profitable and interesting is it to trace the workings of the minds of the philosophers in reaching their conclusions, to discover how they were affected by their times, their associates, their opponents, to witness the conflict of school with school, to understand the evolution of the various systems of thought, and the effect of these systems on subsequent speculations.

Maurice selects from Hebrew literature the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Job, and the prophets, as having philosophical and ethical value. Hebrew theology he considers a revelation of God to his people, as their strength and support. The Decalogue is the expression of universal principles. The history of Israel is the

history of God's dealing with his people. Other nations have had a divine teacher, not always recognized. Egyptian theology founded upon man's conception of God, was employed to uphold society by divine sanction. The magicians, however, turned their knowledge to the support of tyranny. The Phœnician genius was commercial, and their religion idolatrous. The Babylonians cultivated astrology. The Persians believed in both a good and an evil spirit—Ormuzd and Ahriman—who were contending for the supremacy of the world. The Hindoos have their religion, their philosophy, and their social castes, and the Chinese the moral teachings of their sage, Confucius.

After sketching the philosophy of these nations, Maurice passes on to the clearer light of the Greek sages, and from Greek philosophy to Roman, mediæval and modern systems. The Divine mind, as Maurice maintains, has guided the course of thought, through Neo-Platonism, Christian teaching, and modern speculation, and has directed the evolution of morals towards the goal of human perfection and happiness. While we recognize the conflict between good and evil, we have reason for faith in the ultimate triumph of the good.

Chapter XXII

OTHER MORALISTS

H. S. NASH, professor in the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge.—(1) In his work, entitled “Genesis of the Social Conscience,” Nash aims to trace the development of *social conscience* from the Oriental, through the Greek and Roman civilization and that of the Middle Ages, to modern times.

He holds that in the Mediterranean world, for the first time in history, the individual man was clearly defined—not as this or that person, but as the generic individual, the humanity found in every man; that the worth of the individual, even of the common man, recognized by the prophets of Israel, was emphasized by Christianity; that the unity of God involves the unity of mankind; that the potential is larger than the actual, showing that the good of self-knowledge and self-mastery, possible in every man, better than his present best, is achieved by working out through his freedom his highest potentiality; that the sense of sin became a fact of consciousness, and a leveler and a foe of aristocracy; that the idea of the kingdom of God will disclose itself as the belief in human perfectibility, and as the duty of lifting the humblest of mankind to the attainment of the highest possibilities.

Neither Assyria nor Chaldea, neither Egypt nor Persia, recognized the rights of man. Greece was the home of individuality; philosophy and art flourished; the favored few were highly cultured; yet in Athens the slaves outnumbered the freemen. Rome, the seat of empire, became the home of despotism and brutality, as witnessed in the tyranny of the emperor, the sports of the circus, and the contests of the gladiators.

Christianity, in its life-and-death struggle with pagan and imperial Rome, finally gained the day. "The debate between the Christian and heathen concepts of God involved a warfare of ideals for humanity. The dogma of the incarnation completed the dogmas of creation and revelation. It affirmed that there is nothing in God which may not come into relation with mankind. It was all in the interest of the common man."

The slaves were freemen in Christ. In the Catacombs there is no inscription which shows that a slave was buried there. Christianity regards persons as the essence of reality. The offertory for the poor became a part of the eucharistic service.

The transfer of the seat of government from Rome to Constantinople left a free field for the development of the Church. The result was the papacy, or imperial Christianity. The unworldly, the intensely pious, sought the retirement of the cloister, where they could live a holy life undisturbed by the excitement of the world.

In the monastery the equality of man was recognized under the title of Christian brotherhood. The estimate of the worth of the individual soul was sure

to work out into the world and leaven the whole lump of humanity.

Monasticism opposed feudalism; the monks preserved learning. It was in the monasteries that the common man first won a complete emancipation; the social function of monastic life had its part in the preparation of our times. All men are not monks; the majority must live in the world; but to these the monks revealed their rights.

The Crusades stirred Europe to its depths. The Knights of the Cross, returning from the Holy Land, brought with them the learning of the Eastern Empire. The Renaissance, the learning of the Arabians, the fall of Constantinople, the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the discovery of America, the invention of the art of printing, the Protestant Reformation, were the mighty forces that developed the mind of Europe, and gave to the progress of civilization an impetus unparalleled in the history of the world.

We inherit our equipment of reason from Greece, of law from Rome, of conscience from Christianity. The intellect of the Church fused the philosophy of Greece with the morality of the Bible. The two movements—the Reformation and the Renaissance—the religious and the secular, broke with the past, and started human progress on a new course.

Christianity showed the moral goal. "The individual has an inherent right to happiness. It is the business of the State to guarantee the right." Every man has the divine right to be individual; but this right can be secured only in society, and by co-operating with his fellows for the common welfare; he must subordi-

nate his interests to those of the State. Even self-culture is not only for the sake of self, but for the well-being of society. "Let no man seek his own, but each his neighbor's good."

Rousseau was the embodiment of emotion, Kant of reason; both emotion and reason are necessary to the complete man. Sociology, which satisfies the feelings, must be guided by a philosophy which is approved by reason. The State guarantees justice; the Church quickens conscience; both have their problems. By their harmonious co-operation mankind will realize its high destiny.

(2) In his lectures on "Ethics and Revelation," Nash aims to mark out the road along which conscience must travel. History impresses upon our attention the importance of those social questions which involve the well-being of the human race. Conscience, which is consciousness permeated with a sense of obligation and responsibility, must take a wider range as knowledge of self and of society becomes broader and deeper. Religion, the sense of fellowship with God, the abiding reality in a world of change, gives assurance of ability to advance towards the ideal goal of being. It thus creates in ourselves, and aims to create in others, an abiding self-respect.

Christianity has a genius for history. The Bible claims to be the record of a revelation of the dealings of God with man. Criticism has its work and its faults; but it will learn to handle the Bible with respect. Conventionalism must give way to truth. Traditional things are shaken, that those things that can not be shaken may remain.

The work of the new century will be to create "a humanity that seeks to live nobly, and would fain lift mankind to the level of its own best things."

The sociology of the twentieth century will be guided by ethics inspired by revelation. "Nothing is easier, considering the narrow range of our vision, than to mistake some strong eddy near the shore for the deep current in the midstream of history."

Between the ancient and the modern world there are broad resemblances and deep differences. The one was the then known civilized world, the other is the actual world of all the nations. Christianity, to achieve success, must show itself to be the friend of man, the helper of the poor. At home it is challenged both by science and by labor; it must admit the claims of the one, and show itself the friend of the other.

The modern man has discovered the infinitude of the universe and the indefinite past of his race. In former times the typical outside opposer was the philosopher—Philo the Jew, or Plotinus the Gentile; now he is the man of science; but the man of science will be compelled to work in the interests of humanity. Man is more than an organized body. The brain can no more think than the eye can see; yet both are instrumental.

Culture is under obligation to regard the well-being of society; it should seek the refinement of the people. The highest culture must be based on equal rights, competence, health of body, and soundness of mind and morals. Ethics, the science of righteousness, leads to that religion whose two great principles are the *Fatherhood of God* and the *brotherhood of man*.

Nash shows that the State is the outcome of the

cosmic order; that it is necessary to the pursuit of science itself; that it is, therefore, to the interest of the man of science to care for the State, which is the surety of justice, the guardian of individual liberty; and that it is his right to demand a pure religion as a guarantee of the highest development of the social order.

Our knowledge needs to be organized by a great conception of that fundamental reality which gives stability to the universe, and law and order to society, investing it with beauty and dignity. The ultimate good is harmony with universal order, the foundation of which is God, the ultimate reality. To render God loving allegiance is true religion.

The State is the highest expression of the social order; its form may vary, but its principle is ever the same. The citizen is bound to render service to his fellow-men. Service itself is essential; its form is accidental, and may vary a thousand ways. In choosing the form of his service, the individual should follow the bent to his natural powers.

Human life is rational, and its value is of inestimable worth. The individual finds ample scope for the exercise of his strongest powers in the endeavor to realize his own highest possibilities, and the fullest ideal of social life. The law that rules society is the law that rules the universe—the law of harmony. Faith in this law is the religion of science—the enthusiasm of humanity for universal order.

What of the religions? Kuenen classifies them as national and universal, placing Buddhism with Christianity as universal; but they have essential differences. Christianity is optimistic, and proclaims the ultimate

triumph of the kingdom of God, and gives assurance of eternal life. Buddhism is pessimistic, unworldly, and proffers as its great reward the unconsciousness of nirvana.

The classification of religions as monotheistic and polytheistic has won a wide acceptance; but the massing of tribes into nations, and of nations into empires, made the triumph of monotheism inevitable.

Tiele divides religions into natural and ethical; but the moral progress of mankind demands an ethical religion.

Hegel classifies religions in respect to the principle of individuality, as religions of masses, religions of individuality, and the religion of the Spirit, or Christianity, in which the individual realizes his highest attainments by entering, with all his power, into the historical life of the race.

Deism has given way to pantheism; but pantheism is not friendly to individuality, nor does it square with the being and perpetuity of the State. The claims of personality and the needs of the State will incline reason to reject the impersonal god of pantheism, and to accept the personal God of Christianity as the ultimate reality—the God in whose keeping the interests of the individual and the welfare of society are forever safe.

The march of humanity is towards a universal confederation—the commonwealth of all the nations, insuring the rights of the individual, and his hearty co-operation with his fellow-men for the welfare of all mankind.

The man of science, realizing his individuality, knows the importance of maintaining his freedom of

thought, in order that he may discharge his duty, and thus meet his responsibilities. He witnesses the glory and majesty of the universe, and believes that at the foundation of things there is sincerity in which he can trust. The sense of responsibility inspires him with the belief that nature will supply him with resources of power to meet his responsibilities.

In its conflicts with paganism, the Church was trained to regard the State as alien, and to believe that the true spiritual life could be found only by a withdrawal from the world. The monastic tendency became so strong that it prevailed even when Christianity became the religion of the State. Mystical views of revelation prevailed, and the clergy were regarded as the infallible guides of conscience. It has, however, come to pass that thinking men, who believe in their own individuality and liberty, must follow their own conscience in regard to duty; and thus ethics is developed apart from religion.

As Christianity is the religion of the Bible, the interpretation of Scripture must not be exclusively under the control of the clergy, who are awake to their own interests, but thinkers must have the right of private judgment; they can accept the Bible as revelation, only as they realize that it speaks the truth of God to the reason and conscience of the people through spiritual men, whose reason and conscience were quickened by the Spirit of the living God.

The man who feels himself to be in harmony with the deepest principles of the universe maintains his dignity and self-respect through every conflict and amidst persecution or reproach.

Individuality, free thought, science, the free State, work together with morality and religion in the highest interests of the human race.

The philosophy of history is the true theodicy, vindicating the ways of God to man, showing that humanity is advancing towards the realization of a rational end—the perfection and happiness of all mankind.

History, the autobiography of society, is to society what memory is to the individual man. In history, the record of experience, there is found a unity of purpose, showing that the trend of events is not aimless, drifting without guidance, as an iceberg upon the great ocean. The instincts, the reason, the conscience, and the imagination, conspire to guide the voyage of humanity to the destined haven.

The dogmatic claim of infallibility must give place to the free thought of conscientious and rational individuality. The Church can stand without fear upon the Bible, open to the investigation of the deepest reason and the highest criticism. The allegorical interpretation of Scripture, attaching importance to symbol rather than to fact, must give place to the historical and critical. Not fate, but free will, under the guidance of reason, will secure for man his high destiny. The prophecies of the Bible point to future history, when righteousness shall cover the earth as the waters do the depths of the ocean.

The instinct of humanity assumes that the care of things assures the rights of individuality; that God's creative and providential energy is committed to the purpose of making what *is* harmonize with what *ought to be*.

Revelation assumes that God has given to man his best gifts. Though God respects the individuality and freedom of man, yet he invites his co-operation. The pantheistic view of God binds not only nature fast in fate, but the human will.

Christianity accepts Christ as the divine teacher of man in both religion and morals. Faith in the inmost center of things trusts the laws of nature as the laws of God.

Individuality must seek self-mastery, and bring its reason and conscience and dearest plans into harmony with God's eternal purposes, realizing that it finds its own highest good only as it works for the highest social welfare.

2. *Leslie Stephen*.—(1) Only a few salient points of Stephen's "Science of Ethics" can be given: Moralists are almost unanimous as to the *form* of right and wrong conduct, but as to the *essence* and *criterion* there is great disagreement.

Opinions widely spread deserve respect for their mere existence; they are phenomena to be accounted for. They gradually modify and approach each other, but perfect agreement is not to be expected.

It is not easy to predict the conduct of an individual or the uniformities in the action of society, as shown by statistics. The prediction of the course of history is still more difficult, and is beyond the power of the human mind.

In the same circumstances of outward environment and inward character human conduct does not change; but the difficulty is, the circumstances are usually not the same, either as to environment or as to character.

Social phenomena can not be explained by studying the constituent elements separately, but only in the interrelation of the parts to the whole. The problem of existence can not be solved theoretically, but only practically in ourselves and in the evolution of history.

Instincts correspond to certain permanent conditions, and differing opinions are explained by circumstances. The mechanical facts underlying mental processes do not disprove these processes, nor supersede their psychological statement. Hunger induces men to eat, whatever physiological implications are involved. Life is a struggle to diminish suffering and to realize pleasure. *Good* means everything that favors happiness, and *bad* everything that conduces to misery. The reasonable man is one who, instead of being a slave to immediate impulses, adapts means to ends, and follows that course of conduct, though not in itself agreeable, that promises the best results.

Happiness that determines the will is future; conduct is determined by present feeling, or by the judgment as to what is most desirable. A great part of conduct is automatic, or if at the instant we are conscious of the motive it is instantly forgotten. Reason and feeling are bound together. The reasonable man is a mirror of nature. His conduct shows a logical consistency in its parts. We start with certain relations between our instincts, the variations of which produce types of character.

The process of evolution is a discovery of efficiency of different kinds, affording the advantage of a variety of types. The useful, as pleasure-giving, approximately coincides with the useful as life-giving. An agent of a

certain character does what affords him pleasure, but his character is determined by the conditions of his existence.

The essential processes of life are automatic. Habits are formed by repetition; they can be overcome only by persistent change of conduct, involving modification of character; and as subject to change are not essential to life. The relations of the individual and the race are mutual, but certain qualities of the individual are variable. Society, though not strictly an organism, is an organization made up of component societies and individuals.

Positive law is based on custom which is the outgrowth of conduct. Moral law, as applicable to all the members of society, gives expression to the sentiments of the society in regard to certain forms of conduct which reason declares to be detrimental or beneficial, forbidding the one and encouraging the other. Morality, as a growth, is the fruit of a gradual evolution of the organic instincts through many generations. The fundamental precept of law, *Be strong*, implies other precepts as conditions—be temperate, be prudent, be truthful, be courageous.

Justice and benevolence are social virtues; they are altruistic in their consequences, though egoistic as to their source in the pleasure or pain of the doer. Sympathy implies the power to represent the feelings of others, so as to share their joys and sorrows.

Conscience is a complex of instincts and judgments; it pronounces conduct right or wrong, as it is conceived to be worthy or unworthy of the agent, or useful or hurtful to society. Happiness is the utilitarian test, and

health the evolutionary; they give approximately the same moral standard.

Why should a person be virtuous? Because virtue tends to the general welfare; it is favorable to health; it promotes happiness; it prevents discord, and produces harmony. If it requires self-sacrifice on occasion, it stamps heroic conduct with the seal of nobility, as worthy of the highest honors.

(2) The solid reputation Mr. Stephen gained by his two volumes, entitled "History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century," has awakened expectation of something great in his treatise of three volumes on "English Utilitarians," nor are we disappointed. The present work does not cover so wide a field as the former, but on this account it has greater unity, and is more definite and satisfactory.

Stephen devotes each of his three volumes mainly to one of the three chief advocates of utilitarian ethics—*Jeremy Bentham*, *James Mill*, and *John Stuart Mill*.

In the first volume he treats of *Bentham*, who undertook to reform the administration of law, regarding this legal work as the application of what he considered the fundamental principle of ethics, *The greatest happiness of the greatest number*. This principle, though previously enunciated by Beccaria, an Italian jurist, was first consistently applied by Bentham to the solution of ethical problems. Bentham was a thorough-going utilitarian.

In his second volume Stephen gives a clear view of the work of *James Mill*, who gave to utilitarianism a broader scope, and entitled it to be considered a school of ethics. Stephen shows how Mill applied the prin-

ciple of utility to the practical questions which agitated society in the early part of the nineteenth century; and he adds to the interest by giving an account of the criticisms of his opponents.

In the third volume Stephen treats of the work of *John Stuart Mill*, who by his general ability, his power of clear statement, and especially by regarding the quality of pleasure, gained a wider acceptance of utilitarian ethics.

If Mill, by granting moral value apart from utility, or the consequences of conduct, yielded so much to the opposite school of intuitionism, that utilitarianism could no longer be considered the exclusive school of ethics, he simply and honestly advanced the cause of truth. It still holds true, however, that in practical affairs, as in legislation, where the law-makers are morally bound to vote for the true interests of the people, the consequences are the chief, if not the only guide. In everyday life utilitarianism still remains, for the most part, the ethics of the people. It is, therefore, preposterous to say that utilitarianism is dead. It is not likely to die; but it is not all of ethics. Other systems supplement it and supply the guide in its failing case, where the consequences can not be computed.

In giving attention to the criticisms of such able opponents as Carlyle, Maurice, and Newman, Stephen has added greatly to the interest of his work, which is to be regarded as a fitting close to the labors of an industrious life.


3. *International Journal of Ethics*.—Of all the means of stimulating ethical investigation, and of raising the standard of morality, whether by addresses, sermons,

ethical chairs in colleges, books, or periodicals, perhaps none exceed in efficiency the *International Journal of Ethics*, published in Philadelphia, eleven volumes of which are now complete. It has an editorial staff composed of able men of various nationalities, and in addition contributors of high attainments and of national or even world-wide reputation.

The *Journal* does its work, not by reaching the masses directly, but by influencing thinkers who reach the people. The articles deal with a wide range of subjects, philosophical, practical, critical, and historical, relating to ethical questions of living interest. These articles possess a permanent value. The volumes bound make a valuable addition to any ethical library.

The *Journal* is tolerant of opinion, and gives free scope to independent thinkers in the discussion of their themes. One thing is apparent—however good men may differ in theological opinions, or even in their theories of ethics, they are in accord in regard to practical morality, and can co-operate in their endeavor to lift humanity to a higher plane of life.

The outcome of the whole investigation is this: Though it is true that no one would endeavor to be worthy or useful, unless he found satisfaction in the endeavor, yet worthiness and usefulness should be the direct aim; satisfaction will follow as a natural consequence, and will be all the more enjoyable because unsought. If self-examination should reveal unworthiness of character or unrighteousness of life, then a transformation of character and a reformation of life can be effected by forethought, right aims, and right efforts—by ceasing to do evil and learning to do well.



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
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